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Divine Causality and Human Free Choice

*Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and
the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited*

By

R.J. Matava



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Cover illustration: Detail of 'The Creation of Adam' on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, Vatican City. Fresco by Michelangelo, 1511–1512.

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D.A.
A.S. *B.A.*
I.R. *J.P.*
G.J.

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Contents

Acknowledgements IX

Abbreviations XII

Prologue 1

- 1 Framing the Question 1
- 2 The Aim and Scope of this Study 7
- 3 Rationale 10
- 4 The Form of this Study 13

1 An Historical Introduction to the Controversy *de Auxiliis* 16

- 1 The First Period: Open Scholarly Engagement (1582–1594) 18
- 2 The Second Period: Papal Intervention and the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* (1594–1607) 31
- 3 Resurgences 34

2 Domingo Báñez on Divine Causality and Human Free Choice 37

- 1 Divine Art: The Idea of Physical Premotion 37
- 2 Báñez on Free Choice 73
- 3 Human Freedom, Physical Premotion and Sin 88
- 4 Conclusion 99

3 Domingo Báñez's Critique of Molina 102

- 1 Molina's Teaching on Free Choice, Divine Causality and Providence 103
 - 2 A Survey and Condensation of Báñez's Critique of Molinism 116
 - 3 Báñez's Critique of Molina's Doctrine of Free Choice and Divine Causality 120
 - 4 Báñez's Critique of Middle Knowledge 130
- Appendix: Do the Limitations of Correspondence-Type Truth Theories Undermine the Grounding Objection? 156

4 Luis de Molina's Critique of Báñez 169

- 1 The Historical Context of Molina's Condemnation of Báñez 170
- 2 The Central Issue of Dispute: Báñez's View on the Efficacy of Divine Causality 171
- 3 Three Problematic Outworkings of Báñez's View on the Efficacy of Divine Causality 174

4	The Root of the Problem: God Predetermines All Human Actions	188
5	Conclusion	210
5	Physical Premotion or Aristotelian Premotion? The Proposal of Bernard Lonergan	213
1	Lonergan's Critique of Báñez	215
2	Lonergan's Interpretation of Aquinas	223
3	A Constructive Critique of Lonergan's Interpretation	229
4	Conclusion	239
6	Creation, Causal Priority and Human Freedom: Revisiting Thomas Aquinas	242
1	The Thesis that Aquinas Understands God's Motion of the Human Will as an Exercise of God's Creative Causality	243
2	A Textual Argument for Understanding God's Motion of the Human Will as an Exercise of His Creative Causality	248
3	Aquinas on the Status of God's Creative Action: An Exposition of <i>ST I</i> q. 45 a. 3	263
4	Conclusion	275
7	God Creates Human Free Choices: An Explanation and Defense	277
1	Literary Origins of the View	278
2	What it Means to Say Human Acts of Free Choice are Created by God	282
3	Five Potential Objections Briefly Considered	294
4	A Suarezian Objection and Counterproposal: Divine Concurrence Revisited	306
5	Conclusion	320
	Epilogue	322
	Select Bibliography	325
	Index	347

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1 The microforms of both works were produced at the Slangenburgh Abby in Doetinchem, the Netherlands.

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Deo gratias.

Feast of St. Augustine

28 August 2015

Washington, DC

Abbreviations

ACPQ	<i>American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly</i>
CE	<i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i> (1907–1911 ed.)
Com. inéd. a la I–II	Domingo Báñez, <i>Comentarios inéditos a la prima secundae de Santo Tomás</i> , ed. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P., all volumes*
De aux.	Diego Alvarez, <i>De auxiliis divinæ gratiæ et humani arbitrii viribus</i> (Cologne: Antonium Boetzerum, 1622)
DM	Francisco Suárez, <i>Disputationes metaphysicæ</i>
DS	Henricus Denzinger & Adolfus Schönmetzer, S.J., <i>Enchiridion symbolorum</i> (36th ed., 1976)
DTC	A. Vacant, E. Mangenot & É. Amann, <i>Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique</i>
NCE	<i>New Catholic Encyclopedia</i> (2nd ed., 2003)
NV	<i>Nova et Vetera</i> (English ed.)
PACPA	<i>Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association</i>
QDP	St. Thomas Aquinas, <i>Quæstiones disputatæ de potentia Dei</i>
QDV	St. Thomas Aquinas, <i>Quæstiones disputatæ de veritate</i>
Sch. com. in ST I	Domingo Báñez, <i>Scholastica commentaria in Primam partem Angelici doctoris S. Thomæ usque ad LXIII quæstionem</i> (Douai: Petrus Borremanus, 1614)
SCG	St. Thomas Aquinas, <i>Summa contra gentiles</i>
SH Mai.	Luis de Molina, <i>Summa Haeresium Maior</i> , in <i>Neue Molinaschriften</i> , ed. Friedrich Stegmüller (1935)
SH Min.	Luis de Molina, <i>Summa Haeresium Minor</i> , in <i>Neue Molinaschriften</i> , ed. Friedrich Stegmüller (1935)
SSS	St. Thomas Aquinas, <i>Scriptum super libros sententiarum</i>
ST	St. Thomas Aquinas, <i>Summa theologiae</i>

* This work spans three volumes. Volume 1 (published in 1942) covers qq. 1–18, vol. 2 (published in 1944) covers qq. 71–89, and vol. 3 (published in 1948) covers qq. 109–114. I will not refer to the Beltrán de Heredia volume but instead to the relevant question and article from the *ST* when citing a passage from this source.

Prologue

1 Framing the Question

Reflection upon the canon of sacred Scripture, the faith of the Church and experience raises a difficult set of questions about the relationship between God and human freedom: How is it the case that human persons act freely and that God creates everything that exists, infallibly directing every happening in the universe?¹ If God causes my free choosing, how can that choice be up to me? Yet how can my choice be at all if God does not cause it? Perhaps God causes my free choosing only in an indirect or general way. But if God causes my choice like that, how does my choosing not elude the universal scope of his providential governance? More vexingly, how can sin be understood in light of God's causation of human free choices? These questions are of central importance for understanding many core Christian doctrines, such as those concerning grace, predestination, personal vocation, justification and merit.² As Fergus Kerr observes, the question of divine-human cooperation is "the problem central in all Western theology."³ Such questions as the above have been at the heart of some of the most important theological debates for the

-
- 1 On the one hand, there are abundant scriptural affirmations of divine sovereignty. For example, God is the creator of all that is (Gn 1.1; Jn 1.1–3; Col 1.16–17); thus, he must be the creator of free choices insofar as they exist. He exercises control even over human hearts, which he directs like the waters of a stream (Prov 21.1). The accomplishment of human actions is attributed to God (Is 26.12; Eph 2.10; Phil 2.13), apart from whom human persons can do nothing (Jn 15.5). Asserting the priority of grace and the gratuity of election, St. Paul teaches that salvation depends not upon human activity, but upon divine mercy. Human persons are portrayed as clay in the hands of the divine potter who "has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills" (Rom 9.18). On the other hand, Scripture clearly affirms that human persons can make free choices. For example, in Deuteronomy, God exhorts the Israelites to choose life by keeping the commandments (30.19) and Ben Sira echoes—perhaps even interprets—this passage with his robust affirmation of free choice (Sir 15.11–20). Both of these passages connect the notion of free choice to covenant, which is an architectonic theme of the entire scriptural narrative: it would seem that the very notion of covenant assumes the ability to freely accept or reject God's offer. For a useful overview of the biblical teaching, see Mark John Farrelly, *Predestination, Grace and Free Will* (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1964), 38–70.
 - 2 Moreover, questions such as the above also underlie how one thinks about other important theological issues such as scriptural inspiration, the saving human actions of Jesus and ministerial/sacramental action.
 - 3 Kerr, *After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 142.

last millennium and a half, and indeed underlie “the most intractable division in the history of Western Christianity.”⁴

In the early fifth century, the question of the relationship between divine causality and human free choice was the central issue underlying Augustine’s (354–430) debate with Pelagius (c. 354–419), and it also drove the subsequent controversy over the ‘Massilian’ or ‘semi-Pelagian’ position of John Cassian (c. 360–435) Faustus of Riez (c. 405–90), Vincent of Lérins (d. c. 434–50) and others.⁵ The question of divine causality and human free choice was also implicit in the ninth-century predestination controversy between Gottschalk of Orbais (c. 800–68), John Scotus Eriugena (c. 800–77) and Hincmar of Reims (806–82), and it is relevant to several later medieval disputes, such as those over Peter Abelard’s (1079–1142) teaching on grace and free will, Peter of Auriol’s (c. 1280–1322) teaching on the truth of future contingent propositions and the related controversy over future contingents between Peter de Rivo (Peter van den Becken, c. 1420–1500) and Henry de Zomerren (c. 1419–72).⁶

4 Kerr, 148.

5 Paul’s teaching on grace (especially in the Epistle to the Romans) and Augustine’s interpretation of that teaching, developed against the Pelagian position, are *the* foundational sources of all the later controversies on divine causality and human free choice. It is almost impossible to overestimate Augustine’s influence over the subsequent Western theological tradition on topics concerning grace and the extent to which positions in later controversies would be (correctly or incorrectly) aligned with that of Augustine or Pelagius. In respect to the Pelagian controversy, there is a noticeable shift between Augustine’s early treatments of free choice and his position after the encounter with Pelagius. Augustine’s early position is reflected in *On Free Choice of the Will*, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993). His later position can be found in several anti-Pelagian works (e.g., *On Grace and Free Will*, *On Rebuke and Grace*, *On Predestination of the Saints*), but one of the best presentations of it can be found in Augustine’s earlier *Letter to Simplician* (396/7). This shows that the main features of Augustine’s mature teaching on grace were actually worked out prior to and independently from the Pelagian controversy. Relevant sections of the *Letter to Simplician* are included in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, trans. John H.S. Burleigh, Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), 376–406. There is debate concerning the interpretation of the shift in Augustine’s thought on grace and free will: Did Augustine abandon his earlier view or merely develop and/or emphasize a different aspect of it? For one discussion of this, see Gerald Bonner, *Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine’s Teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom* (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2006). On ‘Semi-Pelagianism’ see for example, Irena Backus and Aza Goudriaan, “‘Semipelagianism’: The Origins of the Term and its Passage into the History of Heresy,” *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 65, no. 1 (2014): 25–46.

6 On the ninth-century predestination controversy, see *Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy: Texts Translated from the Latin*, trans., ed. Francis X. Gumerlock and Victor Genke, Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation, no. 47, ed. Roland J. Teske S.J.

Behind this latter debate were differences between William of Ockham's (c. 1285–1347) position on grace and free will and the different, though arguably more Augustinian, positions of such earlier thinkers as Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) and John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308).⁷ This division between nominalist and Augustinian perspectives on divine and human agency was also evident in the opposition between the teaching of Ockham's followers, Robert Holcot (c. 1290–1349) and Gabriel Biel (c. 1425–95), and those defending a more strongly Augustinian position, such as Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290–1349) and Johann von Staupitz (c. 1460–1524).⁸

The debates of the late Middle Ages over divine causality and human free choice anticipated the grace controversies of the Protestant Reformation. Positions like those of Holcot, Hus, Biel and Wycliffe were developed with greater influence in the early sixteenth century by Luther (1483–1546) and Calvin (1509–64). In his debate with Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536), Luther identified the question of divine causality and human free choice as the single most foundational difference between his position and that of the

(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010). See also John Scotus Eriugena, *Treatise on Divine Predestination*, trans. Mary Brennan, Notre Dame Texts in Medieval Culture, no. 5, ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 1998).

7 See Heiko Oberman, *Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought Illustrated by Key Documents* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 123–41.

8 See the texts collected in Oberman, 142–203. Other important representatives of a medieval Augustinianism that anticipated the position of the Protestant Reformers on grace and free will were John Wyclif (1320–84) and his follower Jan Hus (1369–1415). It should be noted, however, that the very description of positions as 'Augustinian' or not becomes increasingly fraught with difficulty the further removed that position is from the actual Pelagian controversy. Sometimes 'Augustinian' positions differed from each other in important ways. For instance, to what extent is there alignment between the positions of Aquinas and Scotus, or between either of their positions, and those of Wycliffe or von Staupitz? The limits of the valid 'nominalist/Augustinian' distinction must be recognized—it is an oversimplification to assume that positions in post-medieval debates (such as the Controversy *de Auxiliis*) necessarily fall neatly to one side or the other, or to assume that defenders of free choice are simply nominalist and not Augustinian, while defenders of the divine initiative are Augustinian (that very schematization betrays the tacit and questionable assumption that grace and human free will stand in a competitive relationship). Scotus was an important influence on Molina's position and both sides in the Controversy *de Auxiliis* claimed the authority of Augustine, arguing over his proper interpretation. Note that the broad characterization of positions here as 'Augustinian' is meant to indicate a certain affinity those positions have with Augustine's (anti-Pelagian) teachings on grace. This should be distinguished from the narrower use of 'Augustinianism' to designate the 17th c. position of the Augustinian order on the *de Auxiliis* question.

Catholic Church.⁹ Divine causality and human free choice was also the subject of Calvin's debate with Albert Pighius (c. 1490–1542).¹⁰ Moreover, while according to Luther's teaching on biblical perspicuity a unified doctrine of grace and free will should have been (preeminently) evident from Scripture, there was anything but consensus on the matter during the post-Reformation period.¹¹ The relationship between divine action and human free choice was at the heart of a number of parallel post-Reformation-era disputes, including the Remonstrant Controversy and Cambridge free will debates within Calvinism, the Synergist Controversy within Lutheranism, and within Catholicism, the disputes over Baianism and Jansenism, as well as the infamous Controversy

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- 9 For Luther's debate with Erasmus, see the following volume, which contains Rupp's translation of Erasmus's *Diatribes* and Watson's translation of Luther's *De servo: Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, trans., ed., E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson, Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), esp. 122, 128, 137–38. Luther's one substantive commendation of Erasmus is that Erasmus recognized the fundamentality of Luther's position on divine causality and human free choice (333).
- 10 On Calvin's debate with Pighius, see Calvin, *The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human Choice against Pighius*, trans. G.I. Davies, ed. A.N.S. Lane, Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996).
- 11 As Alan Clifford suggests, this historical fact calls into question the plausibility of Luther's doctrine of perspicuity. See Alan C. Clifford, *Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology 1640–1790* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 142. One could of course maintain that one's own interpretation is the perspicuous doctrine of Scripture and that all opposing views are simply wrong. But the fact of such fundamental disagreement so soon on the heels of the Protestant Reformation at least suggests that the doctrine of grace and free will may not be as perspicuous as Luther supposed. On perspicuity, see Luther, 110–111, cf. 112, 115, 158ff., 224, 242, 244, 334 (all references in this note are to the Watson translation of the *De Servo*). However, for Luther, *Sir 15.14ff.* is obscure and even its status as the inspired word of God is dubious (176, 182). The *De servo* is commonly acknowledged to be Luther's greatest work and it is there (of all places) that Luther develops the doctrine of biblical perspicuity on which his view of scriptural authority (*Sola Scriptura*) hinges. This is worth noting because of the centrality of *Sola Scriptura* to Luther's overall position: Whatever disagreements may be identified between Luther's position and that of the Catholic Church, the two most foundational concern (1) the relationship between divine action and human freedom, and (2) revelation and authority. Of these, it would seem that the former had priority for Luther insofar as it set the context for the latter. Thus, while the Reformation and Post-Reformation grace/free will controversies are important in their own right, they also indirectly force questions of virtually equal importance concerning revelation, hermeneutics and ecclesial authority.

de Auxiliis.¹² Of all these quarrels, it was perhaps the Controversy *de Auxiliis* that brought the question of divine causality and human free choice most clearly to the fore.

The Controversy *de Auxiliis* (1582–1607) spanned a quarter of a century during the tumultuous years between the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648).¹³ The controversy takes its name from the fact that it concerned the nature of God's *auxilium* or helping (i.e. 'actual') grace. Unresolved questions about human cooperation in justification that were occasioned by the Protestant Reformation were the main impetus for the disagreement. Specifically, the controversy concerned whether God's *auxilium* was intrinsically and infallibly efficacious, or whether its efficacy was determined by the free response of the human recipient. The chief positions in the controversy were those of the Dominican and Jesuit schools represented respectively by Domingo Báñez (1528–1604), Francisco Zumel (d. 1607), Diego Alvarez (c. 1550–1631) and Thomas de Lemos (1555–1629) on the one hand; and Luis de Molina (1535–1600), Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), Gabriel Vasquez (c. 1549–1604) and Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) on the other. There were also other significant participants than these, and the debate was not solely between members of the Dominican and Jesuit orders. Whether during the controversy or in its aftermath, Augustinians, Carmelites and Hieronymites, for example, all weighed in on the matters of dispute. Zumel himself was not a Dominican, but a Mercedarian.

The Controversy *de Auxiliis* was terminated by the Holy See without any definitive resolution four centuries ago and it remains officially unresolved to this day. However, while the Controversy *de Auxiliis* ended without any final resolution, it did at least force a precise identification of the neuralgic issues underlying not only Catholic/Protestant disagreements on grace, but also centuries of related dispute.

In addition to the data of sacred Scripture and reflection upon experience, the expanding corpus of magisterial doctrine that has developed over the last

12 On these debates, see for example, William Placher, *The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996), 146–63; cf. 88–107; Kathryn Tanner, *God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1988), 141–52. See also Luther D. Peterson, "Synergist Controversy" in *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation*, Hans J. Hillerbrand, ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 4:133–35, Nigel S. Voak, "English Molinism in the Late 1590s: Richard Hooker on Free Will, Predestination, and Divine Foreknowledge," *Journal of Theological Studies* 60, no. 1 (2009): 130–77.

13 On the council, see Hubert Jedin, *History of the Council of Trent* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1957).

fifteen centuries within the Catholic tradition upholds the analogy of faith between God's sovereign, provident governance and the reality of human free choice.¹⁴ Today, this body of teaching provides additional data for theological reflection.¹⁵ However, unlike other central mysteries of the Christian faith that are equally difficult to understand, such as the Trinity and Incarnation, the magisterial teaching on the relationship between divine action and human free choice is hardly comparable. The Magisterium has proposed no definitive positive teaching on the precise relationship between divine causality and human free choice. Rather, the Magisterium has set the bounds for a consideration of

14 For the concept of the analogy of faith, see CCC 114. For the original use of the expression ἡ ἀναλογία τῆς πίστεως, see Rom 12.9.

15 I will be writing from a Roman Catholic theological perspective, and so my use of the terms "Church," and "Magisterium" refer to the Catholic Church and her official teaching body. Some representative loci of Church teaching on free choice, grace and surrounding issues include the Sixteenth Council of Carthage (418), which dealt with Pelagianism (DS §§222–230); the *Indiculus* (c. 435–42), combating semi-Pelagianism (DS §§238–49); the Second Council of Orange (529) which settled the semi-Pelagian controversy (DS §§370–97); Pope Hadrian I's letter to the bishops of Spain *Institutio universalis* (c. 785–791) condemning predestination to evil (DS §596); the rival councils of Quiersy (853) and Valence (855), which were both occasioned by Gottschalk of Orbais's teaching on twofold predestination (DS §§621–24, 625–33), as well as the two Councils of Toul (859–60) which attempted to settle the tension between the teachings of Quiersy and Valence by a pastoral harmonization of those teachings rather than by a real resolution of the underlying issues; the Council of Sens (c. 1140) condemning certain views of Peter Abelard, including several on grace and freewill (see DS §§721–39); Pope Sixtus IV's *Ad Christi vicarii* (1474), condemning certain of Peter of Auriol's views on the truth-value of future contingent propositions (DS §§1391–96); Pope Leo X's bull, *Exsurge Domine* (1520) condemning certain views of Luther (DS §§1481–82, 1486); The Sixth Session of Trent (1547), on justification (§1520–83); Pope Pius V's bull, *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* (1567), condemning certain views of Michael de Bay (for example, DS §§1925, 1927, 1929, 1939, 1941, 1946, 1966); Pope Paul V's formula (1607) for terminating the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, (DS §§1997); Pope Innocent X's bull, *Cum occasione* (1653) condemning Jansenism (DS §2001–07), and his decree of 1654 declaring false the view that Paul V had prepared but never promulgated a condemnation of Molina (DS §2008); Pope Clement XI's bull, *Unigenitus Dei Filius* (1713) condemning certain views of the Jansenist, Pasquier Quesnel (see for example DS §§2401, 2410, 2438–39); Pope Clement XII's bull, *Apostolicae providentiae officio* (1733) affirming the freedom to teach, essentially, the Dominican point of view in questions related to the Controversy *de Auxiliis* even after the condemnation of Quesnel, whose view was in some respects similar (DS 2509–10); and Pope Benedict XIV's bull, *Dum praeterito* (1748), again affirming the freedom to teach in questions *de auxiliis* (DS §2564–65).

the issue by definitively ruling certain positions out and by its positive teachings on justification, original sin, predestination and God's universal salvific will. The magisterial intervention on the precise question of divine *auxilium* and human free choice was famously *not* to decide it, but simply to reassert the parameters of discussion and to affirm the freedom of all sides in holding their (mutually contradictory) views.

There was prudence in this decision: At the time of the original *de Auxiliis* disputes, the Church lacked the theological resources to deal decisively with the question of how human free choices depend upon God. She had the raw materials, chiefly in the form of Aquinas's insights into divine transcendence and the doctrine of creation, but these were not developed in sophisticated enough a way or sufficiently distinguished from competing interpretations to allow for a definitive resolution of the controversy. However, as I will argue in the final chapter of this study, we have today the resources to deal decisively with the question *de Auxiliis*. And for several reasons, it must be dealt with.

A failure to deal definitively with the *de Auxiliis* question blocks substantive ecumenical progress and so the attainment of the ecclesial unity that Jesus desired (Jn 17). It also stymies the development of an adequate response to modern philosophies that assert an antinomy between God and human freedom. Moreover, a failure to resolve the *de Auxiliis* question forestalls the articulation of a unified view on the relationship between nature and grace, one of the greatest theological controversies of the twentieth century. Beyond this, a failure to deal with the *de Auxiliis* question hinders the development of an eschatology which makes better sense of the canon of Scripture as a whole than either universalism or limited atonement do. Finally, a failure to settle the *de Auxiliis* question hinders the development of a spirituality richly informed by a doctrine of grace which avoids lapsing, in practical terms, into either a kind of tacit Pelagianism or a tacit quietism or theological fatalism. It is impossible to deal with any of these important matters (as well as many others) without an adequate conceptual framework for thinking about the relationship of divine causality and human free choice.

2 The Aim and Scope of this Study

The aim of this study is not to deal directly with any of the wider issues related to the *de Auxiliis* problematic identified in the preceding paragraph, although I hope the results of this investigation will help to develop our understanding of those issues. Rather, the more limited aim of this study is to undertake

an historical investigation of select primary sources of the Controversy *de Auxiliis*.¹⁶ My ultimate intention, however, is not only to exposit the chosen historical texts, but also to engage with them critically and synchronically. The present work, then, is best understood as an exercise in historically informed philosophical theology. In particular, this work will focus on the presently less-studied side of the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, Domingo Báñez, O.P. and the theory of physical premotion that he, along with others, taught and developed.¹⁷

Domingo Báñez, a Dominican friar of Basque origin, was without question one of the most important exponents of the doctrine of physical premotion during the latter half of the sixteenth and dawn of the seventeenth centuries. Báñez was one of the ablest theologians of his day. In addition to serving as a spiritual director to St. Theresa of Avila, Báñez occupied the prestigious first chair of theology at the University of Salamanca from 1581 to 1599. It was during that time, in 1584, that Báñez published his commentary on the first sixty-four questions of the *Prima pars* of St. Thomas's *Summa theologiae*. In the course of that commentary, Báñez covered such topics as divine knowledge and will (qq. 14, 19), providence (q. 23), and predestination (q. 24). Later in 1588, Báñez published his commentary on the remaining questions of the *Prima pars* (qq. 65–119), covering other topics directly relevant to the grace controversy, such as the human will (qq. 82–83) and divine governance (qq. 103–105).¹⁸ It was

16 Few of these texts have ever been translated into English. Parts of some have been translated into other languages.

17 For a useful overview of Báñez's life and work, see José Ángel García Cuadrado, *Domingo Báñez (1528–1604): introducción a su obra filosófica y teológica*, Cuadernos de Anuario filosófico, Serie de filosofía española, no. 13 (Navarre, ES: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1999). See also Jacobus Quetif and Jacobus Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum recensiti*, reprinted in the Burt Franklin Bibliographical and Reference Series, no. 16 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1954), 11.1:352–53; W.J. Hill, "Báñez and Bañezianism," in *NCE* 2:49–51; John R. Volz, "Bañez, Domingo," in *CE* 2:247–49; and P. Mandonnet, "Báñez, Dominique," in *DTC* 2–1:140–145. Friedrich Stegmüller provides an illuminating account of the context within which Báñez's thought on matters *de auxiliis* developed: See his detailed "Introducción," in *Francisco de Vitoria y la doctrina de la gracia en la escuela salmantina* (Barcelona: Biblioteca Balmes, 1934), 1–163.

18 Later editions combined both these volumes. This study makes use of the 1614 Douai edition of the *Scholastica commentaria* (published by Petrus Borremanus), as this is the most up-to-date complete version. A partial, non-critical, modern edition of the *Scholastica commentaria* was assembled under the editorship of Luis Urbano, O.P. and published in Madrid, 1934 as part of the *Biblioteca de Tomistas Españoles* series. The Urbano edition was to span four volumes, but production was halted due to outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. As Llamzon notes, during the war, much of the Urbano edition, including the existing plates, was destroyed. See Benjamin S. Llamzon, "Introduction" in Báñez, *The Primacy*

also during his tenure at Salamanca that Báñez composed (or coauthored) his works on grace, most notably the posthumously published commentary on Questions 109–114 of the *Prima secundae*; the *Tractatus*, a positive synopsis of his view (also published posthumously); and the *Apologia*, an invective against the view put forth by Molina and Suárez.

Báñez was noted for his uncompromising commitment to what I shall call ‘classical Thomism’—the study of Aquinas in the commentatorial tradition which represented the dominant theological paradigm of (Catholic) early-modern and neo-scholasticism. According to classical Thomism, the theory of physical premotion is, as Báñez maintained, nothing more than a strict interpretation of Aquinas’s teaching on the divine motion of the human will. On this view, physical premotion is merely a later (and perhaps more precise) formulation of Thomas’s original teaching on divine *auxilium*—a formulation Thomas himself would recognize and endorse, were he confronted with the questions of the sixteenth century.¹⁹

Physical premotion was advanced by Báñez as an account of what *Deus operatur in omni operante* (*ST* I q. 105 a. 5) means: God operates in all creaturely agents—including free creaturely agents—by *moving* them to act. According to Báñez’s theory of physical premotion, God determinately and indefectibly moves the creaturely free will from a state of potency to a state of act by a created motion that is distinct from and naturally antecedent to the creature’s own free act. It is this *motio*, or changing, which is called a ‘physical premotion’. The ‘pre-’ signifies that the changing being referred to is antecedent (though only by an antecedence of nature, not time) to the creaturely self-motion (the human act of free choice) which is God’s effect. The motion is called ‘physical’ because it is an influx of God’s *efficient* causality as opposed to an instance

of Existence in Thomas Aquinas, trans. Benjamin S. Llamzon (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), 108 n. 2. In 1964, a reprint of this part of Báñez’s commentary on the *Prima pars* was produced by the William E. Brown Reprint Library at the direction of the Dominicans of Dubuque, IA.

19 As the Jesuits were keen to point out (and the Dominicans comfortably admitted), Aquinas nowhere uses the term ‘*praemotio physica*’, which was a neologism coined by Thomas’s later commentators. Dummermuth, an advocate of physical premotion, traces the lineage of the theory to some of Aquinas’s earliest commentators. See Ch. 4 of his *Thomas et doctrina praemotionalis physicae seu responsio ad R.P. Schneemann S.J. aliosque doctrinae scholae Thomisticae impugnatores* (Paris: Ephemeridis L’année Dominicaine, 1886), 427–558. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, “Premotion physique,” in *DTC* vol. 13:1:34–35, 51–56; T.C. O’Brien, “Premotion, Physical,” in *NCE* vol. 11:669.

of his final or formal causality.²⁰ In short, the physical premotion is a causal impulse from God, an inflow of divine efficient causality that is passively received into the human will, stimulating the will to actively elicit its own free operation.

3 Rationale

What is the rationale for limiting the principal focus of this study to Báñez and the theory of physical premotion? Given the external limitations on the scope of a project such as this, it seemed wise to focus attention on Báñez and physical premotion because of the comparative neglect this side of the debate has experienced over the last half century, particularly amidst a resurgence of interest in Molinism stemming from Alvin Plantinga's reinvention of that theory during the 1970s as an aspect of his free will defense to the problem of evil. Moreover, very recently there have been some indications of renewed support for physical premotion stemming from of a renewal of interest in classical Thomism by a younger generation of Catholic scholars influenced perhaps by the legacy of John Paul II and particularly his encyclicals, *Veritatis splendor* and *Fides et ratio*.²¹ Despite this small but notable renewal of support for the classical Thomist position, however, recent decades have not seen any substantive first-hand engagement with Báñez's writings on divine causality and human free choice. One likely reason for Báñez's neglect is simply that many of his

20 For a good introduction to the idea of physical premotion, see T.C. O'Brien, "Premotion, Physical" and "Predetermination." See also Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "Premotion physique." O'Brien mentions, citing Serry's polemical *Historiae*, that the term 'physical premotion' was foisted upon the Dominicans during the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. Whether the term was foisted upon the Dominicans or not, one finds it throughout Báñez's work and I have not seen any indication that Báñez used it with reluctance.

21 Thomas Osborne has recently published an article supporting physical premotion and arguing that its contemporary neglect is unwarranted. See Osborne, "Thomist Premotion and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion," *NV* 4, no. 3 (2006): 607–631. Steven A. Long has also defended the theory in recent literature. See Long, "Providence, Freedom and Natural Law," *NV* 4 no. 3 (2006): 557–606; cf. "Natural Law or Autonomous Practical Reason: Problems for the New Natural Law Theory," in *St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives*, eds. John Goyette, Mark S. Latkovic and Richard S. Myers (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2004), 178–184. There has also been at least one recent thesis devoted to the topic, written at least two years prior to the aforementioned articles. See Harold Smith Reeves, "*Praemotio Physica* and the Problem of Human Freedom" (Ph.L. thesis, Catholic University of America, 2002).

works on grace and freedom were not available in print until the mid to late mid-twentieth century,²² when, in the Catholic world, interest in scholastic theology began to rapidly decline. But another factor surely contributing to Báñez's neglect among Anglophone scholars is that none of his works have been translated from the original Latin, with the exception of his commentary on one article of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae*.²³ In light of these circumstances, a study such as the present one is warranted in order to fill a gap in existing scholarship.

One further reason Báñez's position has received such little attention in recent literature is perhaps due to the force of the objections that have been leveled against it by neo-Molinists and other libertarians. But however compelling the objections to the positive features of Báñez's account may be, they do not necessarily discredit the force of his critique of Molinism or the truth of the principal underlying convictions that motivate his position. In fact, one reason for revisiting Báñez is that contemporary scholars without any apparent attachment to the theory of physical premotion have advanced powerful and potentially decisive arguments against the possibility of middle knowledge, thus calling into question a chief aspect of what has, historically, been the chief alternative to physical premotion.²⁴ Moreover, a rudimentary form of at least one of these contemporary anti-Molinist arguments was formulated

22 Between 1942 and 1948 the Spanish Dominican, Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, compiled Báñez's commentaries on qq. 1–18, 79–81, and 109–114 of the *Prima secundae*. See his, *Com. inéd. a la 1–11*, vol. 1: *De fine ultimo et de actibus humanis* (Salamanca: CSIC, 1942); vol. 2: *De vitiis et peccatis* (Salamanca: CSIC, 1944); and vol. 3 *De gratia Dei* (Salamanca: CSIC, 1948). The third volume, on qq. 109–114, includes the *Tractatus* as an appendix to the commentary. Two decades later, Beltrán de Heredia published an indispensable compilation of other (untranslated) Bañezian documents from the grace controversy, including the *Apología*. See his: *Domíngó Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia: textos y documentos* (Madrid: CSIC, 1968).

23 This is Benjamin Llamzon's translation of *ST* I q. 3 a. 4, cited above as, *The Primacy of Existence*. See Llamzon's brief but useful introduction to the volume that connects Báñez's stance on the being/essence distinction with his position in the Controversy de *Auxiliis* (see esp. 9–10).

24 See, for example, Robert Adams's classic article, "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14 no. 2 (1977): 109–17. See also the excellent discussion by William Hasker, *God, Time, and Knowledge* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 29–52. There has been a good deal of philosophical debate over middle knowledge subsequent to Adams's article. In addition to the works cited in Ch. 3.1, below, see for example, the collection of essays, *Middle Knowledge: Theory and Applications* eds. William Hasker, David Basinger, and Eef Dekker (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2000).

already in the sixteenth century by Báñez and his confreres. Thus, the primary sources of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* have something to offer the contemporary debate, at the very least insofar as they help to establish the real state of the question.

As mentioned above, Báñez saw himself as an interpreter who departed “not so much as a finger-nail’s breadth, even in lesser things” from the teaching of Aquinas.²⁵ However, shifting away from the commentatorial hermeneutic of classical Thomism toward a more historical and intellectually independent reading of Aquinas, several twentieth-century scholars have either argued or implied that St. Thomas saw a way through the debate between Báñez and Molina that neither Báñez nor Molina themselves saw.²⁶ Two of the earliest and most noteworthy examples are Gerard Smith’s 1936 dissertation, *Freedom in Molina*²⁷ and Bernard Lonergan’s landmark study, *Gratia Operans*, first

25 According to Volz, 248, the words are Báñez’s. I have not been able to locate the original quote.

26 In addition to Smith and Lonergan, mentioned below, such authors (and representative examples of their work) include Antonin-Gilbert Sertillanges, O.P., *S. Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1925), 1:255–68; Germain Grisez, *God? A Philosophical Preface to Faith* (formerly titled: *Beyond the New Theism*) (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005), 274–85; Kathryn Tanner, *God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988)—see in particular her discussion of the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, 141–52; James Ross, “Creation II,” in *The Existence and Nature of God*, ed. Alfred Freddoso (Notre Dame: UND Press, 1984), 115–141; Hugh McCann, “Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will,” *Faith and Philosophy* 12 no. 4 (1995): 582–598; Harm J.M.J. Goris, *Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will* (Utrecht: Peeters, 1996); W. Matthews Grant, “Aquinas Among the Libertarians and Compatibilists: Breaking the Logic of Theological Determinism,” *PACPA* 75 (2001): 221–235; see also Part Two of his “Aquinas and the Free Will Defense” (Ph.D. diss. Fordham University, 2002). For further coverage of these and other authors, see the final part of Ch. 1 as well as Ch. 7.

27 Gerard Smith, S.J., *Freedom in Molina* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1966). Smith completed his Ph.D. at the Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies at the University of Toronto in 1936. However, as Thaddeus Birch records, the conclusion of Smith’s dissertation was so controversial at the time that Jesuit censors did not allow the dissertation to be published till thirty years later. See Thaddeus J. Burch “Smith, Gerard,” in *American National Biography Online*, October 2008 update, accessed 18 January 2010, <<http://www.anb.org/articles/o8/o8-02367.html?a=1&n=smith%2C%20gerard&ia=-at&ib=-bib&d=10&ss=0&q=1>>. Smith’s controversial conclusion was that in denying God-caused freedom, Molina’s position did not differ fundamentally from Luther’s, which denied freedom altogether (225). For a view along similar lines and indebted to Smith’s then-unpublished dissertation, see Anton C. Pegis, “Molina and Human Liberty,” in *Jesuit*

published in 1941–42.²⁸ In light of these alternative readings of Aquinas and the objections that have been raised against the theory of physical premotion, it seems necessary to revisit Báñez's position in light of his own writings.

4 The Form of this Study

The following investigation comprises seven chapters.

In Chapter One I set forth a brief historical introduction to the Controversy *de auxiliis*. Providing historical context for the interpretation and analysis of primary sources from the controversy is an important preliminary exercise because it has ceased to occupy much attention in mainstream contemporary theology. The aim of this first chapter is to provide a basic orientation to the Controversy *de Auxiliis* for scholars who may be unfamiliar with it.

In Chapter Two, I explain Báñez's position on the divine causation of human free choices. Central to the first part of this chapter is the discussion of the ontological status of physical premotion. I then unpack Báñez's understanding of human free choice, discussing the crucial parallel distinctions between *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis*, the composed and divided senses, *de dicto* and *de re* necessity. I also explore how, for Báñez, human free choice remains intact under God's determining premotion. Finally, I consider Báñez's understanding of sin in light of the doctrine of physical premotion. Especially important here is the question of whether God causes sin or

Thinkers of the Renaissance, ed. Gerard Smith, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1939), 75–131.

28 This was Lonergan's S.T.D. dissertation, completed at the Gregorian University in Rome under the direction of Charles Boyer between 1938 and 1940. It originally appeared as a series of articles in *Theological Studies* between 1941 and 1942, and then in a condensed, revised form in 1971 as *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, edited by Lonergan's former student, J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder). In 2000, a volume bearing the same title (*Grace and Freedom*) and edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, emerged as the first volume in, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press). That edition (2000) contains both *Grace and Freedom* and the original unabridged dissertation, *Gratia operans*, along with helpful notes and translations. Michael Stebbins has published an illuminating presentation of Lonergan's thought on grace and freedom. See his, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World Order and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).

predetermines the will to sin by his provision or non-provision of an intrinsically efficacious physical premotion.

The preceding aspects of Báñez's thought, explored in Chapter Two, are only part of his overall position on divine *auxilium*, for equally significant is his opposition to the alternative theory proposed by Jesuit scholastics Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez. In Chapter Three, I explore these critical dimensions of Báñez's thought. I begin with a brief summary of Molina's teaching in order to contextualize the subsequent investigation of Báñez's critique of it. Báñez's critique, while wide-ranging, is shown to center mainly on the following two fundamental points: first, Molina's teaching on the nature of human free choice, and second, Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge. Báñez objects to Molina's teaching on freedom principally because, in Báñez's view, it exempts something positive from the scope of God's universal causality. Báñez objects to middle knowledge chiefly because there quite literally *is* nothing for middle knowledge to be of. Báñez's argument here is shown to anticipate contemporary forms of the so-called 'grounding objection' to middle knowledge. I devote some attention to possible avenues for replying to this point of Báñez's critique. In the Appendix to Chapter Three, I explore whether alleged flaws endemic to correspondence-type truth theories undermine the sort of argument Báñez makes against Molina's account of divine providence and conclude they do not.

After setting out the positive and critical sides of Báñez's position in Chapters Two and Three, in Chapter Four I examine the central objections raised against Báñez's position by Luis de Molina. I first consider Molina's argument against Báñez's position on the intrinsic efficacy of divine *auxilium*. I then consider Molina's view of the implications Báñez's position has for moral responsibility, especially in respect to conversion and sin. Finally, I consider Molina's charge that Báñez's account of physical premotion is deterministic. Crucial to this final section of Chapter Four is its discussion of Báñez's recourse to divine transcendence and the distinction of the composed and divided senses to forestall Molina's line of criticism.

In Chapter Five, I consider the thought of Bernard Lonergan on God's motion of the human free will. Bernard Lonergan's work on grace and freedom is relevant to the present investigation because he attempts a critique of physical premotion on the basis of an historical rereading of Aquinas. Endeavoring to unshackle Báñez's source from the categories and presuppositions of the sixteenth-century debate, Lonergan develops a position on the divine causation of human free choices that differs from the classical alternatives offered by both Báñez and Molina. Lonergan's work on the topic of divine causality

and human free choice is necessary to examine because it tends to be ignored in recent work on the subject by philosophers (mostly Anglophone analytic philosophers of religion), while there tends to be something of an informal consensus among the theologians familiar with Lonergan's work that he definitively dissolved the *De auxiliis* impasse. I think Lonergan's contribution is too important to ignore and I also wish to challenge the informal consensus that he has provided an adequate resolution of the *De auxiliis* debate. Chapter Five begins by exploring Lonergan's critique of Báñez, but then turns to an exposition and appreciative critique of Lonergan's own alternative reading of Aquinas. Vital to this discussion is Lonergan's distinction between physical premotion in Báñez's sense and a different kind of premotion Lonergan finds in Aristotle and Aquinas. Equally important is the role of fate on Lonergan's account of premotion.

I then revisit the work of St. Thomas directly in Chapter Six. There, I provide textual warrant for a different interpretation of Aquinas's use of 'motion' as an idiom signifying God's causation of human free choices than that defended by Báñez. Important features of this chapter include the connections it draws between divine application, conservation and creation; its discussion of the radically inclusive scope of God's creative causality; and its analysis of the nature of God's creative action as, in one respect, identical with the divine essence, and in another respect, a unilateral predicamental relation of dependence in God's effect.

In the final chapter of this study, I develop in a more speculative way the historical, textual argument initiated in Chapter Six. I call this view 'Total Personal Creation' or 'TPC'. After tracing the literary origins of TPC, I then explain what it means to interpret Thomas's 'motion' idiom within the framework of creation and I explore some of the principal implications of such an interpretation. Several objections to TPC are then considered, including the charges that TPC is compatibilism, or that it represents an occasionalist view of causation. I also consider at greater length the Suarezian objection that TPC's portrayal of divine transeunt action is unduly reductive. Important features of Chapter Seven include its discussion of the immediacy of divine action, the logical equivalence of God's willing and created states of affairs' obtaining, the inherently relational nature of God-talk, and the implications of divine simplicity for understanding God's causality. The closing discussion of Suárez's sophisticated position on efficient causality enriches the earlier treatment of Molina's doctrine of general concurrence in Chapter Three and validates Báñez's objection to the Jesuit doctrine generally, while at the same time highlighting an underlying liability common to both the Dominican and Jesuit views.

An Historical Introduction to the Controversy *de Auxiliis*

[H]e calls it a certain vain piece of a question, ill begun and more unadvisedly published,—a question which no law or ecclesiastical canon defineth; a fruitless contention; the product of idle brains; a matter so nice, so obscure, so intricate, that it was neither to be explicated by the clergy nor understood by the people; a dispute of words, a doctrine inexplicable, but most dangerous when taught, lest it introduce discord or blasphemy; and, therefore, the objector was rash, and the answer unadvised, for it concerned not the substance of the faith or the worship of God, nor the chief commandment of Scripture; and, therefore, why should it be the matter of discord? for though the matter be grave, yet, because neither necessary nor explicable, the contention is trifling and toyish.¹

JEREMY TAYLOR, *quoting Constantine the Great*

Such were the sentiments of Constantine toward the Arian controversy. They are manifested in a letter of October, 324 that Constantine addressed to both Arius and his bishop, Alexander of Alexandria, who were locked in dispute over the question of whether the Son of God is a creature. Constantine urged Arius and Alexander to realize that their dispute was insignificant and so to set it aside. Yet, as John Henry Newman recounts, Constantine's letter was "answered by the meeting of the Council of Nicaea, and by the insertion of the word 'Consubstantial' into the Creed of the Church."² I take the precedent as a warning against dismissing the Controversy *de Auxiliis* as a mere intramural,

1 Jeremy Taylor (1613–67), *A Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying* [1647], §2, as quoted by John Henry Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, ed. Ian Ker (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 143 18–30 (96). For the exact original quote, see volume 5 of *The Whole Works of the Right Rev. Jeremy Taylor, D.D.*, ed. Charles Page Eden (London: Spottiswoode, 1883), §2.26 (399). Note Taylor sympathizes with Constantine's view, while Newman criticizes their standpoint. There is dispute surrounding some of the historical circumstances of Constantine's letter. The text of the letter can be found in various sources, including Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*, trans. Ernest Cushing Richardson, in *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 11-1, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 11 cc. 64–72, see esp. cc. 68–71.

2 Newman, 142 5–7 (96).

scholastic trifle. Despite its complexity, the Controversy *de Auxiliis* is pivotal to the basic Christian teaching on salvation and so is central to the faith and life of the Church.

To the extent the Controversy *de Auxiliis* is remembered at all today, it is recalled as one of the most intractable and vitriolic theological disputes in history, particularly when viewed in continuity with the related debates that preceded and followed it. While the controversy has been regarded by some as sterile and purely academic—‘baroque scholasticism’ at its worst—it is nevertheless important to realize that the issues it concerned were, in the final analysis, of perennial importance for the life of the Church. The importance of the matter of dispute helps to explain why *de Auxiliis* was so contentious: The pastoral stakes were high, and especially in the sixteenth century, when disputation over grace, freewill, justification and predestination threatened to further divide a fractured Church still reeling from the effects of the Protestant Reformation.

Reckoning by what scholars consider its official dates, the Controversy *de Auxiliis* began with a public debate at the University of Salamanca in January of 1582 and was formally terminated with no decisive resolution by the Holy See in September of 1607.³ While the Controversy *de Auxiliis* properly spans that

3 For an historical overview to the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, see (for example) C.M. Aherne, “Grace, Controversies on,” in *NCE* 6:403–04; Antonio Astrain, “Congregatio de Auxiliis,” in *CE* 4:238–39; James Brodrick, S.J. Robert Bellarmine: Saint and Scholar (London: Burns & Oates, 1961), 189–216; “A Saint among the Scholars,” *Blackfriars* 9, no. 99 (1928), 357–76; Alfred Freddoso, “Preface,” in Luis de Molina, S.J., *On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia*, trans. Alfred Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); John A. Hardon, S.J., *History and Theology of Grace: The Catholic Teaching on Divine Grace* (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2005), 251–79; W.J. Hill, “Báñez and Bañezianism,” in *NCE* 2:49–51; P. Mandonnet, “Báñez, Dominique,” in *DTC* 2-1:140–45; Ludwig von Pastor, *A History of the Popes From the Close of the Middle Ages*, trans., ed. Ralph Francis Kerr (vols. 21, 24) Dom Ernest Graf, O.S.B. (vols. 25, 34) [London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.], 21:186–92; 24:281–367; 25:229–52; 34:40–58; 205–18; T. Ryan, “Congregatio de Auxiliis,” in *NCE* 4:110–13; E. Vansteenberghe, “Molina, Louis,” in *DTC* 10-2:2090–92; “Molinisme,” in *DTC* 10-2:2094–2101, 2141–2166; Aelred Whitacre, “A Saint among the Theologians,” *Blackfriars* 9 no. 97 (1928): 221–34; “A Saint Among the Theologians II,” *Blackfriars* 9 no. 98 (1928): 291–303; “A Saint Among the Theologians,” [a reply to James Brodrick, op. cit.] *Blackfriars* 9 no. 99 (1928): 357–76. The authoritative (if polemical) histories of the controversy are (from the Dominican point of view) Jacques Hyacinthe Serry, O.P., *Historia Congregationum de auxiliis divinae gratiae* (Antwerp: Societatis, 1709); and (from the Jesuit point of view) Livinus de Meyer, S.J., *Historiae controversiarum de divinae gratiae auxiliis* (Venice, 1742). De Meyer and Serry wrote under pseudonyms that were perhaps clever intimations of their respective theological commitments: The Jesuit writes as Theodore Eleutherius (literally, ‘God’s gift: freedom’) and

quarter-century, it was precipitated by the Baianist controversy (c. 1552–1567) and followed by the Jansenist controversy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which was itself essentially an offshoot of Baianism. Both the Baianist and Jansenist controversies are closely related to the Controversy *de Auxiliis* theologically, and all three quarrels are best understood in light of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Church's response to it by the Council of Trent.

The Controversy *de Auxiliis* may be divided into two main periods or stages. The first stage consisted of open scholarly engagement. By 1594 this had become quite intense, climaxing with a series of public debates between the Dominicans and the Jesuits. Subsequently, Pope Clement VIII (PM 1592–1605) imposed silence on both parties in order to mitigate the quarrel's divisive effects and reserved to himself the official adjudication of the question. This began the second stage of the controversy, during which the Pope established a special commission called the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* to study the efficacy of actual grace and specifically to evaluate a work central to the whole controversy, Luis de Molina's *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione* (Lisbon, 1588). The commission's task was to help the Pope come to a decision on the aforementioned matters so that a solemn definition could be promulgated. Instead of promulgating a solemn definition however, the Pope (now Paul V) ended the controversy in September 1607 by effectively declaring a truce, imposing silence on both sides, and instructing them to await the final decision of the Holy See—a decision we still await today.

1 The First Period: Open Scholarly Engagement (1582–1594)

Four main events (or series of events) mark the period of open scholarly engagement. The first is a public disputation at the University of Salamanca in 1582 that concerned the free and meritorious character of Christ's atoning death. Shortly after that in 1585, the controversy between the Baianists and the Jesuits erupted once more at the University of Louvain, which had been a seedbed of disagreement over matters of free choice and predestination for some time. Perhaps the most decisive moment in the initial period of the controversy, however, was the printing, initial censure and subsequent release of Molina's *Concordia* at Lisbon in 1588. The publication of this seminal work greatly

the Dominican writes as Augustin Le Blanc (might the intention have been to suggest the strong continuity between Augustine and his white-habited heir?).

intensified the controversy. Finally, the fourth period of the debate occurred between roughly 1593 and 1594. During that time, Molina and Báñez mutually denounced one another's works to the Spanish Inquisition and there was a series of vehement public debates between the Dominicans and the Jesuits at Valladolid. This final series of events marked the final moment of the controversy prior to the papal imposition of silence on the disputants in 1594.

1.1 *The Montemayor-Báñez Debate and its Aftermath* (*Salamanca, 1582–84*)

The origin of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* lies in a public debate convened by the Mercedarian friar Francisco Zumel (1540–1607) at the University of Salamanca on 20 January 1582. Zumel was a member of the faculty at Salamanca and a friend and disciple of Báñez, who in 1581 had succeeded his teacher and confrere Bartolomé de Medina (1527–81) to first chair of theology at that university. The main point of contention at the debate was whether Jesus died freely and meritoriously given that he had received a precept from the Father to lay down his life. The real significance of this question, however, was not that it called into question the free and meritorious character of Christ's paschal sacrifice, but rather that it probed the conditions of an act's being free and therefore meritorious. The question provided a test case for thinking about predestination and justification, and for critically discussing the theory of physical premotion maintained by the Dominicans. According to that theory, God efficiently, antecedently, and determinately causes the created will to choose what and when it does.

Prudencio de Montemayor S.J., challenged the Dominican theory on the grounds that it entailed a denial of free will. He maintained that Christ died neither freely nor meritoriously if the Father decreed that he lay down his life. Several others who shared this view joined Montemayor, including his Jesuit confrere Miguel Marcos, the Benedictine Juan de Castaneda, and most notably, the illustrious Luis de León (1528–91), an Augustinian theologian and poet. León took up the Jesuit cause and soon became the chief proponent and defender of Montemayor's position for the remainder of the debate.

The claims of León and Montemayor provoked a forceful counterattack from Báñez, who argued that they were variously contrary to Scripture, natural reason, and the Second Council of Orange (529); incongruent with the teachings of Augustine and Thomas; and represented vestiges of Pelagianism.

The debate between León, Báñez, and their respective companions continued for seven days, concluding on 27 January 1582. By then, the respective parties involved had hurled accusations of Pelagianism and Lutheranism at one another and matters had so escalated that on 5 February, the Hieronymite

monk, Juan de Santa Cruz, submitted a deposition to the Spanish Inquisition at Valladolid, bringing to its attention sixteen theses defended by León and Montemayor.⁴ The last twelve of these in particular merit attention because much of the subsequent controversy crystallized around them:

4. Not because God has willed me to speak do I speak, but rather because I speak God has willed me to speak.
5. Not because God has foreseen me to speak do I speak, but rather because I speak God has foreseen that I am going to speak.
6. God is not the cause of [a creature's] free operation, but causes only the [creaturely] cause to be.
7. Divine providence is not with respect to the multiplicity of good acts in particular.
8. God foresees morally good works to be done in general and universally, not here and now and in particular.
9. Divine providence does not determine the human will or any other particular cause to good operation, but rather the particular cause determines the act of divine providence.
10. Doctrine contrary to these aforementioned conclusions is erroneous and Lutheran.
11. With God conferring equal grace upon two men, one is able without any other addition to be converted but the other to refuse.
12. Only by the sufficient grace of God apart from anything else preventing will Peter be converted.
13. The impious person, in his justification, determines the sufficient grace of God to active use through his own will.
14. Antecedently, God lavishes nothing more than sufficient grace to the impious person prior to justification with respect to the ability to act, but only concomitantly.
15. God and the will of the impious person determine themselves mutually and at the same time in justification.
16. Predetermination from the part of God is not greater in the justification of the impious than from the part of the human will.⁵

4 The full text of these theses can be found in Mandonnet, 143. It is important to note that León maintained that his theses were inaccurately represented by Santa Cruz (see Pastor, 24:292).

5 For the full text of these theses, see Mandonnet, 143: "IV. Non quod Deus voluit me loqui ego loquor, sed contra: quod ego loquor Deus voluit me loqui. V. Non quod Deus providit me loqui ego loquor, sed contra: quod ego loquor Deus providit me locuturum. VI. Deus non est causa operationis liberae sed causat tantum esse causa. VII. Providentia Dei non est

Báñez, for his part, submitted a tract to the Inquisition including ten of Montemayor's theses and an explanation of why he regarded these as erroneous.⁶ Báñez' account of the propositions upheld by Montemayor is similar to Santa Cruz's list with only minor differences in wording. Notably however, Báñez omits theses (9), (14) and (15), and includes three interesting theses Santa Cruz's does not:

4. There are good things done by us in time which are not foreseen by God.
5. God does not foresee or determine the number of all singular things, such as oxen or ants.
7. Every man, while a wayfarer, has sufficient grace through Christ by which he can turn to God; neither is it necessary that such grace be always received in man or efficacious according to a specific effect, but it is sufficient for God to aid by a special assistance.⁷

What is significant about all these theses for the investigation at hand is, first, while more extreme and less carefully refined than what was to become the official Jesuit position, they do trace the lineaments of what the Jesuit school

respectu multorum actuum bonorum in particulari. VIII. Deus providet bona opera moralia fieri in generali et in communi, non tamen hic et nunc et in particulari. IX. Dei providentia non determinat voluntatem humanam aut quamlibet aliam particularem causam ad bene operandum, sed potius particularis causa determinat actum divinae providentiae. X. Doctrina contraria his proxime praecedentibus conclusionibus, erronea est et lutherana. XI. Conferente Deo aequale auxilium duobus hominibus absque ullo superaddito, poterit alter illorum converti, alter vero renuere. XII. Solo auxilio Dei sufficienti absque ullo alio praevenienti Petrus de facto convertetur. XIII. Impius in justificatione sua determinat auxilium Dei sufficiens ad actualem usum per voluntatem suam. XIV. Deus nihil amplius antecederet largitur impio dum justificatur quod ad efficientiam pertineat quam auxilium sufficiens, sed tantum concomitanter. XV. Deus et voluntas impii mutuo et simul se determinant in justificatione. XVI. Non est major praedeterminatio in justificatione impii ex parte Dei, quam ex parte voluntatis humanae."

6 For the original text, see Báñez, "El Padre Domingo Báñez al Consejo de la Inquisición sobre las Tesis del Padre Prudencio de Montemayor, S.J.," in *Domingo Báñez y las Controversias sobre la Gracia*, ed. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P. (Madrid: CSIC, 1968), 101–13.

7 Báñez, "Sobre las Tesis del Montemayor," 101: "Quarta propositio: Aliqua bona fiunt in tempore a nobis quae non sunt praevisa a Deo. Quinta propositio: Deus non praevidit nec determinavit numerum omnium rerum singularium, v. gr. boum aut formicarum. Septima propositio: Omnis homo dum est in via, sufficiens per Christum auxilium habet quo in Deum converti possit, nec ut tale auxilium recipiatur semper in homine oportet aut quod sit efficax secundum peculiarem effectum, sed satis est Deum speciali assistentia assistere."

was thinking at an early stage of the controversy. The Jesuits and their collaborators were first and foremost committed to what would be identified today as a 'libertarian' view of free choice: God does not cause the free determination of the will precisely as such. The Jesuit school thought such a view of freedom was necessary in order to uphold moral responsibility, the possibility of merit and divine inculpability for sin.

Second, following from the aforementioned view of free choice, grace is presented as not intrinsically (per se) efficacious. Rather, the efficacy of grace is understood to be a function of human acceptance or rejection. It is important to note that this view of grace was not universally shared by Jesuits and would later become a significant point of divergence within their school. While some, like Molina and Lessius, held that grace is not intrinsically efficacious, others, like Bellarmine and Suárez, held for a more moderate view called 'Congruism', which affirmed the intrinsic efficacy of grace (although it combined this affirmation with middle knowledge, discussed in Chapter Three).⁸

Third, while Montemayor's theses do not explicitly advance the doctrine of middle knowledge, they do prepare the ground for such a doctrine because something like it must be posited if the universal scope and infallibility of divine providence is to be upheld on the supposition of the above theses.

Finally, the aforementioned theses merit our attention because a good deal of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* centered around the question of whether Molina's *Concordia* asserted Montemayor's theses and should, for that reason, be condemned as heretical.

The Inquisition at Valladolid sent Juan de Arrese to Salamanca to begin the proceedings against León, Montemayor and their associates. The process, however, soon became mired in a thicket of difficulty. Opinions which Arrese solicited in order to adjudicate the matter were mixed. While the faculty at Salamanca sided mainly with Báñez, the universities of Alcalà and Valladolid were divided, with significant support for Montemayor and León. Some

8 Another distinguishing characteristic of Congruism is that it affirms predestination is *ante praevisa merita*, or before foreseen merits. Molina and Lessius held for predestination *post praevisa merita*. After the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, the Jesuit order adopted Congruism over strict Molinism as its official doctrine. This decision was made under the leadership of Claudius Aquaviva, who was then Superior General also responsible for the institution of the Jesuit *ratio studiorum* (the official curriculum for Jesuit intellectual formation). Accordingly, Congruism was the doctrine approved to be taught in Jesuit houses of study. On Congruism, see H. Quilliet, "Congruisme," in *DTC* 3:1120–1138 (see especially 1134–37 for a discussion of predestination and 1130–34 for a comparison with Molinism). See also Walter McDonald, "Congruism," in *CE* 4:251–52; and K. Hargrove "Congruism," in *NCE* 4:120–21.

Dominicans of Andalusia, in southern Spain, even took the side of the Jesuits.⁹ At the same time, Léon hedged his position by maintaining that he knew the theses he upheld were not those of Augustine and Thomas, and even that they were novel and temerarious.¹⁰ He claimed however, that he was not asserting them, but merely maintaining them disputatively.

After two years of deliberation, Gaspar Cardinal de Quiroga (1512–95), archbishop of Toledo and then Inquisitor General of Spain, issued a judgment against Léon and Montemayor on 3 February 1584. While the sixteen theses were not formally condemned as heresy, Léon was prohibited from teaching them in public or private and Montemayor was removed from his position as lecturer for several years.

1.2 *The Clash of Leonard Lessius and the Baianists (Louvain, 1585–88)*

While the censure of Montemayor and Léon temporarily quelled any serious battles between Dominicans and Jesuits in Iberia, the dispute soon erupted anew in the Low Countries, particularly at the University of Louvain.¹¹ Louvain had previously been a seedbed of such conflicts. Just over a century earlier, it had been home to a contentious battle between Peter de Rivo and the Franciscan, Henry de Zomerer, over God's foreknowledge of future contingents.¹² The Louvain quarrel over future contingents ended with the censure of several of Rivo's propositions deemed by Pope Sixtus IV (PM 1471–84) to be inconsistent with the truth of biblical prophesy.¹³ More recently however, Louvain had been home to a protracted dispute concerning the suspect doctrines of the respected Catholic theologian and exegete, Michael de Bay ('Baius', 1513–89).¹⁴ The Baianist controversy (c. 1552–67) was the precursor to

9 See Pastor, 292.

10 See Mandonnet, 143.

11 See Pastor, 21:186–192.

12 For an historical introduction to this earlier dispute, see Leon Baudry, *The Quarrel over Future Contingents: Louvain, 1465–1475: Unpublished Texts*, trans. Rita Guerlac, New Synthese Historical Library, vol. 36 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989), 1–32.

13 For Sixtus IV's bull, *Ad Christi vicarii*, see DS §§1391–96.

14 On Baius and his thought, see P.J. Donnelly, "Baius," in *NCE*, 2:18–21; M.W.F. Stone, "Michael Baius (1513–89) and the Debate of 'Pure Nature': Grace and Moral Agency in Sixteenth-Century Scholasticism," in *Moral Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity*, eds. J. Kraye and R. Saarinen, New Synthese Historical Library, vol. 57 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2005), 54–69; X.-M. LeBachelet, "Baius," in *DTC*, 2-1:38–62 (on Baius and his doctrine) 64–111 (on the condemned propositions). See also the historical introductions in DS, §§427–28; and J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, *The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church*, 6th ed., (New York: Alba House, 1996), 188, 765 (this source also

the phase of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* that took place at Louvain in the years 1586–1588 between the Flemish Jesuit, Leonard Leys ('Lessius', 1554–1623) and the members of the Louvain faculty still sympathetic to Baius (including Baius himself).¹⁵

The Baianist controversy concerned Baius's allegedly Protestant or Protestant-like views on such issues as original sin, nature, grace and free choice. Baius held, for example, that free choice consists in mere freedom from coercion, that the power of free choice was lost with original sin, and that free choice is not restored by grace, but rather that choices are predetermined by it.¹⁶ By 1567, the Baianist controversy had gained the attention of Pope Pius v (PM 1566–72), who in that year issued a bull formally condemning some seventy-nine allegedly Baianist theses.¹⁷ The problem was, however, that a certain vagueness in the bull's concluding censure allowed Baianists to question which, if any, of the propositions were really condemned and in what sense.¹⁸

conveniently provides a representative selection of Baius's propositions in English in its chapters on original sin and grace).

- 15 On Leonard Lessius, see P. Bernard, "Lessius," in *DTC* 9:1:453–54; J. de Ghellinck, "Lessius," in *CE* 9:192–93; C. Meyer, "Lessius," in *NCE* 8:518.
- 16 See DS §1966, cf. §§1939, 1941.
- 17 There was some debate as to the actual number of propositions censured in the bull. Significantly, however, the difference in numbering depends not on content, but upon how certain of the theses are divided. This variance can be seen in DS §§1926–30; 1946–79: The shorter list simply merges what are distinct propositions on the longer, but the ideas censured remain the same. Even so, Stone notes that the discrepancy in numbering the propositions was a cause for questioning the force of the bull (see Stone, 63).
- 18 There were several issues pertaining to the meaning of the bull. First was the issue of how many propositions were actually censured (noted above). Second was the issue of the gravity of the censure as it applied to particular propositions: as the censure (reproduced below) shows, the propositions were collectively condemned with a condemnation that ranges from 'heretical' to the less grave 'offensive to pious ears'. Third was the issue of the '*comma Pianum*': the lack of a comma in the censure indicating whether the propositions were being condemned as understood in the sense intended by their authors, or whether the propositions were being condemned in terms of their abstract, objective content, despite the fact that some of them would be true when understood in the sense intended by their authors. Le Bachelet notes that such a lack of punctuation was "according to the custom of the Apostolic Chancery" (48). The issue again, was whether the intended sense of the propositions was the true or false one. The censure following the list of propositions reads: "The aforementioned weighty opinions, [the Baianist theses] by strict examination in Our presence, although some by another manner may be sustainable in the strict and proper sense of the words according to the intention of their authors We by Our authority condemn, circumscribe and dispel as heretical, erroneous, suspect, temerarious, scandalous and causing offense to pious ears respectively, whenever they are

Arguably, the meaning of the censure was sufficiently clear¹⁹ and there is some evidence to suggest the Pope's reasons for wording the censure as he did were pastoral: Pius v did not want to make it harder than necessary for Baius and his disciples to abandon their former views and return to the fold.²⁰ However, the censure's ambiguity had the effect of enabling Baianism to ferment well into the 1580's, so that when Lessius came to Louvain in 1585 to teach at the Jesuit college, he found Baianism well entrenched.²¹

Lessius, troubled by the recalcitrance of the Louvain faculty, took aim at their Baianist tendencies in his first work, the *Theses theologicae*, which he wrote with his colleague Jean Hamel ('Hamelius', 1554–1589) in 1586.²² While

uttered or published {Quas quidem sententias stricto coram Nobis examine ponderatas, quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent in rigore et proprio verborum sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas, erroneas, suspectas, temerarias, scandalosas et in pias aures offensionem immittentes respective, ac quaecumque super iis verbo scriptoque emissa, praesentium auctoritate damnamus, circumscribimus et abolemus}" (DS §1980). I have deliberately left the translation syntactically rough in order to highlight the difficulty of the *comma Pianum*.

- 19 Stone makes the case on philological grounds that the comma should be placed after '*possent*' and that it was disingenuous for Baius and his followers to assume otherwise. This interpretation is corroborated by the punctuated copy of the bull found in the archives in Rome (Stone, 64 n. 67). See also Le Bachelet, 53–54.
- 20 See Donnelly, 19. In this regard, it is also important to note Baius was a respected theologian of great influence and was one of the theological experts sent to the Council of Trent. Another potentially significant minutia is that Pius v was a Dominican. While I am not aware of any historical evidence to suggest this gave him sympathy for Baius in his plight with the Jesuits, the Dominican and Jesuit positions on actual grace had more or less solidified by this time and the Dominican view was closer to that of Baius than that of the Jesuits. There had also been friction between the Dominican and Jesuit orders virtually since the latter's inception.
- 21 See von Pastor, vol. 21:186. Lessius came to the Jesuit college at Louvain after completing his theological studies in Rome under Francisco Suárez and Robert Bellarmine. Bellarmine, who taught at Louvain before going to Rome, was one of the staunchest opponents of Baius during the original controversy. Both Bellarmine and Suárez are among the most important defenders of Molinism. The perdurance of Baianism at Louvain prompted Pope Gregory XIII (PM 1572–85) to reiterate Pius v's condemnation of Baianism in his bull, *Provisionis nostrae* (1579). For a further discussion of Lessius's dispute with the Louvain Baianists, see F. Claeys Bouuaert, "Les origines de la controverse théologique dite de auxiliis divinae gratiae (1587–1588): Récit de ses origines par L. Lessius," *Les ephemerides theologicae lovanienses* 41 (1965): 548–60.
- 22 This Jean Hamel, a Dutch-Flemish Jesuit, is not to be confused with Jean-Baptiste du Hamel (1624–1706), a French Oratorian. On the Jesuit Hamel, see Carlos Sommervogel, s.j. et al., *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, Nouvelle ed.* (Brussels: Oscar Schepens;

the *Theses* were never printed in their entirety, in significant part they advanced a view of grace, free choice and predestination directly counter to that of Baius and substantially similar to Molina's yet-unpublished theory.²³

Lessius's *Theses* provoked Baius, who was still embittered with the Jesuits from his personal dealings with them two decades earlier. Collaborating with his nephew, Jacob du Bay (d. 1614) and disciple, Jacob Janson (who would later succeed Baius as head of the University of Louvain and go on to become the teacher of Cornelius Otto Jansen), Baius consolidated thirty-four theses from Lessius's work and presented them to the faculty at Louvain.²⁴ When questioned whether the theses were his, Lessius objected that they were incorrectly formulated and taken out of context and so did not accurately represent his thought. Lessius then drafted a more careful representation of the thirty-four theses and presented it to the faculty. The theologians of Louvain responded on 9 September 1587 by censuring thirty-one of the theses as Pelagian.²⁵

The controversy between Lessius and the Louvain faculty spread rapidly as other university faculties throughout the region began to take sides and issue censures against either Lessius or his opponents. The conflict even escalated to the point of physical altercations in the streets between students of opposing schools.²⁶ During the course of all this, there was an exchange of several polemical and apologetic tracts between Lessius and the Louvain faculty.

Bellarmino, writing to Cardinal Madruzzi, then Secretary of the Inquisition, sums up nicely what the disagreement between Lessius and the Louvain

Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1893; reprint, Louvain: Éditions de la Bibliothèque s.J., Collège Philosophique et Théologique, 1960), 4:59.

23 See Sommervogel, vol. 4:1726.

24 For a complete list of the censored theses, see Gerardus Schneemann, s.J., *Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus: accedunt opuscula inedita Leonardi Lessii et Josephi Kleutgen eiusdem Societatis theologorum atque exemplum phototypicum autographae Pauli v relationis* (Freiburg i.B.: Herder, 1881), 359–62.

25 Accounts differ as to whether all thirty-four theses were actually censured or just thirty-one. See Pastor vol. 21:189 who states thirty four, and Vansteenbergh, 2099, who maintains 31, along with James Brodrick, "A Theologian Among the Saints: A Reply," *Blackfriars* 9, no. 99 (1928): 363. Note that three of Lessius's 34 theses concern his peculiar view of biblical inspiration, whereas the other 31 concern predestination and reprobation (though significantly, both sets of theses reflect similar assumptions about divine and human causality).

26 See Pastor, 21:189.

faculty was about.²⁷ The points of disagreement may be reduced to the four themes of cooperation, providence, grace and election.

First, for the Louvain faculty, divine-human cooperation is a matter of God's predetermination of the human will to all its acts. It must be pointed out that the faculty held God's predetermination of the will to be causal, not temporal, and that the will is still in some sense self-determining. This self-determination, however, is naturally consequent upon the divine predetermination. This is worth pointing out because while Báñez was not a Baianist, his view on this point (discussed further in Chapter Two) seems to be the same as that of the Louvain faculty. Conversely, Lessius held a position like Molina's: that the will's self-determination excludes its being determined by God. Lessius did not maintain that the will determines itself independently from God's help, but like Molina, that God's help takes the form of an indifferent concurrence rather than predetermination.

Second, for the faculty, providence, and therefore, predestination, are matters of divine preordination that do not depend on God's foreknowledge. Rather, on this account, God's foreknowledge depends upon his will. This marks a significant divergence from Lessius, who held that the providential ordering of things does not determine contingent causes, but instead presupposes foreknowledge of those causes' autonomous self-determinations.

Third, underlying the faculty's ideas on grace was the Baianist notion that God does indeed make impossible demands on people; that is, God issues commands without providing the grace for all to whom the commands are addressed to fulfill them. Thus, the faculty maintained that not all receive grace sufficient for salvation. If grace is truly sufficient for salvation, and if grace irresistibly determines the will (as Baius maintained), then sufficient grace infallibly effects salvation. Lessius, on the other hand, wished to maintain a real distinction between efficacious and sufficient grace, and to maintain that grace is not *per se efficax*, but resistible.

Noticing both a similarity and a difference between the Louvain faculty and Báñez on this point will help to clarify the relevance of the present discussion to the broader Controversy *de Auxiliis*. With the Louvain faculty, Báñez holds for the intrinsic efficacy of grace. Unlike the faculty and like Lessius, however, Báñez affirms the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. While it is a perennial objection of the Jesuit School that Báñez's appeal to physical premotion to explain the intrinsic efficacy of grace makes it impossible for him to consistently maintain truly sufficient grace, still there is a place for it in

27 For a representation of the salient points from Bellarmine's letter (translated into French), see Vansteenbergh, "Molinisme" 2099–2100.

his system, and in this respect, Báñez's view is less harsh and more optimistic than Baianism.

Following upon their respective notions of grace, the Louvain faculty and Lessius disagree on the gift of perseverance. Unsurprisingly, this disagreement is a function of the disagreement over grace's resistibility. For the faculty, there is only one gift of perseverance and whoever is given it perseveres unfailingly. For Lessius however, all the justified are given a gift by which they *can* persevere to the end, even if not all the justified, but only the elect are given a gift by which they *do* in fact persevere.²⁸ Thus, perseverance in grace is a possibility open to all and can be understood in two ways, either as accepted and effective, or as rejected, and while sufficient, ineffective.

Fourth, for the faculty, election is entirely gratuitous and does not depend on foreseen merits, whereas for Lessius (and Molina), election is *post praevisa merita*. As noted above, the issue of predestination *post* or *ante praevisa merita* would become a source of controversy among the Jesuits along with the question of the intrinsic efficacy of grace, with Congruists like Suárez and Bellarmine holding (with Aquinas) that predestination is prior to foreseen merits. For this reason, Bellarmine notes in his memorial to Madruzzi that Lessius's position on election is of secondary importance and is detachable from the preceding claims.

To sum up, Lessius is driven by the notion that God really does wish all to be saved and provides everyone with aid truly sufficient to reach heaven. This state of affairs underscores the exigency of one's responding to God's offer of grace, turning from sin, believing the Gospel, and living the life of good deeds God calls one to walk in. If one does not believe this is possible, one cannot do it. That is why believing it possible is so important. This appears to be Lessius' main concern: What one does really makes a difference to one's salvation and the decision about what one does lies in one's hands. At all costs he wishes to preserve this thesis; the sinner, not God, is responsible for sin. Consequently, reprobation is due not to an antecedent infallibly efficacious decree of God, but rather to one's own free refusal of God's grace.

As matters came to a head, Octavio Frangipani, the papal nuncio, intervened, determined to prevent a further escalation. He ordered the disputants to cease arguing and informed them the matter would be referred to the Pope for a final decision. Sixtus v, keenly aware that the controversy at Louvain could provoke a new schism in the Church, appointed a commission of cardinals

28 See Bellarmine's text as supplied by Vansteenbergh, 2100: "*Tous les justes reçoivent un don de persévérance par lequel ils peuvent persévérer s'ils le veulent; seuls les élus reçoivent un don par lequel ils persévèrent en fait.*"

to carefully examine Lessius' theses. In 1588, Sixtus v declared in a note to Frangipani that the controversy was concerned with "certain articles of sound doctrine," thus implying that Lessius's theses were not heretical, as the faculty had maintained.²⁹ However, no condemnation was issued against the position maintained by the faculty either. In July of that same year, Frangipani enjoined both parties, under the pain of excommunication, not to censure one another. This event constituted the first direct involvement of the Holy See in the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, and unbeknownst to him, the Pope's efforts to preserve peace at this point in the controversy foreshadowed the manner in which the entire dispute would ultimately be dealt with nineteen years later by Paul v (PM 1605–1621).

However, just as Pius v's 1567 bull, *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* had not suppressed Baianism and had to be subsequently reinforced by Gregory XIII's *Provisionis nostrae* (1580), similarly, opposition to the Jesuits' teaching on grace and free will continued to smolder at Louvain. Years later, the faculty would try once more (albeit unsuccessfully) to gain approbation of that teaching's censure by Innocent XI (PM 1676–1689), and then, at least a papal pronouncement on it by Innocent XII (PM 1691–1700).³⁰ Such persistence despite the Holy See's effort to suppress the quarrel characterized both sides of the entire Controversy *de Auxiliis*.

1.3 *The Advent of Molina's Concordia (Lisbon, 1588)*

Although silence was imposed on the disputants at Louvain, the controversy earlier sparked at Salamanca flared up again in Portugal. In fact, while the Salamanca debate marked the official beginning of the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, it was the publication of Molina's *Concordia* at Lisbon in 1588³¹ which

29 See Pastor, 21:191. The relevant quote is supplied in Schneemann, 189: "controversy has arisen between the theologians of the University of Louvain and the priests of the Society of Jesus over certain articles of sound doctrine {inter Universitatis Lovaniensi theologos et sacerdotes S.I. super quibusdam sanae doctrinae articulis controversias ortas fuisse}."

30 See Pastor, 21:192 n. 4. Aelred Whitacre also notes that Louvain reasserted its censure of Lessius after the silence of 1588 in 1613, 1649, 1697, and 1723. See Whitacre, "A Saint Among the Theologians," *Blackfriars* 9, no. 100 (1928): 427–28.

31 The full title of the work is, *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione ad nonnullos primae partis divi Thomae articulos*. Molina probably developed the ideas propounded in the *Concordia* during the course of his lectures at Évora on *ST I* (1570–73). This is reflected in the second of Molina's major works: *Commentaria in primam divi thomae partem* (Cunca, 1592). Several significant early writings from the Évora period have been reprinted in Stegmüller (ed.), *Geschichte des Molinismus*, vol. 1 of *Neue Molinaschriften* (Munster: Aschendorff, 1935).

categorically touched off the conflict. The *Concordia* was the fruit of many years' reflection and writing while Molina was lecturing on the *Prima pars* of Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* at the University of Evora from 1570–73. During this time, Molina collected notes towards the publication of a commentary on the *Prima pars*, which was eventually published at Cuenca in 1592. The entire *Concordia* is in reality an extended commentary on a few select articles from the *Prima pars*: q. 14 a. 8 on whether God's knowledge is the cause of things, q. 14 a. 13 on whether God knows future contingent things (*Concordia*, I–IV), q. 19 a. 6 on whether the will of God is always fulfilled (*Concordia*, V), q. 22 aa. 1–4 on divine providence (*Concordia*, VI), and q. 23 aa. 1–5 on predestination (*Concordia*, VII). In this “bomb of a book,”³² Molina propounded an originaive and systematic account of libertarian free choice, simultaneous indifferent concurrence, and middle knowledge.³³

Bartolomeo Ferreira, O.P., then censor of the Portuguese Inquisition, suspected Molina's *Concordia* of containing at least some of Montemayor's previously condemned theses. Consequently, Cardinal Albert of Austria, the Grand Inquisitor of Portugal, halted circulation of the *Concordia* pending its review. He solicited the opinions of Báñez and several other theologians on the soundness of Molina's work. Báñez disapproved of it, objecting that the *Concordia* affirmed six of Montemayor's condemned theses. The determination was then made to condemn the *Concordia*, and Cardinal Albert called upon Molina to justify his work. In response, Molina wrote a defense arguing that his magnum

For a detailed account of Molina's life and work, see Iohannes Rabeneck, “De vita et scriptis Ludovici Molina,” *Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu* 19 (1950): 75–145.

32 Brodrick, *Robert Bellarmine*, 192.

33 While originaive, Molina's system was anticipated by the work of others, such as Jan Driedo (1480–1535); his pupil, Ruard Tapper (1487–1559); Tapper's pupil, Josse Ravesteyn (Tiletanus, 1506–70); and Tapper's junior colleague, Maarten Baudewyns (Rythovius, 1511–1583) (see Vansteenbergh, “Molinisme” 2095–97). All of these men were Catholic controversialists from Louvain and direct forerunners of Lessius. While there has been some suggestion that Pedro da Fonseca was the real originator of middle knowledge, Rabeneck argues that middle knowledge did in fact originate with Molina. See his “Antiqua legenda de Molina narrata examinatur,” *Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu* 24 (1955): 295–326. In an earlier article, “De Ludovici de Molina studiorum philosophiae curriculo,” *Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu* 6 (1937): 291–302, Rabeneck argues that Molina was not a student of Fonseca. The potentially strong, though indirect influence of Scotus on Molina's system has been also observed. See for example, Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy: Gifford Lectures 1931–32*, trans. A.H.C. Downes (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 1991), 321; see also the chapter on Molina in Douglas C. Langston, *God's Willing Knowledge: The Influence of Scotus' Analysis of Omniscience* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988).

opus contained none of Montemayor's condemned theses. Molina won the Inquisitor's approbation in 1589, and the *Concordia* was disseminated along with the *Appendix ad concordiam*, Molina's letter of defense to Cardinal Albert.

1.4 *The Escalation of the Controversy (Spain, 1593–94)*

A few years later, however, Molina's work again fell under scrutiny, this time because in 1590, the Spanish Inquisition, led by Cardinal Quiroga, had undertaken to assemble an updated index of prohibited books. The faculty at Salamanca, where both Báñez and Zumel held posts, was commissioned to review all recent literature. By 1593 the faculty were examining both Molina's *Concordia* and his recently published *Commentaria* on the first part of Thomas' *Summa theologiae* (Cunca, 1592).³⁴ Tensions built, and in 1594, Molina denounced Báñez and Zumel to the Inquisition, charging them both with maintaining Protestant doctrines. At this, Quiroga, put a stop to Báñez's review at Salamanca and demanded that all relevant documents be delivered. Around the same time, Báñez placed another censure on Molina's work, finding it to be opposed to both Church doctrine and natural reason (i.e., Thomistic metaphysics).

A series of highly charged public debates ensued between Dominicans and Jesuits at Valladolid in 1594. Rather than resolving the controversy, these debates made it greater than ever. Finally, at the advice of the papal ambassador to Spain, the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Aldobrandini, imposed silence on both parties and relayed that the matter would be reserved to the decision of the Holy See. That papal intervention had also meanwhile been sought by King Philip II, Quiroga and several other bishops and cardinals distressed by the controversy.

2 *The Second Period: Papal Intervention and the Congregatio de Auxiliis (1594–1607)*

Later in 1594, Quiroga solicited the opinions of several university faculties and other theologians on the orthodoxy of Molina's *Concordia*. In 1595, Salamanca placed a censure on the *Concordia*, just as Molina had a new edition published at Antwerp with revisions intended to address the concerns of his opponents.³⁵

34 It is worth noting that a second edition of the *Commentaria* was published at Lyon in 1593, which was supplemented by relevant passages from the *Concordia*. Later editions were subsequently published, the most recent being the Lyon edition of 1622.

35 For a summary of the revisions, see Vansteenbergh, "Molinisme" 2141–2153.

That same year, Báñez drafted the *Apologia*, a lengthy invective against the Jesuits and defense of the Dominican position. The Jesuits in turn wrote several defenses of their own. In 1597, Báñez wrote the *Libellus supplex*, addressed to Clement VIII, requesting the requirement of silence be lifted for the Dominicans, since it was not they, he argued, but the Jesuits, who had departed from the traditional teaching.

Between 1594 and 1597, the many writings that had accumulated from the controversy were gathered and sent to Rome. In November 1597, Clement VIII established a commission—the official *Congregatio de Auxiliis*—to study Molina's work and offer an evaluation of its orthodoxy. By March of 1598, the commission had decided to place a censure on both the *Concordia* and the *Commentaria*, but just then, a good many additional writings arrived from Spain to be examined.³⁶ Several months later—yet hardly long enough to carefully review the new evidence—the papal commission came to the same resolution as before: The *Concordia* was to be censured. At word of this, numerous intercessions were made to the Pope on behalf of the Jesuits, not only from among their own number, but also by the King of Spain, the Empress of Austria and other influential people.

Despite the commission's decision, Clement VIII decided to allow the discussion to continue, adopting a new colloquial format for the exchange. He presumably thought this might remedy the palpably negative and captious atmosphere of the debate. However, the colloquia were unfruitful and tensions only escalated.³⁷

In 1600, the commission resumed its normal sessions, deciding again in 1601, after three revisions of the censure, that Molina's theory was unorthodox. However, Clement VIII again refrained from making a decision, as several

36 Vansteenbergh specifies that the literature was comprised of three large collections: one from the Jesuits, one from the Dominicans, and one from the universities (see "Molinisme," 2155).

37 It bears mention that during this time (1599–1600), Báñez was formulating another significant work, although one not published until the mid 20th c.: the *Comentarios ineditos a la prima secundae de Santo Tomás*, 3 vols. ed. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P. (Salamanca: CSIC, 1942–48). See especially vol. 3, which concerns ST I–II qq. 109–14 (Thomas' tract on grace) and also includes Báñez's *Tractatus* (discussed below, Ch. 1). During these years Báñez also produced two important opuscula: the *Institutiones minores dialecticae*. *Responsio ad quinque quaestiones de efficacia divinae gratiae* and a transcription of an exchange he had with Jesuit fathers entitled: *De efficacia praevenientis auxilii gratiae, an sit intrinsece et a se, vel a libero hominis arbitrio*. Both works were published for the first time by Beltrán de Heredia in *Domínguez Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia: textos y documentos* (Madrid: CSIC, 1968).

universities and nobles supported Molina's orthodoxy and questioned that of Báñez. At this point, it seemed that a more determinative strategy would resolve the dispute. Robert Bellarmine, S.J. proposed that an ecumenical council be convened. Alternatively, his Jesuit confrere, Gregory of Valencia, made the simpler recommendation that the commission's sessions be held in the presence of the Pope.³⁸

From 1602–1606, representatives of the Dominican and the Jesuit schools debated in the presence of both the Pope and the commission. After dozens of sessions, the commission judged against Molina. While it seems Clement VIII may have been sympathetic to Báñez's cause, he died before promulgating a condemnation of Molina (interestingly, Bellarmine, years earlier, had predicted Clement would die before issuing a condemnation of Molina). Each member of the College of Cardinals then took an oath (mandatory by unanimous decision) to quickly resolve the dispute if elected Pope.³⁹ Leo XI was chosen in April 1605, but remarkably, after reigning only twenty-seven days, he too died before promulgating a decision. Following Leo XI, Paul V ascended the Chair of Peter in May of 1605. He had attended the previous sessions of the commission while a cardinal, and decided to resume hearings in his presence. Subsequent sessions continued to prove favorable to Báñez and unfavorable to Molina.

Finally, in 1607, Paul V called for the commission's verdict and also for the final opinion of each of its individual members. In the end, the commission was divided over whether to condemn Molina's theory. In accord with the advice of Francis de Sales and the repeated urgings Bellarmine had made to Clement VIII, Paul V by a bull of 5 September 1607 ended the debate, affirming the tenability of both theories and ordering the proponents of each theory to cease accusing proponents of the other theory of heresy.⁴⁰ Both parties were to await the final determination of the Holy See, which, more than 400 years later, has yet to come. Further, by a decree of the Inquisition in 1611, Paul V forbade the publication of books on the subject of efficacious grace without prior papal approbation.⁴¹

38 See Vansteenberghe, "Molinisme," 2159.

39 See Vansteenberghe, "Molinisme," 2162.

40 See DS §1997.

41 See the historical caption prior to DS §1997. Some earlier editions of Denzinger carry a more detailed introductory note which states the prohibition of Pius V and subsequently Urban VIII (see below) has fallen into disuse. As William Most points out, it is at least clear from §6.6 of the 1917 *Code of Canon Law* that the disciplinary laws prohibiting publication on matters *de auxiliis* is no longer in force. See Most, *Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions* (Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, 1997), 375.

While almost officially condemned at least six times, Molina's theory emerged ultimately unscathed and the *Concordia* became one of the most thoroughly examined books in Western history.⁴² Báñez' theory also emerged unscathed, although it seems never to have been either as carefully scrutinized or in as much jeopardy of ecclesiastical censure as Molina's theory. After a quarter of a century and well over a hundred meetings of the papal commission, the Controversy *de Auxiliis* was finally over.

3 Resurgences

The disagreement over the reconciliation of efficacious grace and human free choice continued to smolder till nearly 1800, flaring up repeatedly under the guise of the Jansenist controversy. The truce imposed by Paul v on the disputants in the Controversy *de Auxiliis* had to be reinforced under Urban VIII in 1625 and 1641, Innocent x in 1654, Alexander III in 1690, Clement XII in 1733, Benedict XIV in 1748 and finally again under Pius VI in 1794.⁴³ During this time there arose the development of a third major side to the controversy: the so-called Augustinian theory of premotion, which conceived of God's motion of the human will in terms of moral, rather than efficient causality.⁴⁴

Moreover, scholastic debate over grace and free choice again arose in the late nineteenth century following the reception of Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), which marked the dawn of neo-scholasticism. Indeed, the publication of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.'s doctoral dissertation, *Gratia Operans*, in 1941 can be considered as marking the close of the neo-scholastic debate over divine causality and human free choice. From *Aeterni Patris* to Lonergan, a number of significant works on *de Auxiliis* were published, ranging from Norbert del Prado, O.P. and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.'s landmark defenses of

42 See Alfred J. Freddoso, "Preface," in Luis de Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge*, viii.

43 See DS §§1997 (note), 2008, 2331, 2509–10, 2564, 2679. Alexander III's reinforcement came in the form of a bull (1690) condemning certain Jansenist errors, including the proposition that Urban VIII's bull, *In eminenti ecclesiae* (which reinforced Paul v's ruling on matters *de auxiliis*)—was fraudulent. Pius VI's reinforcement came in the context of his condemnation of the Jansenist (and Gallican) pseudo synod of Pistoia in his constitution *Auctorem fidei*. Among its teachings, Pistoia included a grievous breach of the theological freedom repeatedly guaranteed earlier by Pius VI's predecessors, apparently by its vehement assault on Molinism (in matters of grace) and probabilism (in morals).

44 For an introduction to this school of thought, see E. Portalié, "Augustianisme," in *DTC* 1-2:2485–2501; R.P. Russell, "Augustinianism" and "Augustinianism, Theological School of," in *NCE* 1:880–86.

classical physical premotion to more compromising theories, such as Louis Billot, S.J.'s 'semi-Bañezianism'⁴⁵ and the theory of impeded premotion developed by del Prado's successor at Fribourg, Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P.—a theory later adopted by Jacques Maritain and independently arrived at by others.⁴⁶ This period also saw important historical scholarship on Molina, notably Friedrich Stegmüller's *Neue Molinaschriften* and Johannes Rabeneck, S.J.'s early research on Molina's intellectual formation. Another notable work from this period (and just before Lonergan's dissertation) is Gerard Smith, S.J.'s aforementioned doctoral dissertation, *Freedom in Molina*.

Even if there was no significant theological development concerning divine causality and human free choice in the period between Lonergan's work and the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), significant publication on matters *de auxiliis* continued through the end of the 1960s. During this period, Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, O.P. published a number of important historical essays, as well as Báñez's previously unpublished commentaries on the *Prima secundae* and several opuscula from the Controversy *de Auxiliis*.⁴⁷ It was also during this period, in 1953, that Rabeneck published his critical edition of Molina's *Concordia* at Oña and Madrid.

Beginning with the end of the 1960s, a theological sea-change, occasioned perhaps in part by the confluence of *Ressourcement*, the Second World War, Vatican Council II and the subsequent advent of new, contextual or liberationist theological methodologies, resulted in a decline of interest in traditionally

45 Stebbins, 203–04 (n. 112) notes that the term 'semi-Bañezian' is Lonergan's own. Billot's basic idea, as introduced by Stebbins is that God's premotion of the will is to the will's indeliberate act of willing the end, not to its deliberate act of choosing the means. Thus, on this system, there is physical premotion without physical predetermination.

46 See for example, Jacques Maritain, *God and the Permission of Evil*, trans. Joseph W. Evans (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966). Michael Torre wrote an extensive dissertation expositing and defending Marín-Sola's work some thirty years ago. This study was recently published as *God's Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree?* (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2009). He has recently published a translation of several seminal articles on the topic by Marín-Sola, together with his own commentary and extensive historical contextualization. See Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call: Francisco Marín-Sola on Sufficient Grace* (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2013). William Most independently arrived at what is essentially the same position, which he sees as corresponding also to that of Mark Pontifex, O.S.B., Charles Cardinal Journet and Philippe de la Trinité. See Guilielmo G. Most, *Novum tentamen ad solutionem de gratia et praedestinatione* (Rome: Editones Paulinae, 1963), later revised and published in English as cited above.

47 See the volumes mentioned in n. 37, above.

scholastic topics.⁴⁸ Since then, interest in the relationship between human freedom and divine causality has, in general, waned significantly among Catholic theologians, although there has been some resurgence particularly among contemporary analytic philosophers of religion.⁴⁹

As will be shown in the final chapter of this study, several recent thinkers have more or less independently advanced a more satisfactory proposal for understanding the relationship between divine causality and human free choice by recourse to Aquinas's teaching on creation. Their proposal (which I shall abbreviate TPC for 'Total Personal Creation') is distinct from both the original positions of Báñez and Molina, and from later developments such as those of Lonergan and Marín-Sola. TPC breaks with the common suppositions framing both the classical debate and the contemporary debate between libertarians and compatibilists by focusing upon the implications of God's being the transcendent cause of *esse*.

48 Though note in this period the posthumous publication of the collected works of the great 20th c. Thomistic commentator, Santiago Ramirez, O.P. (1891–1967). On the topic at hand see especially his *Opera omnia* v. 4: *De actibus humanis*, 239–61 (§§337–364); v. 8.2: *De vitiis et peccatis*, 493–94 (§215) and v. 9.2: *De gratia*, 758–84 (§§232–260).

49 Two counterexamples to this general trend are Stebbins' work on Lonergan and Joseph P. Wawrykow's *God's Grace and Human Action: Merit in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 1995). Wawrykow's book relies on Lonergan's reading of Aquinas for the precise relationship of divine causality and human free choice. These works illuminate one additional factor that likely contributes to the decline of theological work on divine causality and human free choice, at least among Catholic scholars in this period: That is the belief the question had already been settled by Lonergan a generation earlier.

Domingo Báñez on Divine Causality and Human Free Choice

[T]he active determination of the will depends on the passive motion, which is from the free choice of God intimately operating and moving and reducing the capacity of free choice to act according to the mode of its nature, by illuminating the intellect that it would better apprehend the means and inspiring the will that it would efficaciously choose that which is well pleasing to God.¹

DOMINGO BÁÑEZ

In this chapter I treat the thought of Domingo Báñez on divine causality and human free choice. The chapter has three parts. The first deals with physical premotion—the divine assistance by which God operates in every agent cause (*ST* I q. 105 a. 5). The second deals with the nature of human free choice. The third deals with divine causality with respect to the act of sin, one of the most crucial aspects of the Controversy *de Auxiliis*.

1 Divine Art: The Idea of Physical Premotion

The basis for Báñez's discussion of divine-human cooperation is St. Thomas's axiom that creatures depend on God for all their operations.² Thomas maintains that God works in every agent cause according to three principles of action: the end, the agent and the form. God works in created agent causes according to the second of these principles by *moving* created agents to act. This movement is something beyond bringing a created agent cause into being with its respective form, by virtue of which it is able to act, and it is something beyond the conservation of a created agent cause. God's *moving* created agent causes is his *applying* them to actual operation. Because created agents stand

1 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §6 (381): "activa determinatio voluntatis pendens est a passiva motione, quae est a libero arbitrio Dei, intime operantis et moventis et reducentis in actum liberum arbitrium juxta modum suae naturae, illuminando intellectum ut melius cognoscat media, et inspirando in voluntatem ut efficaciter eligat quod beneplacitum est Deo."

2 See *ST* I q. 105 a. 5 c, ad 3; cf. I–II q. 109 a. 1 c.

in relation to God as secondary causes to the first cause, they act only in virtue of his acting and cannot act apart from him. It is important to note the universality of the principle, *Deus operatur in omni operante*. By *omni operante* Thomas means *all* created agents, including those with the capacity of free choice. This affirmation however, raises questions, for elsewhere Thomas maintains that the act of free choice consists in the *self*-movement of the will.³ How can the will move itself if it is moved by God? What does it mean for God to 'move' the free will?

Báñez answers these questions with his theory of physical premotion. Physical premotion is, for Báñez, a kind of divine aid or assistance {*auxilium*}, by which God *applies* the human will to act. Thus, to understand physical premotion, and therefore, how the will is both a self-mover and moved by God, one must understand divine assistance. However, while all physical premotion is divine aid, not all divine aid is physical premotion. Therefore, it is necessary to explain what specifies the *auxilium* that is physical premotion. Moreover, *auxilia* that are instances of physical premotion can be further categorized into different kinds according to whether they are for the performance of natural or supernatural acts, and whether, in either case, they are directed toward the will's first act ('volition' or the willing of the end) or its second act ('choice' or the willing of the means). Thus, on Báñez's theory, there are different kinds of physical premotions.

The aim of Part One of this chapter is to explore the idea of physical premotion in detail. Part One will be divided into five sections. First, I will take up the theme of divine *auxilium* in order to clarify what kind of divine assistance physical premotion is and is not, and further, what kinds of physical premotions there are. Second, I will take up the notion of 'vital act' in order to clarify the sense in which a creature premoved by God moves itself and produces an act that is properly its own. The third section will be devoted to the immediacy of divine causality and the final two sections will probe the ontological status of physical premotion by considering its relationship to the human subject's resultant vital operation, particularly in light of texts that seem to raise challenges to the received understanding of physical premotion.

The principal loci for the present investigation are found in Báñez's posthumously published commentary on *ST* I–II qq. 109–114 (1599–1600) and the Second Part of the also posthumously published *Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter moventis*

3 See *ST* I q. 83 a. 1 ad 3; I–II prol.; q. 9 a. 3.

humanem voluntatem, a mature work (1600) that provides a synoptic overview of Báñez's thought on divine causality and human free choice.⁴

1.1 Báñez's Account of Divine Auxilium

The Controversy *de Auxiliis* was, as its name suggests, a debate about divine aid, or *auxilium*. But what exactly is *auxilium*? Báñez defines *auxilium* as “the influence of an efficient cause ordered to some operation or motion of a pre-existing thing.”⁵ There are several things to note about this definition.

1.1.1 *Auxilium* is not Creation

The first is that *auxilium* differs from creation. Whereas creation makes a thing to be from nothing, *auxilium* presupposes the existence of the thing that is aided or moved to act.⁶ This distinction first implies the causal indigence of creatures: a creaturely potency, such as the will, once created, exists; but,

4 The *Tractatus* is included as an appendix to Beltrán de Heredia's edition of Báñez's unpublished commentary on the grace tract of the *Prima secundae*. See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la 1–II*, 351–420. To clarify or corroborate Báñez's position, I will also rely at points on Diego Alvarez's, *De auxiliis divinæ gratiæ et humani arbitrii viribus, et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorumdem auxiliorum concordia libri duodecim* (Cologne: Antonium Boetzerum, 1622)—hereafter '*De aux.*' A younger contemporary and a Dominican confrere of Báñez, Alvarez (1550?–1631) single-handedly defended Báñez's position before congregations of the papal commission *de Auxiliis* for three years beginning in 1596 with his assignment to teach at the Minerva in Rome. Alvarez was widely regarded as a first-rate defender of the Dominican position, not only in his own day but for generations afterward (note, for example, the regard of del Prado and Garrigou-Lagrange). Most of Alvarez's published work concerns the topic of grace and free will. For these reasons, I take Alvarez to be a reliable representative of Báñez's views on divine causality in general. I have noted one minor point of disagreement relevant to, but not decisive for, the Dominican position in the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. There may be others, but none, I think, of the sort that would render Alvarez an unreliable witness to Báñez's position. On the life and work of Diego Alvarez, see the entries by Quetif and Echard, 2:481a–482a; McMahon, *CE* 1:373b–374a; Duval, *NCE* 1:325–26 and Mandonnet, *DTC* 1-1:926–27. *De aux.* III dd. 18–19 contain one of the clearest and most detailed discussions of the ontological status of physical pre-motions I have found, and they also are a primary source of the *Controversy de Auxiliis*, not a product of later scholasticism.

5 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §2 (374): “Possumus itaque definire auxilium esse influentiam causae efficientis ad aliquam operationem vel motum rei praeexistentis ordinatam.” It is necessary to qualify this definition insofar as Báñez does admit *auxilia* that are not efficient causal influences (for he acknowledges *auxilia* that exert a kind of moral or final causality); but the definition remains useful insofar as Báñez's principal concern is with efficient, or ‘physical’ *auxilia*.

6 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §§1–2 (373–74).

Báñez maintains, despite being a principle that is formally sufficient for its own operation, the created potency still lacks what it needs to actually operate. For actual operation the help of God is required. God's help is understood here specifically as a *moving*, for, as Thomas maintains in *ST* I–II q. 109 a. 1, “However perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it is not able to proceed to its act unless it would be moved by God.”⁷ Adopting this axiom, Báñez repeatedly affirms that, “all creatures need, for their operation or motion, the *auxilium* of God, the first mover.”⁸

While the distinction of aid from creation first implies the causal indigence of creatures, at the same time it suggests that creaturely causes have a certain causal integrity: On Báñez's view, creaturely causes have the power to produce an effect properly their own. Creaturely agent causes have such agential integrity or causal power in virtue of their being and their being *what* they are. This latter point refers to a created agent's essence and indicates what it means to say that a creaturely agent cause is *formally* sufficient for the production of its own act. Since created causes are formally sufficient as causes, they are divinely *aided* actually to perform *their own* operations. Insofar as these operations are produced by the created causes themselves, the created causes are neither mere instruments of God, nor mere occasions for God to exercise a causality solely his own. Otherwise, creaturely causes would be mere tools, not agents, or they would not be causes at all.⁹

This point will serve to highlight a second feature of Báñez's account of *auxilium*, namely, the distinction between *auxilium*—understood in a strict sense—and *concursum*.¹⁰ According to Báñez, there is aid that is not concurrence, concurrence that is not aid, and aid that is, at the same time, concurrence.

1.1.2 Concurrence and *Auxilium*, Habitual and Actual

As Báñez understands it, “*auxilium* properly bespeaks an influence into the principal, even if secondary cause; but concurrence bespeaks an influence into the effect produced.”¹¹ An influence that is at once both aid and concurrence

7 “Et ideo quantumcumque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis ponatur perfectus, non potest in suum actum procedere nisi moveatur a Deo.”

8 Báñez, *Tractatus*, II c. 1 §2 (374): “idcirco [*ST* I–II q. 109 a. 1 c.] omnis creatura indiget ad suam operationem vel motum auxilio Dei primi moventis.”

9 In other words, to maintain that God simply supplies a creature's acts rather than moves a creature to act is putatively to court occasionalism. This point will be revisited below.

10 Báñez's use of terms at times allows for *concursum* to be understood as a kind of *auxilium*, broadly speaking. He is careful to distinguish the precise, technical sense of ‘*auxilium*’, however, in *Tractatus* II c. 2 §3 (385–86).

11 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §3 (385): “Nam *auxilium* proprie dicit *influentiam in causam principalem*, etiamsi sit *secundaria*; *concursum* vero dicit *influentiam in effectum productum* . . .”.

attains both to the other cause and to the combined effect of both causes. What distinguishes aid from concurrence, then, is whether the influence of the helping cause is at the level of the cause helped or the jointly produced effect.

What auxilium is *not*, however, is a sort of influence at the level of effect alone, where the other 'cause' producing the effect is a mere instrument rather than another agent. Such causal influence is not aid, but a kind of concurrence. The example given by Báñez is that of an artist and his paintbrush. Physical premotion (at least physical premotion of the relevant sort) is not instrumental concurrence.

In contrast, concurrence that is aid attains not only to the joint effect produced, but also to the other cause producing it (which cause is not a mere instrument, but an agent cause in its own right). Concurrence that is aid is physical premotion. It is aid bestowed upon a cause, which brings about that cause's actual production of some particular effect.

Yet, there is also aid that is not concurrence. Aid that is not concurrence is not physical premotion.¹² The example Báñez gives of such aid is God's bestowal of habitual grace and infusion of the theological virtues. This sort of aid—which I shall call 'habitual aid' or 'habitual *auxilium*'—does attain at the level of cause, for it introduces something new in the other agent, but what distinguishes it from physical premotion is that what is introduced is a disposition or aspect of character (a *habitus*) that disposes one for action rather than a causal stimulus that moves one to the actual performance of some particular, determinate action.¹³ I shall call the divine assistance that moves one to the

12 For a contrasting view from one of Báñez's non-Dominican but Thomist contemporaries, see Pedro de Cabrera, OSH (1539–1616)—(not to be confused with a coeval Franciscan with the same name)—*In tertiam partem Sancti Thomae Aquinatis comentarij et disputationes a qvæstione decima vsque ad vigesimam sextam inclusiue* (Cordoba: Andrea Barrera, 1602) q. 18 a. 4 d. 6 dub. 1 §20 (408a). Cabrera considers habitual *auxilium* such as infused *habitus* to be a kind of physical premotion. I take Báñez's position to exclude such a view. Báñez distinguishes physical premotion as an influx of *efficient* causality from an inhering form (such as a quality). On Báñez's view, God does not formally determine the will by a physical premotion. The motivation for Báñez's position is that if God did so determine the will, it would leave no room for the freedom of the will. Because Cabrera considers actual *auxilium* (i.e. physical premotion in Báñez's sense) to be a transient *quality*, he is able to consider habitual *auxilium*—which is clearly a form—*physical*. In short, there is no division of 'physical' from 'form' or 'quality' for Cabrera, whereas for Báñez and Alvarez, it seems there is. For Báñez, 'physical' in 'physical premotion' specifies *efficient* causality.

13 This would include any natural analog of supernatural habits (habitual grace), if there is such an analog. Báñez clearly thinks there is a natural analog (physical premotions for the performance of deeds proportionate to man's nature) to supernatural actual grace (physical premotions for the performance of deeds beyond the proportion of man's nature).

performance of some particular action ‘actual aid’ or ‘actual *auxilium*’. In conclusion then, physical premotion is God’s actual (as opposed to habitual) *auxilium* (as opposed to mere *concursus*).

The distinction between aid and concurrence is important because it lies at the center of a disagreement between Báñez and the Jesuit school over the nature of divine aid: According to Molina and Suárez, God’s *auxilium generale* is nothing more than his conservation of secondary causes and his immediate, indifferent concurrence with their operations and effects.¹⁴ Molina and Suárez deny that creatures endowed with causal powers of their own require anything more to be introduced *de novo* in order to act, because if something additional were required, the causal integrity of secondary causes would be undermined. Furthermore, in Molina and Suárez’s view, if free secondary causes were unable to move themselves without the addition of something from outside, they would not be free.

In contrast, Báñez maintains that *auxilium* consists not in the mere conservation of a created agent cause and a cooperative causal influence only at the level of effect, but rather a causal impulse that influences the creaturely agent itself, resulting in that agent’s action.¹⁵ Báñez points out in response to Molina that for God’s influence to attain to an agent’s operation is nothing other than for it to influence *that agent* as operating.¹⁶ Furthermore, to deny that God causally influences created agents, but instead influences only their effects, sets up a view of divine-human cooperation that sees God as a partial cause with the human agent (like two men dragging a boat, to use Molina’s quint-essential example).¹⁷ This, for Báñez, depreciates divine omnipotence and destroys basic metaphysical principles, rendering, in particular, the teaching of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* VIII nugatory.¹⁸

1.1.3 *Auxilium* and the Designation ‘Physical Premotion’

Báñez’s definition of the divine assistance he calls *auxilium* also makes it clear that such divine aid is an influx of *efficient*, not final causality. For this reason, in most contexts Báñez considers actual *auxilium* to be ‘physical’. The modifier

¹⁴ See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §5 (387).

¹⁵ This is true even while *auxilium* at the same time attains to the effect the creature produces: “Hic tamen influxus immediate attingit causam et effectum, quoniam ut est a Deo non dependet a causa secunda, quamvis ipse effectus pendeat ab utraque.” *Tractatus* II c. 1 §4 (377).

¹⁶ See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §4 (377).

¹⁷ See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §15.

¹⁸ See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §6 (379).

‘physical’ used of *auxilium* is worthy of explanation, however, since ‘physical’ might initially suggest formal as opposed to efficient causality. That is because the term ‘physical’ is derived from φύσις, the Greek term for nature, and a nature, in the Aristotelian sense, is an intrinsic formal determination of certain things which makes those things to act in a specified, characteristic sort of way and so to *be* a certain sort of thing.¹⁹ God’s *auxilium* is not physical in this sense. It is not the moving of a secondary cause to act through the endowment of a nature that determines the secondary cause to act as it does. If *auxilium* were physical in this sense, it would leave no room for the freedom of the secondary cause, for a thing’s nature determines it *ad unum*.²⁰

The term ‘physical’ also does not carry the connotations of modern physics—a potential stumbling block for the contemporary reader of Báñez influenced by the rise of modern science. God’s *auxilium* is not ‘physical’ in the sense of ‘material’—a collision between bodies in motion. *Auxilium* is not a bodily push or shove.²¹ Rather, *auxilium* is considered to be ‘physical’ because it is an influx of efficient causality that is true and real in the natural order.²²

19 I refer here to ‘nature’ not simply as the form of any object, but as the form of a ‘natural’ thing (as opposed to an artifact). For more on the idea of nature, see Book II of Aristotle’s *Physics* (192b 7–200b 10); cf. III.1 (200b 12).

20 On this point, see Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §1–2 (170a–171b).

21 It does seem to me however that Báñez’s use of the term ‘physical’ for God’s *auxilium* is not completely incidental to the revolution in scientific thinking that was beginning to dawn in Báñez’s day. Considerable work would need to be done to trace and test the possible connections—an enterprise that ranges well beyond the limits of the present investigation. But even while Báñez surely did not have our modern understanding of the convertibility of matter and energy, I do think he envisioned God’s transeunt causality passing into the creature as a sort of divine energy {influxus}, an impulse that emanates from God and terminates in the creature, stimulating it to act. I also think that the Controversy *de Auxiliis* was not a mere intramural theological dispute, but broadly forced considerable reflection on the nature of causality during the early modern period. The question of the relationship between grace and freedom, divine and human action was, arguably, *the* question *du jour*, and it likely shaped the development of modern philosophical positions on causality as well as scientific thinking on the causal relations between things in (at least subhuman) nature.

22 Alvarez illustrates this point by recourse to the Council of Ephesus’s (431) use of the term ‘physical’ to describe the hypostatic union: That union is not ‘physical’ in the sense of being located in one of the two *natures* {φύσεις}; rather, as ‘hypostatic’, the union is in the person (*suppositum* or ὑπόστασις). The council Fathers’ claim (against Nestorius) is that the union of Christ’s two natures is ‘physical’ in the sense of being “true and real” as opposed to merely apparent or metaphorical, or an accidental union of two distinct

This is an important point because Báñez acknowledges that not all actual *auxilia* are influxes of physical (efficient) causality: Some actual *auxilia* exert a moral as opposed to a physical influence on the will. Moral *auxilia* can take the form of God's vocation or invitation, or his presenting some particular object to the will to attract its response. Moral *auxilia* are instances of final causality at work, rather than instances of efficient (physical) causality. While Báñez does not deny the existence of moral *auxilium*, he argues that it does not obviate the need for physical *auxilium*, because moral aid does not efficaciously guarantee the will's determinate response. But such an ensured determinate response is necessary if the infallibility of divine governance is to be upheld. In sum, God's *auxilium* is *physical*—that is, an influx of *efficient causality*.

God's physical *auxilium* is also *prior* to the action of the secondary cause, not, however, in time, but in nature or causality: God's action can be temporally simultaneous with the creature's action, but it always antecedes the creature's action insofar as God is the *first* cause, the prime mover.²³

Finally, because this antecedent physical influence *changes* the created potency that receives it from a state of non-operation to actual operation, it is called a 'motion.' That is why on Báñez's system, God's actual *auxilium* is called '*physical pre-motion*.' Hereafter, 'aid' or '*auxilium*' will refer specifically to physical premotion unless otherwise specified.

1.1.4 Natural and Supernatural *Auxilium*

A fourth point about divine *auxilium* is that it is needed for the performance of *all* creaturely operations. This point is based on a Thomistic axiom to which Báñez repeatedly appeals: That all creatures, however perfect, are unable to proceed to act unless moved by God (*ST* I–II q. 109 a. 1 c.). This means, first, that God's help needed for the performance of those acts that are proportionate to human nature and not only for those that are beyond it.

Báñez calls God's aid to acts proportionate to human nature *auxilium generale*.²⁴ *Auxilium generale* is required for the doing of all naturally good acts—that is, acts that are not sins insofar as they are reasonably directed toward human goods, but which are nevertheless not meritoriously good because they are not directed toward God as ultimate end (St. Thomas gives the

substances founded on dignity or authority. See Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §2 (170b–171a); d. 23 §19 (217b); cf. *ST* III q. 2 a. 6.

23 Besides a physical premotion's natural or causal priority to the human act of free choice, Alvarez also maintains that the physical premotion has a "conceptual priority" {prioritas rationalis}. See for example, *De aux.* III d. 23 §1 (206b), cf. for instance, III d. 18 §9 (136a).

24 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §§4–5 (387).

examples of an unbeliever's building a house or planting a vineyard).²⁵ God's aid is called *auxilium supernaturale* if it is for the willing or doing of supernatural good—that is, for the performance of actions oriented toward God as their ultimate end even if in a merely preparatory way. The divisions of supernatural aid correspond to the divisions of grace set out in *ST* I–II q. 111. Some of these divisions have been anticipated by the discussion above. For example, supernatural *auxilia* are either habitual or actual; they are also either operative or cooperative, depending on whether they move the will to an elicited act (such as volition, intention or choice) or to a commanded act (use), and *auxilia* are either prevenient or subsequent, depending on the relative position of the act they produce in Thomas's sequence of human will-acts.²⁶

Báñez's position that divine *auxilium* is needed for the performance of *all* creaturely operations means, secondly, that divine *auxilium* is just as much needed for acts of willing the end as for acts of willing the means. Insofar as an act of choice always presupposes a prior act of will with respect to the end—an act of will which renders choice possible—at least two physical premotions are presupposed in every act of choice: a physical premotion that produces that act of choice itself and a prevenient physical premotion that produces an act of willing of the end (whether this act is the simple willing of the end or a previous choice, such as free consent to the end), in virtue of which act, the end being willed, the agent is disposed to will the means to it.²⁷

25 See *ST* I–II q. 109 a. 2, cf. a. 1. The thought, in contrast to the condemned theses of individuals such as Martin Luther, Michael de Bay, Cornelius Jansen and Pasquier Quesnel, is that not every act one does prior to justification is necessarily a sin. The fallen human person is capable of deliberate actions that are naturally good, though without the grace of justification, one is not capable of meritorious actions. Moreover, one can do no good action prior to justification which is dispositive for justification without the aid of prevenient actual grace.

26 For a helpful schema illustrating the sequence of will acts on St. Thomas's action theory (as well as their relation to the corresponding sequence of acts of intellect), see, for example, John Finnis, *Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory* (Oxford: OUP, 1998), 71. See also Alan Donagan, "Thomas Aquinas on Human Action," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 642–54.

27 On the account given here of Báñez's position, it need not be assumed that separate premotions are required for the intention of the end and the act of free choice that intention involves (consensus), only that one premotion is needed for the *volition* of the end and another for the act which is at once intention-of-the-end-and-choice-of-the-means, which latter act ensues upon a prior volition of the end. On the connection between choice and intention, see Finnis, "Object and Intention in Moral Judgments According to Aquinas," *The Thomist* 55 (1991): 1–27. Note that while this means there are *at least* two premotions assumed in every act of choice (one for the act of simple volition and one for

1.1.5 Sufficient and Efficacious *Auxilium*

According to Báñez, there is one further and very important division of actual *auxilium* besides those that have already been mentioned. This final division is not explicitly made by St. Thomas, but derives from fifteenth-century thought, and it lies at the heart of the controversy between the Dominican and Jesuit schools over the nature of actual grace.²⁸ For Báñez, supernatural actual *auxilia*—whether operative or cooperative, prevenient or subsequent—are either intrinsically and infallibly efficacious or merely sufficient (and intrinsically inefficacious) for producing the free choices that are necessary for one's salvation.²⁹

the act of choice), Báñez's position would seem to entail that often there are often at least three: In cases where the relevant act of *liberum arbitrium* is not consent to actually will (i.e., intend) the end that is simply willed (i.e. by an act of simple volition), but a commanded act of *deliberatio* (including judgment)-and-*electio* that presupposes the previous act of consent to the end, it would seem a distinct physical premotion is required. I say "would seem to entail" because I have not yet found this issue explicitly addressed in Báñez. Moreover, whether *consensus* (the effect of operative grace) and a commanded act of *deliberatio* and *electio* (the effect of cooperative grace) require two distinct premotions is a question of whether operative and cooperative are the same grace. But, as explained in note 29 below, there is disagreement among Báñez's followers as to whether operative and cooperative are the same grace when this is a question of actual as opposed to habitual grace (as it is here). Also, following Thomas, Báñez thinks that for every act of will there is a corresponding act of intellect (charts such as the one mentioned in Finnis, *Aquinas*, above, helpfully illustrate this correspondence in the sequence of intellect and will acts). Whether Báñez thinks a distinct premotion is required for each intellectual act is an interesting question, but not one I will attempt to answer here. If the answer is affirmative (as I think it may be), it means that Báñez's system of physical premotion is actually quite complex, with several premotions assumed in every act of choice. Additionally, it would seem by extension that everything said here about physical premotions understood as supernatural *auxilia* (actual graces) would also apply by analogy on the natural plane: in the case of natural acts of free choice there must be always at least two and often three physical premotions, and this number is increased if a separate physical premotion is required for each intellectual act corresponding to an actuation of the will.

28 It is often pointed out that the division of actual grace into sufficient and efficacious—a division which Báñez presupposes—is nowhere to be found in Aquinas's tract on grace. While this is true, it must also be acknowledged that Aquinas elsewhere does at least come close to such a distinction (see for example *QDV* q. 29 a. 7 ad 4 on the merit of Christ).

29 It is important to note that a free choice can be produced by *operative* grace and not only by cooperative grace. Thus the distinction between sufficient and efficacious cannot be reduced to the distinction between operative and cooperative. The reason is that justification is the result of operative grace and justification presupposes a dispositive act

To understand this point, it is necessary to first recognize that, in Báñez's view, all grace is 'efficacious' in the sense that all grace efficaciously brings about the effect God intends it to achieve.³⁰ God's will, for Báñez, is not defectible and his causal influence is not determinable by creatures. Nevertheless, God does not always intend his *auxilium* to efficaciously result in a salutary act of free choice,³¹ so that not all grace is 'efficacious' for such an act. Grace that does not efficaciously issue in a salutary act of free choice is said to be by its very nature merely 'sufficient'. The important point here is that, according to Báñez, the efficacy of *auxilium* is not determined by the mode of human response to it (acceptance or rejection—as on Molina's view), but by the intrinsic quality of the *auxilium* itself. Báñez insists on this point in order to preserve the infallibility of divine governance. On Báñez's view, since God is not determined by creatures' actions, he infallibly determines them.

Thus far, I have traced the main aspects of what *auxilium* is on Báñez's view. Báñez understands *auxilium* to be a causal impulse—a physical premotion—which flows from God into secondary agents, applying them to act. Such a causal impulse is necessary for any and every creaturely act to obtain. Moreover, God's *auxilia* are intrinsically efficacious of the ends for which they are intended by God, although not all *auxilia* are intended to efficaciously produce and predetermine a salutary act of free choice. With this understanding of *auxilium* in mind, I will now consider the precise way in which God works in the human will.

of *liberum arbitrium* (free consent). See *ST* I–II q. 111 a. 2 ad 2; q. 113 aa. 3, 5–8. Followers of Báñez disagree over whether operative and cooperative *actual* grace are numerically distinct or identical (they agree operative and cooperative *habitual* grace is one). Pedro de Herrera, O.P. (Báñez's successor at the University of Salamanca) thinks operative and cooperative can be numerically identical (see *Com inéd a la I–II* q. 111 a. 2 §12 (198–99), whereas Báñez's 20th c. disciple, Garrigou-Lagrange thinks they are numerically distinct (see his *Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas, 1a 11ae q. 109–14*, trans. The Dominican Nuns of Corpus Christi Monastery, Menlo Park, CA (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1952), 174–75 (cf. 179).

30 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 3 §6 *secunda conclusio* (392).

31 The *auxilium* could, for example, be intended to produce a *volition* of the good but not the actual, freely consented willing of it. In this case, *auxilium* would not be intended to produce an act of free choice, though it would efficaciously issue in a simple willing of the end. Or *auxilium* could be intended to produce the act of sin *as act*, (though not *as sin!*), and therefore it would be intended to efficaciously produce an act of free choice but not a salutary one.

1.2 *Physical Premotion and the Idea of ‘Vital Act’*

How is the will both moved by God and a self-mover according to Báñez? To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit the notion of ‘vital potencies’ and ‘vital acts’—a commonplace of scholastic theology that has since become obscure. It is necessary to revisit this idea because Báñez regards *liberum arbitrium* as a vital potency and *electio*, or choice, a vital act. Vital potencies are powers of soul—a living thing’s principle of life.³² Vital potencies are the capacities for action possessed by created animate beings as such. In other words, vital potencies are powers that creatures have in virtue of being alive. Creatures that possess life, because they live, are able to produce acts that are properly their own. Such acts are called ‘vital acts.’

Vital potencies, Báñez explains, are perfected by their respective ‘vital acts.’³³ For example, vision is a vital potency which is perfected by the immanent, vital act of sight. Similarly, the intellect is perfected by understanding, judging and reasoning, the senses are perfected by sensation, and *liberum arbitrium* is perfected by the act of choice or *electio*.³⁴ What is important to recognize is that the act which perfects a vital potency originates from that potency and is proper to it. In other words, vital potencies really and operatively produce their own acts,³⁵ and furthermore, are formally *sufficient*, as principles, for the production of their proper acts.

If this is so however, why do they need divine *auxilium*? For if *liberum arbitrium* is a sufficient principle for the production of its own act—the act of choice—why would the power to choose stand in need of divine *auxilium* to pass into operation? For Báñez, the answer is that however much vital potencies are formally sufficient as principles for the production of their acts, no principle, however sufficient by its form or nature, can *actually operate* apart

32 While to the best of my knowledge Aquinas does not use the term ‘vital act’, he does speak of free choice as a “motion of the vital and rational soul,” following Augustine (*QDV* q. 24 a. 4), and elsewhere speaks of the soul as the principle of ‘vital deeds’ {*operum vitae*} (*ST* I–II q. 110 a. 4 ad 1; also cf. *SCG* IV c. 20 §6).

33 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §5 (387).

34 While Báñez notes the fact that vital potencies are perfected by their respective vital acts is clearest in the case of immanent acts, the same is true of transeunt acts. See *Tractatus* II c. 2 §5 (387).

35 This point is evident from Báñez’s insistence in response to Suárez, that the will is not merely passive, but actively indifferent with respect to its exercise. See *Tractatus* I c. 1 §6 (358), §9, *nota quarto* (362). Báñez also devoted an unpublished opuscula to this issue (“*Responsio ad questionem*,” found in Ms. 862 at the Biblioteca Angelica, Rome), but Fr. García Cuadrado notes that this piece adds nothing substantial to what has already been said in Báñez’s commentaries and other recently published works on the grace controversy. See García Cuadrado, *Domingo Báñez*, 56.

from the movement of the first mover flowing into and actuating it, moving it from a state of potency to a state of act. The reason for this is an outworking of the doctrines of creation and conservation: All things that obtain rather than not obtaining—including movements of creaturely free will—depend upon God to obtain. For, as Báñez says, “just as the *esse* of God is the cause perpetually inflowing *esse* into creatures, thus it is necessary that whenever a creature goes from not operating to operating, or in any other way moves or is moved, the influx of divine motion is prior in the order of causality.”³⁶ It is interesting that Báñez here not only (implicitly) affirms *God’s* causal priority with respect to creaturely operations, he also refers to an ‘influx of divine motion’ that is causally prior to the creaturely action.

Báñez and other proponents of this view find support in Aquinas’s *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7.³⁷ This crucial text is the backdrop against which to understand Báñez’s view of physical *auxilium*. Responding to the seventh objection, which is that creaturely agents need nothing further than their natural powers of operation to actually operate (since otherwise there would be an infinite regress of divine actions required for creaturely operation),³⁸ Aquinas teaches,

36 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §5 (378): “sicut esse Dei est causa perpetuo influens esse in creaturis, ita necesse est ut quando creatura transit de non operante in operantem, vel quomolibet alias movet aut movetur, ita influxus divinae motionis sit prior ordine causalitatis.”

37 In addition to Báñez’s references to this passage, cf. for example, Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 18 §§9, 17–18, (136b, 141b); d. 19 §5 (149b–150a). Note that while proponents of physical pre-motion argue that several passages from Aquinas contain the idea of physical pre-motion (especially *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7), that idea is not explicit in Aquinas and the terminology ‘*praemotio physica*’ does not appear anywhere in Thomas’ writings. Thomas does however occasionally employ the term ‘*praedeterminatio*’ in relevant contexts, though whether his use of this term corresponds to Báñez’s theory of physical pre-motion is controversial. It is clear in general from the literature that the very terminology of ‘physical pre-motion’ was a subject of controversy (both in itself and as an interpretation of Aquinas), somewhat as was the label, ‘Bañezian’ in contradistinction to ‘Thomist’. On the former point, see for example, Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §1 (169b–170a).

38 The objector’s argument runs thus: “If God works in the operations of nature, it follows that by so doing he imparts something to the natural agent: since every agent by acting makes something to be actual. Either then this something suffices for nature to be able to operate by itself, or it does not suffice. If it suffices, then since God also gave nature its natural forces, for the same reason we may say that the natural forces were sufficient for nature to act: and there will be no further need for God to do anything towards nature’s operation besides giving nature the natural forces. If on the other hand it does not suffice, he will need to do something more, and if this is not sufficient, more still and so on indefinitely, which is impossible: because one effect cannot depend on an infinite number of actions, for, since it is not possible to pass through an infinite number of things, it would

It is to be said that the natural power which is conveyed to natural things in their inception inheres in them as a certain form in nature having fixed and stable *esse*. But that which God does in a natural thing by which that thing actually acts is *as a mere intention, having a certain incomplete esse, like the way that colors are in the air and the power of art is in the instrument of the artisan*. Therefore, just as art can give sharpness to the axe as a permanent form within it, but not that the power of art would be in it as a certain permanent form (unless it [the axe] would have intellect), thus, a natural thing's own proper power can be conveyed to it as a permanent form within it, but not the power by which it acts—as an instrument of the first cause—for *esse* (unless it were given to it to be the universal principle of being); neither again can it be conveyed to a natural power that it should move itself, nor that it should conserve itself in *esse*: Whence, just as it is clear that it ought not be attributed to the instrument of the artisan that it operate without the motion of art, so too it cannot be conveyed to a natural thing that it operate apart from the divine operation.³⁹

Thomas here distinguishes divine operation in a creature from its God-given natural form whereby it operates. God can give a creature the power to produce some effect like the way a woodsman can forge and sharpen an axe. But the creature cannot *actually produce* the effect unless God acts within it, just

never materialize. Therefore we must accept the alternative, namely that the forces of nature suffice for the action of nature without God operating therein" (*QDP* q. 3 a. 7 obj. 7).

39 Aquinas, *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 (emphasis mine): "Ad septimum dicendum, quod virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis ut quaedam forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura. Sed id quod a Deo fit in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, nisi haberet intellectum; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem vis qua agit ad esse ut instrumentum primae causae; nisi daretur ei quod esset universale essendi principium: nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit ut moveret se ipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina." To better grasp the underlying conviction that motivates this passage, see T.C. O'Brien's helpful appendix, "Esse, the Proper Effect of God Alone" in Aquinas, *Divine Government* (1a 103–9), vol. 14 of *Summa theologiae* (Blackfriars ed.), trans., ed. T.C. O'Brien (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1975), Appendix 1, 174. O'Brien illustratively renders *virtus* in the passage above as 'genius' ("the genius of an artisan in his tools").

as the axe cannot actually cut wood unless it is applied to the wood in the right sort of way by the woodsman. So applied, the axe will cut by virtue of the form it has (in contrast to say, a mallet, which will not cut because its form is not suited to that effect). But despite its form, the axe will not actually cut unless it has the woodsman's intention-defined power, his applied technique—the *vis artis*—coursing through it. We might say: just as a closed circuit cannot light a bulb or power a fan (or any other load) unless it is connected to a source of electricity, a formally complete natural agent cannot operate unless energized or stimulated by divine operation. For Báñez, physical premotion is the power of divine art flowing from God into the created agent.

Thus, against Suárez, Báñez maintains that something real must be introduced de novo into the capacity of free choice in order for it to pass from potentiality into actual operation.⁴⁰ But what is introduced is not a quality added *per modum principii* to the will or intellect, but a *motion*—a physical premotion.⁴¹

40 The physical premotion is *aliquid reale*. See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §6 (379). Alvarez also stresses that the physical premotion is not a mere *ens rationis*, but is “something real existing in nature [aliquid reale in rerū natura existēs].” See *De aux.* III d. 23 §9 (211b).

41 Alvarez is unambiguous that the physical premotion is not a *quality* added to the soul, but is instead a ‘*motio virtuosa*’ (emphasis mine). While he considers the physical premotion to be a principle of action, he does not consider it to be something added to the will *per modum principii*. Rather, the will is formally complete of itself for acting, as Báñez maintains. See *De aux.* III d. 19 §§7ff. (151a–155a). However, while I take Báñez and Alvarez as representing the more established view among Thomists, there does seem to have been some disagreement within the school on the question of whether physical premotion is a quality. For the view that it is, see for instance, Cabrera, q. 18 a. 4 d. 6 dub. 1 (406b–412b), see esp. §13 (407a–b) and §59 (411a). However, Cabrera’s stated position in this passage (dub. 1) raises important questions about his view of the ontological status of physical premotions. For example, while Cabrera clearly thinks *auxilium* with respect to the will’s first act has the aspect {ratio} of a form (and indeed, is identical with the vital act of the will itself in first act), he does not think *auxilium* has the *ratio* of a form with respect to the will’s second act. In respect to the will’s second act, God’s *auxilium* is the complement and consummation of first act and is distinct from the vital act of the will in second act (see §61 [411a]). Is Cabrera talking about numerically one *auxilium*, such that the *auxilium* by which God moves the will to second act just is the *auxilium* which is really identical with and only formally distinct from the will’s first act? Or does he think there are two numerically distinct *auxilia*, only the former of which has the aspect of a form or quality (operative grace) while the latter of which is not a form or quality, but something else? If the latter, Cabrera’s view of the most interesting kind of physical premotions—those immediately antecedent to choice—may be closer to Báñez and Alvarez than it would initially seem. The question may simply reduce to this: Are operative and cooperative *actual* grace numerically the same grace, or numerically distinct? As far as I can tell, there has been longstanding debate over this question among Thomists. Note moreover that

This physical premotion is a created reality (something other than God), an “impulse” {impulsus},⁴² or “active force” {vis activa}⁴³ that makes the vital potency to be in act. This physical impulse or active force is divine *auxilium*, whether understood as general concurrence (*auxilium naturale*) or as actual grace (operative or cooperative *auxilium supernaturale*). Physical premotion is not, according to Báñez, a principle of vital acts, but the *actuation* of a principle (the vital potency) that is sufficient, as such, for the production of its own act.⁴⁴

This last point is very important. For Báñez, were it necessary for something to be introduced *de novo per modum principii*, the causal integrity of vital potencies would be compromised. The efficient causality proper to vital potencies could not then be affirmed because the act produced would not genuinely be that potency’s own insofar as it did not originate from that potency considered in itself. For this reason, such an act could not be a vital act at all and one could not maintain the will’s freedom or integrity as an efficient cause.

This concern to safeguard the integrity of secondary causes is also the principal reason why Bañezians understand the divine causation of creaturely free choices as the bestowal of a motive force or actuating impulse instead of as creation *ex nihilo*. The immediacy and totality of creation are deemed problematic for an understanding of God’s application of secondary causes. To maintain that God immediately makes creaturely acts of will to be *ex nihilo*, or to identify divine *auxilium* with creaturely acts of will, would putatively be

the question specifically concerns *actual* grace. That operative and cooperative *habitual* grace is numerically the same is a point I take to be uncontroversial.

42 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 4 §7 (407).

43 See Pedro de Herrera, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. III a. 2 §8 (190), where he refers to gracious *auxilium* as “a certain active force constituting the potency in highest and commensurate actuality {quandam vim activam constituentem potentiam in ultima et commensurata actualitate}.” Beltrán de Heredia notes that although the commentary on *ST* I–II q. III was actually authored by Herrera (Báñez’s successor at Salamanca), it still remains “*una lectura bañeciana*” (“Introducción,” 11). Diego Alvarez also identifies the physical premotion as a “*vis activa*.” See for example, *De Aux.* III d. 18 §9 (136a, *et idem*). Note the similarity of this terminology to the “*vis artis*” of *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 above.

44 Báñez identifies this *aliquid reale* with the divine governance as it exists in the governed. See *Tractatus* II c. 1 §6 (379), cf. *ST* I q. 23 a. 2. Báñez thinks of governance as it exists in the governed as a motion—specifically, a physical premotion—since governance is the execution of God’s providential design, which guides everything to its rightful end. Báñez’s point that physical premotion is not a principle of vital acts should be understood to mean that the physical premotion is not a *formal* principle of vital acts. It is undeniable that in some sense the physical premotion *is* a sort of principle of the vital act in which it results, and other authors (favorable to the position) sometimes call it a principle.

to court occasionalism, the view that creatures exercise no real causality of their own.⁴⁵

While Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange made this point expressly in the twentieth century,⁴⁶ it also underlies the discussion of operative grace in the commentary of Báñez's successor, Pedro de Herrera, on *ST* I–II q. 111 a. 2.⁴⁷ There, Herrera argues that the human act of will which proceeds from operative grace cannot be caused immediately by God because if it were, that act could not be what it is: an immanent act produced by a vital potency that is perfective of its agent.⁴⁸ If the act resulting from operative grace is to be a human act at all, it must proceed from the human soul, even if the soul is passively moved by God to the production of that act and is not self-moved. Herrera's argument is that interior *human* will acts cannot be immanent to or perfective of *God*, and if they proceeded *immediately* from God, they could not also proceed from a vital potency.

45 Occasionalism was introduced to Western thought during the Middle Ages chiefly through the works of influential Islamic philosopher-theologians like the orthodox Ash'arite, al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), who defended it, and the more progressive Mu'tazilites Ibn Sinā (Avicenna, 980–1037), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–98), who rejected it. While occasionalism did not gain a strong foothold in the West during the high Middle Ages, some argue it was at least suggested in the works of such thinkers as of William of Auvergne (c. 1185–1249), William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347), Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1300–50), Peter D'Ailly (1350–1420) and Gabriel Biel (c. 1425–95), though it is controversial whether any of these thinkers actually defended the view. Forms of occasionalism were subsequently defended in the modern period by Arnold Geulincx (1624–69), Nicholas Malebranche (1638–1715), George Berkeley (1685–1753) and others. For an introduction to occasionalism, see William Hasker, "Occasionalism," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1998, <<http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/K057SECT2>> (19 Nov. 2008). Aquinas's own thought on causality emerged in large part through his engagement with the Islamic thinkers, whose writings he would have encountered while a student at the University of Naples. Aquinas's view affirms the universality and infallibility of divine governance while rejecting the occasionalism of Ghazālī. This explains the concern among Thomas's later commentators, such as Báñez, to affirm both divine sovereignty and the causal efficacy of creatures.

46 See Garrigou-Lagrange, "Promotion Physique," in *DTC* 12-2:39–41.

47 See Herrera's commentary in Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 111 a. 2 §8 (190–91). This same basic concern is what motivates Alvarez's distinction of physical premotion from the act of choice. If God's *auxilium* were not really distinct from the human act of free choice, then 'human' free choices would be produced by God alone. This would undermine both human freedom and the integrity of the human person as a secondary cause of any sort at all—two distinct, but related issues. See Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 19 §8 (152b–153a); cf. §9 (155a–b).

48 The prime example of the effect of operative grace is when the will that previously willed evil begins to will the good. See *ST* I–II q. 111 a. 2 c.

By extension, it would seem to follow that if God cannot immediately (i.e. creatively) cause the effects of operative grace, much less can he immediately cause cooperative grace's effects—human will acts that are not only proper to the will but are the will's *self*-movements. The broader thought underlying Herrera's position would seem to be this: creaturely operation cannot proceed immediately from God and still remain creaturely operation because if God's action is immediate or creative, then it is the work of God alone. Anything wrought by God in creation cannot also be wrought by a creature because no creaturely activity—indeed nothing at all—is presupposed in creation. But creaturely operations are wrought by creatures. Therefore, creaturely operations cannot be creatively wrought by God.

The idea of vital act in Báñez's account shows he acknowledged that while a creature must be moved to act by God, it still produces an act that is really and properly its own under the influence of divine motion. The creature's dependency on the creator in acting does not cancel creaturely agency, but is rather the ground for its possibility.

1.3 *The Immediacy of Divine Causality*

Despite denying that divine *auxilium* creatively causes its results, Báñez and other proponents of physical premotion frequently stress the important point that God causes human free choices in a way that is immediate.⁴⁹ But what can this claim mean?

On Báñez's account, there are senses in which God's causation of a human free choice is immediate, and there are senses in which it is not.

God's causation of a human free choice is immediate insofar as God, who causes both the necessary and the contingent, is the sole exterior cause who can determine the will with no detriment to its freedom.⁵⁰ Hence, God cannot predetermine the will to a particular act of choice by putting in place any secondary cause(s) intermediate between God and the created will. Otherwise, the will would not be free in choosing. Insofar as God causes human free choices without the mediation of any determining cause besides the will itself, God causes human free choices immediately.

However, when God's premotion is called 'immediate', what is meant is that the premotion "immediately attains" to the human will, or equivalently,

49 See for example, Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §4 (376–77); cf. Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 18 intro (132a), §§3, 11, 19 (134a, 137a, 142b); d. 19 §4 (149a); d. 23 §§7, 13, 26 (210b, 214a, 221a); d. 24 §§18, 20–22 (235b, 236b–237b).

50 See for example, Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 111 a. 2 (529b B); q. 116 a. 1 (562a A); cf. q. 105 a. 3 (514b D–E).

that the premotion is “immediately received” into the human will.⁵¹ What is being claimed here is that no created entity intervenes between God’s physical premotion and the human will it stimulates to act. There is an immediacy of God’s physical premotion to the human person’s own operation. But it must be noted that the physical premotion itself—God’s causality as something created—intervenes between God and the human free choice which is his effect. In this respect, God does not produce the human free choice immediately. Rather, God’s created causality mediates between him and his effect. Crucially however, the premotion is not conceived of as a secondary cause, for no created cause besides the will itself can determine the will’s choice without detriment to its freedom. Rather, the premotion is God’s causality, a transeunt emanation of divine power which joins God to his effect, making him virtually immediate as cause to that effect.

This mediatory role played by God’s causality envisioned as a created antecedent to choice leads to a further point about God’s causal immediacy to the operations of secondary causes.

Báñez distinguishes two kinds of immediacy an efficient cause can have to its effects.⁵² A cause is immediate by an ‘immediacy of supposit’ when *as an acting substance*, it is immediate to its effect. If the meaning of this is not clear on its own, it can be grasped more easily by contrasting it with the second kind of immediacy, called ‘immediacy of power’. Even if an efficient cause *as agent* is not immediately productive of an effect, it can still be virtually immediate to that effect insofar as its *power* reaches the effect, as it were, making immediate contact with it. The fire heats the kettle by an immediacy of supposit (assuming for the sake of the example that fire is a *suppositum*), but the fire heats the water in the kettle by an immediacy of power.⁵³ The underlying thought is that

51 See for example, Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 19 §4 (149a); d. 24 §18 (253b).

52 For this distinction in context, see for example Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 8 a. 1 (135a D–138a C); q. 103–105 a. 5 (497a A–515b D).

53 Or an alternative example: I can lift a certain stone by hand and if I do so, I immediately cause the stone’s upward movement *immediatione suppositi*. Alternatively, I can lift the stone by controlling the levers of an excavator which actuate valves that move fluid which in turn pushes the pistons of the hydraulic rams attached to the excavator’s digging arms that cause the shovel’s movement which moves the stone. In this case, my causal powers are mediated through a piece of complex machinery. Thus mediated, my *causal powers* are immediate to the effect of the stone’s motion, for they are—at some relatively foundational level—what make the stone move. Therefore, I am immediate to the effect *immediatione virtutis*. But it is the excavator (or excavator shovel) and not me personally that is substantially immediate—immediate *immediatione suppositi*—to the effect. For one neo-scholastic discussion of the distinction between *immediatio suppositi* and

there is no action at a distance, so a cause must be conjoined to its effect in at least one of these two senses of immediacy. In the latter sense (immediacy of power) there is a medium between the primary cause and the effect, but the medium's very function is to channel the primary cause's power, making that power immediate to the effect (even while the primary cause *itself* is not).

Contrary to what Molina at least implies, on Báñez's view, God immediately causes human free choices by both an immediacy of power *and* an immediacy of supposit, though differently in respect to each.⁵⁴ As Alvarez explains, God causes every effect of a secondary cause in every (positive) respect by an immediacy of power, (though not by an immediacy of supposit), while by an immediacy of supposit, God causes every effect of a secondary cause, though not in every respect.⁵⁵ God causes by an immediacy of supposit the "esse and ultimate actuality that is found in the effect" since *esse* is the proper effect solely of God.⁵⁶ But God does not cause by an immediacy of supposit what the secondary cause contributes "by virtue of its proper form."⁵⁷ The reason for claiming God causes every effect of a secondary cause globally by an immediacy of power should be sufficiently clear from the doctrine of creation. The purpose, then, of the scholastic distinction between *immediatio virtutis* and *immediatio suppositi* dovetails with the notion of vital act, treated in the section above: It is simply a way of accounting for the reality of secondary causality in a universe over which the creator exercises a universal causal purview.

Applying the above distinctions about God's causal immediacy to the case of human free choice, the following points can be made in summary. The human will is a secondary cause with its own proper effect, namely, the act of self-determination (choice). The will produces this effect by an immediacy

immediatio virtutis, see Giovanni Cornoldi, S.J. *The Physical System of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Edward Heneage Dering (New York: Benzinger, 1893), Chs. 15–17. Available online at: <<http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/physic.htm>> accessed 16 July 2009.

- 54 See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §§4–5, 7 (165–66). Cf. Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §4 (376–77).
- 55 See Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 28 §19 142a–b. Cf. the discussion in Báñez, *Sch. com. in st 1* q. 103 a. 6 (501a B–502a D).
- 56 Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 19 §19 (142b): "Cæterum immediatione suppositi producit omnem effectū causæ secundæ immediate, non quidem quantum ad omnia, sed quantum ad aliqua, videlicet quantum ad esse, & quantum ad vltimam actualitatem quæ reperitur in tali effectū." Cf. Báñez, *Sch. com. in st 1* q. 8 a. 1 (136a B–138a C).
- 57 Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 19 §19 (142b): "Verum quantum ad ea, in quæ influent etiam causæ secundæ, virtute suæ propriæ formæ, fatetur Caietanus, Deum non agere immediate immediatione suppositi, cum agat mediantibus suppositis secundarum causarum, quæ vt agentia secunda principalia suos producunt effectus." Cf. Báñez's clear and strong statements about the integrity of secondary causes moved by God in *Sch. com. in st 1* q. 105 aa. 2–3 (514a B, 514b A).

of power and an immediacy of supposit. God also immediately produces the human free choice. God produces the human act of free choice considered under the aspect of its entity by an immediacy of supposit. But God also produces the act of free choice globally by an immediacy of power insofar as the human will mediates, as it were, God's physical premotion so that the premotion attains—'contacts'—its terminus or effect, namely, the human act of choice. Thus, God himself is not immediate to the creaturely free choice as its respective chooser (like the way the human agent is), but his *power*, channeled by the human will, is immediate to that act of choice. Finally, in respect to God's immediacy of power, note that God's causal immediacy is mitigated in two distinct ways, only the latter of which is really controversial. First, the created will as a secondary cause mediates between God, the primary cause, and the act of free choice produced by both. But second—and easier to miss—is that not only the secondary cause, but God's power, conceived of as an entity distinct from God, mediates between God and the effect produced through that power.

1.4 *Whether Physical Premotion is Distinct from the Creaturely Act*

The preceding discussion highlights an important point about divine *auxilium* and the vital act of *electio*: The premotion which is divine *auxilium* is distinct from the self-motion produced by the free will. Sure enough, the free will does not determine itself independently from God (as Báñez charges Molina and Suárez maintain, or at least imply), but subordinate to him. Nevertheless, on Báñez's account, the act of choice is not produced directly or immediately by God, but instead by the free will actuated *through* God's physical *auxilium*.⁵⁸ The created will cannot rise to act apart from this passively received divine motion.

Báñez clearly distinguishes God's aiding premotion from the will's own self motion in *Tractatus* II c. 1 §6. There, speaking of divine *auxilium* and the act of free choice respectively, he states that the *determinatio passiva prout est a Deo movente* and the *determinatio activa prout est a voluntate consentiente* are not distinct aspects of one *determinatio* considered in two different respects, but are rather two individual *determinationes*, the latter of which depends upon the former. The whole passage reads:

Which determinations (that is, the passive determination according as it is from God moving, and the active determination according as it is from the will consenting), however much they would be temporally conjoined,

⁵⁸ Herrera speaks of *gratia operans* as a physical *auxilium* "by means of which" God applies the human will {... gratiam physicam operantem qua media Deus operetur talem applicationem ...}. See *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 111 a. 2 §11 (194).

nevertheless, the active determination of the will depends on the passive motion, which is from the free choice of God intimately operating and moving and reducing the capacity of free choice to act according to the mode of its nature, by illuminating the intellect that it would better apprehend the means and inspiring the will that it would efficaciously choose that which is well pleasing to God.⁵⁹

This passage makes clear that the active self-determination of the will (*electio*) follows upon and necessarily presupposes a passively received motion from God (*praemotio physica*).⁶⁰ It is by virtue of this passively received motion that

59 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §6 (381): “Quae determinationes, videlicet determinatio passiva prout est a Deo movente, et determinatio activa prout est a voluntate consentiente, quavis in eodem momento conjunctae sint, tamen activa determinatio voluntatis pendens est a passiva motione, quae est a libero arbitrio Dei, intime operantis et moventis et reducens in actum liberum arbitrium juxta modum suae naturae, illuminando intellectum ut melius cognoscat media, et inspirando in voluntatem ut efficaciter eligat quod beneplacitum est Deo.”

60 Alvarez also distinguishes an active from a passive indifference of the human will and aligns this with the distinction between the determination of the will by which it is formally determined in second act and the determination of the will *in ultimo complimento actus primi*. See *De aux.* III d. 22 §§35–37 (197b–198b); see also d. 23 §27–28 (221b–222b). For Alvarez (as for Báñez in the passage above), the will has a passive indifference in first act with respect to God’s *auxilium* and an active indifference in respect to its own free act (second act). The determination of the will in first act, or more precisely, in ‘ultimate fulfillment of first act’ is not formally free, whereas the determination of will by which it is formally determined in second act is free. The former determination (with respect to which the will is passively indifferent) is God’s physical predetermination of the will, whereas the latter determination (with respect to which the will is actively indifferent) just is the act of free choice itself. The vital act of free choice is the terminus *ad quem* to which the physical premotion is ordained. This shows that for Alvarez the physical premotion of the will to choice is “something created” that is naturally “previous to” and “really distinct from” and the act of choice itself (d. 23 §13 [213], §27 [222a], cf. d. 19 §4 [149a]). The above references are representative, not exhaustive—there are many statements of this view of physical premotion in Alvarez’s work. Contrast this with Suárez’s position (which Alvarez explicitly rejects), according to which *auxilium* is really identical with and only modally distinct from the act of choice (for Suárez’s position, see the discussion in Ch. 7 of this book). The terminology ‘ultimate fulfillment of first act {ultimum complimentum actus primi}’ is a key turn of phrase used by authors of the period to refer to physical premotion as a mediate determination of the will between first act and second act. Note accordingly that the distinction in question here is not between the will’s first act and its second act, but rather between (1) a certain intermediate between first act and second act—namely, the physical premotion—and (2) the will’s second act—namely, choice. The question of the will’s first act and any requisite premotion for it (including

the will produces its own proper act of free choice (*electio*). Sure enough, this ordering of prior *auxilium* and subsequent act is a causal sequence, not a temporal one, but it remains true that the passively received motion is a distinct and necessary causal precondition upon which act of free choice depends in order to obtain.

However, the interpreter of Báñez soon runs into a difficulty, for at two points in the chapter following the passage cited above, Báñez makes claims that initially seem to contradict it. In *Tractatus* II c. 2 §§2 and 7, Báñez appears to identify *auxilium* with creaturely vital acts. This throws into question the above distinction between physical premotion and the vital act of free choice which is its terminus. Does God move the will by an active force really distinct from and antecedent to the creature's own act, or is it that God's *auxilium* just is the creature's own act of intellect or will?

This question is important because the precise ontological status of physical premotions has, in the estimation of its opponents, clouded the theory of physical premotion since the time of the original *de Auxiliis* disputes. Suárez, for example, considers *praemotiones* superfluous and ontologically obscure.⁶¹ More recently, Bernard Lonergan has deemed them a “metaphysical mystery,” something “not only not understood, but also a positive confusion.”⁶² Literature on physical premotion tends to be vexingly ambiguous on this crucial point: Is the

whether or not such a premotion is identical with or distinct from the will's first act) is a separate issue. For the idea that the physical premotion immediately antecedent to choice is an intermediate between the will's first act and second act (and not simply the will's first act, or the requisite premotion for the will's first act), see d. 19 §9 (154b) and esp. the interesting discussion at d. 23 §27 (222a). Note that Alvarez, in claiming that the physical premotion is a mediate entity, is *not* claiming that God's causality is a mediate entity between God and God's effect, nor is he claiming that there is any intermediate between God's causality and God's effect. His point rather is that God's causality (i.e. the physical premotion) is an intermediate between the will's first act and the will's second act. Hence the aptness of the phrase, ‘*ultimum complimentum actus primi*’ or ‘*complimentum virtutis activae*’ (fulfillment of the active power)—see for example, d. 19 §9 (155a–b). Hence also the coherence of the claim that physical premotion is a medium between first and second act with the claim, frequently repeated elsewhere, that God's *auxilium* ‘immediately attains’ to the secondary cause—a position to which Báñez is also strongly committed. Both authors hold that God's causality is immediate and attribute importance to this immediacy. But their position is simply that nothing comes between God's causality and God's effect. That much is uncontroversial. What their position at least clearly implies and is arguably much more problematic is that God's causality is itself a medium between God and his effect.

61 See *DM* 22 §2.14, 23 (Freddoso, 179, 185).

62 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 74; *De ente supernaturali*, in *Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, vol. 19 of *Collected Works*

praemotio a creature's actual transition to act (i.e., the creature's own acting viewed simply under the aspect of its coming about), or is the *praemotio* a distinct reality that brings about a creature's transition to act or actual operation?⁶³ What exactly *are* physical premotions?⁶⁴

of Bernard Lonergan, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 250–51: “non solum non intelligitur sed est positiva confusio.”

- 63 For an example of this ambiguity, see the *NCE* article by T.C. O'Brien, “Premotion, Physical,” which contains one of the most clear and plausible characterizations of physical premotion that I have seen. Having stated that the expression ‘physical premotion’ is pleonastic (because ‘motion’ itself implies priority), O'Brien goes on to identify physical premotion as “the creature's passage to action” (670a)—thus emphasizing the “one reality that is the agent's motion” (670b)—but then states that the physical premotion “makes this [the will's] causality effective” “in bringing about the transition to act” (671b). Perhaps the most important recent discussion of the ontological status of physical premotions is found in Osborne, 627–28. He points out that according to the theory of physical premotion “there is no intermediate between God's causal activity and the will” (626). However, this is tantamount to saying there is no intermediate between physical premotion [i.e. God's causal activity] and the will. That much is not in question. The libertarian objection turns on whether God's causal activity is itself a created reality between God and the creaturely action God causes. Osborne clearly acknowledges that for at least some representative proponents of physical premotion (I would include Báñez in this category), it is. Distinguishing God's causality as a created reality from the human act of choice, he goes on to state, “This point does not entail that there is an intermediate real being that does the work in moving the will. Indeed, if there were such a being, then it could not predetermine the will so that the agent acts freely. Only the first cause can do so.” I take it that Osborne's point here does not turn on a denial of physical premotion's being an intermediate real being. I think this because while clearly the physical premotion is not a real being—a ‘thing’—in the sense of being a substance, it is undeniably a real entity of some sort and distinct from the divine essence (on this point, see also J.H. Nicholas, *The Mystery of God's Grace* [Dubuque, IA: Priory Press, 1960], 25). Moreover, the intermediacy of this reality seems to be clearly maintained: it is from God and naturally antecedent to the creaturely action God causes. I take Osborne's main point instead to be that physical premotion does not do the work in moving the will; God does (see also Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, 240–282, esp. cf. 260–61). This point strikes me as extremely important. Still, an opponent might charge this simply highlights the subtlety of Báñez's determinism (or compatibilism) rather than exonerating him of it. For while God and not the physical premotion is the agent principal to the human free will, it is still the case that if a certain antecedent created (and hence non-transcendent) reality obtains (namely, the *praemotio*), one's choice cannot be otherwise. Recall Báñez's claim is not simply that God (cause) is naturally prior to his effect, but that God's *causality*, considered as distinct from God (divine action taken passively), is naturally prior to his effect.
- 64 The question is exigent moreover because if the *praemotio* is a reality distinct from God and the human agent's free choosing which is causally antecedent to the human agent's

1.5 *Two Difficult Passages on the Ontological Status of Physical Premotions*

In the context of a consideration of the will's first operation, Báñez pursues the question of what that passive motion is by which God moves the will when it goes from not willing to willing the good in general.⁶⁵ After explaining that that motion cannot be something added *per modum principii*, Báñez goes on to say,

But I confess myself not to understand what else that divine premotion would be, if passively considered, than the faculty of intellect itself, placed in complete act by the author of nature, who operates in all things according to the design of his providence.

But if premotion is *actively* considered, according as it is in God, I understand it to be nothing else than the divine will, which is present in all things, effecting in them everything that they do, insofar as what they do has the notion of being and goodness.⁶⁶

Báñez would seem to be indicating in the first part of this passage that physical premotion, is nothing other than the intellect's act of apprehending the end that precedes the will's corresponding act of willing the end.⁶⁷ This is perplexing because the intellect is a vital potency, and intellectual acts are vital acts. Thus, it would seem that Báñez is here identifying physical premotion with the vital act of intellect.

A bit further along in the same work, Báñez makes a similar move in the context of a discussion of operative actual grace. After explaining that operative grace is the sudden illumination and excitation by God calling and inviting

choosing and which infallibly settles that choosing to be for *this* rather than *that*, then it raises the question of whether Báñez's view is a form of determinism, namely, a theological compatibilism, for there would be a created reality—a sufficient reason—that accounts for the free choice's being of what it is, that is other than one's very act of self-determination. For a fuller consideration of this concern, see the discussion in Chs. 4–5, below.

65 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §2 (384).

66 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §2 (384): "Sed fateor me non intelligere quid aliud sit illa divina praemotio, si passively consideretur, quam ipsamet facultas intellectus posita in actu completo ab auctore naturae, qui operatur in omnibus secundum rationem suae providentiae. Si autem *praemotio active* consideretur, prout est in Deo, nihil aliud esse intelligo quam divinam voluntatem, quae in omnibus rebus intime adest, efficiens in illis omnia quae fiunt, prout habent rationem essendi et bonitatis."

67 The will, as intellectual appetite, tends toward the intelligible good—good *understood* as 'to-be-pursued'.

the soul to good by means of prevenient divine inspirations, Báñez says, “[b]ut it is to be noted that, in this way, wholly prevenient *auxilia* are even identified with vital acts of the intellect and will.”⁶⁸ Again, the reader wonders what Báñez could mean by *identifying* divine *auxilium* with creaturely vital acts.

I can think of three plausible ways of reading the two difficult passages above (*Tractatus* II c. 2 §§2, 7). I will consider these three interpretations with reasons for and against each and will ultimately prefer the third reading as the most plausible.

1.5.1 Do the Passages Contradict the Received Understanding of Physical Premotion?

First, the two passages might genuinely be anomalous. Perhaps *Tractatus* II c. 2 §§2, 7 represent a late development in Báñez’s thought (the *Tractatus* was one of Báñez’s last works), or a clearer late expression of what he thought all along, but expressed ambiguously in his earlier writings. On this view, the passages in question should cause us to rethink our view of physical premotion and they may reveal that theory is not liable to determinism as has historically been charged. In other words, this first possibility raises the question of whether the two passages in question provide a hermeneutical key for rethinking Báñez’s earlier discussions of physical premotion.

One thing recommending this view is the Aristotelian axiom that the motion of the mover is the movement of the moved. On this view, God’s active changing of the created potency just is the created potency’s undergoing change. This reading would also fit well with the idea God’s premotion of the human will is immediate—and with Báñez’s insistence on the immediacy of God’s causation of human free choices.⁶⁹

A second point in support of this reading is that it seems consonant with Thomas’s idea of God’s creative causality, particularly as expressed in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3, which the language of §2 quoted above seems to parallel exactly. In *ST* I q. 45 a. 3, it is clear Aquinas does not think of God’s act of creation as some reality between God and the created thing—something other than God that emanates from God and which antecedes and terminates in the created thing. Rather, for Thomas, God’s transeunt action or causality can be understood in only one of two ways: Taken actively, it is nothing other than the divine essence. In this sense, God’s action is clearly ontologically prior to the created effect, but

68 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §7 (388): “Notandum est autem quod huiusmodi auxilia omnino praeventientia identificantur quidem cum actionibus vitalibus intellectus et voluntatis.”

69 This point deserves attention and was recently defended by Thomas Osborne, 626–27. See also the discussion of Báñez on the immediacy of divine action, above.

it is nothing short of God himself (plus a conceptual relation to the creature). It is not something created. Taken passively, God's action is a unilateral real relation of dependence that inheres in the creature. In this sense, God's action is something other than God (and thus, strictly speaking, is itself something created, though not a substance), but it is not something ontologically antecedent to the created thing. Rather, understood as a real *relation*, God's action is an accident that inheres in what it is God creates and so is ontologically posterior to it. The subject of this relation is the creature, the foundation is the creature's participated *esse*, and the terminus of the relation is *God* (not the creature).

Similarly, Báñez makes a distinction between considering premotion 'actively' and 'passively'. According to Báñez, to consider premotion actively is to consider it *prout est in Deo*.⁷⁰ This suggests that to consider it passively is to consider it *prout est in nobis*. Thus, to consider physical premotion 'actively' or 'passively' is to consider it as it is in its cause or effect. Considered as it is in its cause, physical premotion just is God himself—the divine will disposing all things according to the plan of God's providence. Considered as it is in its effect, physical premotion just is the creaturely act—in this case, cognition of the end—with a certain respect to God the mover.

A third point to recommend the first reading is that by eliminating a *tertium quid*, it makes the theory of physical premotion more plausible: The physical premotion cannot be a determining antecedent of choice.

However, this reading supposes that what Báñez says about (1) physical premotions and (2) vital acts that *dispose* the agent for the act of choice on the one hand, is equally true of (3) physical premotions that *immediately bring about* the vital act of free choice and (4) vital acts of *free choice* themselves on the other. But this supposition is questionable. What Báñez says in §§2 and 7 shows that it is not *in principle* impossible for a physical premotion to be identical with its corresponding vital act. But this is not enough to establish that all physical premotions—or even just the physical premotions that are immediate to the act of choice—are identical with their corresponding vital acts. This first reading, in other words, does not appreciate the force of Báñez's qualification that premotions *wholly prevenient* are identical with vital acts of *intellect*—which acts of intellect dispose the agent for choosing.⁷¹ Thus,

70 Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §2 (384).

71 As the second passage from §7 indicates, Báñez identifies wholly prevenient *auxilia* not only with certain acts of intellect, but also with certain acts of the will. However, he has in mind here the will of the end—a will act presupposed by (and thus entirely 'prevenient' to) the act of choice.

one reason for setting aside the first reading is that it ignores this important qualification.

Another reason this reading should be set aside is that Báñez gives no indication in the *Tractatus* that he is modifying his position in any way from what he said in earlier works and it seems clear both in Báñez's earlier works and elsewhere in the *Tractatus* that (1) in the act of choice, God's physical premotion is distinct from the will's own self motion and (2) that the latter depends on the former. If anything, the *Tractatus* gives the impression that Báñez is insisting once again on the correctness of his perennial view against the doctrines of '*aliqui moderni*'.

Because this first reading ignores a crucial qualification in the text and renders Báñez's position inconsistent with what he teaches elsewhere, it should be set aside.

1.5.2 Are Certain Vital Acts Presupposed by Choice Physical Premotions?

It may be that the first interpretation proposed above miscarries by conflating two distinct, sequential vital acts, only the former of which Báñez has in mind when identifying physical premotion with a vital act. Whereas the first reading identified God's premotion with the vital act which is choice, a second interpretation is that God's premotion of the will to choice is identical with the vital acts which choice presupposes, namely the cognition and the willing of the end.⁷² The first acts of intellect and will on this reading *just are*

72 Báñez's invocation of the principle, "whatever is a cause of the cause is a cause of the caused . . . insofar as it is a cause of the cause as causing {quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati . . . in quantum aliquid est causa causae ut causantis}" (*Tractatus* II c. 1 §6 [380]) may initially seem to suggest something like this second reading. Báñez invokes this principle in replying to the objection that divine premotion is unnecessary because the intellect from its cognition of the end is able to move itself to cognition of the means and the will from its volition of the end is able to move itself to the act of choice. Báñez's point is that while he agrees the intellect and will are able to move themselves in the aforementioned ways, this does not obviate the need for God's premotion, for even if the second acts of intellect and will can be explained in terms of self-motion, the intellect and will require a premotion to be put in first act and thereby disposed for self-motion. The idea that the very cognition and volition of the end themselves count as premotions to choice is similar to what I describe as 'subjective external premotion' of the will in the context of discussing Lonergan's position (Ch. 5 below). However, I do not believe Lonergan would agree that the first acts of intellect and will *require* a physical premotion to obtain. Also, as I argue next in considering the third way to read *Tractatus* II c. 2 §§2, 7, while Báñez identifies God's premotion *to first act* with the first acts of intellect and will,

what constitute the physical premotion(s) that (immediately) account(s) for choice. The thought here is that when Báñez talks about God's physical premotion of the will to choice, 'physical premotion' designates the first acts of intellect and will. *These* are the physical premotion by which God causes the act of choice. It should be noted that for Báñez, while the cognition and willing of the end would (on this reading) be premotions with respect to the act of choice, it is also the case that cognition and willing of the end—as vital acts—each depend on their own respective physical premotions. So on this second reading, the vital act with which premotion is identical is neither the choice of which that vital act is the premotion (as the first reading, above, would have it), nor is it the premotion on which that vital act (cognition or willing of the end) depends.

If the act Báñez is identifying with physical premotion is an act of intellect or will presupposed by choice—not choice itself—one cannot hold that the physical premotion on which a choice depends is identical with that act of choice itself (as the first reading would have it). In other words, one cannot interpret Báñez's identification of physical premotion with vital act in the above context as justifying the belief that they can be identified generally. The second reading's taking into account Báñez's specification of which premotions and which vital acts are identical is one reason to accept it.

Another reason that recommends this interpretation is that it again, though in a different way from the first reading, makes physical premotion more plausible as a theory by offering a certain response to the concern that it undermines human freedom. If premotion is just God's disposing created persons for choice by placing them in first act, they are left with their own "strip of autonomy" within which they are free to choose.⁷³ To borrow Bernard Lonergan's simile, as the swordsman moves the tip of the sword by grasping only the hilt, so too God causes choice by moving the will from outside the bounds of freedom.⁷⁴

he believes another physical premotion, direct from God, is necessary to reduce the intellect and will to second act (and crucially, Báñez does *not* identify this second physical premotion with the second acts of intellect and will—cognition of the means and *electio*). Lonergan would also disagree with this need for this second physical premotion.

73 The phrase, "strip of autonomy," drawn from Bernard Lonergan, is discussed further in Ch. 5 below.

74 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 445, 147; cf. 116–18. As noted above in part, Lonergan's position (discussed in Ch. 5) does not agree in all respects with this second reading of Báñez.

However, a problem facing the second interpretation is that while Báñez clearly believes choice presupposes certain other vital acts, such as cognition of the end, and while from the above passage, Báñez manifestly considers at least certain vital acts presupposed by choice to be a kind of physical premotion, I am not aware of any other place where he says that these requisites of choice are God's premotion of the will *to choice*. The point is so obvious, one would expect it to be put forthrightly: God's physical premotion of the will in the act of free choice just is his poising the will for choice by putting it in first act. But I have found no place where Báñez maintains this position.

Another problem with the second interpretation is that insofar as it reduces God's premotion of the will in the act of choice to his preparation of the will for choice by placing intellect and will in first act, God's premotion would not determine the choosing will to only one outcome. Knowledge and desire of a particular end leave one indifferently disposed toward a variety of means. But Báñez clearly maintains in his various treatments of physical premotion (including the *Tractatus*) that physical premotions antecedently determine choice (albeit with no detriment to free choice, as Báñez understands it). So this second reading should also be set aside.

1.5.3 The Identification of Physical Premotion with Vital Act Applies Only in the Case of *Auxilium* that is Altogether Prevenient

A third interpretation is that Báñez is analyzing physical premotion as any Aristotelian would be expected to analyze motion in general: That is, with respect to its termini, or, as action and passion.

On this view, action is something from the agent in the patient.⁷⁵ According to Aristotle, motion is “the fulfillment of what is potentially, as such.”⁷⁶ Moreover, Aristotle maintains there is a single actuality of mover and moved, agent and patient.⁷⁷ In the course of responding to the objection that “it is contrary to reason to suppose that there should be one identical actualization of two things which are different in kind” since then “to teach will be the same as to learn and to act the same as to be acted on,” Aristotle teaches,

It is not absurd that the actualization of one thing should be in another. Teaching is the activity of a person who can teach, yet the operation is

75 Action is something from the agent in the patient: Transeunt action cannot be something in God, or else God would be really related to the world—any action *ad extra* would entail a real change in him, which is impossible if God is what he has to be to be the creator.

76 Aristotle, *Phys.* III.1, 201a 10–12.

77 Aristotle, *Phys.* III.3, 202a 18–22.

performed in something—it is not cut adrift from a subject, but is of one thing in another.

There is nothing to prevent two things from having one and the same actualization (not the same in being, but related as the potential is to the actual).

Nor is it necessary that the teacher should learn, even if to act and to be acted on are one and the same, provided they are not the same in respect of the account which states their essence (as raiment and dress), but are the same in the sense in which the road from Thebes to Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes are the same, as has been explained above. For it is not things which are in a way the same that have all their attributes the same, but only those to be which is the same. But indeed it by no means follows from the fact that teaching is the same as learning, that to learn is the same as to teach, any more than it follows from the fact that there is one distance between two things which are at a distance from each other, that being here at a distance from there and being there at a distance from here are one and the same. To generalize, teaching is not the same as learning, or agency as patiency, in the full sense, though they belong to the same subject, the motion; for the actualization of this in that and the actualization of that through the action of this differ in definition.⁷⁸

Thus, according to Aristotle, the mover's moving the moved *is* the moved's movement. The action of the agent is the same in reality with the passion of the patient, even though they differ in respect. Just as the road from Thebes to Athens and Athens to Thebes is the same road, or a steep ascent is the same as a steep descent, so too *in the context of §§2 and 7*, God's illuminating the intellect and the intellect's act of intellection are indeed one and the same reality.⁷⁹ What Báñez says is exactly what he means: God's premotion *just is* the vital act *in the case of premotions that are omnino praeveniens*.⁸⁰

78 Aristotle, *Phys.* III.3, 202b 6–22.

79 Interestingly, Suarez thinks God's motion of the will in first act is "effected through an act that is vital" (*DM* 19 §4.13 [Freddoso, 323]), though he (and Molina) on the one hand and Báñez, on the other, clearly have different understandings of the ontological status of actual *auxilium* (see the discussion of Molina and Suárez's positions on divine causality in Chs. 3 and 7 below).

80 If this reading of Báñez's position is correct, then his position is also corroborated by Cabrera, for while they disagree on whether or not a physical premotion is a form or quality, Cabrera agrees in identifying physical premotion with the will's first act. See Cabrera, q. 18 a. 4 d. 6 dub. 1 §§40–42 (409b), §58 (411a). For the opposite view however, see Báñez's

This last caveat turns out to be important for understanding Báñez, and it highlights certain features of the ontological status of physical premotions that could be easily missed. For Báñez, motion of the mover is identical with the movement of the moved; *but*, the movement of the moved (in this case) is not identical with the moved's own *self*-motion. It is one thing to talk about an active mover and a passive thing that is merely moved. It is another to talk about the moved thing being not only moved *ab extra* and passively, but also

successor, Pedro de Herrera, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 111 a. 2 §8 (189–90), discussed below. For Cabrera, the physical premotion is really identical with and only formally distinct from the vital first act of the will. This is because the vital first act of the will just is the terminus of the physical premotion (§61 [411a]). Also, as on Báñez's view, this identification of physical premotion with vital act is—crucially—limited to first act. Cabrera too distinguishes physical premotion from the will's second act (choice). What is less clear to me is whether or not Cabrera thinks the physical premotion immediately antecedent to choice is a distinct premotion from the premotion that is identical with the will's first act. However, for two reasons, it seems more probable to me that the premotion to choice is not the same as the premotion that is identical with the vital act of will in first act. First, proponents of physical premotion accept the distinction of efficacious from sufficient grace. But if the premotion immediately antecedent to choice were just the will in first act, then the division of efficacious and sufficient grace (on which the entire *Controversy de Auxiliis* rested) would be superfluous: It would simply reduce to the distinction of operative and cooperative grace. Merely sufficient grace would be equivalent to operative grace (which efficaciously puts the will in first act, but is not efficacious for putting it in second act) and efficacious grace would be cooperative (it would result in the will's second act). Second, Alvarez describes physical premotion as a medium between potency and act, specifically as a medium between the will's first act and its second act. Taking Alvarez's view as representative, if the physical premotion immediately antecedent to choice were just the will's own first act, there would be no reason to posit an intermediate between first act and second act. Consider, for example, Alvarez's claim that the physical premotion “confers a certain power of operation, but not *per modum actus primi*” (d. 19 §9 [154a]): The relevant physical premotion is not the first act of will itself. By considering the relevant physical premotion to be something between the first act of the will and the will's own self-movement (choice), I take the physical premotion immediately antecedent to choice to be distinct *both* from the will's own movement in first act *and* the will's own *self*-movement in second act. That point aside, the main things to take away for present purposes are, (1) the view that certain physical premotions just are vital acts of the human subject is not unique to Báñez, but is attested in another coeval author of the Thomist school (although Herrera's position confirms there was not universal agreement on this point); and (2) when physical premotions are identified with vital acts of the human subject, they are *not* identified with the second act of will (choice), but only with the first act—this much appears to have been agreed upon by proponents of the Dominican position.

a mover of itself. In the consideration at hand—one that concerns *auxilium omnino praeveniens* (that is, *prius tempore*—not just metaphysically prior) to the exercise of free choice—the motion of the moved is not a self-motion, but it is a vital act.⁸¹ The vital act in this case is not distinct from the motion of the mover (the motion of the mover being the physical premotion). The same reality is signified under different definitions. On the one hand, it is God's will effecting; on the other, it is the intellect placed in the act of cognizing. The patient (here, the intellect), is a doer despite being a patient (a done-unto) in the sense that it immediately produces its own act. But while the relevant faculty of soul elicits its own act, this action is initiated from outside, not by the faculty itself. Here, the movement of the moved is here something passive—*operans*, but not *cooperans*—moved, but not self-moving.⁸² In sum, the motion of the mover is the movement of the moved if and only if the moved is not moving.

By contrast, in the case of choice—a self-movement of the will—the premotion which disposes for choice, the premotion *omnino praeveniens*, does not suffice.⁸³ In the case of choice, there is also, besides the premotion that is *wholly* prevenient, a movement of the moved that is not identical with the motion of the (extrinsic) mover.⁸⁴ In short, there has to be a second movement of the moved that is its own in a sense beyond that act's being merely a vital act. It must be an active self-determination of the creature, who is a patient with respect to (and in this case, with respect only to) God. The motion of the mover is the movement of the moved, but the movement of the moved is not the same thing as the motion of the moved *as mover*. Rather, it is the motion of the mover *as moved*. When the motion in question is just the motion of the subject *as moved*, then the premotion is identical with the vital act.

The self-movement of the moved in choosing not only requires the motion of the mover in first act (which is a vital act of the creature, and on which the

81 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 2 §1 (383). Thus, all self-motions are vital acts, but not all vital acts are self-motions. A vital act is proper to the agent insofar as it emanates from his own potencies, but that is not enough to classify the act as *free* or *self-determining*.

82 For a discussion of the distinction between operative and cooperative grace, see *ST* I–II q. III a. 2.

83 Note the significance of 'altogether' or 'entirely' {*omnino*}—all premotion is antecedent to choice, and so in that sense might be considered 'prevenient' to it, but Báñez here has in mind promotions that are prevenient in the sense more typical to discussions of prevenient grace in the context of the preparation of adults for justification—those promotions which place the will in first act.

84 I acknowledge here—with Báñez—that God works interiorly. My point in designating God an 'extrinsic' mover is simply that God is not the creaturely agent.

creature's self-movement remotely depends), but also the motion of the mover in second act (on which the self-movement proximately depends). The second premotion can be identified neither with the vital act (of free choice) nor with the first premotion, which *is* identical with its respective vital act. The relevant premotion is a reality distinct from both.

I believe the relevant passages of §§ 2 and 7 of *Tractatus* II c. 2 should be read according to this third interpretation because this interpretation makes the plain sense of the text intelligible in a way that coheres with Báñez's teaching on physical premotion as a whole.⁸⁵

Consider, for example, Báñez's rejection of Suárez's identification of concurrence with the act of free choice. For Suárez, the human person's natural capacity for free choice is to be understood as an *auxilium* and the actual operation of that natural capacity, concurrence.⁸⁶ "But this opinion is false," according to Báñez, for,

God concurs *with* us to produce an act; therefore, divine concurrence is not our very act itself. Otherwise, we would say that divine concurrence concurs for [our very] concurring. Likewise, when we say that man needs the *auxilium* of God the mover or God's concurrence in order to act—for instance, in order to believe—no one means that man needs *action* in order to act.⁸⁷

Rather, what is understood by *auxilium*, according to Báñez, is the *motion* of God as efficient cause moving the agent who is not operating to actual operation.⁸⁸ In the case of free choice, the created agents' actual operation is

85 Moreover, it does so from the Aristotelian philosophical perspective Báñez would have assumed. Again, what I designate 'the received understanding' is the view that physical premotion is ontologically distinct from the act of free choice. As noted below, it seems the view that physical premotions were ontologically distinct from their respective acts more broadly (not only the act of choice) was also in circulation among members of the Dominican school.

86 This representation of Suárez's position in *De auxiliis* III c. 20 §4 is as recounted by Báñez. See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 109 a. 4 §2 (87).

87 Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 109 a. 4 §2 (87), emphasis mine: "Deus enim concurrat nobiscum ad actionem producendam: ergo concursus divinus non est ipse actus noster. Alias diceremus quod divinus concursus concurrat ad concursum. Item quando dicimus quod homo indiget auxilio Dei moventis sive concursu Dei ad agendum, v.g. ad credendum, nemo intelligit quod indiget homo actione ad agendum."

88 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 109 a. 4 §2 (87).

not simply supplied by God, but are also efficiently produced by the creatures who make free choices, since free choice is a vital self-motion.⁸⁹

Moreover, in the relevant part of §7, Báñez is trying to explain how Second Orange's teaching that "God does many good things in man that man does not do"⁹⁰ comports with his claim that God's wholly prevenient grace causes in us an act that is properly our own *because produced by us*, with the concurrence of our own powers. How could an act produced by us be something that we not do? The answer is that even while the effects of wholly prevenient grace are vital acts, because they are not self-motions as free choices are, they are said to be things that *homo non facit*—man here is moved but not a mover. What the council fathers have in mind as the 'doings' of man are his free acts, not just acts elicited by him.⁹¹ When Báñez identifies physical premotion with vital acts of the intellect and will, he is not identifying divine premotion with creaturely free choice. Rather, he is showing that the identification of physical premotion and creaturely operation is limited to acts of the intellect and will that are prior to free choice and presupposed by it.

Finally, the view that *auxilium* and the human act of free choice are distinct is corroborated both by Báñez's contemporaries and by later Thomists.⁹² For example, Alvarez unambiguously maintains that God's physical premotion is *aliquid creatum*, something "*praeuiam*" and "*realiter distinctum*" both from the creature's own vital potencies and the vital act of free choice.⁹³ Similarly,

89 Cf. Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 113 a. 8 §§5–6 (305–06).

90 DS §390: "Multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non facit homo."

91 Cf. Cabrera, q. 18 a. 4 d. 6 dub. 1 §§53–55 (410b).

92 Note above how Herrera even thinks that God's operative physical premotion cannot be identified with the vital first act of the will. See *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 111 a. 2 §8 (189).

93 For a few representative texts, see Alvarez, *De aux.* d. 19 §§4, 8–9 (149a, 152b–153a, 155a–b); d. 23 §13 (213a–b) §27 (222a). Notice at d. 19 §8 (152b), the physical premotion "*est terminus productus per solam operationem diuinam*." Here, the physical premotion is itself depicted as a terminus of divine operation. The point seems to be that the physical premotion is a created entity. The picture that emerges then is this: (1) There are the vital acts presupposed by choice which dispose the will for choice. Perhaps God's premotion to these acts is identical with them or not. At least Báñez and Cabrera seem to think they are identical. (2) Then there is the premotion to choice itself, which is manifestly distinct from choice (for all authors) and apparently distinct also from the prior vital acts that dispose for choice (whether or not these are identical with their respective physical premotions). This latter physical premotion immediately antecedent to choice is a mean between first and second act and, considered as a created reality, is a "terminus produced by divine operation." (3) Moreover, as a *motion* stimulating the human agent to the act of choice, the physical premotion has its own terminus, which just is the human act of free choice. See *De aux.* 111 d. 22 §38 (199a), d. 23 §28 (222b). Thus, *as divine operation*

Garrigou-Lagrange clearly states that physical premotions are created realities distinct from God and the creaturely act.⁹⁴ Finally, Pedro de Herrera states that God's operative physical *auxilium* is not identifiable with either the will of God or with human operations.⁹⁵ According to Herrera, operative grace cannot be the divine will itself insofar as operative grace is a *created* gift bestowed on human persons.⁹⁶ But neither can operative grace be a creaturely act for Herrera, since creaturely acts are the effects of God's *auxilium*, and causes must be distinguished from their effects.⁹⁷ While Herrera's position signals disagreement within the school about the identity of physical premotion and the will's first act (cf. Báñez and Cabrera), the general underlying thrust of his position supports the more limited point at hand concerning free choice: God's action is really distinct from creaturely action.⁹⁸

(i.e. God's 'moving' a created potency), the physical premotion has a terminus, while *as a created or extrinsic* divine operation, it is something other than God and is itself a terminus of God's production.

94 See for example, Garrigou-Lagrange, "Premotion Physique" 39.

95 Herrera, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 111 a. 2 §8 (189): "Gratia operans non est voluntas increata Dei et beneplacitum ejus, nec nostra operatio ut procedit a Deo tamquam a prima causa." Note here a divergence between Herrera and the stated position of Báñez in *Tractatus* 11 c. 2 §§2, 7.

96 See Herrera, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 111 a. 2 §8 (189).

97 See Herrera, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 111 a. 2 §8 (190). Specifically, Herrera says that operative *auxilium* is an "active principle" of creaturely operations. This is interesting, given the pains at which Báñez argues *auxilium* is not something introduced *per modum principii* to human operation. Despite this terminological incongruence however, both parties maintain that acts of will are vital acts and produced properly by the will, and that it is impossible for the will to produce its act without divine *auxilium*. So whether *auxilium* is called a principle or not, both Báñez and Herrera affirm its necessity for creaturely operation and are careful to maintain that creaturely operation is properly a creature's own. When Báñez argues that physical premotion is not something introduced in the way of a principle, he seems to mean that it is not introduced in the way of a *formal, operative* principle. See *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 109 a. 4 §2 (87). Given this specification, it would still be possible to understand physical premotion as a principle of another sort, such as a non-formal 'active' principle (in Herrera's sense).

98 Whereas Báñez is willing to identify *auxilium* with the first act of intellect and will, Herrera seems unwilling to identify *auxilium* and creaturely operation even in this instance. While this marks a difference from Báñez's view, it does not contradict Báñez's more limited position that the act of free choice is distinct from God's physical premotion, which is the relevant point at issue. If anything, Herrera's position highlights the general concern of the Dominican school to keep physical premotion and creaturely action distinct.

In light of the above considerations about the necessity of a divine motion that is distinct from and antecedent to the creaturely act of choice, one can see why Báñez responds to the charge that determining premotions destroy free choice by instead saying that God's determining premotions *perfect* free choice and that the *denial* of such premotions eradicates the possibility of free choice altogether.⁹⁹ To the question, "How can the will move itself if it is moved by God?" Báñez would reply, "How can the will move itself if it is *not* moved by God?" For, in the absence of God's *auxilium* applying a creature's capacity for free choice to act, free choice, however much a power of self-determination, is utterly unable to produce its own act of self-determination. Thus, one reason why the distinction between *auxilium* and free choice is so important is that it allows Báñez to highlight the causal integrity of the will and the will's activity in determining itself on the one hand, *and* the will's causal indigence and passive dependence upon God for its act of self determination on the other.

2 Báñez on Free Choice

On Báñez's theory of divine *auxilium*, God efficaciously brings about the human act of free choice thorough the mediation of a determining premotion. The premotion itself is God's *transeunt power*, which is immediate to the created effect, in this case, a human free choice. While this premotion is the transeunt power or causality of God, who is transcendent, the premotion itself is a created reality distinct from the human act of free choice which depends on it. According to Báñez, then, there is a respect in which the human will is necessitated in the act of choice by something finite other than its own act of choosing. But if the will, in choosing, is necessitated by something finite other than its very own act of choice, how can there be the indeterminacy that free choosing presupposes and settles? How does Báñez conceive of human free choice?

The preceding questions will be explored in this part, which has four sections. The first presents Báñez's definition of free choice. The second explores the warrant for this definition by considering the root and essence of freedom. In the third section, the kind of indifference required for free choice will be investigated. In the fourth, the distinction between the composed and divided senses of a conditional proposition will be elucidated because Báñez appeals to that distinction to explain how a free choice requires indifference. The principal loci for all four sections of this part are found in Báñez's

99 See for example, Báñez, *Tractatus* I c. 1 §6 (358–59); I c. 3 §4 (372); II c. 1 §7 (382), cf. §6 (379–81).

Scholastica commentaria in primam partem Angelici Doctoris S. Thomæ (Douai, 1614)¹⁰⁰ and the First Part of the *Tractatus*.

2.1 *Báñez's Definition of Liberum Arbitrium*

Báñez believes the reality of human free choice is demonstrable from divine revelation, human reason and the consensus of the Fathers.¹⁰¹ Báñez adopts his working definition of free choice from Book II of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*: "Free choice is the faculty of the intellect and the will for acting or not acting, or for acting one way or another."¹⁰² Often, Báñez simply defines free choice as a "faculty of the intellect and will for whichever" {*facultas ad utrumlibet*}, where '*utrumlibet*' refers to either acting or not acting, or acting one way or another.¹⁰³ Because the human person is free, he or she is said to be master of his or her own acts {*dominum suarum operationem*}.¹⁰⁴ At least two things are immediately evident from these indications of Báñez's view of free choice. First, the one capacity for free choice is located in two distinct powers of the soul—the intellect and the will—and second, free choice consists in a kind or kinds of indifference of the acting subject toward multiple alternatives for action. Each of these points is relevant to the debate with Molina, to be treated in the next chapter.

2.2 *The Root and Essence of Freedom*

According to Báñez, the capacity for free choice is a faculty of the intellect and will. But if free choice is one faculty, how can it reside in two distinct powers of the soul? The answer is, by being of each power in a different respect. Báñez

100 The Douai edition of 1614 is used here as it is the latest edition of Báñez's complete commentary on all 119 questions of the *Prima pars*. The present investigation chiefly concerns the commentary on q. 83. While Báñez published his commentary on qq. 1–64 of the *Prima pars* in 1584, his commentary on the remaining questions first appeared in 1588, when it was published both individually at Salamanca by the convent of St. Stephen as, *Scholastica commentaria super caeteras primae partis questiones*, and together with the commentary on qq. 1–64 at Lyon by Stephanus Michaelus et al.

101 On Scripture and the Fathers, see *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 83 a. 1 dub. 1 *prima conclusio* (370b–371b); on the dogmatic tradition, see *secunda conclusio* (371b–372a); on the testimony of reason and common experience, see *tertia conclusio* (372a–373a).

102 As quoted by Báñez, *Tractatus I* c. 1 §8 (360): "Liberum arbitrium est facultas intellectus et voluntatis ad agendum vel non agendum, vel agendum unum vel aliud" (from Lombard's *Sentences II* d. 24 c. 5). Cf. *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 83 a. 1 com. (370a).

103 "[F]acultas intellectus et voluntatis ad utrumlibet." See *Tractatus I* c. 1 §8 (360).

104 "[L]ibertat . . . est formaliter & essentialiter in voluntate." Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 83 a. 1 com. (370a).

explains that free choice is “radically and causally” in the intellect, but “formally and essentially” in the will (cf. *ST* I–II q. 13 a. 1).¹⁰⁵

To understand how free choice is radically in the intellect and formally in the will, one must consider the Thomistic anthropology Báñez presupposes. For Thomas, the will is an appetitive power corresponding to the intellect.¹⁰⁶ Will is called ‘*appetitus rationalis*’ (rational appetite) because the intelligible good which is the will’s object is apprehended and proposed to the it by the practical intellect: The practical intellect first understands the good as worthy of pursuit and then presents this to the will. This relationship with the intellect distinguishes the will from sub-rational appetites, such as the sensory appetite, whose objects are not apprehended by the intellect, but by the senses.¹⁰⁷ Thus, all of the will’s activity is based upon the activity of the practical intellect: The will tends toward its object *as understood* to be pursuitworthy.

What is true of the will’s activity in general is also true of choice in particular. Choice, according to Thomas, is the proper act of the free will as such.¹⁰⁸ A double analogy helps explain the relationship between the activities of the intellect and the will: Just as the understanding of first principles (a non-discursive process) is to reasoning (a discursive process), so too is volition of the end to choice of the means. In this way, the acts of the intellect and will are seen to parallel one another. But beyond this parallel, there is also a direct correlation between acts of the practical intellect and the acts of will that follow them: As the understanding of first principles (of practical reason) is to the volition of the end, so too is counsel (deliberative inquiry) to the choice of means. Choice presupposes volition of an end and both volition and choice presuppose a distinct act of intellect: the understanding of first practical principles and counsel, respectively.¹⁰⁹ Finally, it is important to

105 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *secunda conclusio* (376a); *Tractatus* I c. 1 §3 (355). This view of free choice is also attested in Alvarez. See for example, *De aux.* III d. 18 §23 (145a); d. 26 §12 (263a).

106 Thomas argues for the existence of divine will on the basis of the divine intellect (see *ST* I q. 19 a. 1). See Báñez, *Tractatus* I c. 1 §9 (360).

107 See *ST* I q. 80 a. 1.

108 See *ST* I q. 83 a. 3, cf. a. 4.

109 The sequence, then, would be something like this: (1) Apprehension of first practical principles (the good to be pursued and done), (2) volition of the end (3) counsel concerning means, (including the judgment that terminates counsel), (4) choice. It should be noted that the willing of the end need not be always conceived of as a separate act from the choice of means; the willing of the end, understood as *intentio*, is just accomplished in the willing of the means. However, besides *intentio* there is the simple *volitio* of the intelligible good. See *ST* I–II q. 8 a. 3, q. 12 a. 4.

note that the intellectual act of counsel is terminated by a judgment of reason which directly precedes the act of choice.

To understand Báñez's position it is also helpful to become familiar with two views he opposes.¹¹⁰ The first of these is the voluntarist position maintained by Henry of Ghent ('Henricus', 1217–93) and the Scotists. The second is the intellectualist position held by William Durand of St. Pourçain, O.P. ('Durandus', 1275–1334). Báñez regards the two positions as mistaken extremes and proposes his interpretation of Thomas as a sound *via media*.

According to the voluntarist position followed by Henry of Ghent, the intellect is a cause of liberty only by being a necessary condition for it.¹¹¹ For the voluntarists, freedom resides radically and causally in the will, not the intellect. For Durand, freedom is in the intellect not just radically and causally, but also formally.¹¹² Báñez argues against both in his commentary on *ST* I q. 83 a. 1. He presents three reasons for thinking freedom is in the intellect radically and causally and four reasons for thinking freedom is in the will formally and essentially.

Báñez first argues that freedom is radically in the intellect, against the voluntarist position of Henry of Ghent, by citing the view of Origen and St. Clement that the existence of free choice in human persons can be demonstrated on the basis of the indifference of reason's judgment, which terminates the process of deliberation.¹¹³ Second, he appeals to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* III.2–3 for the view that choice arises from the counsel and judgment of the intellect and to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IX.5 for the view that to be disposed toward opposite alternatives {se habeat ad opposita} belongs only to rational powers as such.¹¹⁴ Third, Báñez argues that voluntary action arises from the cognition of the will's object. In the case of choice—the type of voluntary action under consideration here—the act of will (*electio*) follows upon the intellectual judgment that terminates counsel. Thus, if choice is free, the freedom of choice must arise from the indifference of the judgment that precedes it.¹¹⁵ The common thread running through the three preceding arguments is that the root

110 My subsequent representation of these positions is taken from Báñez's characterization of them in *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 (375a).

111 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 (375a).

112 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 (375a).

113 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *prima conclusio* (375a–b).

114 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *prima conclusio* (375a). He cites the *Metaphysics* as Bk. IX "text 3". This does not seem quite right. I believe the correct reference—at least according to the present standard division of the text—is to *Metaphysics* IX.5 (1047b 30–1048a 25).

115 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 (375b).

and cause of the will's freedom is the indifference of the intellectual judgment that precedes the act of choice.

Báñez also later tries to answer the voluntarists' concerns by maintaining that an affirmation of freedom's radical existence in the intellect does not compromise its essential existence in the will. Rather, he maintains, the radical existence of freedom in the intellect is the very condition for the possibility of the will's being essentially free. This is because, as a matter of principle, whatever is formally and essentially in the effect is virtually and radically in the cause.¹¹⁶

In response to the intellectualist position of Durand, Báñez gives four reasons for thinking that freedom exists formally and essentially in the will. The first is that freedom must be formally in the will because if it were formally in the intellect, even the intellect's acts that precede any act of the will would be free insofar they would proceed from an essentially free power. But the acts of intellect that precede all acts of the will are naturally determined. Since naturally determined acts are not free, the intellect cannot possess freedom formally.¹¹⁷ Second, given reason's judgment regarding the particular object it proposes to the will, the will retains the ability not to choose in accord with reason's judgment. Since the will retains this ability to do otherwise even presupposing the judgment of reason, the will possesses freedom formally and not only by derivation from the intellect. Moreover, since the exercise of an agent's other powers, which the will puts to use, is free only by participation in the freedom of the will, the will possesses freedom in a manner that is principal and formal.¹¹⁸ Third, Báñez explains that sin and merit are ascribed only to a power that is formally free. But sin and merit are ascribed only to the will.

116 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *secunda conclusio* (376a).

117 The text actually reads: "ergo in intellectus est formaliter libertas." However, context indicates that this must be a misprint and should read: "ergo in intellectus non est formaliter libertas"—the beginning of the passage, for example, begins: "Libertas formaliter non est in intellectu, sed in sola voluntate." Initially, this first argument of Báñez's seems liable to the objection that it implies all the will's acts are free insofar as they proceed from a power that is essentially free; but at least one of the will's acts—namely the willing of the end—is necessitated. Therefore, not all of the will's acts are free. However, the rejoinder to this potential objection is supplied in the context of Báñez's commentary on q. 82 a. 4 (369a) where he also takes up the view of Henry of Ghent. There he explains that however much the will is not free to willing the end *quantum ad specificationem*, it is free *quantum ad exercitum*. On this basis it is possible to maintain that all acts proceeding from the will are at least in some sense, genuinely free (cf. *Tractatus* I c. 19 *nota secundo* [361]).

118 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *secunda conclusio* (375b).

Therefore, only the will is formally free.¹¹⁹ Fourth, Báñez states, “[o]nly that power is formally free which, *with all* [temporal] *antecedents for acting supplied*, is able by its own choice to act and not act.”¹²⁰ But only the will has this ability to do otherwise in the presence of all temporally antecedent conditions. Thus, only the will is formally free. Indeed, it is because of the will’s formal indifference in the face of all temporally preceding conditions that the human person is said to have mastery over his or her actions through the power of free will, and is therefore praiseworthy or blameworthy.¹²¹

2.3 *On the Indifference Required for Free Choice*

What is apparent from both sets of arguments—both those defending the radical existence of freedom in the intellect and those defending the formal existence of freedom in the will—is that the faculty of free choice consists in a certain indifference toward a plurality of alternatives for action. According to Báñez, indifference does belong to the essence of free choice.¹²² To understand Báñez’s view of free choice, it is necessary to understand the kinds of indifference in which he thinks it does and does not consist.

Because freedom is radically in the intellect and formally in the will, the indifference required by free choice can be found in two corresponding powers of soul: the cognitive and the appetitive. Moreover, indifference in either can be considered with respect to both the subject and the object. This leads Báñez to a discussion of divine and human freedom and indifference with respect to sin. Finally, creaturely freedom, for Báñez, is not absolute: There are certain constraints on the sort of indifference required for free choice.

A rational indifference belongs to the capacity for free choice insofar as the intellectual judgment that terminates counsel and proposes to the will what is to be chosen could have been otherwise. Judgment could have been otherwise because none of the means under consideration has a necessary connection

119 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *secunda conclusio* (375b–376a).

120 Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *secunda conclusio* (376a) (emphasis mine): “Illa sola potentia est formaliter libera, quae *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*, potest pro suo arbitrio agere & non agere.” He goes on to immediately add: “sed sola voluntas est hujusmodi, ut ab omnibus conceditur.” This passage is remarkable because of its similarity to Molina’s definition of free choice: Quo pacto illud agens liberum dicitur quod *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum* potest agere et non agere aut ita agere unum ut contrarium etiam agere possit (*Concordia I* d. 2 §3; emphasis mine). See the discussion in Ch. 3 below.

121 Báñez’s rejection of intellectual determinism is also evinced in his discussion of whether heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. See *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 115 a. 4 (550b D).

122 See Báñez, *Tractatus I* c. 2 (363–368).

to the end in view. Since the various means are all conducive to the realization of the given end (albeit in various ways), reason's judgment that certain means are or are not to be chosen is indifferent. On the part of the judging subject, this indifference is said to be active, whereas on the part of the object (the means considered and judged by practical reason) this indifference is said to be passive. Thus, both judgment (or the subject of, or capacity for judgment) and the object judged are indifferent, but not in the same sense.

As indicated above, a volitional indifference belongs to the capacity for free choice not only by derivation, from the indifference of the judgment that precedes the act of free choice, but also because the will retains its own ability to either accept or reject the judgment of reason: created persons can choose what they have judged to be bad. Again, choice can be considered on the part of either the subject or the object. Subjectively, the free will is actively indifferent. Objectively, the object chosen is passively indifferent. In sum, the indifference required for free choice is found in both judgment and choice, and additionally, both judger and chooser on the one hand, and the judged and chosen on the other, can be called "indifferent."

The distinction between passive and active indifference outlined above brings into view another sense of passive indifference that is crucial to the theory of physical premotion. As Báñez explains, besides the passive indifference of an object (means) lacking a necessary connection to the end and the active indifference of the free subject, there is also a *passive* indifference on the part of the free subject when that free subject is a creature.¹²³ The basic reason for this is that all free creatures depend passively on God for all their operations. This is because no creature is its own act. Instead, creatures' operations consist in a transition from potency to act—a change. What is more, as a matter of principle, nothing can be changed from potency to act except by something that is already in act.¹²⁴ The reason this is important is that it points out the need for divine *auxilium* for a created free will to pass from potency to act: The will, however much a self-mover (possessing active indifference), is unable to proceed to its act unless it be moved by God, the first mover. Since the created capacity for free choice is receptive with respect to the divine motion and since it is not determined by nature to one end, it is passively indifferent.¹²⁵

123 See Báñez, *Tractatus* 1 c. 2 §6 *tertia conclusio* (366–67).

124 Báñez actually adduces four reasons for thinking created free choice has a passive indifference, but these will not be rehearsed here because the main point reduces to the explanation just given. See Báñez, *Tractatus* 1 c. 2 §6 *tertia conclusio* (366–67).

125 Alvarez points out that the natural indifference of the will toward a variety of possible determinations indicates the need for divine premotion. The will's being in potency to a

Yet, insofar as the created capacity for free choice, under the determining influence of a physical premotion, determines *itself* by a vital act, creaturely free choice is also actively indifferent. This point is crucial because Báñez holds that the faculty of free choice and its exercise—even if creaturely and therefore passive—does not formally consist in passivity or potentiality. Rather, free choice is formally an *active* faculty and its exercise, action.¹²⁶ Báñez is at pains to stress this point because it can be easily misunderstood or overlooked within the context of his theory of physical premotion, which stresses the passive receptivity of the creaturely agent with respect to divine causality, and also because he feels it is required by Trent's teaching on justification.

Báñez's distinction of active and passive indifference further points out an important distinction between negative and privative indifference, which amounts to a difference between divine and creaturely freedom.

Understood in a negative sense, indifference simply means not inclined {non differens} or determined to one or another alternative. All forms of indifference are at least negative. The privative sense, however, adds to this the notion that what is indifferent is not only *non differens* but also apt to be determined, whether by itself, by another, or by itself and another. In other words, privative indifference denotes a certain passivity in the indifferent thing that is not denoted by indifference that is merely negative. The manifest implication is that while created free wills are privatively indifferent, divine free will can only be negatively indifferent because God is pure act and so in no sense determinable. Consequently, privative indifference belongs only to free creatures and cannot be essential to a universal definition of free choice that applies by analogy also to God. Negative indifference can be attributed to divine freedom, however, since all privative indifference is negative, but not all negative indifference is privative.

Báñez wishes to define free choice in such a way that it can be predicated of both God and created persons because he takes it for granted that any perfection of a creature must exist preeminently in the creator, and free choice is

variety of possible determinations demands that if it is to act, it be reduced to act by something already in act. See *De aux.* 111 d. 23 §20 (218a–b); cf. §§25–27 (221a–b) and d. 18 §13 (139a).

126 Báñez, *Tractatus* 1 c. 2 §6 *quarta conclusio* (367): “Nihilominus facultas liberi arbitrii et usus illius facultatis, quantumlibet sit liberum arbitrium creatum, non consistit formaliter in passione aut potentialitate illius facultatis, sed revera facultas est activa et usus illius est actio.” Citing Canons 4–6 of Trent's *Decree on Justification*, Báñez then goes on to say that, “constat facultatem illam esse activam ad agendum hoc vel aliud, vel ad eligendum agere vel non agere.” Thus, we can add to Báñez's definition of free choice taken from Peter Lombard (§ 1.3.1, above), that free choice is an *active* faculty toward whichever.

a creaturely perfection.¹²⁷ The upshot of this participationist view is that on Báñez's account, divine freedom is the ground and touchstone for creaturely freedom, not the other way around. How Báñez conceives of divine freedom has direct consequences for how he conceives of creaturely freedom, especially with respect to its diminishment through sin and its perfection through grace. Because divine freedom is the prime analogue, the ability to sin that obtains in the case of creaturely wayfarers cannot belong to the formal notion of free choice that applies also to God, Christ, the good angels and the blessed. Indeed the ability to sin does not belong to Báñez's conception of free choice, but rather to its imperfection.

That is why, in describing the way that freedom entails the ability to do otherwise, Báñez explicitly excludes the ability to do the contrary. For however much freedom entails the ability to do otherwise, "nevertheless, free choice is not therefore more perfect to the extent that it is in more ways indifferent."¹²⁸ For if freedom entailed the ability not only to act differently than one does, but also to do the contrary, then freedom would require the ability to sin. But God, Jesus as man, the good angels, and the blessed do not have this ability, despite being free—and not only free, but more perfectly free than wayfarers. Thus, Báñez contrasts what he calls 'freedom of diversity', which does belong to the essence of free choice with 'freedom of contrariety', which does not. When, in his definition of free choice, Lombard speaks of the ability to act in one way or another, Báñez understands this to mean freedom of diversity, but not freedom of contrariety.

The ability to act or not act, this is a third category of indifference which Báñez calls 'freedom of contradiction'. *Liberum arbitrium* then, encompasses freedom of contradiction and freedom of diversity, but not freedom of contrariety. A free agent must be able to do otherwise at the moment of choice in the sense of being able to act or not act (God, for example, could have not created), or to do one thing or a different thing (God could have created different worlds than this one), when either acting or not acting, or doing one thing or another are all morally good options. But freedom does not require that one be able at the moment of choice to do one thing or its contrary: to love or hate, help or harm, take care of or kill, and so forth.

As the next chapter will show, Báñez's exclusion of the ability to sin from the definition of free choice is one of the notable divergences between his

¹²⁷ See Báñez, *Tractatus*, I c. 2 §6 *secunda conclusio* (366).

¹²⁸ "[Q]uamvis indifferentia sit necessaria ad rationem liberii arbitrii, tamen non ideo erit perfectius liberum arbitrium quia pluribus modis in se est indifferens." Báñez, *Tractatus* I c. 1 §9 *nota tertio* (362).

and Molina's conception of human liberty. While more will be said about the divine permission of sin in the next section, it is worth mentioning here that although Báñez does not think the ability to sin belongs to freedom essentially, he does think freedom is an essential condition for sin, for sin is precisely the *misuse* of free choice.¹²⁹ This misuse is possible because of the defectibility inherent to creaturely finitude: since creatures are dependent on God for all their operations, and since wayfarers are not confirmed in grace (with possible exceptions), they retain the sort of indifference whereby they can sin (even while they need not be able to sin in order to be free).¹³⁰ In other words, wayfarers do (*de facto*) have freedom of contrariety.

The preceding considerations about indifference make it clear that freedom, for Báñez, is not the unqualified indifference of the faculty of free choice. There are limits to that indifference. Besides excluding freedom of contrariety, Báñez holds that the will necessarily wills the end and is necessitated *de dicto* with regard to the act of choice. I will here consider the willing of the end and in the next subsection deal with the distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* modality.

While the faculty of free choice is an ability to will or not will, or to will one thing or another, Báñez explains that '*facultas ad utrumlibet*' is not a proper characterization of the will with respect to its willing of the end, for the will is determined by a necessity of nature to will the universal good {*bonum in communi*} as it is proposed by the intellect.¹³¹ Since the will is determined to will the *bonum in communi*, it is not able to will any object under the formality of evil (that is, understood as evil) as its proper end. However, while no will is indeterminate with regard to the specification of its end (even God necessarily wills his own goodness—cf. *ST* I q. 19 a. 2), a human will is still indeterminate with respect to exercise, for it is not the case that the human will always actually wills its specified end (this is evident, for example, in the case of someone who is asleep). Unlike divine will, creaturely will is not always in act, but only sometimes.¹³² This distinction between specification and exercise corresponds to the distinction drawn above between freedom of diversity and freedom of

129 See Báñez, *Tractatus* I c. 1 §8 (360).

130 In Báñez's day, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception had not been defined, although it enjoyed popular belief and Trent's *Decree on Justification* allowed for this popular faith without endorsing it. It is beyond the scope of this study to consider Báñez's view of Mary's sinlessness.

131 See *Tractatus* I c. 1 §9 *nota secundo* (361).

132 Báñez counts this as an 'imperfection' of created free choice. See *Tractatus* I c. 1 §9 *nota secundo* (361).

contradiction: The will possesses a freedom of contradiction with regard to willing the ultimate end but not a freedom of diversity. With respect to willing the means, the will possesses a freedom of contradiction and a freedom of diversity (and in some cases, contrariety). In the case of choice, the will has freedom of exercise and freedom of specification.

While the necessitation of the will with respect to the specification of its proper object limits indifference, it is also grounds freedom. For freedom pertains to choice, and choice concerns the means to a specified end. There can only no choice of means without a prior willing of an end. Thus, in an overarching sense, necessity is the ground for freedom on Báñez's account. The more perfectly assimilated one is to one's naturally-determined end, the more perfectly free one is with respect to willing the means to it, as Báñez demonstrates by appealing to the examples of divine and angelic freedom.¹³³

Báñez distinguishes the primary foundation of freedom from the proximate foundation of its exercise. The principal foundation of freedom is the will's determined relationship to its proper end, the good in general. However, the proximate foundation of the exercise of freedom is the cognition of various equally suitable means to that end and the indifferent judgment with respect to one of those courses of action that terminates counsel. Because the intellect judges indifferently with respect to multiple alternatives (freedom of specification), and because the will retains the ability to reject the judgment of reason (freedom of exercise), the will is not naturally determined to choose any particular alternative.

This sheds light on the question of how the will could possess freedom of specification or exercise in the act of choice given the theory of physical pre-motion outlined in the previous section above. With respect to the specification of its proximate object, the will is free because it is not determined *by its nature* to the willing of one alternative or willing at all *even if* the will is causally predetermined by God in the moment of choice to choose what it chooses. Moreover, the will retains its *power* of doing otherwise even in the moment of choice when it actually does what it does. To make sense of these claims, I will next consider the distinction between de dicto and de re modality.

2.4 *The Composed and Divided Senses of a Conditional Proposition: De dicto and de re modality*

To explain how creaturely free choices foreknown and predetermined by God remain genuinely free, Báñez appeals to the distinction between the composed and divided senses of a conditional proposition. The distinction of the

¹³³ See *Tractatus* I c. 1 §9 (361–62).

sensus compositus and *sensus divisus* corresponds to the distinction between ‘necessity of consequence {*necessitas consequentiae*}’ and ‘necessity of the consequent {*necessitas consequentis*}’ and to that between ‘de dicto’ and ‘de re’ necessity.¹³⁴ These basically equivalent distinctions were central to the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. The distinction between the composed and dividend senses was interpreted differently by the Dominican and Jesuit sides of the debate and the tenability of Báñez’s position depended on the soundness of his interpretation.

According to Báñez, freedom (active indifference) applies only in the divided sense, not the composed sense. That is, the will can be conditionally necessitated and still remain free. To be free requires that it be non-necessitated only in the divided sense. But what exactly does this mean?

A common locus for the distinction between absolute and conditional necessity is *ST* I q. 19 a. 3.¹³⁵ In this article, Thomas addresses the question of whether God necessarily wills whatever he wills. Thomas explains that God necessarily wills his own goodness because his own goodness is the proper object of the divine will. However, God also wills other things as a means to manifesting his goodness. These he does not will with an absolute necessity because one who wills the end does not necessarily will the means conducive to it unless the end cannot be obtained without employing such means. To use Thomas’ example, one who wills to cross the sea (prior to the advent of flight) necessarily wills to take a ship, and one who wishes to stay alive wills to eat. But one who wills to take a horse on a journey that could be made by foot does not necessarily will to go by horse since the end could be obtained by alternative means. Likewise, God wills things other than himself on account of his own goodness, but not of necessity, because God’s own goodness is perfect and would exist even if he did not create and sustain anything.

Thus, God is not bound to will things other than himself by any sort of natural necessity. But, in fact he does will other things. Furthermore, the divine will is immutable. Given the fact of God’s willing contingent reality with an infallible, eternal decree, that reality obtains by a necessity of supposition, but not with an absolute necessity, since God need not have created anything.

134 Necessity in the composed sense (necessity of consequence, or *de dicto* necessity) is sometimes also called ‘conditional necessity’, ‘necessity of supposition’, ‘hypothetical necessity’, ‘necessity *secundum quid*’, ‘necessity of infallibility’ or ‘necessity of immutability’ by various authors and in various contexts. For a discussion of the equivalence of these terms with references to Báñez and Aquinas (as well as others), see Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 25 §§2–18 (248aff.), esp. §§2, 14 (248a, 254b).

135 See also *QDV* q. 23 a. 4; *SCG* I c. 83.

The difference between absolute and conditional necessity is expressed by the distinction between interpreting a proposition in its composed and divided senses. Thomas explains this distinction between composed and divided senses when treating of divine foreknowledge in *ST* I q. 14 a. 13. His explanation is formulated in response to an objection:

[E]verything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent thing must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.¹³⁶

What is known must necessarily be because knowledge as such is of truth, and truth is the correspondence of thoughts with the realities thought about.¹³⁷ As Thomas maintains, "Truth is the making-commensurate of intellect and thing."¹³⁸ Put negatively, it would be impossible to know *x* if *x* were not the case. The essence of the objector's argument is this: If a future contingent were known by God, its contingency would be eliminated. Therefore, it is impossible for God to know future contingents.

In reply, Thomas distinguishes between the composed and divided senses of the saying: "Everything known by God must necessarily be." Taken *in sensu composito*, the consequent: "*x* must necessarily be" obtains with a necessity of supposition: the necessity of this consequent obtains on the condition that its antecedent, "*x* is known by God," likewise obtains. In the composed sense then, the sentence is understood as a whole encompassing both antecedent and consequent, and the necessity of the consequent is a function of the antecedent. Thus, the necessity of the consequent in this instance is most adequately described as the necessity of consequence rather than the necessity of the consequent. The necessity is of the following, not of what follows. In other words, the necessity in question is a *de dicto* necessity: a necessity stemming from the saying {dictum} as a whole, not from the inherent or ontological mode of the reality picked out by the consequent. This sort of necessity is also called 'logical necessity' because the necessity stems from the relationship of ideas expressed in the proposition (the relationship of parts in the whole), but the necessity in question is not the intrinsic ontological necessity of the parts themselves considered in isolation from the whole.

¹³⁶ *ST* I q. 14 a. 13 obj. 3.

¹³⁷ See *ST* I q. 16 a. 1 c.; cf. *QDV* q. 1 a. 1.

¹³⁸ *ST* I q. 16 a. 1 c: "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus."

On the other hand, understanding the proposition *in sensu diviso*, the consequent “*x* must necessarily be” (where *x* stands for a reality other than God) does not obtain necessarily. That is, if the antecedent is not supposed, the consequent does not perforce obtain in and of itself. If it did, its necessity would be called ‘necessity of the consequent,’ or ‘ontological’ or ‘de re’ necessity. In the divided sense then, the consequent is considered separately from the antecedent.

Among present-day expositors of the composed and divided senses, Anthony Kenny proposes a helpful example to illustrate the distinction.¹³⁹ He asks us to consider the following proposition:

- (1) If there is a University at Oxford, then necessarily there is a University at Oxford.

This proposition, he explains, can be understood in two crucially different senses. Interpreting (1) in the composed sense, it would be tantamount to the following proposition:

- (2) “If there is a University at Oxford, then there is a University at Oxford” is a necessary truth.

Obviously, (2) is true because it affirms the necessity of the truth of a tautology. Whether or not there is in fact a university at Oxford makes no difference to the truth-value of (2). This sort of necessity is logical: it applies to the statement as a whole, comprising both antecedent and consequent. It is the consequence rather than the consequent that is necessary.

However, we could interpret (1) differently. Understanding it in the divided sense, (1) would be tantamount to this:

- (3) If there is a University at Oxford, then “there is a University at Oxford” is a necessary truth.

¹³⁹ See Anthony Kenny, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” in *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays* ed. Anthony Kenny (London: Macmillan, 1969), 258–60. The propositions I present here are quoted directly from Kenny (259), although I have not employed additional quotation marks above in order to avoid obscuring Kenny’s point (as his text itself includes quotation marks). My explanation of the example is also indebted to Kenny’s explanation.

Unlike (2), (3) affirms the necessity of the consequent, and (3) is false because it is possible that there not be a university at Oxford (i.e. it is not ontologically necessary—the existence of a university at Oxford is not something that obtains because of what that state of affairs is). This is clear from the fact that the University of Oxford did not always exist. Thus, the fact of there being a university at Oxford does not establish the necessary truth of a proposition picking out that state of affairs. In other words, while it is true that anything that is, while it is, must be, it is not the case that everything which exists, exists by absolute necessity.

Thomas applies this distinction with respect to the divine foreknowledge and will. Given that God knows something other than himself, it is true that what he knows must be. But it is not the case that the known thing, in itself, must be.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, given that God wills something, he must necessarily will it with a necessity of supposition since God is eternal and immutable.¹⁴¹ But this does not entail that God necessarily wills it (thus eliminating the contingency of his willing). By extension, if God wills something contingently, what he wills obtains necessarily because of the indefectibility of the divine will, but the indefectibility of the divine will does not eliminate the contingency of the thing willed. There is the contingency of God's willing, on the one hand, and the contingency of what is willed, on the other. Thus, just as Thomas can say, "anything known by God must necessarily be" he can likewise say "anything willed by God must necessarily be". But what must be on the condition that God knows or wills it does not necessarily have to be absolutely.

From the above clarification, it is possible to see how Báñez can maintain that the will is determined in its act of choosing, but could still have chosen otherwise at the moment of choice. For the will is necessitated *in sensu composito* in the very moment of its act, but it remains free *in sensu diviso*—that is, while

140 Here it is important to distinguish a thing's existing intentionally and "pre-volitionally"—in our discursive way of thinking—in the divine intellect, and its actual existence brought about ("post-volitionally" again, discursively speaking) by divine decree. God knows all possibilities in knowing himself and he knows himself with an absolute necessity, but he does not know other things as they exist in themselves with an absolute necessity, but rather with the necessity of supposition. Thus the distinction between divine *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* and *scientia visionis*: God's knowledge of vision presupposes his act of will, and so while he knows with an absolute necessity all things by his *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, since he does not will all things by an absolute necessity in willing his own goodness, therefore, what God knows by his knowledge of vision, he knows with a necessity of supposition; that is, he knows it on the condition that he has decreed it to obtain. See ST I q. 19 a. 3 ad. 6; q. 14 a. 8 c.

141 See ST I q. 19 a. 3 c., ad. 1; a. 8 ad. 1.

it is in act, the will must be in act in the way that it is, but it nevertheless could have done otherwise than it *de facto* does. It is also apparent from the above clarification how Báñez can maintain that the will can be determined by God and yet remain free: if God wills Peter to perform action *A*, then, in the composed sense, Peter necessarily performs action *A*. But in the divided sense, Peter (and Peter's *A*-ing) remains free. The divine will does not impose necessity on the creaturely free will in the divided sense. Since freedom, on Báñez's account, only requires that the will be free in the divided sense, human actions determined by God remain free. Indeed, according to Báñez, everything is necessary with respect to the divine will. The contingency of contingent realities is not spoken of with respect to divine causality, but rather with respect to created causes, which are defectible in their operations.

It is also important to note that on Báñez's account of God's movement of the human will, the antecedent supposed when a one's act of choice is considered *in sensu composito* is not just one's very choosing (if Peter performs action *A*, then necessarily Peter performs action *A*) or even the divine will (if God wills Peter to perform action *A*, then necessarily Peter performs action *A*), but a physical premotion (if there is a physical premotion for Peter to perform action *A*, then necessarily Peter performs action *A*). Recall that physical pre-motions are distinct both from God (or the divine will) and the creaturely free act that God wills.

In light of the above considerations, we are left with the following composite understanding of Báñez's concept of freedom: Free choice is that active faculty of the intellect and will which, with all temporal antecedents for acting supplied, is able in the divided sense to act or not act, or to act in one way or another. Freedom does not involve indifference in the composed sense.

3 Human Freedom, Physical Premotion and Sin

Given Báñez's theory of physical premotion and the understanding of creaturely freedom explained above, one may wonder how God is not responsible for sin. For an outworking of Báñez's claim that God predetermines human free choices would seem to be that sin becomes practically unavoidable for the one who commits it. This raises questions about commonly accepted notions about God's justice in allowing sin, saving the elect and condemning those who fail to repent. It also raises the question of whether Báñez's view of free choice and predestination is relevantly like the Calvinist or Lutheran views condemned at Trent.¹⁴²

142 See for example, DS §§1554–56. This point is discussed further in Ch. 4 below.

In this part, I shall concentrate on Báñez's account of God's allowing sin. In the first section, I will focus first on human freedom with respect to sin. I will then consider divine causality and the act of sin in Section Two. Finally, in the third section, I will consider the malice of sin in respect to human agency. The principal locus for these matters is Báñez's posthumously published commentary on *ST I-II* q. 79 (1584–85, 1598–99), which concerns the external causes of sin, (specifically divine causality).

3.1 *Human Freedom and Sin*

The answer to the question of how one is free with respect to one's acts of sin is the same as the answer to the question of how one is free with respect to any of one's acts of choice: human persons are free in the divided sense because they are not necessitated by nature to act in only one way. But human persons are not free or indifferent toward potential objects of choice *in the composed sense*. On the hypothesis that there is an indefectible divine predetermination that the will choose in a certain way (something positive), it is impossible that the will not actually choose that way. Conversely, on the hypothesis that there is not a physical premotion for the will to act in a certain way, then necessarily the will does not act in that way. If a human person is not provided with the physical premotion (efficacious actual grace) needed to perform a salutary act, he or she will indefectibly *not* perform a salutary act. Yet, if one fails to perform a salutary act under the circumstances that require it, one sins. To sin, one must be free. However, freedom does not require one to be free in the composed sense, but only in the divided sense, and one is free in the divided sense with respect to one's acts of sin because, just as with one's other acts, one is able to do otherwise *at*, but not *in*, the moment of choice.

While one has the ability to do otherwise, however, on the hypothesis that God does not provide efficacious grace for the performance of a salutary act, the non-performance of a salutary act is infallibly ensured, for one cannot move oneself to act—even the act of sin—unless one's own self-determination is causally preceded by a divine determination (since, on this view, God is the first mover).¹⁴³ Thus, for Báñez, God's not providing efficacious grace, infallibly ensures one's sinning. Nevertheless, one remains free by nature because none of the means under consideration in the act of choice has a necessary connection to the end intended. Lacking such a necessary connection, the outcome of the choice could have been otherwise despite whatever it *de facto* is. The decisive factor in whether one's choice is for this or for that is God's premotion of the will.

143 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §58 (236).

The relevant point, of course, is that although one is not obliged to perform all salutary acts all the time, the non-performance of a salutary act under the circumstances where such an act ought to be performed is a sin. The key is that whereas God does provide everyone with sufficient (operative) grace for the performance of all they ought to do, God does not provide everyone with efficacious (actual) grace for all they ought to do. In the absence of efficacious actual grace, sin is inevitable. Yet, sin remains a free act.

Báñez's way of saving divine justice is by positing an asymmetry between God's causal involvement in good acts and his causal involvement in bad. In the case of good acts, God has the initiative whereas in the case of sins, the human person has the initiative. But more than this, God has the causal initiative even in bad acts with respect to whatever in them positively exists, for "sin is neither pure negation or privation, but a *human act* contrary to virtue."¹⁴⁴ Báñez is able to maintain this asymmetry by distinguishing between the positive reality of an act and the privation that afflicts an act that is a sin: while God is the first cause of everything that has positive existence in the act of sin, the sinner is the first cause of the malice of sin—that is, the evil or privation that constitutes an act as sin.¹⁴⁵ In other words, God causes the act of sin as act, but not as sin; the sinner causes the act of sin as sin. This raises two questions: First, in what sense does Báñez understand God to be the cause of sin, and second, how does Báñez understand the human person to be the cause of sin's malice (or indeed, how can anything cause sin's malice if malice has no positive existence)? I will treat these questions in turn.

3.2 *Divine Causation and the Act of Sin*

St. Thomas teaches in the second article of *ST* I–II q. 79 that God causes the act of sin, yet does not cause it to be a sin. In commenting on that article, Báñez considers seven different opinions before presenting his own.¹⁴⁶ I will not deal with the first five, which he dismisses as erroneous.¹⁴⁷ The sixth and seventh however, merit attention because each grasps some aspect of what, in Báñez's view, is the correct solution to the question of how God causes the act of sin without causing sin itself.

The sixth opinion Báñez considers was held widely by Thomists. It relies on a distinction between causes and effects of the natural order and those of the

¹⁴⁴ Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §16 (207).

¹⁴⁵ See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §56 (235).

¹⁴⁶ See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §§13–21 (205–11).

¹⁴⁷ The opinions Báñez finds erroneous are those of Lombard, Durand, Gregory of Rimini, Ockham and Biel, and Cano, respectively.

moral order. In this view, natural effects should be reduced to natural causes and moral effects to moral causes. Since sin is a moral act and effect, God is not the cause of sin simply speaking because God is not the moral cause of sin. However, insofar as the act of sin *as act* is a natural effect, God is the natural cause of the *act* of sin.¹⁴⁸ Báñez thinks that, correctly interpreted, this view simply is that God is the natural cause of sin because he causes the entity or substance of the *act* of sin.¹⁴⁹ But Báñez does not regard this opinion as an adequate answer to the difficulty at hand, for he holds that God is not only the natural cause of the *substance* or *entity* of the act of sin but is also the natural cause of its *particular determination*.¹⁵⁰

A distinction Cajetan makes in the seventh opinion Báñez considers will clarify this point.

Cajetan distinguishes three aspects of sin: the act itself, its moral species and its deformity.¹⁵¹ He explains that there is no difficulty with respect to the first and third of these aspects: everyone agrees that God causes the positive

148 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §19 (209). Cf. Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 18 §21 (144a–b); d. 23 §11 (213a); d. 24 §19 (236a).

149 Báñez also points out that the sixth opinion lends itself to various problematic interpretations of what it means for God to be the natural cause of sin. See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §19 (209).

150 Báñez contrasts God's being a 'natural' cause of the act of sin with his being a 'moral' cause of sin. By 'natural cause' Báñez means that God "causes the naturality and physical entity of that act which is a sin {Deus causa naturalis quia efficit naturalitatem et physicam entitatem illius actus qui est peccatum}." Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §19 (210). By my use of 'entity' or 'substance' above, I mean what Báñez means by '*entitas physica*' and '*naturalitas*'. I take it that the *entitas physica* or *naturalitas* of the act of sin is not just its *esse* as such—the act of being whereby sin is *as act*—but also includes also *what* is—the act itself to the extent it enjoys positive existence. Because the particular determination—considered just as such—is a positive feature of the act that is a sin, it belongs to the *naturalitas* or *entitas physica* of the act of sin. This is Báñez's point: It is not possible to abstract the *esse* or the substance of the act of sin from its particular determination and say God causes just the *esse* or substance of the act *but not* its particular determination (as though the particular determination in the case of sin were wholly evil), as Molina seems to maintain (see the discussion on Molina's position in the following chapter). For while the particular determination makes the act to be what it is (for *this* rather than *that*), it is not wholly bad. Since the particular determination is a positive feature of the act, God causes the particular determination, on Báñez's view. But God does not cause the precise lack of entity which constitutes that particular determination morally deficient.

151 My presentation of Cajetan's view is taken from Báñez. See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §20 (210).

being of the act of sin *as act* and that God does not cause the moral deformity that characterizes the act *as sin*. The difficulty lies then in understanding God's causal involvement with the second aspect: the moral species of the act of sin. The difficulty arises because the sinful act is morally specified by malice. How could God cause the species of an act when that species is morally evil?

To explain this, Cajetan makes a second distinction. The badness, or malice {malitia} of sin can be considered in two ways: In one way as resulting from a positive object and as belonging to a certain class and determinate species, and in another way as a deviation from the law and from the ultimate end—as a lack of rectitude of the will.¹⁵² This distinction of the twofold malice of sin corresponds to the distinction considered previously between the latter two aspects of the act of sin. The object (of the act of sin) considered as a positive reality belonging to a determinate class defines the moral species of the act of sin (the second aspect), whereas the lack of conformity between this act and the moral law is the deformity that characterizes the act as sin (the third aspect). According to Cajetan, God does cause the moral species of the act and to that extent, causes the malice of sin. But God is not the cause of sin *simpliciter et absolute loquendo* because he does not cause the deformity that consists of the act's deviation from the moral law.¹⁵³ Malice understood in that latter sense is to be attributed to the free will operating without regulation by the moral law {liberum arbitrium operans sine regula}.

But Cajetan then goes on to make a second point with which Báñez forcefully disagrees.¹⁵⁴ According to Cajetan, insofar as God causes the moral species of the act, it is not unfitting to say that God causes the contrariety between the act of sin and the act of virtue, and consequently, that God causes the lack of rectitude {Deus est causa privationis rectitudinis conversionis ad objectum virtutis} which characterizes an act as sin. While Báñez concurs with Cajetan in thinking that God causes the particular determinations of all human acts (including sin), he vehemently denies that God causes moral malice or the privation of rectitude.¹⁵⁵ Instead, God causes the act of sin and even the species of the act of sin in the sense that he causes all of the real entity that is the

152 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §20 (210): "Unde notat secundo, quod duplex malitia consideratur in peccato: altera quae est ex objecto positiva et in genere certo et specie determinate; altera vero quae est ex aversione a lege et ab ultimo fine."

153 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §20 (210).

154 Báñez even remarks, "praeter quam quod haec locutio videtur offendere aures theologorum, etiam est irrationabilis..." (*Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §21 [211])!

155 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §21 (211).

substratum of evil; but God in no way causes the privation of sin.¹⁵⁶ Thus, God allows the malice of sin, but he does not, strictly speaking, merely allow the act of sin itself. That he causes.

In sum, Báñez's opinion is that God is the real, efficient and physical cause of all the 'naturalities' {naturalitas} (entity or substance) which is in the act of sin (from the sixth opinion), and he also causes the real natural or entitative contrariety that is found in each human act of sin and virtue—that is, he causes the particular determination—as to its positive reality (from Cajetan's opinion); but God is not the cause of the moral contrariety that characterizes the act of sin as such, since that contrariety is evil.¹⁵⁷ The distinction between natural and moral contrariety, then, is crucial.¹⁵⁸ For Báñez, the defect that makes a sin to be a sin is not to be assigned to the first cause (God), but to the defectible second cause (the human person, or more specifically, created *liberum arbitrium*), a point we shall revisit in the next subsection.

As Cajetan pointed out, God's causing the positive reality of the act of sin and his not causing the defect were points not especially controversial. The interesting questions concerned God's causation of the particular species of the act of sin. Báñez's view on this issue, introduced in the context of the first *dubium* of his commentary on *ST* I–II q. 79, is treated in greater depth within the context of the second. That second *dubium* is this: "Whether God would be the cause of the act of sin, insofar as by antecedent, prevenient, physical *auxilium* he efficaciously inclines and predetermines the will of man to the act of sin naturally prior to the will's own self-determination to that same act."¹⁵⁹ Báñez's nuanced answer consists of four points.

156 Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §21 (211): "Sed inquit quod est causa actus peccati et causa speciei actus peccati, hoc est, totius entitatis realis quae est substratum peccati." Cf. §23 (212).

157 The actual text of Báñez's opinion reads thus: "Deus est causa efficiens realis et physica totius naturalitatis quae est in actu peccati, et etiam est causa contrarietatis realis quantum ad naturalitatem quae invenitur in actu peccati et in actu virtutis, non autem est causa contrarietatis quantum ad omnem moralitatem specificam" (*Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §22 [211]).

158 Báñez appeals to the examples of hot and cold on the one hand, and justice and injustice on the other, to illustrate the difference between natural and moral contrariety. See *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §24 (212–13).

159 Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 *dubium secundum* (216): "Utrum Deus ita sit causa actus peccati, quod auxilio physico praevio et praevenienti efficaciter inclinet et praedeterminet hominis voluntatem ad actum peccati, prius natura, quam ipsa voluntas se determinet ad illud."

In the first, Báñez maintains that while God does predetermine the will by physical *auxilium*, God does not formally predetermine the will to evil.¹⁶⁰ By this, Báñez means that, no matter what is true about the divine predetermination of the will, it is never true to say that God in any way causes the privation that makes sin to be sin.¹⁶¹ Báñez takes this point to be the common opinion of the faithful and *de fide*. Moreover, Báñez points out that to maintain otherwise would be nonsense. For if God formally predetermined the will to evil, doing it would conform to the divine plan. But if evil were in conformity with the divine plan, it would be good by virtue of that very conformity. Still further, God cannot predetermine the will to evil insofar as evil is opposed to divine goodness, which is the ultimate end toward which God directs everything, including human wills by his *auxilium*.

Báñez's second point is that God is not able to predetermine the will by moral *auxilium* to intrinsically evil acts.¹⁶² The third, however, is that if one is speaking of acts that are not intrinsically evil (evil on account of the object of the act) but evil on account of the circumstances, God does predetermine the will to these acts both by moral and physical *auxilium*.¹⁶³ These two points concern moral *auxilium* and a distinction between acts that are intrinsically evil versus those that are only circumstantially so. They clear the ground and set the stage for Báñez's substantive response to the second *dubium*. Given that moral *auxilia* are things like precepts, counsels and exhortations, Báñez simply explains that God does not move the will by such means in the case of intrinsically evil acts. This is because acts that are evil on account of their objects are not acts God commands, counsels or exhorts people to perform. In the case of acts that are only circumstantially evil however, God does move the will by moral *auxilium* because the object of the act is good and God does command, counsel and exhort to good. In the third dictum (treating of circumstantial sins), Báñez notes that God also moves the will by physical *auxilium*, whereas

160 Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §45 (224): “Deus non potest praedeterminare voluntatem hominis ad malum formaliter.”

161 Cf. Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 24 §26 (239a).

162 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §46 (225): “Deus non potest praedeterminare voluntatem hominis auxilio morali, praecepto, consilio vel exhortatione, ad materiale peccati quod intrinsece et ex objecto est peccatum; unde non potest esse causa moralis isto modo actus intrinsece mali.”

163 See Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §47 (227): “Si loquamur de actu bono ex objecto, malo autem ex aliqua extrinseca circumstantia vel fine operantis, Deus auxilio morali, exhortatione, praecepto et consilio et auxilio physico efficaciter praedeterminante voluntatem inclinatur nos ad illud.”

he makes no mention of physical *auxilium* in the second dictum, which concerns acts that are intrinsically evil.

Báñez's fourth and final point is that "God, by intrinsically efficacious physical aid {auxilio} that is predeterminative of the will, premoves the will to the substance and entity of the act—even the act intrinsically evil on account of its object—prior by nature to the will's self-determination to that act."¹⁶⁴ This makes clear Báñez's view on the question of whether or not God physically moves the will to intrinsically evil acts. According to him, God causes the substance and specific determination of all acts—even intrinsically evil acts. And according to his fourth point, God predetermines the will to the act of sin.

Still, it is important to realize that this fourth point is a necessary consequence of Báñez's theory of physical premotion. He is not introducing anything new, but consistently applying his theory to the case of sin.

3.3 *Human Causation and the Malice of Sin*

There is no need to consider here how the human agent is a cause of the positive aspects of the act of sin. That can be gathered from the preceding discussion of Báñez's view of vital acts and free choice. What must still be considered is how the human agent causes—and freely causes—the *malice* of sin, in light of the view, presented in the fourth dictum, that God indefectibly predetermines human *liberum arbitrium* to the act of sin. Given the indefectibility of the divine predetermination to the act of sin, it would seem that it is not within man's causal powers not to sin if such a predetermination obtains.

That makes one passage of Báñez's commentary on q. 79 seem particularly enigmatic. Responding to one of the counterarguments of the second *dubium*, Báñez remarks,

To the second proof I reply that, because it is possible, given the divine predetermination to such an act [an act of sin], that that act not be chosen (because it is chosen freely), it is indeed imputable sin, and by consequence free; therefore, it holds good that, *given such a predetermination, it is possible for the malice of the act not to follow, just as that act itself is able not to follow.*¹⁶⁵

164 Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §48 (229): "Deus auxilio physico intrinseco efficaci et praedeterminativo voluntatis praemovet illam ad substantiam et entitatem actus ex objecto et intrinsece mali, prius natura quam voluntas se determinet ad illam."

165 Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §65 (240) (emphasis mine): "Ad secundum probationem respondeo quod, quia possibile est, posita divina praedeterminatione ad talem actum, illum non elici, quia libere elicitur, est enim peccatum imputabile, et per

Báñez's main objective in this difficult but important passage is to maintain that, on the supposition of a divine predetermination to the act of sin, it is possible for the malice of sin not to follow. Indeed the malice does not follow at all, strictly speaking, on account of the divine predetermination, because that predetermination causes only the positive aspects of the act and its particular species, as we saw in the previous subsection. This much is clear from the preceding analysis of Báñez's view.

What is new is Báñez's ground for asserting the contingency of malice: That is the contingency of the *act* of sin, even on the divine predetermination. Báñez says it is possible for sin's malice not to follow a divine predetermination to the act of sin because it is still possible, even given that predetermination, for the act not to follow. What is new here is that the act of sin is being considered in the composed sense—*posita divina praedeterminatione*—not the divided sense, as one might expect from Báñez's other discussions of creaturely freedom. For as we saw in the section on freedom, Báñez maintains that free choice—the ability to do otherwise—applies only in the divided sense and *not* in the composed sense. How then are we to make sense of the passage under consideration? How is it possible for the act of sin not to follow given an indefectible divine predetermination to that act?

It seems to me the most plausible interpretation must be along the following lines, assuming, as is most likely, that what Báñez says here is consistent with his earlier, pivotal appeal to the distinction between the composed and divided senses to save human freedom.¹⁶⁶ It is possible that the act of sin not follow the divine predetermination to sin not as act but as sin. God predetermines to the act of sin, but God does not predetermine to the act *as* sin, and this constitutes the basis for asserting that it is possible for the act not to follow.

While all *auxilium* is efficacious for the end intended by God, the cooperative *auxilium* by which God causes the positive aspects of sin is not enough to efficaciously move the will to an act that is morally good, even while it

consequens liberum, ideo bene stat quod, *posita tali praedeterminatione, possit non sequi malitia actus, sicut ipse actus potest non sequi.*"

166 It may be that Báñez's commentary on the tract on sin of *ST* I–II was never as carefully refined as his published commentaries (Beltrán de Heredia notes this is the case, for instance, with respect to Báñez's commentary on *ST* I–II qq. 1–18; see the "Introducción" to that volume, 10). This may account to some extent for the anomaly of the passage under consideration, or at least its lack of further explanation. However, Beltrán de Heredia also notes specifically that the commentary on q. 79 underwent a great deal of development over the course of the *Controversy de Auxiliis*. This would seem to indicate that Báñez devoted a substantial amount of attention the issues under consideration in that question. See Beltrán de Heredia's "Introducción" to the commentary, *De vitiis et peccatis* (on *ST* I–II qq. 71–89), 16, 20.

does efficaciously move the will to act. Still, since God does not predetermine the *malice* of sin, the will, under God's predetermination, is able not to perform the act *of sin* (even while it necessarily produces an act) because malice is the characteristic ingredient of sin. In other words, the act of sin as both act and sin is the product of more than God's contribution, and to that extent, it is not necessitated by God's contribution alone. For the act of sin considered *in toto* is the product not only of the God's physical predetermination, but also of something that is the creature's own: a defect not predetermined by God. Defect is the only contribution that can be entirely a creature's own. This is so because of the finitude of creatures who are not their own act and so cannot autonomously cause being.

Since the defect contributed by the creature does not result from the divine determination but from the creature's own imperfection, it remains possible even on the condition that God predetermines the will to the act of sin that the person will not perform that sin. The divine predetermination to an act of sin, taken as an antecedent, does not conditionally necessitate that sin *in toto* as its consequent, but only the positive aspects of that act of that sin. The malice of sin is excluded from what the divine predetermination predetermines the creaturely will to.

An example Báñez uses in a different context to illustrate how God can cause defective acts without causing the defects themselves clarifies how God can indefectibly predetermine the act of sin without necessitating sin *per se*. Consider God's concurrence in bringing about the act of limping. Báñez explains,

God by efficacious concurrence premoves the crippled shin that it would walk according as it is able, otherwise it [God's concurrence] would not be efficacious. But the *crippled* shin is not able to walk except by limping. Therefore, God moves to the act of limping.¹⁶⁷

In other words, God moves the shin to the act of walking, but because of a defect on the shin's part, the shin can only walk by limping. If God moves a shin so-crippled to the act of walking, then he necessarily moves it to the act of limping—the only form of walking such a shin can perform. But while God causes the shin and the shin's act of limping (that is, its movement), God does not cause the privation that makes the shin's act an act of limping *rather than* an act of walking without a limp. Similarly, God causes the act of sin by a

¹⁶⁷ Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I-II* q. 79 a. 4 §67 (242) (emphasis on the supplied subject mine): "Deus efficaci concursu prae-movet tibiam claudam ut ambulet modo quo potest, alias non esset efficax. Sed non potest ambulari nisi claudicando. Ergo movet ad claudicandum."

physical predetermination, but he does not by that physical predetermination cause the act to be an act of sin rather than an act of virtue; he causes all that is good in the act of sin and nothing that is bad. The badness of sin is due directly to the deficiency of the free creaturely agent, not to God's predetermination.

It is possible for Báñez to maintain that human persons are free in the divided sense with respect to acts of sin because God does not determine the will to the malice of sin per se and human persons are not determined by nature to perform the acts of sin, even as act. Consequently, it remains absolutely possible for human persons to receive an efficacious grace by which they would not sin. According to Báñez's view, insofar as one is able, in a situation of choice, to receive a physical premotion whereby one would choose well, one's will is not necessitated, *in the divided sense*, to acts of sin.

It is also crucial to note that, according to Báñez, God has no obligation to provide efficacious grace to human persons to keep them from failing. In particular, the aid by which God preserves fallen human persons from committing actual sin is entirely gratuitous. After the fall, human persons find themselves in a bad situation. God chooses to save some of them from that situation. But God is not obliged to actually save every human person in that situation from it. Therefore, God does not incur the fault or guilt creatures bear for their moral failures, and God's non-provision of efficacious grace in the case of sin putatively does not undermine his goodness, justice or mercy.

Further questions could be raised at this point about why God permits sin and, reprobates sinners. Some answers can be provided. God permits sin as punishment for previous sins¹⁶⁸ and he reprobates to manifest his justice.¹⁶⁹ In either case, evils are permitted only for the sake of greater goods that could not obtain unless these evils were permitted.¹⁷⁰ But beyond this, Báñez resists attempts to probe the mysterious question of why God draws some to himself while permitting others to fall. It is here that he cautions his readers in the words of St. Augustine: "*Quare vero istum trahat illum non trahat, noli investigare si non vis errare*"—"If you wish not to err, do not seek to know why God draws one man to himself and not another"¹⁷¹ and reiterates St. Paul's exclamation from Romans 11: "*O altitudo . . .*"¹⁷²

168 See, for example, Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §30 (216).

169 See, for example, Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §28 (214–15).

170 See, for example, Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la I–II* q. 79 a. 4 §§25, 28 (213–215).

171 See St. Augustine's commentary on John 6.44, as quoted (for example) by Báñez in *Tractatus* II c. 4 §5 (403); cf. §7 (411).

172 See Rom 11.33–36. For Báñez's appeal to this text, see for example, *Tractatus* III §§9–10 (417–20).

4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented Báñez's views on physical premotion, human free choice and the divine permission of sin. For Báñez, God operates in all agent causes because he and only he is *ipsum esse subsistens*. In particular, God operates in free creatures by applying created *liberum arbitrium* by means of his physical aid, or *auxilium*, understood in terms of a causally antecedent, temporally simultaneous created motion that is distinct from the creaturely act of free choice itself. This *auxilium* is called 'physical premotion', and it is required for all of the will's acts, including, in particular, the act of choice, which is predetermined by the influence of such a premotion. Nevertheless, the act of choice remains the human person's own operation under the influence of that premotion because choice is a vital act, and vital acts are produced by their respective vital potencies (in this case, the free will).

Yet, it is not enough that an operation be a vital act in order to be free, for freedom consists specifically in the operation's being an act of *self-determination*, not simply its being the product of the capacities of the living *suppositum* whose act it is. According to Báñez, the capacity for free choice under the influence of divine aid remains free in the divided sense because, while conditionally necessitated on the hypothesis of a divine predetermination, *liberum arbitrium* is not by nature determined to one outcome, but is a power disposed toward opposites. This disposition of indifference is radically in the intellect and formally in the will. Freedom is rooted in the intellect because practical reason apprehends various means to an end and judges indifferently among them due to the lack of a necessary connection between any of them and the end intended. This indifference is called 'freedom of specification'. Freedom is formally in the will insofar as the will is free to either accept or reject the judgment of reason. This indifference is called 'freedom of exercise'. Freedom requires the ability to do otherwise understood as the ability to act or not act, or to act in a different way. But freedom, of its essence, does not include the ability to sin.

While the free will is conditionally necessitated when it is moved to act by God, God's physical premotion in cases of sin does not necessitate the will's commission of sin. This is because God causes nothing of the malice of sin by his physical predetermination, but only the positive aspects of sin, namely the act as such and its species understood as a positive determination. Conversely however, God's non-action ineluctably results in the commission of sin insofar as the human person needs efficacious grace to avoid sin. But God's non-action cannot per se *cause* sin, even while it does conditionally necessitate sin. Thus, on Báñez's account, God's will is the principal cause of both the salvation of

the elect and the obduracy of the reprobate, but sinner alone is responsible for what makes sin to be a sin. While Báñez does affirm that God indefectibly reprobates some, he does not endeavor to explain why God reprobates some and not others. It is at this juncture that Báñez has recourse to divine incomprehensibility.

The most important thing that has emerged from the foregoing investigation is the ontological status of God's physical premotion of the human will to the act of choice. That is because of the implications that ontological status has for the immediacy of God's action in moving the will and consequently for the freedom of the will in choosing.

It has been shown that the physical premotion is a reality distinct from and causally antecedent to the human act of free choice. The physical premotion is also distinct from God's uncreated essence. The premotion is not conceived of as a secondary cause, nor is it a substance of any sort. In this respect, the physical premotion is not a 'creature' in the ordinary sense of the word.¹⁷³ Yet, to the extent the physical premotion is something real, something entitative (however incomplete) that is not God, it is something created. This appears to be a potential liability of Báñez's view because while one can appeal to divine transcendence as the basis for God's ability to cause free effects as such, a similar move cannot be made with respect to the physical premotion insofar as it is a finite reality.¹⁷⁴

If physical premotion were merely a metaphorical way of signifying God's causality, perhaps this liability would be mitigated or avoided altogether (whatever other liabilities such a move might incur). But physical premotion is not posited as a metaphor. Nor is it understood to be a mere entity of reason. Rather, it is posited as a real feature of the created order. As a result, the ability to develop a satisfactory account of human free choice within the bounds of Báñez's system appears questionable, for on that account, human free choices are necessitated by created antecedents distinct from the choices themselves.

Nevertheless, the basic driving insight behind Báñez's position is surely correct. Báñez's great insight is that all positive features of creation—including the free acts of created persons—depend on God for their being. This basic conviction illuminates the fundamental posture of receptivity the human person has before God, and consequently, that gratitude is the fundamental posture the human person *ought* to have before God.

¹⁷³ See *ST* I q. 45 a. 4.

¹⁷⁴ This line of thought will be explored more fully at points from Ch. 4 onward.

The central liability of Báñez's view, identified above, along with the viable alternatives for avoiding it remain to be further explored. In order to set up that further investigation, it is necessary to attend next to the other side of Báñez's position, namely, his critique of Luis de Molina, for it will shed light on whether the Molinist alternative is a viable one.

Domingo Báñez's Critique of Molina

It follows from the opposite view that something real in time is brought forth into being by the human will which God . . . does not first will to be. . . . [T]hus, God would not, simply speaking, be the first and most universal cause of all things that exist, which is impossible.¹

DIEGO ALVAREZ

Those future conditionals which, in fact, are not future, do not have any certitude and infallibility, whether by logical necessity, or in their proximate cause (which of itself is contingent and indifferent), or from that which is in fact future, or from the decree of the divine will (because, as Molina admits, such knowledge precedes all free acts of the divine will). Therefore such future conditionals are not, as such, knowable by God.²

DOMINGO BÁÑEZ

Chapter Two treated Báñez's thought on divine causality and human free choice. This chapter builds on the previous one by considering Báñez's critique of the views of Luis de Molina, Báñez's main opponent in the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. The present chapter is divided into four parts.

1 Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §14 (183b): "Sequeretur ex opposita sententia aliquid reale fieri in tēpore ab humana voluntate, quod Deus [absoluta voluntate beneplaciti,] prius non voluerit esse. [Probatur: nam determinatio, siue influxus creatæ voluntatis est aliquid reale, procedens in tempore à voluntate creata: ergo, si Deus antecederet ad determinationem eiusdem voluntatis creatæ nō voluit, neq; determinavit, quod ipsa volūtas creata se determinet, & libere influat in suum actum; iam aliquid fieret in tempore à voluntate creata antecederet ad decretum, & determinationem voluntatis diuinae; &] ita Deus non esset simpliciter prima, & vniuersalissima causa omnium existentium, quod est impossibile." Text in brackets is present in the original; brackets here correspond to my ellipses above.

2 Báñez, *Apologia*, I c. 16 §2 (182): "Illa futura conditionata quae revera non sunt futura, non habent aliquam certitudinem et infallibilitatem, neque ex vi consequentiae, neque in sua causa proxima, quae de se contingens est et indifferens, neque ex ea quod revera futurum est, neque ex decreto divinae voluntatis, quia, ut Molina fatetur, talis scientia antecedit omnem actum liberum divinae voluntatis. Ergo talia futura conditionata ut sic non sunt a Deo scibilia." As explained below, Báñez was the primary, but not the sole, author of the *Apologia*.

The first provides a synopsis of Molina's doctrine of free choice, divine causality and providence. The second part briefly introduces one important primary source that catalogs Báñez's objections to Molinism. The common threads running through these objections reveal that Báñez mainly targets two aspects of Molina's theory: his view of free choice and divine causality on the one hand, and on the other, his doctrine of middle knowledge. Báñez's reasons for rejecting those two aspects of Molina's teaching will be considered in this chapter's third and fourth parts.

Since this study is not exclusively concerned with what Báñez's view was, but also with its truth, I shall begin in this chapter to take a position in respect to Báñez's view, and so necessarily, in respect to Molina's too. Accordingly, I am concerned in this chapter of the study not only with what Báñez's arguments against the Molinist position were, but also with whether they are sound. Therefore, while this chapter deals principally with the original sixteenth-century texts from an historical standpoint, I do not confine the investigation exclusively to them, but also take into account more recent literature when it is relevant to an assessment of the truth of Báñez's critique. Whereas my concern in this chapter is with the content and soundness of Báñez's critique of Molina, Chapters Four and Five will provide the occasion for examining the soundness of Báñez's alternative position as set out in Chapter Two.

1 Molina's Teaching on Free Choice, Divine Causality and Providence

Molina's mature teaching on free choice, divine causality and providence is contained in his monumental *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione*.³ The *Concordia* contains seven parts, arranged according to the following sequence:⁴

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- 3 A critical edition of the *Concordia* with a helpful apparatus was published by Iohannes Rabeneck, S.I. under the title variant: *Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, predestinatione et reprobatione concordia* (Oña: Collegium Maximum Societatis Jesu; Madrid: Societatis Editorialis "Sapientia," 1953). Alfred Freddoso published a translation of Part IV of the *Concordia* titled, *On Divine Foreknowledge* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Freddoso has also published unedited and in some cases, partial translations of select disputations from Part II of the *Concordia* on his website: <<http://www.nd.edu/~afreddoso/translation/molina25.htm>>.
 - 4 For a thorough introduction to Molina's doctrine, see Vansteenberghe, "Molinisme," in *DTC* 10-2:2101–2141. Rabeneck's "Conspectus concordiae" (64*–69*) and "Summaria disputationum" (69*–87*), included in the beginning of his critical edition of the *Concordia*, provide

- Pars I: On the freedom of the will and its powers for doing good works
(24 disputations)
- Pars II: On the concord of free choice with divine concurrence
(11 disputations)
- Pars III: On the concord of free choice with actual grace
(11 disputations)
- Pars IV: On the concord of free choice with divine foreknowledge
(7 disputations)
- Pars V: On the will of God
(3 disputations)
- Pars VI: On divine providence
(2 disputations and 3 articles)
- Pars VII: On predestination and reprobation
(7 disputations and 2 articles)

My summary of Molina's doctrine is based on Parts One to Four of the *Concordia*. These four parts are the most relevant for this study because in them Molina lays the foundations of his theory. The other three parts draw conclusions from the first four.

1.1 *Molina's Teaching on Free Choice*

The importance of free choice in Molina's system can be gauged from the place and amount of attention it receives in the *Concordia*. Molina's treatment of free choice occupies first place in his magnum opus, preceded only by a brief commentary on *ST* I q. 14 a. 8 (whether God's knowledge is the cause of things). The first part of the *Concordia*—on free choice—is also the longest and most structurally complex of the entire work, comprising twenty-four disputations. In the *Pars prima*, Molina defines free choice and considers its powers with respect to performing natural and supernatural acts in the states of innocence, sin, redemption and pure nature.

While most of the first part concerns the abilities of free choice, perhaps the most important element is Molina's comparatively brief definition of free choice itself. This definition is important for two reasons. First, it provides access to Molina's system as a whole, since its other two pillars—general concurrence and middle knowledge—rest on Molina's conception of free choice. Second, the core of Molina's criticism of Báñez (which I will treat in Chapter Four) is the charge that physical premotion is a form of determinism. Thus,

an excellent window into that work. See also F.L. Sherrin "Molinism," in *NCE* 9:770–72 and the contemporary philosophical discussions of middle knowledge cited in §1.3 below.

insight into Molina's understanding of freedom clarifies why he opposes physical premotion.

Both Molina and Báñez think that *liberum arbitrium* moves itself to act. However, while Báñez thinks *liberum arbitrium* can be a self-mover without being the *only* mover or first mover of itself, Molina thinks that, in choosing freely, human *liberum arbitrium* is a self-mover *that is not moved by any other*. Thus, in his classic definition of free choice, Molina asserts: "that agent is called free which, with all requisites for acting supplied, is able to act and not act, or so to act for one thing that he is able to also act for the contrary thing."⁵ Molina then goes on to add:

But because one cannot thus operate except by a previous decision and judgment of reason, choice is called free from the fact that that a judgment of reason precedes. Thus it is that free choice, if it is to be admitted anywhere, is nothing other than the will in which freedom formally resides by the aforementioned previous judgment of reason.⁶

What is important to note from Molina's definition is that while the capacity for free choice depends upon reason, the role of reason is, in a way, secondary. Although Molina acknowledges that free choice depends on a prior judgment of reason, it is *indifference*—the agent's ability to do otherwise in the presence of *all* antecedent factors—that is the principal defining characteristic of freedom.⁷ Note here the difference of emphasis in Báñez and Molina on the role of reason in free choice. While it would be a mistake to overplay this difference between Báñez and Molina the difference, while subtle, is important.⁸

5 Molina, *Concordia* I d. 2 §3 (14): "Quo pacto illud agens liberum dicitur quod positus omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere aut ita agere unum ut contrarium etiam agere possit."

6 Molina, *Concordia* I d. 2 §3 (14): "Quoniam vero non ita operatur nisi praevio arbitrio iudicioque rationis, inde est, quod quatenus ita praeexigit iudicium rationis, liberum appellatur arbitrium. Quo fit ut liberum arbitrium (si alicubi concedendum sit) non sit aliud quam voluntas, in qua formaliter sit libertas explicata praevio iudicio rationis."

7 See, for example, *Concordia* I d. 2 §§4, 6, 9 (14–15), where Molina asserts that children and the mentally handicapped can act freely. For Báñez's critique on this point, see *Tractatus* I c. 1 §3 (356).

8 Recall that for Báñez, freedom does not consist in the indifference of the will in the presence of all antecedent factors, but rather in the will's indeterminacy before a range of options, all of which are identified as pursuitworthy by reason. Báñez thus lays primary emphasis on the role of reason and nature in explaining what freedom consists in, whereas Molina puts more emphasis on indifference itself. Still, the above passage shows that Molina does root freedom

In accord with his understanding of the Council of Trent's *Decree on Justification*, Molina emphasizes the decisive significance of human cooperation in justification, and his view of free choice has direct implications for his account of divine causality.⁹ Because freedom entails the ability to do otherwise in the presence of all antecedent conditions, God's causality, for Molina, cannot determine creaturely free choices. Molina therefore maintains that of two people receiving the same grace, it is possible that one be converted and the other not.¹⁰ Molina even maintains it is possible that a person who receives less grace than another may be saved by freely consenting to it, while the one receiving greater grace may be lost by rejecting it. Thus, on Molina's account, the efficacy of actual grace depends on the consent of human free choice.

Another related factor that almost surely influenced Molina's conception of free choice was his Jesuit formation.¹¹ Writing in the wake of Protestant claims about justification by faith alone, Ignatius of Loyola was concerned about the bad effects such a doctrine could have on Christian action. In fact, the teachings of Luther, Calvin and others on the limitations of human freedom and the role of works soon gave rise to antinomianism and later, quietism (however opposed to such movements the Reformers themselves would have been).¹²

In an appendix to the *Spiritual Exercises*, a work surely central to Molina's spirituality, St. Ignatius stressed the reality and significance of free choice. Warning of the laxity and sloth that would follow upon the belief that all one's actions and salvation were inescapably predetermined, St. Ignatius taught:

Nor should we talk so much about grace and with such insistence on it as to give rise to the poisonous view that destroys freedom. Thus, with the help of God, we should take every opportunity of talking about faith and grace, having in view the greater praise of His Divine Majesty; but our language and way of speaking should not be such that the value

in the intellect. This should forestall the temptation to overplay the difference between the two thinkers on this point.

- 9 Báñez, of course, also assents to Trent's teaching, and affirms human cooperation in justification. For a further discussion of this point, see Ch. 4.
- 10 See Molina, *Concordia* I d. 9 §§6–7 (56–57). In this disputation, Molina also expresses the view that faith is not only the effect of God's prevenient grace, but also of man's free choice (see §§10–11). See also III d. 39 §4 (242).
- 11 See John Hardon, *History and Theology of Grace: The Catholic Teaching on Divine Grace* (Ann Arbor: Sapientia Press, 2005), 251–53.
- 12 See Hardon, 253. Within Catholic circles, a denial of free choice was also central to Baianism and Jansenism, both of which were subsequently condemned as heresies.

of our activities and the reality of human freedom might be in any way impaired or disregarded, especially in times like these which are full of dangers.¹³

Thus, Molina, writing as a Jesuit priest engaged in the Tridentine Reformation both affirmed a strong notion of free choice and tried to reconcile it with a traditional conception of the infallibility and universality of divine providence. Molina attempted this reconciliation by his teachings on divine concurrence and middle knowledge.

1.2 *Molina's Teaching on Divine Causality*

Molina's view of free choice shaped his conception of divine causality with respect to the act of human free choice. Like Báñez, Molina distinguishes God's causal activity with respect to one's natural acts from his causal activity with respect to one's supernatural (i.e. meritorious) acts. Molina calls God's causal activity vis-à-vis one's natural acts of free choice 'general concurrence,' whereas calls God's causal activity vis-à-vis one's supernatural acts precisely as supernatural, 'grace'. While Molina thinks God's causal activity vis-à-vis one's supernatural acts *qua supernatural* is grace, Molina believes God also generally concurs in bringing about the natural aspect of one's meritorious acts (what he calls the 'natural substance' of the act).

Unlike Báñez's *auxilium generale*, which is a physical premotion causally antecedent to the human act of free choice that determines its species, Molina's general concurrence is simultaneous with the human act of free choice and indifferent to the determination that characterizes that act as the specific kind of act it is. Unlike physical premotion, which is a causal influx distinct from the act of free choice it causes, Molina identifies the causal influx which is *concur-sus generalis* with the human act of free choice itself. For Molina, God's general concurrence is nothing but the human act of free choice *as caused by God*. That same act, *as caused by the human agent*, is human concurrence. On Molina's account, therefore, there is one act—the human act of free choice—which is immediately produced by both God and the human person.¹⁴ Moreover, for Molina, God's causal involvement in producing the human act of free choice is

13 St. Ignatius Loyola, "Rules for Thinking with the Church," appendix to the *Spiritual Exercises*, trans. Thomas Corbishley, S.J. (Wheathampstead: Anthony Clarke; Chichester: R.J. Acford Ltd., 1973), 123 (no. 369/17).

14 See Molina, *Concordia* I d. 12 §11 (64); II d. 25 §17 (165); d. 26 §12 (167–68); d. 27 §§4 (171–72), 24 (177); d. 32 §§14–16 (201–02).

immediate not merely by an immediacy of power {immediatione virtutis}, as he alleges it is on Báñez's system, but by an immediacy of supposit {immediatione suppositi}: God himself as agent, and not merely his mediating power, is immediately proximate to and productive of the human act of free choice.¹⁵ Molina thinks that if God did not cause the human act of free choice *immediatione suppositi*, an infinite regress would arise: if God uses created means to bring about effects,¹⁶ one can ask whether he must use created means to bring about the created means he uses to bring about the final effect, and so on.¹⁷ While holding that God immediately causes the human act of free choice, Molina is careful to safeguard the integrity of free human agency. For Molina, God's action does not supplant human action, but rather cooperates alongside it in a kind of synergy.

Molina views divine-human cooperation as the coordination of partial causes for the production of a single, joint effect. The situation, Molina says, is not unlike two men towing a barge:

For in fact, the total effect is from both God and from the secondary causes; but neither from God nor from the secondary causes as total, but as from partial causes which simultaneously demand the concurrence and influx of the other, just as when two draw a boat, the whole movement comes from each of the pullers, but not from each as if from a total cause, since each puller simultaneously effects with the other the whole motion and singular parts of it.¹⁸

In at least one respect, therefore, Molina views God and the created agent as partial, coordinated causes. God and the created agent are partial and coordinated causes because neither alone can produce the effect that both of them together produce acting as a single joint cause. Still, just to the extent that each

15 See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §§4–5, 7 (165–66). See also the earlier discussion of Báñez's position with respect to the distinction between *immediatio suppositi* and *immediatio virtutis* in §1.3 of the previous chapter of this study.

16 In Molina's view, an intermediate created motion, like Báñez's physical premotion, can be nothing other than a secondary cause. See *Concordia* II d. 27 §29 (178); d. 28 §7 (185).

17 See Molina, *Concordia*, II d. 26 §9 (166–67); d. 27 §31 (178).

18 Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §15 (170); cf. I d. 12 §11 (64): "Totus quippe effectus et a Deo est et a causis secundis; sed neque a Deo neque a causis secundis ut a tota causa, sed ut a parte causae quae simul exigit concursum et influxum alterius, non secus ac, cum duo trahunt navim, totus motus proficiscitur ab unoquoque trahentium, sed non tamquam a tota causa motus, siquidem quisque eorum simul efficit cum altero omnes ac singulas partes eiusdem motus."

of the causes is responsible for the production of the entire effect, each is a complete cause *in its own order*.¹⁹

What is most important to note from the view expressed above is that Molina conceives of God's causation not as taking place *on* the human agent (*pace* Báñez), but rather *with* the human agent on the human agent's action and effect.²⁰ Since the human agent is endowed with causal powers of its own, it needs no divinely added perfection to move from rest to operation.²¹ Rather, the human agent is already poised to act. It only needs God's general concurrence for its own autonomous self-determination to obtain.

This last point is important. According to Molina, human agents need God's general concurrence *not* for their choices to be *what* they are, but rather for their choices to be at all. This distinction of a choice's species from its actual existence is the key to understanding the way in which Molina conceives of God and the human agent as partial coordinated causes: What each does, the other does not do. God's influence makes the human agent's action actually to be, whereas the human agent's influence makes the action to be this-rather-than-that. As Molina teaches,

Neither on the part of the thing itself can these influxes be distinguished, except by comparing numerically one and the same action to different causes which in diverse modes influence that whole action; nevertheless, while the universal cause, as a partial cause, confers to the action its

19 Molina, *Concordia* II d. 25 §19 (164); cf. d. 27 §37 (179–80).

20 See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §9 (166–67); see also §2 (164–65). Molina expresses his puzzlement with Aquinas's teaching in *ST* I q. 105 a. 5 that God operates in all created agents. Molina does not understand why, in addition to creating and conserving creaturely agents, God must also move them to act. Molina's difficulty in understanding and accepting Aquinas's teaching on this point is undoubtedly at least partly due to the fact that he encounters Thomas's teaching cast in terms of Báñez's physical premotion. See Smith, 121. Molina does note, however, that Cajetan interprets Aquinas in a way he (Molina) finds entirely agreeable (see *Concordia* II d. 26 §6 (166)). While some have maintained that Cajetan, a Dominican, did not maintain the doctrine of physical premotion, others claim he did. See for example, Antonin-Marie Dummermuth, O.P., *S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionalis physicae seu responsio ad R.P. Schneemann, S.J. aliosque doctrinae Scholae Thomisticae impugnatores* (Paris: Ephemeridis "L'année Dominicaine," 1886), 495–506. On Molina's reading of Aquinas on governance, cf. William O'Connor, "Molina and Báñez as Interpreters of St. Thomas Aquinas," *New Scholasticism* 24 (1948): 246–47. Molina's position on an agent's need to be moved to act foreshadows the critique Bernard Lonergan, S.J. would make three-and-a-half centuries later of Báñez's distinction between an agent's ability to act and actual operation (see Ch. 5, below).

21 See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §2 (164–65); cf. d. 27 §§11–14 (173–74).

entire being, still *it is not from this mode of influence* that the action has its species as an act of this or that kind; on the other hand however, the action has its entire being from the particular cause, likewise as a partial cause, although from this mode of influence the action has that it would be proper and particular to this very cause, and thus, an action distinct in species from others.²²

Thus, there is in reality one effect that is produced by both God and the human agent (the human action), for essence and existence are inseparable in reality.²³ Even so, however, Molina ‘divides up the work’ as it were, between God and the human agent according to the distinction between essence and existence, attributing a choice’s essence (particular species) to the human agent alone. This position is further manifest from Molina’s distinction of the following two propositions: (1) “An effect has that by which it is of such a kind from God influencing [that effect] as a partial cause by universal concurrence,” and: (2) “It comes from the influx of God that [an effect] would be of such a kind.”²⁴ Molina says: “The first we concede, but the second we deny. For [an effect’s being of such a kind] has been shown to come *only* from mode of influence of the particular cause, whose proper and particular effect it is.”²⁵

22 Molina, *Concordia* 11 d. 32 §15 (201–02), emphasis added: “Neque a parte rei influxus illi distinguuntur nisi comparando unam et eandem numero actionem ad diversas causas diverso modo in totam ipsam actionem influentes, quarum ea quae causa universalis est, licet conferat actioni totum esse partialitate causae, actio tamen a modo influendi illius non habet, quod sit talis vel talis speciei actio; ab altera vero ut a causa particulari similiter partialitate causae habet actio totum suum esse, verum ex modo influendi illius sicut habet, quod sit propria et peculiaris actio eiusdem causae; ita habet quod talis actio distincta specie a ceteris.”

23 Note that Suárez, at least, in a way rejects the real distinction between being and essence advanced by Aquinas in his early work, *De ente et essentia*. However, it would seem Suárez’s rejection of the real distinction was based on Giles of Rome’s (1247–1316) construal of that doctrine rather than the authentic view of St. Thomas. See Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., *Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1962), 212. See also the discussion by Stephen P. Menn, “Metaphysics: God and Being,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A.S. McGrade (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 158–60, n. 9.

24 Molina *Concordia* 11 d. 32 §17 (202): “effectum habere a Deo influente per concursum universalem etiam illud quo est talis tamquam a causa partiali . . . ex influxu Dei provenire, quod sit talis.”

25 Molina *Concordia* 11 d. 32 §17 (202), emphasis added: “Primum concedemus, secundum vero negamus. Ostensum namque est non provenire nisi a modo influendi causae particularis, cuius est effectus proprius et particularis.” It must be noted that Suárez’s modification of Molina’s position is much more nuanced on the point of the relationship between

For Molina, it is from the secondary cause that actions get their particular species.²⁶ The function of the secondary cause, for Molina, is to particularize God's nonspecific causal influx (general concurrence).²⁷ One theological reason for this view of concurrence is that it allows Molina to maintain that God is in no way the cause of sin, even materially,

for sin, understood materially, is not to be attributed to God as to a cause, because an action does not have the aspect of being material sin from the fact that general concurrence (which indifferent of itself, so that this or a far different action may follow), immediately influences that action, but [an action] only has [the aspect of being material sin], insofar as the faculty of choice itself, by its own particular influence, influences and determines [that action] to being an action against the law of God and thus an act of sin, materially speaking.²⁸

If what has been said so far about free choice and general concurrence applies to human acts of free choice on the natural plane, Molina explains supernatural (i.e. meritorious, or sanctifying) acts of free choice by recourse to a third factor: prevenient grace. For Molina, a supernatural human act flows from three converging but distinct influences: God's general concurrence, human

God and created causes, and to that extent, more difficult to critique from the standpoint of Báñez's position. For like the Dominicans, Suárez says that God and the human person are both total causes of the effect, each according to its own respective order. This means that the human person, as a total, but secondary cause, is subordinate to God, the first cause and that God, as a total cause, causes not just the existence of the act in some general indeterminate way, but as the specific act it is (even while that specification is determined by the human agent). For a fuller discussion of Suárez's position, see §4 of the final chapter of this study. In sum, note that Suárez's position is not *fundamentally* different from Molina's, but it is more sophisticated and forestalls some of the criticisms of Molina's account. Note too, Molina has a certain insight here that is perhaps infelicitously expressed. Compare what he says above to Ross's point (explored in the second part of the final chapter of this study) about God causing the sun to move or Adam to sin versus the moving sun and sinning Adam *to be*.

26 See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 25 §17 (163); d. 32 §§15, 17 (201–02).

27 See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §12 (167–68); d. 32 §10 (200).

28 Molina, *Concordia* II d. 27 §3 (171): "peccatum etiam materialiter sumptum Deo non esse tribuendum tamquam causae, quoniam non habet, quod sit materiale peccati, prout ad eam actionem influit immediate concursu generali ex se indifferenti ut ea aut longe diversa actione sequatur, sed solum id habet, ut arbitrium ipsum suo influxu particulari in eam influit ipsamque determinat ad esse actionis contra legem Dei atque adeo peccati materialiter sumpti."

free choice, and prevenient grace. That the act of free choice exists at all is due to God's general concurrence. That the act is an act for this rather than that (i.e., its natural species) is due to human free choice. That the act is supernatural is from God's prevenient grace. Molina insists that the existence, natural species and supernatural quality of an act are not to be thought of as three distinct realities, but rather as three aspects of one same reality; namely, the supernatural human act of free choice.²⁹ Moreover, recall that Molina identifies general concurrence with the human act of free choice: Because God acts *immediatione suppositi*, God's general concurrence just is the human act of free choice as it depends on God. Prevenient grace differs in that it is distinct from and precedes the human act of free choice. Unlike general concurrence, which is with the human agent on the human agent's action and effect, prevenient grace precedes free choice and affects the human agent himself.³⁰ While the power to elicit acts of free choice belongs naturally to the human agent aided by God's general concurrence, prevenient grace disposes the human agent to choose meritoriously, as fire, which is apt for heating by its own natural power, must still be applied to heating by being brought into proximity with a heatable object.

Prevenient grace does not compromise free choice, according to Molina, because grace is not intrinsically or infallibly efficacious.³¹ Molina holds that,

'[p]revenient' and 'cooperative' (or 'aiding') grace are not [two] distinct graces, but one and the same grace, which, considered as preceding the act by which free choice cooperates and disposes one for justification, is called 'prevenient'; but considered as cooperating together with free choice (which is also cooperating in the production of the same act), is called 'cooperating' and 'aiding'.³²

According to Molina, grace derives its efficacy from the response of the human recipient: prevenient grace as accepted becomes efficacious, whereas if it is

²⁹ See Molina, *Concordia* III d. 38 §10 (232).

³⁰ See Molina, *Concordia* II d. 26 §12 (167–68); d. 30 §5 (192); III d. 41 §§1–2 (257–58).

³¹ See Molina, *Concordia* I d. 15 §§14–15 (90–91); II d. 29 §2 (185–86) 30 §5 (192); d. III d. 39 §6 (242–43).

³² Molina, *Concordia* III d. 39 §3 (241): "Non ergo sunt distinctae gratiae praeveniens et cooperans atque adiuvans, sed una et eadem, quae spectata, antequam liberum arbitrium cum ea cooperetur eliciatque actum liberum per quem ad justificationem disponatur, dicitur praeveniens, spectata vero, prout cooperante iam cum illa libero arbitrio ipsa etiam cooperatur et influit in eundem actum, dicitur cooperans et adiuvans."

rejected, it remains merely sufficient. Efficacious grace and sufficient grace are intrinsically the same in Molina's view. Molina's distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace is also related to his understanding of the distinction between operative (or 'prevenient') and cooperative grace. Molina understands operative and cooperative grace to be the same grace viewed from different angles. Moreover, for Molina, cooperative grace is efficacious grace because the consent of free choice is supposed. Molina's view of the relationship between human free choice and the efficacy of grace explains how he can reduce the difference between two people receiving the same grace, one of whom is saved, the other of whom is lost, to free choice.³³

Finally, Molina's view of the relationship between human free choice and the efficacy of grace helps to explain his view of predestination. For Molina, predestination is *post praevisa merita*, or after God's foreknowledge of merits. According to Molina, God's predestination of human persons presupposes his knowledge of how they would respond to his grace (which is not intrinsically or infallibly efficacious). God then provides the requisite grace for salvation to those whom he foresees will accept his offer.

1.3 *Molina's Teaching on Divine Providence*

Middle knowledge is perhaps the most original and best-known aspect of Molina's attempt to reconcile God's providential governance and human free choice.³⁴ Middle knowledge is so called because it is a category of divine knowledge situated midway between the two categories of divine knowledge distinguished by Aquinas and commonly accepted in Molina's day: God's 'natural' or 'simple knowledge' {scientia simplicis intelligentiae} and his 'free' knowledge or 'knowledge of vision' {scientia visionis}.³⁵

According to Aquinas, God's 'natural' or 'simple' knowledge is God's self-knowledge—the knowledge he naturally has of his own simple nature (*ipsum*

33 See, for example, *Concordia* I d. 12 §1 (56–57); III d. 39 §4 (242). It also explains how Molina can maintain the related but more extreme position that it is possible for one person to receive greater grace than another and still be lost (through the abuse of free choice) while the other, through the good use of free choice, is saved.

34 There have been many excellent contemporary philosophical discussions of Molina's account of divine foreknowledge. See for example, William Lane Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suárez* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), Ch. 7 (169–206) and the subsequent chapter on Suárez's view; Eef Dekker, *Middle Knowledge* (Leuven: Peeters, 2000); Thomas Flint, *Divine Providence: The Molinist Account* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), esp. 11–71; Freddoso, "Introduction," in Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge*, 1–81.

35 See ST I q. 14 aa. 5–6, 8.

esse subsistens). In knowing his own essence, God knows what he can do, and therefore, the range of what is absolutely possible. Since an apprehension of possibilities is presupposed by God's creative will (action requires the practical intellect's grasp of the end), God's simple knowledge is said to be 'prevolitional', or prior, in our way of thinking, to his decision to create. In simply knowing himself, therefore, God does not know the actual created world (including what *will* be—the world's *actual* future), but instead all logical possibilities.³⁶

In contrast, God's 'free' knowledge, or 'knowledge of vision' is said to be 'postvolitional', or conceptually posterior (in our way of thinking) to God's free decision to create. Free knowledge is God's knowledge of things other than himself; it is his knowledge of things as they actually exist, past, present, or future. By his knowledge of vision, God knows not only the temporal present, but also the past and future because God is eternal and all moments of time are equally present to one in whom there is no before or after, change or succession.³⁷

In Molina's view, 'middle knowledge' {*scientia media*} lies, in our way of thinking, *between* God's simple knowledge and his knowledge of vision, and shares certain characteristics of both. By his middle knowledge, God

discerns what the free choice of any creature would do by its own innate freedom, given the hypothesis that He should create it in this or that order of things with these or those circumstances of aids—even though the creature could, if it so willed, refrain from acting or do the opposite, and even though if it was going to do so, as it is able to freely, God would foresee *that* very act and *not* the one that He *in fact* foresees would be performed by that creature.³⁸

In other words, God's middle knowledge concerns neither the absolutely possible nor the actual (whether by 'actual' is meant past, present or future). Rather, the objects of God's middle knowledge are subjunctive conditionals of the sort: "If person *P* were in non-determining, complete circumstances *C* at time *t*, he would (freely) perform action *A*".³⁹ In recent literature, such conditionals

36 On Aquinas's understanding of divine knowledge, there is no distinction between the possible and the feasible as on Molina's account. This point is further touched upon below.

37 See *ST I* q. 14 a. 13 ad 3.

38 Molina *Concordia* IV d. 49 §11 (Freddoso, 119). See also, for example, d. 50 §15 (Freddoso, 140).

39 Matthews Grant, "Counterfactuals of Freedom, Future Contingents, and the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge," *PACPA* 74 (2000): 307. Grant offers this counterfactual form as a simplification of the formula offered by Flint, *Divine Providence*, 47.

have commonly been called 'counterfactuals of creaturely freedom'. These conditionals are contra-factual in the sense that they are not about what *in fact* is, was, or will be in the actual future, but instead pick out what *would* be on the hypothesis that certain conditions obtained. The relevant conditionals are said to be counterfactuals *of creaturely freedom* because they pick out the hypothetical free choices of creatures rather than some other conditional state of affairs.

Like God's simple knowledge, his middle knowledge is also prevolitional: Middle knowledge is not knowledge of the world God chooses to create, but knowledge of what *would* happen if God created certain creatures and placed them in certain circumstances at certain times. Because middle knowledge is prevolitional, Molina sometimes also refers to it (perhaps confusingly!) as 'natural knowledge'. Unlike God's purely natural knowledge (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*) however, God's middle knowledge does not concern all logical possibilities, but only that subset of logical possibilities which it is feasible for God to realize.⁴⁰

The reason why there is a distinction between the possible and the feasible—why there are some absolute possibilities *de facto* impossible for God to realize—can be traced back to Molina's account of free choice: Since, for Molina, free choice is the ability to act or not act, or so to act that it is possible to do the contrary *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*, what possible free creatures *would* freely do in any of the possible circumstances in which they could be placed confronts God prior to creation as a 'given' which conditions the range of creatable possibilities (hence, Suárez's apt term '*scientia conditionata*' for middle knowledge). If person *P* in circumstances *C* at time *t* would freely *A*, God cannot make it to be the case that *P* in *C* at *t* would *not A*. God does not settle how free creatures would react to various circumstances in which they could be placed, but he does have knowledge of their reactions. God's middle knowledge, therefore, is unlike his natural knowledge and like his free knowledge in that whereas God's natural knowledge is necessary, his middle knowledge could be otherwise than it is. This implies, moreover, that among the divine ideas, there must be some non-necessary 'types' or *rationes*.⁴¹

However, the non-necessity of the objects of God's middle knowledge does not jeopardize its infallibility. If, in fact, *P* in *C* at *t* would not perform action *A*

40 I draw this helpful distinction between the 'possible' and the 'feasible' from Flint, *Divine Providence*, 51–54.

41 Thus, Molina has a different view of divine ideas than Báñez, who holds that the divine ideas (understood as 'types' or '*rationes*') belong to God's necessary knowledge (even if God freely chooses to create according to only some of them—the *exemplares*). For the background to this discussion, see *ST* I q. 15 a. 3.

rather than perform action *A*, God's middle knowledge would be of the former possibility (*P*'s not *A*-ing) rather than the latter (*P*'s *A*-ing). Thus, while a *free* creature *could* do otherwise than God knows it would on a certain hypothesis (insofar as no condition determines its will), if the free creature's decision would be otherwise on the given hypothesis, God's middle knowledge would differ correspondingly to accord with what the free creature would actually do. Thus, while God's middle knowledge could be otherwise than it is, it is impossible, in Molina's view, that God's middle knowledge fail to correspond with what a free creature would do on a given hypothesis.

Despite middle knowledge's similarity to free knowledge in being non-necessary, the two differ in what accounts for their non-necessity. Whereas God's free knowledge would be otherwise than it is only if *God* chooses to create differently, God's middle knowledge would be otherwise than it is only if *possible free creatures* would choose differently on a given hypothesis. Thus, for Molina, the conditional free choices of possible persons condition God's middle knowledge.

Middle knowledge is the linchpin that allows Molina to hold divine sovereignty together with creaturely freedom. God controls a world wherein creatures' free choices are beyond his control because God chooses to create the world in light of his middle knowledge. Since God knows prior to creating (by simple knowledge) not only what creatures he could create, but also (by middle knowledge) exactly how each of these creatures would behave in any of the infinite variety of circumstances in which it could be placed, and then chooses to create *these* creatures in *these* circumstances, God maintains providential control over what happens in *this*, the actual world.

Because middle knowledge is essential to Molina's view, Báñez's critique of it, if sound, will refute Molinism.

2 A Survey and Condensation of Báñez's Critique of Molinism

Báñez's writings on divine causality and human free choice generally include criticism of views he considers mistaken, so that his critiques of Molina and his disciples are found in many places. However, a good statement of Báñez's objections to Molinism can be found in the 1595 *Apologia*, a substantial tract written for the Inquisition by the Dominicans of the Spanish Province as their official case against Molinism and Congruism.⁴² While the *Apologia* was

42 The full title of the *Apologia* is: *Apologia Fratrum Praedicatorum in provincia Hispaniae sacrae theologiae professorum, adversus novas quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris*

produced through the joint effort of eight Spanish Dominicans, Báñez was its principal author and the document accordingly represents his view.⁴³ In the *Apologia*, Báñez advances several criticisms of Molina's doctrine of divine causality, providence and free choice. I will first summarize them, then, in the following two parts of this chapter, extract from them Báñez's principal objections to Molinism, considering the strength of Báñez's arguments.

2.1 *Introducing the Apologia*

The *Apologia* fills 264 octavo pages in its modern print edition. Following a brief opening address and prologue, it is divided into three main parts.

The first part of the *Apologia* presents and critiques what Báñez and his confreres take to be Molina's eight chief errors, which can be summarized as follows.⁴⁴ First, that of two people receiving the same grace, one through the use of his free choice may be saved and the other lost. Second, some of the reprobate receive greater grace than some of the saved (the difference between them again being reduced to free choice). Third, grace is not intrinsically and infallibly efficacious. Fourth, the efficacy of grace comes from free choice (the free consent to receive grace). Fifth, free choice consists of the ability to do otherwise *positis omnibus requisitis*—including divine action—*ad agendum*. Sixth, there is a middle knowledge in God whereby he knows conditional future contingents (counterfactuals) of creaturely freedom. Seventh, God's concurrence does not influence the secondary agent, but only the secondary agent's action and effect. Finally, Molina himself admits that he fails to understand the opinion of Augustine and Aquinas on predestination.

The *Apologia*'s comparatively brief second part then attacks fourteen corollary assertions, which can be summarized as follows.⁴⁵ First, of two people to whom God gives equal grace, one can do better than another. Second, strictly speaking, one who is converted and one who is not do not have equal grace, *unless this is said with respect to prevenient grace* (the implication here being that equal grace is offered to the elect and the reprobate). Third, the internal

Ludovici Molinae nuncupati. For a useful historical introduction to the *Apologia*, see Beltrán de Heredia, "Introducción," in the same volume: *Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia* (Madrid: CSIC, 1968).

43 Among the seven coauthors of the *Apologia* are Pedro de Herrera and Diego Alvarez. A further seventeen Dominicans gave their official approbation to the *Apologia* (see III c. 6 §70 [377–78]).

44 See Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 1 (123–25). The original text indicated the location of these propositions in Molina's work.

45 See Báñez, *Apologia* II c. 1 (235–38). Again, the original text indicates the location of these propositions in Molina's work.

call of God and prevenient graces depend largely on free choice. Fourth, the human person, prior to the fall, was able to merit salvation and eternal life merely with the aid of God's general concurrence. Fifth, God's supernatural aid does not differ essentially from his concurrence in natural acts. Sixth, if something is prior in eternity to its actual existence, free choice is destroyed. Seventh, Christ did not merit from his passion and obedience unto death as to the substance of his act, but only as to his intention. Eighth, it is not because God foresees that the human person's faculty of free choice is going to cooperate that it will cooperate, but rather it is because the human person's faculty of free choice is going to cooperate that God foresees it will cooperate. Ninth, God's general concurrence is indifferent, so that the action in which God concurs takes its species from the influence of the secondary cause, not from God's concurrence. Tenth, God's foreknowledge depends on the human person's free cooperation, so that, for example, a person's being given as one of the elect to Christ by the Father follows from the fact that the person will freely cooperate with God's grace and not conversely. Eleventh, the order of divine providence does not bring about free effects with complete certainty, so that the order of providentially ordered causes does not impose any necessity—even a necessity of consequence—on free choice. Twelfth, it is not necessary to assert that all things—including fortuitous events—are intended, rather than merely permitted, by divine providence.⁴⁶ Thirteenth, none of those confirmed in grace is predestined by God prior to God's foreknowledge of his or her good free choice to accept grace.⁴⁷ Fourteenth, God always gives the grace necessary for salvation to those who try to do what they can; one's salvation is left in one's own hands as long as one is a wayfarer.

The *Apologia's* lengthy third part considers and responds to what Báñez and his confreres apparently considered the strongest counterarguments offered in defense of Molina's and Suárez's doctrine. The first four chapters of the Third Part briefly consider and reply to eight counterarguments of Suárez and other defenders of Molina, while the long fifth and sixth chapters painstakingly scrutinize numerous instances where Molina cites a doctor or scholastic in defense of his views. These latter two chapters provide alternative interpretations of the authoritative texts to which Molina appeals, in an effort to undermine his recourse to them.⁴⁸ The substance of the third part of the *Apologia* will not be further discussed here since the principal aim of this section is to explore

46 Molina has in mind here evils—he mentions the chance suffocation of infants, which God does not intend, but merely permits.

47 Thus, predestination is *post praevisa merita* for Molina.

48 This textual engagement is the reason for the third part's great length.

Báñez's critique of Molina (and Suárez), rather than vice-versa. Also, since the exposition that follows takes a theoretical point of view, Molina's use of sources (however interesting and significant that may be) is outside the main scope of this chapter.

2.2 *A Distillation of Báñez's Critique*

The first two parts of the *Apologia* criticize Molina on twenty-two points. One reason for such an extended (and sometimes repetitive) treatment is the *Apologia's* genre: As a kind of formal testimony drafted for submission to the Spanish Inquisition—a body charged with the task of evaluating the orthodoxy of Molina's work—Báñez and his confreres tried to engage closely with Molina's text. Rather than abstracting from numerous expressions of an idea, therefore, the authors of the *Apologia* took up several of Molina's expressions of each of his central ideas.

As suggested above, however, the common threads running through the *Apologia's* objections allow them to be simplified to two basic points. Most of Molina's allegedly problematic assertions fall in to one of two categories.⁴⁹ Assertions 1–5 and 7–8 in the first part and assertions 1–5, 7, 9, 11–12, and 14 in the second part all concern Molina's doctrine of free choice and view of divine causality.⁵⁰ Assertion 6 in the first part and assertions 8 and 10 in the second concern Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge. (Assertions 10 and 13 in the second part bridge the themes of God's causality and foreknowledge.) For simplicity's sake, therefore, the main targets of Báñez's critique can be identified from the *Apologia* as, first, Molina's doctrine of free choice and divine causality, and second, his doctrine of middle knowledge.

49 The one outlier is assertion 6 in the second part, which mainly concerns Molina's view of eternity and necessitation.

50 Assertion 5 of the first part directly concerns Molina's definition of free choice, whereas the other assertions concern Molina's doctrine of divine concurrence. I believe there is warrant for treating the objections to Molina's view of free choice and divine concurrence together because of the close proximity between these aspects of his view. While middle knowledge is implied by Molina's view of free choice and divine sovereignty, the objections to middle knowledge will be treated separately both because of their complexity and because freedom and concurrence are more directly concerned with questions of causality, whereas middle knowledge is more directly concerned with questions of divine intellect and eternity. This is not, of course, to deny the inseparability of questions about God's causality, knowledge and eternity, but only to distinguish them.

3 Báñez's Critique of Molina's Doctrine of Free Choice and Divine Causality

Molina's doctrine of divine causality can be summed up as the view (explained above) that God concurs by a simultaneous, indifferent causal influx in the production of the natural substance of a human act of free choice (whether that choice itself is natural or supernatural in kind) and the view that grace, by which God causes the supernatural quality of the human person's meritorious (supernatural) acts, is not intrinsically and infallibly efficacious. This view of divine causality is implied by Molina's definition of free choice as the ability to act or not act, or so to act that it is possible to do the contrary *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*. This definition of freedom is basic to Molina's whole system. Thus, some of Báñez's basic objections to Molinism concern Molina's definition of free choice.

Báñez principally takes issue with the following two aspects of Molina's definition of free choice: First, Molina's inclusion of freedom of contrariety, and second, his inclusion of the clause, *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*.

3.1 *Free Choice and Freedom of Contrariety*

Báñez objects to the fact that Molina makes freedom of contrariety—the ability to do one thing *or its contrary*—essential to free choice.⁵¹ The reason is that in so doing, Molina makes the ability to sin essential to free choice. Báñez argues in contrast that the ability to sin belongs not to the perfection of free choice, but rather to its imperfection.⁵² In Báñez's view, by making freedom of contrariety essential to free choice itself, Molina's definition implies that God and the blessed do not have the power of free choice (or, even worse, that they have the ability to sin).

Báñez's first point is legitimate, but it seems to me it could be dealt with easily enough by restricting Molina's definition to *creaturely* free choice. Báñez himself admits that while the ability to sin does not belong to the essence of free choice, the ability to sin does pertain to created natures, which, precisely as created, are defectible. If a created nature is confirmed in grace (as in the case of the blessed), then it no longer has the ability to sin. But in that case Molina could restrict his definition to creatures *in via*. Thus, while Báñez's concern about freedom and sin touches on an important aspect of the nature of free choice, it does not get at the heart of the problem with Molina's conception of free choice.

⁵¹ See Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 13 §4 (171); cf. *Tractatus* I c. 1 §3 (356).

⁵² See Báñez, *Tractatus* I c. 1 §8 (360).

Even more significantly however, Báñez thinks that by emphasizing the indifference of the will as Molina does, he obscures the real basis of free choice.⁵³ Recall that for Báñez, free choice is formally in the will, but radically in the intellect. The basis of free choice, on Báñez's view, is the necessary will of the end and the cognition of indifferent means to that end. The will is free, according to Báñez, precisely because it is not naturally determined to one way of realizing its end, but can choose among various apprehended ways of actualizing it.⁵⁴ This does not imply that the will must be able to choose one thing or its contrary to be free, but only that it be able to choose among a range of apprehended options (all of which could be good). Molina's definition says too much: it says that the free will must not only be able to choose among options, but that it must be able to choose between *contrary* options: not just the possibilities of acting or not acting, or acting for one thing or another when all of these alternatives are good, but the possibility of doing good or doing evil. By including freedom of contrariety, Molina's definition thus obscures what free choice fundamentally consists in, *even* in the case of wayfarers.

3.2 *The Ability to Do Otherwise* *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*

Báñez also objects to Molina's inclusion of the clause, "*positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*" in his definition of free choice. This clause is the object of the most significant aspect of Báñez's critique.

Initially, this may seem puzzling, for recall that according to Báñez, "[o]nly that power is formally free which, with all antecedents for acting supplied, is able by its own choice to act and not act."⁵⁵ The "*positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*" clause which is contained in Báñez's own earlier account of human free choice turns out to be the central feature of Molina's account of freedom which Báñez finds objectionable.⁵⁶ Thus, Báñez is careful to explain in his later treatment that Molina's definition of free choice has a true and a false sense:

53 See Báñez, *Apología* I c. 13 §5 (172); cf. *Tractatus* I c. 1 §9 (362).

54 See *ST* I–II q. 13 a. 4. See also Steven Long, "Providence, Freedom and Natural Law," *NV* 4 no. 3 (2006): 564.

55 Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *secunda conclusio* (376a): "Illa sola potentia est formaliter libera, quae positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest pro suo arbitrio agere & non agere." See the related discussion in Ch. 2, above.

56 To make sense of this, it is necessary to note here two important differences between Báñez and Molina. The first is with respect to what each thinker means by the phrase "*positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*." Báñez's commentary on *ST* I qq. 65–119 was first published in 1588, the same year as the first edition of Molina's *Concordia*. This suggests it is unlikely that Báñez would have been familiar with Molina's definition of free choice and its putatively problematic outworkings—namely, the exemption of free choices from

If the words *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum* refer to what comes temporally before the exercise of a free act, it is correctly understood that the will at this point remains indifferent to acting or not acting. However, the efficacy of the divine motion is not to be counted among these [temporal] antecedents to choice, whether in the order of nature or in the order of grace; for that efficacy is temporally simultaneous with the consent of our will. But if they [Molina and Suárez] understand their definition to refer to the antecedents that are temporally simultaneous with the exercise of a free act, it is to be judged false that, with those [temporal] antecedents supplied, it is simultaneously possible that man not choose the good that God orders or decides, because one of the requisites [for free action] is the actual divine motion by which the will is moved from not willing to willing. Whence it is to be observed that we do not assert that it is impossible simply and absolutely for the will not to choose, but rather that it is impossible for the will not to choose on the supposition that all requisites for acting in the moment of good consent are supplied. Otherwise, the divine intention by which God wills man to choose would be frustrated.⁵⁷

God's causal influence by including divine causality among the *requisitis ad agendum*—at the time he wrote his commentary. The second crucial difference between Báñez's definition and Molina's is that the only sort of indifference required by Báñez's definition is freedom of contradiction (to act or not act), whereas Molina's requires both freedom of contradiction and freedom of contrariety (to do some act or its contrary). As shown in Ch. 2, Báñez does think there is more to freedom than freedom of contradiction (for he also holds for a 'freedom of diversity'), but however much he concedes that the ability to do otherwise belongs to the essence of free choice, he vehemently rejects the idea that freedom requires the ability to do the *contrary*, for then the ability to sin would be essential to freedom and freedom could not be predicated of God, the good angels or the blessed.

- 57 Báñez, *Tractatus* I c. 1 §4 (357): "[s]i fiat sermo de requisitis antequam exerceatur actio libera, optime intelligitur quod voluntas adhuc manet indifferens ad agendum vel non agendum. Verumtamen inter illa requisita non annumeratur efficacia divinae motionis, sive in ordine naturae, sive in ordine gratiae; illa enim efficacia simul est cum nostrae voluntatis consensus. Si autem intelligent suam definitionem de requisitis in momento in quo actio libera exercetur, falsum esse comprobatur quod, omnibus illis positis, sit compossibile hominem non eligere illud bonum quod Deus praecipit vel consulit, quia unum de requisitis est actualis divina motio qua voluntas movetur de non volente in volentem. Ubi observandum est quod non asserimus simpliciter et absolute non esse possibile voluntatem non eligere, sed diximus non esse compossibile cum positione omnium quae requisita sunt in momento boni consensus, quod voluntas non exerceat illum actum. Alias frustraretur divina intentio qua Deus vult hominem eligere."

In considering the antecedents {requisita} to choice, Báñez thus distinguishes things that are temporally prior to choice from the divine premotion of the will, which is *causally* prior to choice but temporally simultaneous with it. This distinction is significant because while Báñez maintains that temporal antecedents cannot necessitate free choice, he maintains the divine premotion of the will does necessitate it.

Still, according to Báñez, while the divine premotion of the will necessitates choice, it does not compromise the freedom of choice. Báñez can explain why by recourse to the composed and divided senses: what is necessary in the composed sense—here, on the condition that God wills it—is not absolutely necessary, but remains contingent. God, as the universal cause of all being, causes both the necessary and the contingent. His causality extends not only to the substance of the effects he brings about, but also to their mode. Thus, in willing that a person make a certain free choice, part of what God wills to bring about is precisely that that person chooses freely. Moreover, recall that what is required for one to choose freely in Báñez's view is that one be able to choose among various finite goods apprehended by the practical intellect. One is free to choose among these goods precisely because each promises some limited fulfillment (and is thus desirable), but none promises total fulfillment (which would make it be necessarily willed).

Báñez thinks that if it were possible for a person to do otherwise than God has willed him or her to choose, the "divine intention would be frustrated," which is impossible. Thus, one of the problems with the clause, "*positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*" is that it includes God's premotion of the will among the antecedents incompatible with free choice. In so doing, Molina's definition of free choice fails to recognize how the distinction between the composed and divided senses accounts for the compatibility between God's motion of the will and its freedom.

More fundamentally, in Báñez's view, God's motion of the will not only does not undermine the will's freedom, but is *required* for free choice. Recall that for Báñez, the created faculty of free choice is a vital potency which, in order to produce its act, must be moved to act by a higher cause, namely, God. God's premotion is necessary to change the will from a state of potency (being able to choose) to a state of act (actually choosing).⁵⁸ Thus, the most basic problem with Molina's definition of free choice from Báñez's perspective is that

58 See Norbert del Prado, O.P., *De gratia et libero arbitrio, pars tertia: concordia liberi arbitrii cum divina motione juxta doctrinam Molinae* (Fribourg (Helv.): Consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1907), 78–79.

it renders free choice impossible by removing the act of free choice from the scope of God's causality.⁵⁹

To this objection, Molina can appeal to his doctrine of general concurrence. According to that doctrine, God does not act on the agent, but does concur in bringing about the agent's action and effect. In Molina's view, an act of free choice depends on God for its being, but God does not determine the choice's species insofar as it is a free act. Thus, Molina is aware that free choices cannot exist unless they are caused by God. For Molina, when we choose freely, God supplies the *esse* of the choice and we supply its *essentia*. We determine what our choices are, but God causes our acts of self-determination *as acts*.

Molina's appeal to God's general concurrence, however, fails to satisfy Báñez because it misses the point of his objection: The change which the will undergoes in the act of choosing is a kind of motion, a reduction from potency to act. And since "whatever is in motion is put in motion by another,"⁶⁰ the will's self-motion must ultimately be accounted for by an extrinsic first mover, or there would be an infinite regress.⁶¹

Báñez therefore objects to Molina's distinction between God's operating on the free agent and his operating with the free agent on the free agent's action. According to Báñez, it makes no sense to speak of God's causation of a creaturely agent's action in contradistinction to his causal influence on the creaturely agent, for to cause an agent's action is nothing other than to influence that agent *as acting*.⁶² Moreover, as one of Báñez's later neo-scholastic disciples argues,

[t]he determination of the free will to one thing is something, and something most noble and excellent. The transition of all secondary causes from potency to act is, without doubt, something of perfection and entity. And the transition of the created faculty of free choice from being *able* to act to *freely acting* in particular bespeaks a very great perfection of entity: namely, the dominion which the rational creature has and, by having, exercises over its own operations.⁶³

59 Gerard Smith comes to a similar conclusion (225). See also Prado, 76–79.

60 *ST* I q. 2 a. 3 c.

61 Reginald M. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *The One God: Commentary on the Prima Pars of Aquinas' Summa Theologiae*, trans. Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1944), 140. Thus, the theory of *praemotio physica* ultimately reduces to the proof from motion.

62 See Báñez, *Tractatus* II c. 1 §4 (377). Cf. (for example) *ST* I–II q. 9 a. 6 (cf. a. 4); q. 10 a. 4; q. 109 aa. 1–2 ad 1; q. 111 a. 2.

63 Prado, 64: "Determinatio autem liberae voluntatis ad unum est aliquid, et aliquid nobilissimum ac excellens. Transitus omnium secundarum causarum de potentia in actum, aliquid abs dubio est perfectionis atque entitatis. Ac praecipue transitus liberi arbitrii creati

The determination of the will is something: it represents an "added perfection," an "added reality which did not before exist"⁶⁴ which must be accounted for by God's causality, "for all things which have the notion of an entity must necessarily proceed from God, and from God immediately, by an immediacy of power."⁶⁵ God gives being to all that is, and so he must be held to cause whatever entity is found in the free act of the human will.⁶⁶ The point is, it is dubious to speak as if God could cause acts of free choice in abstraction from causing the determinations that make those acts to be what they are, for God does not create anything that is indeterminate in being.⁶⁷ As Alvarez argues, the dependence of the human person on God in being entails the human person's dependence on God in acting, and this dependence on God in acting entails that God *predetermines* the will.⁶⁸ For Báñez, human persons cannot determine themselves autonomously from God's causation of their acts of choice, for to determine oneself just is to choose, and to choose is an act. It is precisely this self-determination which God causes when he causes the act of choice. On Báñez's view then, when God causes the act of choice, God's action includes the determination as such which makes the act of free choice to be the specific choice it is.

In contrast, on Molina's view, the determination as such that specifies the free act of will is excluded from the scope of what God causes.⁶⁹ Still, for

de *posse* libere agere ad *libere agendum*, secum fert permagnam entitatis perfectionem, nempe dominium, quod creatura rationalis habet et habendo exercet supra suas proprias operationes."

64 Long, "Providence," 562–63.

65 Prado, 63: "Omne namque quod habet rationem entis, oportet ut procedat semper a Deo: et a Deo immediate immediatione virtutis."

66 See Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 23 §9 (211b); d. 24 §§15, 19 (232a, 236a); cf. d. 18 §21 (144a).

67 See *QDV* q. 8 a. 12; cf. q. 3 a. 1 where Aquinas maintains that divine providence gives a determinate character to the effects God brings about. Cf. *QDV* q. 3 aa. 1, 7 where Aquinas describes the divine ideas as pre-existing causes of subsistent things and speaks of them in terms of 'predefinition'.

68 See Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §§7–8 (176aff.). See also d. 18 §14 (139a–140a), d. 24 §19 (236a); d. 26 §11 (262b); cf. d. 18 §§21–22 (144).

69 This view is corroborated by Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §14 (183b): "It follows from the opposite view that something real in time is brought forth into being by the human will which God, by his absolute will of good pleasure, does not first will to be. This is proven: For the determination or influx of the created will is something real, proceeding from the created will in time. Therefore, if God does neither antecedently wills this determination of the created will to be, nor determines that the created will determines itself and freely influences its own act, then something would be brought forth in time by the created will antecedently to the decree and determination of the divine will, and thus God would not, simply speaking, be the first and most universal cause of all things that exist, which

Molina, God, being the creator, causes everything, so it is not that the act of human free choice is absolutely excluded from God's causal purview. God does cause human will acts by his concurrence. Nevertheless, God's concurrence does not account for the choice's being *of* what is chosen on Molina's view.

Báñez's criticism can be restated by saying that Molina's doctrine of concurrence puts creatures on a par with the creator when it comes to their free acts: Molina's position requires that the human person create his or her self-determinations *ex nihilo*.⁷⁰ For the free determination of an act is not 'something' to which being can be superadded; if it is a something, then it has being, and if it is a something without being, then it is nothing at all (and necessarily lacks determinacy). As Steven Long, a contemporary defender of Báñez, argues, "the creature cannot be the absolutely first cause of its actual self-determination without being converted into being *a se*,"⁷¹ which is, of course, metaphysically impossible and inimical to the Christian doctrines that God alone is *a se* (literally, the doctrine of divine 'aseity') and that all which positively is and is not God is caused to be by God (the doctrine of creation).

is impossible as d. 24 will show {Sequeretur ex opposita sententia aliquid reale fieri in tēpore ab humana voluntate, quod Deus absoluta voluntate beneplaciti, prius non voluerit esse. Probatur: nam determinatio, siue influxus creatæ voluntatis est aliquid reale, procedens in tempore à voluntate creatæ: ergo, si Deus antecederet ad determinationem eiusdem voluntatis creatæ nō voluit, neq; determinavit, quod ipsa volūtas creatæ se determinet, & libere influat in suum actum; iam aliquid fieret in tempore à voluntate creatæ antecederet ad decretum, & determinationem voluntatis diuinæ; & ita Deus non esset simpliciter prima, & vniuersalissima causa omnium existentium, quod est impossibile, vt *disp.* 24. manifestum fiet}. Thus, for Alvarez, the Jesuit view "exempts" or "subtracts" something real in the physical (i.e. 'natural') order from the scope of God's causality. See *De aux.* III d. 22 §14 (183b–184a): "Nam iuxta hanc solutionem cooperatio, & determinatio arbitrii, vt determinatio illius est, semper maneret exempta à decreto absoluto, & voluntate beneplaciti Dei, & consequenter à causalitate ipsius, & solum esset praescita, & non volita, absoluta voluntate, à Deo, quod tamen non est dicendum"; see also d. 21 §7 (164b): "... alias aliquid reale existens in rerum natura subtraheretur ab operatione, & causalitate primi agentis, quod esse impossibile..." Cf. *De aux.* III d. 18 §6 (135b); d. 21 §§8–9 (166a–b); d. 22 §§14–18 (182b–187a).

70 See Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 23 §34 (197a); d. 24 §§19, 26 (236a, 239a); cf. d. 18 §§13–14 (139a–b); d. 21 §4 (162b).

71 Long, "Providence," 563. Cf. Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §19 (79b). Alvarez also points out that the created freewill is not, absolutely speaking, its own first mover, but only relatively so. See for example *De aux.* II d. 7 §14 (73a); d. 21 §11 (167b); d. 22 §§11, 29 (180b, 193b); d. 23 §§20, 26 (218a, 221b); cf. d. 22 §§34, 38, 44 (197a–b, 199a–b, 204a–b).

3.3 *Báñez Thinks Molina's View is at Least Quasi-Pelagian*

The human person's dependence on God for the act of free choice in the order of nature underlies the human person's dependence on God for the act of free choice in the order of grace. The need for a divine initiative in salvation is grounded in the human person's complete dependence on God as a creature. Accordingly, if Molina's account of divine causality neglects the human person's creaturely dependence on God for the act of free choice, it also fails to preserve the divine initiative in salvation. Thus, on Báñez's view, it comes dangerously close to Pelagianism, which maintains that the human person has the initiative in salvation.⁷²

For one, Báñez thinks that Molina's doctrine of general concurrence makes God no more the cause of one's good acts than one's sins.⁷³ Molina's concern of course, is to develop an account that avoids making God the cause of one's sins, but Molina's account involves a causal symmetry that also prevents God from being cause of one's good acts. The implication is that one's good choices have their greater perfection than one's sins from oneself rather than from God. Báñez's charge is that this seems to make God too complicit in sin or not complicit enough in our good acts. Moreover, because the decisive basis for an act's goodness is found in the human person on Molina's account, the human person, rather than God's grace, is also the ground of his or her merit.

This leads directly to a further point. For Molina, human free choice determines grace's efficacy. In fact, as Alvarez points out, God's causal priority is exactly reversed: On Molina's view, it is not God who operates and the human person who cooperates, but rather the human person who operates and God who cooperates.⁷⁴ God's action is determined by the human person.⁷⁵ In Báñez's view, this makes one ultimately responsible for one's own salvation, since the decisive factor determining whether one is saved is one's own decision whether to accept God's grace.⁷⁶ Note that on Molina's account, this decision's being what it is (i.e. a decision for or against) cannot be traced back to God, for God's merely general concurrence is indifferent.

72 See, for example, Báñez, *Apologia* prol. §5 (120). The perspective is also corroborated by Alvarez. See for example, *De aux.* III d. 18 §17 (140b–141a). On Pelagianism, see S.J. McKenna, "Pelagius and Pelagianism" in *NCE* 11:60–63; cf. "Semi-Pelagianism" in *NCE* 12:899–901.

73 See Báñez, *Apologia* II c. 4 §5 (254). See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *One God*, 470–71, 505–06.

74 See Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §19 (79b).

75 See for example, Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 21 §5 (163a); d. 23 §23 (220a); d. 24 §21 (237a).

76 See for example, Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 1 §1 (125)ff.

Finally, if the human response is the decisive factor in determining the efficacy of grace, then predestination becomes principally a matter of divine foreknowledge rather than divine will.⁷⁷ Insofar as election is conditioned by man's foreseen response, predestination is logically consequent to man's foreseen merits; election does not precede and account for them.⁷⁸ Yet Faustus of Riez, perhaps the most prominent of the 5th century semi-Pelagians, maintained that insofar as "man himself can take the first step toward sanctification and also avoid sin; predestination is therefore merely God's foreknowledge of what man has freely decided."⁷⁹ While Molinism is careful to eschew certain crucial aspects of the semi-Pelagian position, the sort of relationship between divine and human causality that characterizes the Molinist account of predestination sounds troublingly semi-Pelagian insofar as it reduces predestination to foreseen merits and negative reprobation to foreseen sins.⁸⁰

77 See, for example, Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 23 §3 (211–12); cf. cc. 23–26. Cf. also Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 22 §14 (184a).

78 Thomas points out that such a position seems to suppose "a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both." He goes on to reinforce this point: "Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause . . . Wherefore, that which flows from free will is also of predestination" (*ST* I q. 23 a. 5 c.). It seems clear from this passage that Aquinas conceives of the relationship between divine and human causality quite differently than Molina does with his partial, coordinated-causes model.

79 S.J. McKenna, "Semi-Pelagianism," in *NCE*, 12:900.

80 See *ST* I q. 23 a. 5. According to McKenna, the term "semi-Pelagian" was coined in the heat of the *de auxiliis* debate as an accusation against the Molinist theory of grace (899). However, according to Backus and Goudriaan, this is a mistaken view that originates in 1907 with M. Jacquin, who relies heavily on Serry's history of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* (30, 41ff.). Backus and Goudriaan make a strong cast that the term 'Semi-Pelagian' originates with the Protestant theologian, Theodore Beza, writing almost thirty years before the Controversy *de Auxiliis* (35). According to Backus and Goudriaan, the original referent of the term 'semi-Pelagian' was not 5th c. Massilian teaching, nor Molinism but 16th c. Catholic doctrine on grace and free will (40). Massilianism was condemned at the Second Council of Orange (529); see DS §§370–97. Significant differences between Molinism and (Massilian) semi-Pelagianism have been acknowledged by the Holy See, and the tenability of Molinism has been subsequently and repeatedly affirmed (though notably the position has not been endorsed). See DS §§1997, 2008, 2564. While Molinism was accused of being Pelagian or semi-Pelagian during the 16–17th c. debates, more recent critics, such as Garrigou-Lagrange have refrained from condemning Molinism as heretical. Nevertheless, such critics still highlight the proximity of Molinism to semi-Pelagianism, and argue that this manifests a significant weakness in the system (see for example, Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, trans. Dom Bede Rose O.S.B. [St. Louis: Herder, 1939]) 127–28, 144–46. 9).

3.4 *Concluding Remarks on Báñez's Critique of Molina on Free Choice and Divine Causality*

Most fundamental in Báñez's critique of Molina on free choice and divine causality is that he exempts from God's causality the determination that specifies a choice. Thus, while Molina holds that God causes human free choices, it can reasonably be argued that Molina implies that free choices, being specific self-determinations, are outside the purview God's causality. While the being of the act and what it is are not the same, there is no determinacy to the act apart from its being. This point of Báñez's critique seems right so far as it goes, whatever one makes of his metaphysical supposition that an agent's transition from being able to choose to actually choosing is an increased perfection of the agent.⁸¹ For whether or not the act of choosing increases the metaphysical perfection of the agent, free choices are contingent positive realities that, as such, need to be accounted for ultimately in terms God's causality.

However, the cogency of Báñez's critique of Molina does not demonstrate the soundness of Báñez's doctrine of physical premotion. His critique points out that the whole reality of human free choices is caused by God, but there might be another account of the divine causation of human free choices than the one he offers. Báñez rightly picks up on the fact that, at the most basic level, the stumbling block of Molina's doctrine of free choice and general concurrence is the doctrine of creation.

Yet just as the legitimacy of Báñez's critique does not require one to accept his account of physical premotion, so too, putative difficulties with physical premotion (to be explored further in Chapters Four and Five) do not require one to reject Báñez's critique of Molina. This is an important point because it seems that one thing that drove Molina to adopt the account of free choice and general concurrence he did was the thought that the only alternative was physical premotion or something like it. Rightly finding physical premotion unacceptable, Molina thought that what today would be identified as a libertarian account of freedom, coupled with a doctrine of simultaneous and indifferent concurrence, non-intrinsically efficacious grace and middle knowledge had to be the right way forward. The difficulties of Báñez's positive account perhaps blinded Molina to the force of his objections.

For an explanation of differences of interpretation between Bañezians and Molinists on the teachings of Orange II and Trent, see Garrigou-Lagrange, *Predestination*, 10–17.

81 Lonergan disagrees with Báñez on this point, making an argument remarkably similar to that of Molina in *Concordia* II d. 26. See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 72, 253–77, and the discussion of his critique below in Ch. 5.

4 Báñez's Critique of Middle Knowledge

Molina's reconciliation of God's foreknowledge and providential governance with human free choice depends on his theory of middle knowledge. Báñez criticizes middle knowledge on several grounds.

First, *scientia media* seems to compromise divine impassibility insofar as through it, God knows realities other than himself that he does not create (namely, conditional creaturely free choices). Apart from the question of how there can be positive realities not created by God, such a view seems to make God a passive spectator, dependent upon creatures for his knowledge of their activities. But Thomas teaches that divine knowledge is causal insofar as the divine ideas serve as the exemplars according to which God creates, by the decree of his will, everything that comes to be. Thus, Báñez argues that God knows future contingent states of affairs because he causes them to be.⁸² Molina, of course, must view the causal dimension of divine knowledge differently because of his concern to uphold human autonomy. Bañezians contend that this alternative view of divine knowledge limits the scope of divine causality and makes God a passive knower with respect to those realities lying outside the scope of his causal influence.

Second, if *scientia media* is to be true knowledge rather than mere conjecture, the Molinist theory seems to entail determinism of choices by the circumstances: God positively *knows* that put in these circumstances, this free agent will do such-and-such. But how can he know that for certain unless those antecedent conditions determine putatively free choice? For if they do not, placed in circumstances *C*, there is no guarantee that person *P* will freely perform action *A* rather than *not A*. A Molinist could reply that God knows the possible future by 'seeing into it' and so observes what the agent *would* do as he might be said to 'observe' the actual future in virtue of its presentiality to his eternity.⁸³ However, this too implies determinism. It also seems to leave Molina open to the first objection about the passivity of the divine intellect and it also leaves one with the difficulty of explaining how the *purely possible, non-actual* future could be known at all; for since it never will exist, there is nothing that will (from our standpoint) be actual to be present to God in the 'now' of eternity. (This foreshadows the third objection, below.) Therefore,

82 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 14 a. 13 (207a C–F).

83 See, for example, the account offered by Calvin Normore, "Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: an Overview," in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives*, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 15–16.

the alternatives would seem to be either, (a) middle knowledge is, in fact, conjectural (however reliable this conjecture might be on account of the supereminence of divine intellect); or, (b) antecedent conditions (circumstances) *do* in fact determine the will. It would seem that middle knowledge must either be fallible or Molina's view of freedom must be abandoned. Both alternatives are, of course, unsatisfactory for the Molinist. Indeed the latter would render middle knowledge otiose insofar as God could know counterfactuals in his divine decree to realize certain circumstances, similar to the way Báñez claims God knows future contingents in his divine decree to move the human will toward a certain end.

The two aforementioned criticisms lead to a third, more basic objection, namely, that there *is* nothing in virtue of which future conditionals that are supposed to be the objects of God's middle knowledge are true. This argument has been called, in contemporary literature, the 'grounding objection.' Lacking a referent (state of affairs), there is nothing to 'ground' or fulfill the truth conditions of the future conditional propositions known in God's middle knowledge. The result is that, lacking a ground, middle knowledge collapses: Middle knowledge is putatively *of* nothing. While this objection has been the subject of much attention in the contemporary literature, a basic version of it can be found much earlier in *Apologia* II c. 16.

Of the three objections outlined above, the most important is the third because it can undermine the theory of middle knowledge. Accordingly, the remainder of this part of the present chapter will be principally devoted to an exploration of the grounding objection. To the extent a treatment of the grounding objection also takes one into the territory of divine impassibility and the influence of exogenous factors on free choice, the first two objections will receive some passing treatment under the rubric of the third.

4.1 *Apologia* I c. 16 §2: *A Rudimentary Form of the Grounding Objection*

Báñez's principal objections to middle knowledge are laid out in *Apologia* I c. 15–17. Within this portion of the text we see a rudimentary formulation of the same basic line of argument that would come to be known in contemporary conversations as the 'grounding objection':

Those future conditionals which, in fact, are not future, do not have any certitude and infallibility, whether by force of consequence {*ex vi consequentiae*}, or in their proximate cause (which, of itself is contingent and indifferent), or from that which is in fact future, or from the decree of the divine will (because, as Molina admits, such knowledge precedes all free acts of the divine will). Therefore, such future conditionals are not, as

such, knowable by God. The argument is proven thus: Since the knowledge of God must be certain and wholly infallible, if such an object [i.e. a future conditional understood in Molina's sense] does not have certitude and infallibility from elsewhere, it cannot be an object of divine knowledge unless one would dare to blaspheme, asserting the knowledge of God to be fallible.⁸⁴

Báñez and his Dominican confreres hold that the conditions imposed by the Molinist theory result in an impossible position. The conditions exclude the possibility of states of affairs that would fulfill the truth conditions of the conditional propositions meant to define the content of God's middle knowledge. Lacking objects, there can be no *scientia media*.⁸⁵

To explore this charge, it is necessary to make some preliminary clarifications. After that, I will consider the four points of the objection contained in the passage above.

4.2 Preliminary Clarifications

First, it is necessary to clarify what Báñez was targeting. His dispute with Molina was not about God's knowledge of absolute future contingents (non-necessary states of affairs that will obtain) but rather, about conditional future contingents (non-necessary states of affairs that could, but in fact will not, obtain).⁸⁶

84 Báñez, *Apologia*, I c. 16 §2 (182): "Illa futura conditionata quae revera non sunt futura, non habent aliquam certitudinem et infallibilitatem, neque ex vi consequentiae, neque in sua causa proxima, quae de se contingens est et indifferens, neque ex ea quod revera futurum est, neque ex decreto divinae voluntatis, quia, ut Molina fatetur, talis scientia antecedit omnem actum liberum divinae voluntatis. Ergo talia futura conditionata ut sic non sunt a Deo scibilia. Probatur consequentia. Quia scientia Dei debet esse certa et omnino infallibilis. Ergo si tale objectum non habet aliunde certitudinem et infallibilitatem, non potest esse objectum divinae scientiae infallibilis nisi quis audeat blasphemare asserens scientiam Dei esse fallibilem."

85 Alvarez develops this same line of critique substantially. See for example, *De aux.* II d. 7 §17 (78). *De aux.* II d. 7 is overall an exceptionally rich and nuanced critique of middle knowledge. The disputation spans nearly thirty quarto pages and focuses directly on the grounding of middle knowledge (rather than being dissipated across a span of subsidiary or less decisive points of critique). The disputation also lacks the polemical edges (or at least the polemical rhetoric) of certain other critical treatments of middle knowledge. One gets the sense that while Alvarez is staunchly committed to the Dominican position, he takes the Jesuit position seriously. Alvarez begins the disputation, for example, with a fairly sustained presentation of the Jesuit position and the arguments in support of it.

86 It should be indicated that absolute future contingents can also be 'conditional' in the sense that antecedent conditions are still involved; it is just that the antecedent conditions

Both sides maintained that God knows conditional future contingents. The argument was whether God knows them *in the way Molina claimed*—that is, within the constraints of his theory of free choice and general concurrence. Divine knowledge of conditional—that is, hypothetical—future contingents presents no special problem for the theory of physical premotion: Rather than having recourse to *scientia media*, the basis for such knowledge is located in the divine decree to realize a certain possible state of affairs. God fore-knows the hypothetical free actions of possible persons because he knows the possibilities he could instantiate by willing, and the free actions of creatures do not fall outside the scope of the direct causal influence of his will. In other words, God knows what creatures *would* do because he knows what he himself *could* do.⁸⁷

Second, whether both sides held that God knows counterfactuals of freedom is a useful terminological question. Recall that 'counterfactuals of creaturely freedom' refers to "true subjunctive conditional propositions of the form 'If person *P* were in non-determining, complete circumstances *C* at time *t*, he would (freely) perform action *A*.'"⁸⁸ Strictly speaking, divine knowledge of counterfactuals (so defined) is part and parcel only of the Molinist theory because "complete circumstances" here correlates to the phrase "all requisites for acting supplied"—which Bañezians object to—in Molina's definition of free choice. That is, the 'circumstances' being referred to in Molina's definition of choice are meant to include God's causal activity. Whether or not God or the divine premotion *ought* to be counted as an 'antecedent circumstance' of a creaturely act is a significant, although different, question. Assuming the Molinist position that God's causal activity is an antecedent circumstance ruled out by the requirements of freedom, Bañezians cannot admit divine knowledge of *counterfactuals* because they maintain that divine decrees are determining (if non-necessitating); thus for them, 'complete circumstances' cannot be 'non-determining'. For Bañezians, while God does not know counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in the Molinist sense, he does know conditional future contingents of creaturely freedom (propositions about what one would do given a Bañezian conception of free choice). While the contemporary literature typically speaks in terms of 'counterfactuals', the discussion

in the case of an absolute contingent are given as opposed to merely hypothetical. For the sake of clarity, following common usage, my use of 'conditional' will be to distinguish *hypothetical* from absolute conditional future contingents of creaturely freedom.

87 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 14 a. 13 for a discussion of God's foreknowledge of future contingents.

88 Grant, "Counterfactuals," *PACPA* 74 (2000): 307.

that follows will generally follow the classical convention of using ‘future conditionals’ where this means ‘conditional future contingents of creaturely freedom’—which, in contemporary Molinist terms, just are ‘counterfactuals’. By avoiding Molinist specificities, however, ‘future conditionals’ can be used universally in referring to God’s knowledge of how possible persons would act under given circumstances on either Báñez’s system or Molina’s.⁸⁹

Third, it is important to note that the foundation of Báñez’s critique is the claim that God’s knowledge must be certain and infallible. Since this is a traditional and widespread affirmation shared by both parties in the debate, I shall not seek to validate it here, though I acknowledge some recent accounts of God have called it into question. The supposition that God’s knowledge must be certain and infallible is important for the argument Báñez constructs because he goes on to show the ways in which the objects of middle knowledge prevent it from having certitude and infallibility. The point is that one cannot have certain and infallible knowledge of contingent and unreal objects.

In his argument that God cannot know the putative objects of middle knowledge, Báñez articulates four ways in which hypothetical future conditionals pertaining to creaturely freedom lack certitude and infallibility. To the extent that these objects lack certitude and infallibility, it is argued, God cannot be understood to have knowledge of them. The possibility of middle knowledge is thus ruled out. Having made the necessary preliminary clarifications, let us now examine each of the four possible avenues for grounding the truth of future contingents.

4.3 *Two Bases for the Truth of Future Conditionals are Clearly Ruled Out*

Of the four possible bases for grounding the truth of future conditionals identified by Báñez, the last two can be dispensed with more easily than the first two because Báñez’s meaning is straightforward and the textual evidence in Molina’s writings makes it indisputable that he does not seek to ground the truth of future conditionals in either of these ways. Since these final two avenues merit only brief discussion, they will be treated together before more attention is devoted to unpacking the former two.

4.3.1 The Truth of Future Conditionals is not Grounded in the Actual Future

Báñez claims that future conditionals on Molina’s account cannot have “certitude and infallibility...from that which is in fact future.” The actual

89 In a few isolated cases, however, ‘counterfactuals’ will be used for clarity’s sake, when the future conditionals being referred to are Molinist future conditionals.

future cannot serve to ground the truth of future conditionals precisely because future conditionals do not concern what is actually future, but rather what *would be* future *on a hypothesis*. Because the states of affairs picked out by future conditionals are not actually future, those states of affairs cannot be present to divine eternity as future states of affairs are.

4.3.2 The Truth of Future Conditionals is not Grounded in God's Will
Moreover, Báñez argues that the decrees of God's will cannot serve as the basis for the truth of future conditionals on Molina's account. The reason Báñez gives in his objection is that middle knowledge is prevolitional: since middle knowledge is logically prior to God's decision to create, the truths known by middle knowledge cannot presuppose God's act of will. However, there is a second, related reason why Molina cannot consistently claim that God's will grounds the truth of future conditionals: That is Molina's definition of free choice. Recall that for Molina, free choice requires the ability to do otherwise *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*. That means that no antecedent to choice—including God—can determine a choice *as free*. Consequently, what free creatures would freely do under certain circumstances is not the result of God's decision, but theirs, and God cannot know these conditionally future decisions in knowing the decrees of his own will.

Having ruled out the possibilities that future conditionals are true in virtue of the actual future or the decrees of God's will, let us now turn our attention to the other two possibilities Báñez considers.

4.4 *The Truth of Future Conditionals is not Grounded* *'ex vi consequentiae'*

Báñez goes on to explain that future conditionals cannot possess certitude and infallibility "by force of consequence" {*ex vi consequentiae*}. What is meant by the cryptic phrase '*ex vi consequentiae*' is initially puzzling, and one might wonder how its meaning correlates—as it would seem to—with the pivotal distinction drawn in the previous chapter between necessity of consequence (*de dicto*, or logical necessity) and necessity of the consequent (*de re*, or ontological necessity). The following subsections will first explain what Báñez means by '*ex vi consequentiae*' and then relate it to the earlier discussion of *de dicto* and *de re* necessity. To begin, let us consider the meaning of '*consequentia*'.

4.4.1 The Notion of 'Consequence'

To understand what is meant by '*ex vi consequentiae*' it is necessary to look to the context of the previous chapter of the *Apologia* (1 c. 15), where Báñez begins his argument against middle knowledge. Although Báñez does not

employ the phrase '*ex vi consequentiae*' in *Apologia* I c. 15, context makes it clear that other expressions he uses—such as '*illative*,' '*in bonitate consequentiae*,' '*in ratione consequentiae*' and '*in rigore consequentiae*'—express the same idea.⁹⁰ Báñez explains that a conditional proposition can be understood in three ways depending on how the word 'if' functions within that proposition. The association between antecedent and consequent can be taken in an illative, existential, or disparate sense.⁹¹

Literally translated, the noun '*consequentia*' just means 'consequence.' But to understand its meaning, it is helpful to juxtapose it with the participle '*consequens*,' a closely related term meaning 'consequent' because in contemporary English, 'consequence' typically refers to the result or outcome of an antecedent state of affairs ('Ideas have consequences!' or, 'A bad grade is the consequence of failing to turn in your assignments!'). For us, 'consequence' means 'upshot' or 'conclusion.' For scholastics however, a result or outcome is typically called a 'consequent.' This is in contrast to the relation between or sequence of propositions taken as a whole. According to scholastic terminology, this relation or sequence taken as a whole is called a 'consequence.'

However, there are several closely related but distinct types of relationships between propositions, so it makes sense to ask to which of these '*consequentia*' refers. One proposition can *imply* another, as in the case of a true conditional (if *a* then *c*).⁹² Or it can be the case that one proposition *entails* another such that, if the one is true, the second must also be true. One proposition can also stand in a *derivative* or *inferential* relationship to another, as in an argument: '*p*; therefore *c*.' As Ivan Boh points out, the term '*consequentia*' was applied fluidly to all three types of relationship during the late medieval period. Furthermore, '*consequentia*' could be used variously to refer to either an argument or conditional itself, or to the *relation* that obtains *within* the conditional or argument between the propositions comprising it.⁹³ While these types of inter-propositional relationship are distinct, they are closely related: medieval scholastics would "use the truth of the conditional proposition as a criterion

90 For the connection, see Báñez's *conclusiones* at *Apologia*, I c. 16 §§1–2 (181).

91 See Báñez, *Apologia*, I c. 15 §§6–8 (180–81).

92 Thus, a conditional proposition is comprised of two constituent propositions: antecedent and consequent.

93 This of course can raise special challenges for the translator. See Ivan Boh, "Consequences," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann *et al.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 300–01.

for the validity of the corresponding argument."⁹⁴ Thus, for any valid argument, there is a corresponding true conditional.

Importantly however, the inverse is not true. As Ivan Boh points out: "We cannot correctly say that whenever 'if A, then B' is true there is a valid argument of the form 'A; therefore B'. It is only if the 'if... then...' is taken as representing entailment that this is so."⁹⁵ Thus, significantly, not every instance of implication (a true conditional) is an instance of entailment. At first, this sounds confusing: How can a conditional proposition be true yet not represent entailment? I think what is meant is simply that not all true conditionals represent a relationship of necessity between the antecedent and consequent. Yet even in the absence of logical necessity, the state of affairs picked out by a conditional proposition might in some given instance obtain, and so the conditional would be true. It is in this sense that a conditional can be true without representing entailment. To borrow an example from Báñez, "If you intercede on my behalf with the king, I will give you a horse" would be true if in fact I follow through with my promise.⁹⁶ However, *formally speaking*, the conditional is not true even if the state of affairs it picks out in this instance happens to obtain, *because I could fail to fulfill my promise*. That is, the conditional is not universally true on the basis of its logical form or its picking out an ontologically necessary state of affairs. Thus, the consequence as such is not said to be 'good' (in the sense that it does not *hold* good) even if it picks out a state of affairs that actually obtains (and is, in this respect, a true proposition). My giving you a horse is not necessitated or causally entailed (whether logically or efficiently) by your interceding on my behalf with the king.

Despite this lack of symmetry between conditionals and arguments, scholastics typically held true conditionals to be only those representing entailment and thus to have a corresponding valid argument.⁹⁷ Thus to refer to the 'goodness' of a consequence is to refer to its formal legitimacy—to its validity *as a consequence*. It is to say that the conditional necessarily holds true, or that it represents entailment. To say that a consequence is 'bad' is to say that the conditional is necessarily false or impossible. What has become apparent is that the term 'good' is being employed here simply to mean 'valid' or 'bona fide', like the way an orthopedist looking at an x-ray might say, "It looks like a good fracture" (as opposed to a sprain) or a police officer arriving on the

94 Boh, 302.

95 Boh, 302.

96 This seems to have been a common example. See for instance, Alvarez's *De aux.* II d. 7 §7 (65a).

97 See Boh, 302.

scene of an alleged robbery might tell the dispatcher, “This appears to be a good robbery” (as opposed to a larceny or mere civil dispute).⁹⁸ This strict view of true or good *consequentiae* as conditional propositions representing entailment seems to be what Báñez has in mind in the context of *Apologia* I cc. 15–16. There, Báñez discusses different kinds of conditional propositions, but only those conditionals which represent a relationship of entailment are included under the notion of a (true) *consequentia*.⁹⁹ Thus, strictly speaking, consequences that do not hold good formally are often not even considered to be consequences. The term ‘consequence’ itself typically denotes entailment.

4.4.2 Ways of Interpreting *consequentiae*

The first type of consequence Báñez considers is the illative conditional proposition. A conditional is understood ‘by notion of the consequence’ {in ratio consequentiae} when the word ‘if’ expresses an inferential {illative} association. Such an association is one of logical entailment and is founded upon the ‘goodness of the consequence’ {bonitate consequentiae}. Indeed, the *bonitas* or *malitia consequentiae* is the basis for the truth or falsity of the conditional proposition. The example adduced by Báñez is, “if man flew, he would have wings.”¹⁰⁰ Granting the conceptual limitations imposed by Báñez’s historical context, the condition: “if man flew” would entail: “man had wings” by logical necessity. The notion of man flying—whether or not he does—includes the notion of his being winged.¹⁰¹ Thus, the truth of the conditional obtains *ex vi consequentiae*: by logical inference, or the power of the consequence itself.¹⁰²

In a second way, conditional propositions can be interpreted in what I shall call an ‘existential’ sense: that is, as requiring the antecedent to obtain in order

98 Some refer to a good conditional (consequence) as a ‘valid’ consequence. While this conveys the idea of the formal nature of a ‘real’ conditional’s truth, I avoid this term because strictly speaking, conditionals are either true or false, while arguments are valid or invalid. See Boh, 300.

99 For a similar discussion of the three ways of interpreting consequences explored below, see Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §7 (65a–66b).

100 Báñez, *Apologia*, I.15 §6 (180): *si homo volaret, haberet alas*. Alvarez makes the same point by appealing to the following example: If a stone was man, then a stone would be a rational animal. See *De aux.* II d. 7 §7 (65a).

101 To make full sense of this, note how logic, for Báñez, is inextricably bound to the way the real world is, and is not something purely formal and abstract. Harm Goris makes a similar point about Aquinas’s attitude toward logic. See Goris, *Free Creatures*, 271–72.

102 For a parallel discussion of the illative interpretation of conditionals, see Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §7 (65a).

to be true.¹⁰³ Báñez gives the following three examples: "If you intercede with the king on my behalf, I will give you a horse"; 'If you had come yesterday, you would have eaten with me'; 'If Peter takes a journey in the summer heat, he will fall ill.'¹⁰⁴ In this sort of future conditional, the antecedent conditions which comprise the basis {fundamentum} for the association expressed by the conditional proposition must actually be {revera sit} in order for the consequent to follow. Such consequents can follow by necessity or not. In one case, if the antecedent obtains, the consequent follows necessarily on that condition. In the other case, even if the antecedent obtains, the consequent still may not follow. It is important to realize that on both accounts, the consequents pick out states of affairs that are *both* conditioned (insofar as they presuppose an antecedent) *and* contingent (although the senses in which they are non-necessary differ).

The sense in which both are conditioned is clear. The sense in which both are contingent merits further explanation. In the former case, the consequent is contingent because it has no absolute necessity of its own, even though it obtains by a necessity of supposition (given the antecedent, the consequent follows). In the latter case, the consequent is contingent *both* because it is not absolutely necessary *and* because it is not even conditionally necessary. This lack of conditional necessity is on account of the fallibility and limited efficacy of the antecedent functioning as a cause of the consequent. For example, if the antecedent consists of a human person's proposal or promise (as in the case "If you intercede with the king on my behalf, I will give you a horse"), the consequent may not follow because of man's fallibility and unreliability; whereas if it consists of a divine proposal or promise, the consequent unfailingly follows by a conditional necessity because "God is faithful in all his words" (Ps 145.14).¹⁰⁵

Thirdly, the term 'if' can be understood 'in a disparate sense' {secundum quamdam concomitantiam disparatam}. This applies in the case when the two parts of a conditional are only incidental to one another but not causally related in any way. For example, "If today Peter goes into the field, the King of France will die tomorrow."¹⁰⁶ After lambasting those who maintain that God

103 See Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 15 §7 (180). The label 'existential' is my own, not employed by Báñez. However, the idea is clearly that the consequent's following depends on the antecedent being "posited in *esse*." See Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §7 (65b).

104 Báñez, *Apologia*, I c. 15 §6 (180): si intercesseris pro me apud regem, dabo tibi equum; si heri venisses, cenasses mecum; si Petrus iter ageret in aestate, incidisset in morbum.

105 Báñez makes exception for cases of prophecy and other revelation when a human person speaks on behalf of God. In such cases, human agency is taken to be unfailing.

106 Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 15 §8 (180): "si Petrus hodie iverit in campum, rex Franciae morietur cras."

knows future contingents in this way also through middle knowledge (presumably because there is no rational basis for the association between antecedent and consequent), Báñez then considers a stronger presentation of the argument: If one supplies the adverb ‘*dum*’ (best rendered here as ‘provided that’ or ‘as long as’), the contingent will be more plausibly rendered an object of middle knowledge. For example, “(if) *so long as* Peter sleeps, the King of France will die.”¹⁰⁷ But Báñez then points out that no special knowledge besides knowledge of the singular parts of such a conditional is required because there is no causal relation of any sort, whether logical or efficient, between the antecedent and consequent; they just both happen to coincide. In other words, such a consequence does not represent entailment. The parts have nothing to do with one another from a causal point of view, so that knowing the truth of the conditional is only a matter of knowing the truth of two independent contingent propositions. This is important because middle knowledge purports to be knowledge of *conditional* future contingent propositions.¹⁰⁸

4.4.3 The Relationship between Logical *consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentiae*

The way that this discussion of scholastic notions of consequence relates to the pivotal distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* necessity described in Chapter Two of this study is as follows. In *Apologia* 1 c. 15 Báñez shows that there are two kinds of conditional necessity, only one of which is logical necessity. Thus, the category ‘necessity of supposition’ or ‘conditional necessity’ captured by other terms such as ‘*necessitas consequentiae*’ is not limited to mere logical necessity but also includes existentially conditional ‘*fundamentum-reversit*’ necessity. In other words, it is possible to maintain that things necessary *in sensu composito* need not be tautologies, but may include things resulting from non-necessary antecedents that, once posited, necessarily bring about a real effect because of their causal efficacy. To return to one of Báñez’s examples from above, if God wills something to take place by a divine proposal or promise, it will unfailingly happen, not *ex vi consequentiae*, but on account of God’s causal infallibility. Thus, conditional necessity can be either logical or ontological (but things ontologically necessary on some antecedent condition still must be distinguished from things that are necessary *de re*, or by their very nature).

107 Báñez, *Apologia* 1 c. 15 §8 (180): “si dum Petrus dormierit, rex Galliae moriturus sit.”

108 For a parallel discussion of consequences of disparate association, see Alvarez, *De aux.* 11 d. 7 §20 (80a) d. 13 §3 (115b).

4.4.4 What it Means to Say Future Conditionals are not Grounded '*ex vi consequentiae*'

Returning to the main point under consideration, how is all of this significant for Báñez's argument against middle knowledge? Most simply, to say that future conditionals do not acquire certitude and infallibility *ex vi consequentiae* is to say that the objects of middle knowledge cannot be known in virtue of the fact that they are logically necessary truths. Báñez does not attempt to demonstrate why the objects of middle knowledge cannot be logically necessary, but it is universally agreed by both sides that they are not. Báñez is, for the sake of a complete argument, ruling out all the potential candidates that could serve as a basis for middle knowledge.

Báñez asserts that all illative conditionals are either necessary or impossible.¹⁰⁹ As such, "[a]ll conditionals which are taken *in vi consequentiae*, if the consequence is legitimate, are known by God through his natural and necessary knowledge, through which also [for example] he knows man to be a rational animal, whether or not man exists."¹¹⁰ The upshot is that "[a]ll future conditionals which are not taken *in vi consequentiae* (i.e. inferentially, or illatively), do not fall within the knowledge of God inasmuch as they precede the absolute or conditional free decree of the divine will, either intending good or permitting evil."¹¹¹ Now, the objects of middle knowledge cannot be taken *in vi consequentiae* since they are not posited as logically necessary truths. That is, a description of what I will freely choose is not included in—is not *logically entailed* by—the notion of the antecedent circumstances into which I am introduced (including my own essence as it exists prior to choice). Therefore, the objects of middle knowledge must fall among those conditionals in which 'if' is to be understood as requiring the real existence of the antecedent (*fundamentum-revera-sit* necessity), or those in which 'if' implies no causal relation at all (the 'if' of disparate association). In either case, according to Báñez, if the objects of middle knowledge are not logically necessary truths, they must fall under God's free knowledge (which, as the name implies, is

109 See also Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §7 (65b).

110 Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 16 §1 (181): "Omnia conditionata quae accipiuntur in vi consequentiae, si consequentia bona est, cognoscuntur a Deo per scientiam necessariam et sibi naturalem, per quam etiam cognoscit hominem esse animal rationale, sive homo existat sive non existat."

111 Báñez, *Apologia* I c. 16 §2 (181): "Omnia futura conditionata quae non accipiuntur in vi consequentiae et illative, non cadunt sub scientia Dei prout antecedunt decretum liberum divinae voluntatis absolutum vel conditionale volentis bonum vel permittentis malum."

postvolitional). However, the possibility of their being under God's free knowledge is ruled out by hypothesis on Molina's view, which maintains that *scientia media* is prevolitional. Thus, Báñez squeezes middle knowledge out of the picture by showing it to be impossible.

Báñez's main idea is this: All logically necessary truths are contained in God's simple knowledge. Moreover, what is known by God in his simple knowledge—the divine essence and the possibility of what can be other than God—is necessary. For it is necessary that things not logically impossible are possible, even if those things themselves are not necessary: The *possibility* (rather than the things) is what is necessary.¹¹² Thus, there is a necessary truth about contingent, non-contradictory things, which is that those things are possible. These God necessarily knows pre-volitionally *as possibilities* in his simple knowledge.¹¹³ But to the extent that middle knowledge is *scientia* and not *coniectio*, it is not about what *could* happen, but what *will* happen, albeit *on a hypothesis*. This requires propositions describing future conditionals to be definitely true or definitely false.

Again, conditional propositions are the objects of middle knowledge. In order to be objects of knowledge, conditional propositions must be true. In order to be true, conditionals must either express entailment (be logically necessary) or they must suppose the *fundamentum* of the infallible divine decree (either ordaining or permitting). The former sort of conditionals are known pre-volitionally in God's *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*. The latter sort are known post-volitionally in God's *scientia visionis*.¹¹⁴ Counterfactuals of freedom are allegedly known pre-volitionally, but the problem of course is that they do not represent logical entailment. In other words, counterfactuals of freedom are not true *ex vi consequentiae*. Therefore, they cannot be known by God pre-volitionally. Thus, Báñez impugns the possibility of middle knowledge by demonstrating that there cannot be a middle ground between God's pre- and post-volitional knowledge.

112 Flint, for example, echoes this point (*Divine Providence*, 38). It is related to Aquinas's idea that God's omnipotence extends to anything whose essence does not involve a contradiction (*ST* I q. 25 a. 3). For an interesting, though different, perspective on this aspect of Aquinas's thought, see Ross, *Thought and World: The Hidden Necessities* (Notre Dame, UND Press, 2008), 32–37, 51 (see esp. 33). See also his "Aquinas's Exemplarism; Aquinas's Voluntarism," *ACPQ* 64, no. 2 (1990): 171–198.

113 See also Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §11 (67b).

114 Indeed, if the consequence is not illative, its determinate truth or validity cannot in principle be known prior to the decree of the divine will—not even by an omniscient God. See Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §11 (68a).

Why is such a middle ground impossible? Insofar as counterfactuals of freedom neither are logically necessary truths nor describe mere possibilities lying within the scope of divine power but which are yet known pre-volitionally, they must suppose that something other than God can be real or actual (in the sense of being definite), prior to and therefore apart from the divine essence and will. To make this claim is to posit realities other than God that elude the scope of God's universal causality. This contradicts the doctrine of creation, according to which all that is not God is created and that God is the creator of all things, visible and invisible. At this point, the intimate connection between the critique of Molinist freedom and the argument against middle knowledge emerges, and it becomes clear that the former critique serves as the basis for the latter. For if God caused man's free choices, there would be no need to posit a pre-volitional knowledge of future conditionals in God other than *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*. Instead the certainty of such conditionals would find its basis in the divine essence and decree.

4.5 *Certitude does not Arise from Knowledge of the Proximate Cause*

Above, we saw that God cannot know future conditionals *ex vi consequentiae*. Báñez rules out another possible avenue for grounding the truth of future conditionals in *Apologia* 1 c. 16: God cannot know future conditionals by knowing the proximate cause—namely, the human agent or the human agent's faculty of free choice.

Recall that for Báñez, God does know future conditionals by knowledge of the proximate cause *as complete and unimpeded*. On Báñez's account, by knowing the entire nexus of antecedent causes that influence a creature's free choice—including God's own causal involvement—God knows what a possible free creature would do in any of the circumstances in which it could be placed. Such an avenue is not open to Molina however, because Molina rejects the idea that any antecedent or set of antecedents—human or divine—can determine a genuinely *free* choice. A free agent is not necessitated to choose as it does whether by external influences or on account of its given nature.

For this reason, it is perhaps surprising that Molina believes God knows future conditionals by comprehending each possible created faculty of free choice.¹¹⁵ Molina maintains that,

115 Molina, *Concordia*, IV d. 50 §15 (Freddoso, 140). See also (in the Freddoso ed.) 115–16, 119, 141, 143, 157, 189, 204, 214, 218, 237–38.

God knows the determination of a created faculty of choice before it exists because of the infinite and unlimited perfection of His intellect and because of the preeminent comprehension by which He comprehends that faculty in His essence in a way far deeper than that in which it exists in itself; and thus on the hypothesis that He should will to situate it in such-and-such an order of things and circumstances, He knows which part it will in its freedom turn itself toward.¹¹⁶

Molina thinks middle knowledge *is* God's knowledge of the proximate cause. According to Molina, God knows future conditionals because he knows each possible faculty of free choice with a depth that surpasses human understanding. Because of the sublime perfection of his knowledge, God knows every possible faculty of free choice not just generally, as a creaturely faculty of free choice, but individually, as *this* unique faculty of free choice that would respond in *this* way under *these* circumstances, even though that faculty of free choice does not yet (and indeed may never) exist.

However, as indicated above, Báñez objects that Molina's suppositions about freedom make it impossible for God to know the future conditional decisions of a created faculty of free choice in comprehending that faculty of free choice itself:

For man, even placed in such an order, [of circumstances] has an essence of free choice, which is of itself indifferent, however much this faculty of free choice is considered singularly. Therefore, from comprehension of this individual faculty of free choice God is not able to know with certainty its future determination to one part, because as Molina says, such-and-such an order of circumstances does not determine the faculty of free choice to one part, but it remains still able to do otherwise.¹¹⁷

Báñez's point is that even if God comprehends each faculty of free choice individually as *this* unique faculty of free choice, insofar as it is a faculty of

116 Molina, *Concordia* IV d. 53.1 §14 (Freddoso, 206–7). See also (in the Freddoso ed.) 190–91, 193, 221, 229.

117 See Báñez, *Apologia* I.16 § 4 (185): "Etenim homo, etiam positus in tali ordine, habet essentiam liberi arbitrii de se indifferentem, quantumvis consideretur hoc liberum arbitrium singulare. Ergo ex comprehensione hujus liberi arbitrii singularis non potest Deus certo scire determinationem ejus futuram ad unam partem, quoniam, ut dicit Molina, talis ordo circumstantiarum non determinat liberum arbitrium ad unam partem, sed adhuc manet potens aliud agere."

free choice at all (according to Molina's definition), it is impossible that circumstances or that faculty's individual essence determine how it will act. Therefore, it is impossible for God to know how a created faculty of free choice would act by grasping its individual essence.

Báñez's point is correct so far as it goes, but it fails to grasp the sense in which Molina thinks a creature's free choices can be known in grasping its individual essence. Báñez's objection assumes the essence in question is a possible faculty of free choice's *given* essence, prior to choice. For Molina, however, it is not a creature's given essence that determines its choices; the thought would seem rather to be that a creature's choices determine (at least in part) its individual essence. Thus, to understand an individual faculty of free choice comprehensively is, for Molina, to know the conditional free decisions it would make, insofar as these are at least partially constitutive of its individual identity. Such a view—that free choices shape one's self—is relatively uncontroversial, at least within the sort of Thomistic framework both Báñez and Molina assumed. The idea is simply that lying, for example, makes one a liar and telling the truth makes one a truth-teller. Giving marital consent makes one a spouse. More broadly, free choices form one's self by lasting as character dispositions such as virtues and vices. Acquired virtues and vices are *habitus* that result from repeated good or bad choices and incline one to act well or badly in the future. Notably, Suárez's use of the term 'habitude' {*habitudō*} to designate the unique property of possible persons in which God knows their conditionally future free decisions highlights an interesting parallel in this regard: Similar to the way actual choices form habits—actual character dispositions—the “mark” left by one's conditional choices is a 'habitude'—a *sui generis* and contingent property that is, nevertheless, at least partially constitutive of one's unique individual essence.¹¹⁸

118 See Calvin Normore, “Future Contingents,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 380–81. See also Adams, 111–12. Adams confesses no apprehension of the mysterious quality or habitude to which Suárez refers (82). However, it seems to me Suárez's 'habitude' might alternatively be a *relation* (something signified at times by the term *habitudō*): More likely, it is the transcendental relation the creature's action has to God as a *casus*, *immediatione suppositi*, of that same action. See the discussion of transcendental relations in Suárez's view of efficient causation (Ch. 7 Pt. 4 below). As noted in that section, for Suárez, God's action and the creature's action are the same in reality. Quite possibly the thought is that God knows this action—which is a feature of the creature insofar as it is from the creature—as from himself (God). To know this is to know a certain 'habitude' or transcendental relation of the creature to himself. Or, possibly the idea is that God knows the creaturely free choice as dependent on him by a predicamental relation of dependence (the subsequent

4.5.1 Middle Knowledge Requires there to be Contingent States of Affairs that Obtain Prior to Creation

Even despite this more nuanced understanding of Molina's position, however, a crucial problem still remains: Middle knowledge requires there to be contingent states of affairs that obtain prior to God's decision to create; namely, the states of affairs picked out by the future conditional propositions God knows in his middle knowledge.¹¹⁹ Even if an agent's individual essence does not determine, but is determined by its conditionally future free choices, the problem is that those acts of choice (and so presumably the character dispositions they leave) do not exist prior to God's decision to create. Since the choices in question are neither logically necessary nor actually existing, the view that God can know them by comprehending an agent's individual essence is dubious. Moreover, the view that there could be contingent states of affairs that obtain prior to creation (to ground the truth of future conditionals) seems incompatible with the doctrine that God is the creator of all that is.

A corollary problem with the view that there are contingent states of affairs that obtain independently from God's decision to create is that God's knowledge of these states of affairs necessarily depends on them. Perhaps one could argue this is not problematic insofar as one would presumably want to say God's knowledge of vision depends on creation: God 'sees' the extant world as it is. Yet, if the obtaining of the states of affairs future conditionals pick out does not depend on God, God's knowledge is not ultimately rooted in himself—as it arguably is in the case of God's *scientia visionis*. Middle knowledge thus renders God a passive knower, which is at odds with a traditional account of the divine attributes.

A third problem is the notion that there are contingent states of affairs that obtain prior to God's decision to create. This limits the scope of divine power, for it means there are some things that God cannot make even though they are absolutely possible. That there are things God cannot make is not itself problematic on a traditional understanding of God. God cannot make dry rain, two plus two equal five, or married bachelors, for instance. All such things are logically absurd and their impossibility does not impose any real limitation on God's power. Logical impossibility is not a constraint on divine power because God himself is the very ground of possibility and necessity.¹²⁰ To say

creation relation Aquinas identifies in *ST I* q. 45 a. 3). But I think the best interpretation of the 'habitude' is that it is a transcendental relation.

119 Cf. Grant, "Aquinas and the Free Will Defense," 12.

120 See John Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles," in his *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, Studies

that God is omnipotent is to say he can do everything that can be done (where 'can' denotes logical possibility), not that he can do the absurd. By extension, while *de dicto* it is impossible for God to make a possible something *on the hypothesis that he has willed not to make it*, the basis for the limitation of God's power in this case is God's own will not to do what he could do. Thus, such *de dicto* or conditional necessitation of God's will also does not inappropriately circumscribe his power. The situation is different, however, in the case of middle knowledge because there, the basis for the limitation of God's power is not God's own nature or will. As with the previously mentioned problem, the circumscription of God's power also conflicts with a traditional account of the divine attributes.

To evaluate the cogency of the line of critique just advanced, it is necessary to understand the Molinist position more deeply on its own terms. As is clear in the passage cited above, Molina does not think that the possible agents in question or their free choices actually exist prior to God's decision to create. This shows that Molina is at least sensitive to the fact that it would be problematic to assert that there are positive realities other than God which exist prior to God's act of creation. Moreover, *actual* states of affairs are not required to ground the truth of future conditionals insofar as the *actual* world is not what such future conditionals are about. Future conditionals are not about what *is* but about what *would be*. What putatively grounds the truth of future conditionals, therefore, are not absolute states of affairs, but *counterfactual* states of affairs.¹²¹

Surely propositions, even future conditional propositions, must correspond to reality in order to be true. But the form such correspondence takes depends on the nature of the proposition in question. A future conditional such as,

(1) If Peter were offered the job tomorrow, he would (freely) take it.

is true only if it is the case that Peter would (freely) take the job if tomorrow it were offered to him. The future conditional is *counterfactually dependent* on a future conditional state of affairs. By 'counterfactual dependence' is simply meant the logical dependence of a proposition's truth on that which the

in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 10 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 163–73. There is a fascinating debate, however, on the interpretation of Aquinas regarding this point. For a different perspective, see James Ross, "Aquinas's Exemplarism."

121 See William Lane Craig, *Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 260–63.

proposition is about—what Trenton Merricks has in a recent book called a ‘trivial’ dependence of truth on being.¹²² Such a trivial dependence of truth on being does not always require that what a proposition is about *actually exist* in order for that proposition to be true. The sort of objection Báñez raises relies, in the words of William Lane Craig, on a “wooden understanding of truth as correspondence.”¹²³

Since the sort of dependence in question is not a causal dependence but a mere counterfactual dependence, God’s knowledge is not causally dependent on something other than himself.¹²⁴ The upshot of this is that middle knowledge purportedly avoids making God into a passive knower precisely because counterfactual states of affairs do not exist in order to cause God’s knowledge. But questions about God’s passivity aside, why should one think that there is any determinacy to what counterfactuals of human freedom are about, particularly insofar as counterfactuals are about hypothetical future states of affairs?

4.5.2 Avenues for Grounding Future Conditionals Known in God’s Middle Knowledge

Molinists have advanced several lines of argument in support of the view that God can have middle knowledge of future conditionals despite the non-actuality of the states of affairs future conditionals are about.¹²⁵ Three of these will be briefly considered here.

The first line of argument, advanced by Molina, is that God can have certain and definite knowledge of what is uncertain and indefinite in itself (i.e. future conditionals and the counterfactual states of affairs they pick out) because of the supereminence of God’s comprehension.¹²⁶ This view is appropriately called ‘supercomprehension’ in the later literature. As Normore points out, Molina thus locates the basis for God’s knowledge of future conditionals not “on the side of the known,” such as in a definite property (*habitus*) belonging to the possible free agent (although he does maintain that what God supercomprehends are possible creaturely faculties of free choice) or in a definite truth value belonging to the future conditional that picks out what the possible

122 See Trenton Merricks, *Truth and Ontology* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007), xiii.

123 Craig, *Divine Foreknowledge*, 263.

124 See Craig, *Divine Foreknowledge*, 261–63; cf. Flint, *Divine Providence* 150–51. This line of defense seems to limit the notion of causality to efficient causation. The possibility of logical causation or that logical causation, if there were such a thing, is problematic, is not discussed.

125 See, for example, Flint, *Divine Providence*, 121–176.

126 See Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, 193–98.

free agent would do in given circumstances, but instead in the perfection of the divine intellect.¹²⁷ Molina makes no further attempt to explain *how* God knows, but claims this is a mystery.

However, while divine incomprehensibility surely renders how God knows mysterious, Molina's view that God supercomprehends possible created faculties of free choice fails to address Báñez's concern. Báñez's concern is not that possible created faculties of free choice are beyond God's ken (such that if God only had a more powerful intellect, he could know them), but rather that they are *in se* unknowable because they do not exist. The point is, however God knows, there must be an object for God to know. But the existence of a corresponding object is precisely what middle knowledge lacks. Note moreover that the sort of knowledge in question is not God's 'practical knowledge' of creatures, the knowledge that is a principle of their coming to be.¹²⁸ Rather, the sort of knowledge in question is a kind of divine speculative knowing—a knowledge of what, in some respect is *given*, not made to be the way it is by God. Molina, therefore, does not provide a cogent account of how God can have middle knowledge.

Supercomprehension was rejected not only by Molina's opponents, such as Báñez, but also by his confrere, Francisco Suárez.¹²⁹ Accordingly, Suárez offers an alternative, second line of argument in support of the view that God can know future conditionals despite the non-existence of the states of affairs they pick out.¹³⁰ On Suárez's view, the law of excluded middle—that of a pair of contradictory propositions one must necessarily be true and the other false—requires that one member of each pair of opposed future conditionals be true.¹³¹ Using the example employed above, this means that either (1) or the alternative:

(2) If Peter were offered the job tomorrow, he would not take it.

must be true. If one of these propositions is true, then God must necessarily know it, assuming that God knows all truths.

127 Normore, 380.

128 See ST I q. 14 a. 8.

129 See Suárez, *De gratia, Opera omnia* v. 7, ed. Carolo Berton (Paris: Vives, 1857) prol. 2 c. 7 n. 24 (95) as cited by Adams, 110.

130 See Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, 219–33.

131 For representations of this basic position (with references to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VI and *On Interpretation* VIII concerning the lack of a medium between truth and falsity), see Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §4 (63b); d. 13 §1 (111b–112b).

However, as Alvarez points out, the law of excluded middle—which is entailed by the law of contradiction—does not apply to pairs of future conditionals opposed in the way that (1) and (2) are because (1) and (2) are not contradictories.¹³² In order to obtain the contradictory of a future conditional, it is necessary to negate the entire proposition, not only its consequent. (1) and (2) share the same antecedent. Thus, the opposite of (1) is not (2), but:

(3) It is not the case that if Peter were offered the job tomorrow, he would take it.

However, does the difference between (2) and (3) amount to anything significant, or is Alvarez just playing a semantic game? The answer is that the difference is significant, for if there is nothing to ground the truth of future conditionals (given Molina's suppositions about human freedom and divine causality), then one can say that all such future conditionals, including (1) and (2) are false.¹³³ But if (1) is false, then its negation, (3), is necessarily true. This shows it is possible to affirm the law of excluded middle without being also compelled to affirm the truth of counterfactuals, as Suárez thinks.

A third line of argument, advanced by Freddoso and Craig, draws a parallel between God's knowledge of future contingents (which concern the actual future) and his knowledge of future conditionals (which concern the hypothetical future).

This third line of argumentation supposes what has been customarily called an 'A-theory' or 'presentist' view of time. According to the A-theory of time, only the present is fully real and the distinctions between past, present and future are objective and mind-independent.¹³⁴ According to A-theory, the future is not yet and remains indeterminate, and the past is no more and remains determinate. The contrast to A-theory is a 'B-theory' or 'eternalist' view of time. This is the view that past, present and future are ontologically on a par and that the distinctions between them are subjective and mind-dependent (the 'Boethian

¹³² See Alvarez, *De aux.* II d. 7 §30 (86a), noted by Adams, 110.

¹³³ For a helpful clarification of this matter, see the 'square of opposition' and the accompanying explanation in the introduction written by Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, Roelf T. te Velde and Marinus A. Schouten to *Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 34. As these authors explain, contradictories cannot both be true or both false, whereas contraries cannot both be true, but they can be both false.

¹³⁴ On A-theory and B-theory, see J.M.E. McTaggart's classic article, "Time," in *The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Richard M. Gale (London: Macmillan, 1968), 86–97. See also Grant, "The Grounding Objection," 309–10.

observer' view of *ST* I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3, at least as this passage has been widely interpreted). On B-theory, the difference between past, present and future is not a matter of existence, but perspective. The future and past are as real as the present.

According to this third line of argumentation, if future conditionals cannot be true because of the non-existence of the states of affairs they pick out, then actual future contingents cannot be true either since (on an A-theory of time) the actual future does not exist. The thought is that if the grounding objection holds good against the truth of future conditionals, it must also hold good against the truth of actual future contingents.¹³⁵ This argument draws its force from the unacceptable consequences of denying the truth of future contingents. According to Craig, these consequences include abandoning divine foreknowledge as well as such basic rules of logic as the principle of bivalence (that every proposition is necessarily either true or false), the principle of contradiction (that a proposition and its contradictory cannot both be true or false at the same time) and the law of excluded middle (mentioned above). It is clear enough why the truth of future contingents is required for divine foreknowledge. The reason why Craig thinks denying the truth of future contingents also requires one to abandon the aforementioned rules of logic is that according to these rules, contradictories like

(4) Peter will accept the job offer tomorrow.

and

(5) Peter will not accept the job offer tomorrow.

must either be true or false. Moreover, whichever is false, the other must necessarily be true (thus, one cannot deny the truth of both on account of the non-reality of the future).

In my estimation, Matthews Grant has offered a cogent reply to this third line of argumentation.¹³⁶ While it is not my intention to represent Grant's response in detail here, the basic outline of Grant's view is significant for the present discussion. First, Grant shows us that the line of argument advanced by Freddoso and Craig relies upon an A-theory of time. If one adopts a

¹³⁵ See for example, Freddoso, "Introduction," in Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge*, 68–81.

¹³⁶ See Grant, "Counterfactuals," 312–323.

B-theory of time, the sorts of logical infelicities Craig mentions do not arise.¹³⁷ With respect to Craig's concern about divine foreknowledge, Grant points out "either of the two main accounts of divine foreknowledge would enable us to explain what grounds future contingents."¹³⁸ On the first account (which is generally thought to assume a B-theory of time), God knows the future in a speculative mode because what is future to us is present to God's eternal gaze. Divine eternity and the actual existence of the future therefore, account for God's knowledge of the future. On the second account, God knows the future in a practical mode as its cause. On this account, God knows the future (even the contingent future) in knowing his own creative will, because the designs of his will are infallibly realized (and significantly, for Aquinas, God causes both the necessary and the contingent, so his willing some effect does not foreclose that effect's being contingent; rather, contingency just is an aspect of the entire effect God wills).¹³⁹

137 There may, however, be cogent reasons for preferring an A-theory. Still, Grant's reply to Craig shows how the grounding objection can be upheld even on an A-theory of time.

138 Grant, "Counterfactuals," 311.

139 This is basically Alvarez's position also (though Grant and Goris do not share Alvarez's commitment to physical predetermination). For Alvarez, future contingents are not determinately true or false logically prior (i.e. *in signo rationis*, or *in signo cognito*) to God's predetermining decree. See *De aux.* 11 d. 7 §§13, 31 (72b, 86a–b); d. 13 §§2–4 (114a–b, 116b). Crucially, the motivation for his position is a commitment to the primacy of *esse* and specifically the dependence of truth on *esse*. In *De aux.* 11 d. 13 §3 (114b), Alvarez argues, "future things do not have determinate entity in logical precedence to God's act of will {*in signo rationis*}, nor [do they have determinate entity] in themselves, because neither are they are understood to exist in eternity, for such existence depends intrinsically on the decree of the divine will... nor do they have determinate *esse* in their causes, for in that logical precedence to God's act of will, [those causes] are not yet understood to have been determined by the first cause to the production of whatever is going to be. Therefore, in that logical precedence to God's act of will [future things] have *no* determinate truth if they are considered as future, *because what does not have determinate entity does not have determinate truth* {*In illo priori signo rationis futura non habent determinatam entitatem, neque in seipsis, quia non intelliguntur existere etiam in æternitate: nam talis existentia intrinsece dependet ex decreto diuinæ voluntatis... nec habent determinatum esse in suis causis: nam in illo priori nondum intelligitur determinata prima causa ad productionem alicuius futuri: ergo in illo priori nullam habent determinatam veritatem, si considerentur, ut futura; quia quod non habet determinatam entitatem, non habet determinatam veritatem*} (emphasis in translation mine). Note though that while Alvarez does not think future contingents are determinately true or false *logically prior* (or prior by a priority of nature) to God's decree, he apparently thinks there is scope for saying that future contingents are determinately true or false *temporally prior* to their occurrence. See *De aux.* 11 d. 13 §3 (116). However, I do not think this necessarily commits him to a 'B-series' or 'eternalist' view of time. Presumably Alvarez's position is grounded

With respect to Craig's concerns about the principle of bivalence and the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, Grant follows Harm Goris's cogent reading of Aquinas on Aristotle's *De interpretatione* 9, which concerns the truth values of future contingents such as the following:

(6) The sea battle will take place tomorrow.

and

(7) The sea battle will not take place tomorrow.¹⁴⁰

According to Goris's reading of Aquinas, bivalence and excluded middle do hold for future contingents, but a future contingent does not have a *determinate* truth value until the time of the state of affairs it picks out.¹⁴¹ Thus, (6) and (7) are not determinately true or false today. Nevertheless, one is not forced to reject bivalence because one can still say that bivalence holds good over the following disjunction as a whole:

(8) Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea battle tomorrow.

On this interpretation, each side of the disjunction can be nothing other than true or false (such as a third truth value between truth and falsity), but which side has which truth value is not settled until tomorrow, when the sea battle either does or does not occur, thus fulfilling or failing to fulfill the truth conditions of (6).¹⁴² As Grant indicates, one is not forced to give up the principle of bivalence on the above reading of Aquinas, but only a *truth-functional*

simply in *divine* eternity (not the eternity of what happens in time): God *now* knows for certain (understanding 'now' of God's knowledge as a relational predication) what *will* be because he is present to the future's actual obtaining (which in reality, is not yet, even though God 'now' is 'then'). For Alvarez, if propositions about the future were determinately true or false *in priori signo rationis* (logically prior to the divine decree), contingency in the created order (including human free choice) would be eradicated. See *De aux.* II d. 13 §3 (115a).

140 See especially Aristotle, *De interpretatione* IX (18a 30–19b 5). See also Aquinas, *On Interpretation*, trans. Jean T. Oesterle, Medieval Texts in Translation no. 11 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962) I. 15 (and the related discussions in I.13–14).

141 See Goris, 232–33.

142 Relatedly, Alvarez points out that bivalence does not require abstract determinate truth or falsity, but rather simply excludes both contradictories' being simultaneously true, or simultaneously false. See *De aux.* II d. 13 §§3–4 (116a).

interpretation of that principle. Grant goes on to argue that a non truth-functional interpretation of bivalence does better justice to our intuitions supporting that principle, which “have more to do with our grasp of being than the requirements of a formal, truth-functional semantics [note omitted]” and moreover, that no disastrous consequences result from rejecting a truth-functional interpretation of that principle.¹⁴³ The upshot of Grant’s reply to Craig is that the attempt to save middle knowledge by drawing a parallel between the truth of future conditionals and the truth of future contingents is no more successful than the attempts of Molina and Suárez, explored above.

4.6 *Concluding Remarks on Báñez’s Critique of Middle Knowledge*

Middle knowledge is the key, on Molina’s account, to the reconciliation of human free choice with God’s infallible foreknowledge and irresistible will. Middle knowledge is a type of divine *scientia* that falls conceptually between the two categories of divine knowledge commonly recognized in Molina’s day: simple knowledge and knowledge of vision. Simple knowledge is God’s natural knowledge of his own essence, in which he grasps all logical possibilities prior to his decision to create. Since simple knowledge is God’s prevolitional self-knowledge, it cannot be other than it is. Knowledge of vision is God’s knowledge of the world as it actually exists. Accordingly, knowledge of vision presupposes God’s act of creation and is contingent. Middle knowledge is prevolitional like God’s simple knowledge, but contingent like God’s knowledge of vision. What God knows by his middle knowledge are the conditionally future free choices the persons he could create would make in any of the circumstances in which God could place them. In other words, by his middle knowledge, God knows propositions of the form, *If person P were in complete, nondetermining circumstances, C at time t, he would freely perform action A*. Because God creates in light of such middle knowledge, he maintains providential control over what happens in the world down to the minutest detail. Nevertheless, God does not predetermine the free choices of his creatures.

Báñez objects to middle knowledge for several reasons. The most basic of these reasons is that there is no way for future conditionals to be certain and infallible—that is, true—on Molina’s system. Báñez considers four possible avenues for grounding the truth of future conditionals, but claims that each of these avenues is ruled out on Molina’s view.

143 Grant, 313; see also 312–316. Grant notes that Aristotle grounds the principle of contradiction in the nature of being: The same thing cannot both be and not be (at the same time in the same way), (*Metaphysics* 1005b–1006a).

First, Báñez argues that the truth of future conditionals cannot arise from what is actually future because future conditionals are not about the actual future, but the conditional future. Accordingly, God cannot know future conditionals by virtue of his eternity.

Second, Báñez argues that the truth of future conditionals cannot be grounded in the divine will because middle knowledge is prevolitional. Since middle knowledge does not suppose God's will to create, God cannot have middle knowledge in knowing the decisions of his own will. Moreover, on Molina's view of free choice, God does not cause the free decisions of creatures. Therefore, God cannot know those decisions in knowing his own will.

Third, Báñez argues that the truth of future conditionals cannot arise 'by force of the consequence'. To say that a future conditional is true 'by force of the consequence' is to say that it is true because the consequent of that conditional positively follows from the antecedent by some type of logical necessity. Since, on Molina's view, free choices cannot be necessitated by their antecedents, a future conditional cannot be true in virtue of a necessary relationship between *prosthesis* and *apodosis*.

Fourth, Báñez argues that the truth of future conditionals cannot arise from knowledge of the proximate cause. On the surface, this is because a free creature is not determined to choose as it does by its respective nature, but rather is naturally indeterminate. Nevertheless, Molina conceives of middle knowledge as God's supereminent comprehension of creaturely faculties of free choice and Suárez speaks of a *sui generis* property of individual essences (a *habitus*) by which God knows the conditionally future free decisions of those individual essences. In other words, Molina and Suárez think God knows future conditionals precisely in knowing the proximate causes whose acts those future conditionals are about. Crucially, for Molina and Suárez, to know the proximate cause just is to know the choices it would make; the nature of the proximate cause does not determine its free choices. But the problem is this: If the proximate causes and their free acts do not exist, what grounds the truth of future contingents? Molina's appeal to supercomprehension fails to address how God can know something that is *in se* unknowable. Suárez's appeal to the principle of bivalence fails because pairs of future conditionals with opposed consequents are not contradictories if their antecedents are shared. Appeals to a parallel between the truth of future contingents and the truth of future conditionals fail because of the significant disanalogies between the two kinds of propositions: Actual future contingents are grounded in the actual future. One need not surrender bivalence (or the laws of contradiction or excluded middle) in order to maintain that propositions about future contingent states of affairs are not *determinately* true or false until the relevant

time comes for their truth conditions to be fulfilled. Also, it is possible to appeal to divine eternity and/or God's causation of the actual future to account for his knowledge of it. Neither of these avenues helps to explain middle knowledge.

Perhaps the most significant problem with middle knowledge is one closely linked to the central problem with Molina's account of free choice, which middle knowledge is deployed to support: according to Molina, God's knowledge is conditioned by contingent, yet determinate factors (would-be creaturely free choices) prior to his decision to create. As Báñez and Alvarez point out, an inadvertence to the full implications of the doctrine of creation is a flaw fatal to Molina's system. The real difficulty with middle knowledge (as with Molina's doctrine of free choice) is how anything contingent can obtain prior to creation. To the extent Molina fails to provide a convincing answer to this question, he is unable to account for the truth of future conditionals. Since Molina can give no convincing account of what makes future conditionals true, his theory of middle knowledge should be abandoned, as Báñez argues.

Appendix: Do the Limitations of Correspondence-Type Truth Theories Undermine the Grounding Objection?

Part 4, 5.2 above considered three possible ways of accounting for the truth of counterfactuals of human freedom. There is, additionally, a fourth way someone might try to save the truth of such counterfactuals while assuming a Molinist idea of human free choice, despite the non-existence of the human actions those counterfactuals concern. The move is to deny that counterfactuals need to be grounded in anything existent to be true. I will consider this possibility here as an appendix to the foregoing discussion due to the greater amount of attention it requires relative to the three arguments considered above and, at the same time, the necessarily limited amount of attention that can be devoted to it even here, relative to what a full treatment of the subject demands.

1 The Position of Trenton Merricks

Trenton Merricks has developed a critique of correspondence-type theories of truth that is worthy of serious consideration.¹⁴⁴ Merricks objects to the idea

¹⁴⁴ See Trenton Merricks, *Truth and Ontology* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007).

that truth, globally, is grounded in being substantively—that is, in any more than what he calls a “trivial” way. For Merricks, truth depends on being *substantively* when the truth of a truth-bearer is caused by the positive existence of something (what the truth is properly about), whereas truth depends on being only *trivially* insofar as a truth-bearer picks out what is so. Merricks is committed to realism and so maintains that truth, broadly speaking, is a kind of correspondence of truth-bearers to what is so. But his point is that what ‘is so’ is not necessarily an entity or complex of entities. So truth does not *globally* depend on the positive existence of some entity, though Merricks acknowledges that some truths do, such as

(9) There are carrots in the garden.

The proposition expressed by (9) is true just in case there *are* carrots in the garden. But not all truths are relevantly like (9). Consider four such counterexamples:

(10) There are no carrots in the garden.

(11) Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January 1863.

(12) The next Pope will be African.

(13) If I placed page 159 of this book into the fire, it would burn.

Merricks argues that negative existentials like (10) are not made true by the existence of anything because such propositions are not *about* the positive existence of anything. Rather, negative existentials like (10) are about what is not and so are made true precisely by something's *not* being.¹⁴⁵

Propositions about the past and future, such as those expressed by (11) and (12) are also not made true by the existence of anything, at least as long as presentism (or an ‘A-theory’ of time) is assumed, for the past is no more and the future is not yet.¹⁴⁶ Presently, (11) and (12) are true, but (11) and (12) are not *about* anything that actually now is. Consequently, (11) and (12), while now true, are not now made true by the positive existence of anything.¹⁴⁷

145 See Merricks, Ch. 3 (39–67). See also the discussion of negative existentials in Ch. 4 and Merricks's rejection of truth-supervenience (80–97).

146 Of course, if one assumed eternalism (a ‘B-theory’ of time, above), one would have a ready reply to this objection. But Merricks—rightly, I think—considers eternalism too high a price to pay to save correspondence.

147 See Merricks, Ch. 6 (119–45).

The truth of dispositional conditionals, like (13) is also putatively not necessitated by the existence of anything. It might initially seem to be, however. It might seem that the truth of (13) is necessitated by the physical characteristics of paper (specifically, page 159) and combustion. But the physical characteristics of paper and combustion do not establish the truth of (13), for the intervention of other causal factors could block (13) from being true, even if paper and fire retain their physical properties and I place page 159 into the fire. Side-stepping the hypothetical examples that Merricks considers of wizards inducing “finkish dispositions” in things, consider the OT examples of the burning bush (Ex 3.2) and Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego (Dn 3.19ff.). One would expect conditionals such as the following:

(14) If a bush were set on fire, it would be consumed.

and

(15) If a man were cast into the flames of a superheated furnace, the flames would harm his body.

to be true. But assuming the veracity of the plain sense of Ex 3.2 and Dn 3.19ff., (14) and (15) are not true (at least not universally), simply on account of the dispositions or natures of bushes, human bodies and fire, for they are falsified by the biblical counterexamples.¹⁴⁸ The truth of dispositional conditionals like (13), (14) and (15) thus depends on more than the natural dispositions of

¹⁴⁸ One might argue that there is no reason to take the examples of the burning bush or Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego any more seriously than the standard examples Merricks considers of wizards inducing ‘finkish dispositions’ in things like stemware. For one might argue that there simply *are* no wizards, and the only causes there are are those found in nature. As will be argued below, it is correct to think that the truth of dispositional conditionals is (at least partly) grounded in the real natures of things. And it must also be borne in mind that dispositional conditionals which seem true at first may turn out false because the real natures of things overflow with ‘hidden necessities’ that outstrip our unavoidably limited (and ever expanding) knowledge of those things. Thus, conditionals like *If the West Gate Bridge were subjected to expected wind conditions, it would collapse* seemed false until that bridge actually collapsed and certain hidden necessities of steel—namely, lamination due to “locked-in stresses”—became known (see Ross, *Thought and World*, 17). However, the wizard examples are, of course, a heuristic device. Moreover, even if there are no wizards, it begs the question to rule out supernatural causation (and thus the biblical examples, at least) as *de re* impossible, for supernatural causation as such does not purport to be a feature of the natural order. The rejection

the things they concern: Every dispositional conditional also entails a negative existential (namely, one that picks out the non-existence of contravening factors, whether wizards and finkish dispositions, or God and angels).¹⁴⁹ As shown above, negative existentials are not true in virtue of the existence of anything. By extension then, a dispositional conditional cannot be true simply in virtue of the existence of the natures or dispositions of the items the dispositional conditional concerns. Moreover, Merricks argues that one should not expect dispositional conditionals to be made true by the existing dispositions of the things they concern, because dispositional conditionals are, after all, not strictly *about* the way things are, but the way things *would* be if certain conditions obtained (and it is only reasonable to think a truth-bearer is made true by what it is *about*, not something else).¹⁵⁰

Finally, besides the six examples of putatively groundless truths considered above, consider counterfactuals of human freedom, such as:

- (1) If Peter were offered the job tomorrow, he would freely accept it.

Merricks thinks that counterfactuals like (1) are also not grounded in any positive entity or state of affairs.¹⁵¹ Why think such propositions are true at all then? The answer is, for the reasons that motivate Molinism, namely, a non-deterministic view of human freedom and a strong account of divine providence.¹⁵²

of supernatural causality must rely on controversial assumptions, namely, the falsity of creation and the truth of naturalism.

149 See Merricks, 159ff., esp. 164–65.

150 See Merricks, 165.

151 See Merricks, 146–55. More recently, Merricks has further explored the implications of his stance on truth for the grounding objection. See his “Truth and Freedom” *Philosophical Review* 118, no. 1 (2009): 29–58 and “Foreknowledge and Freedom” *Philosophical Review* 120, no. 4 (2011): 567–86.

152 Merricks also treats counterfactuals of determined action, though discussion of that point is omitted here for the sake of brevity. Additionally, Merricks gives careful consideration to de re modal truths. See his Ch. 5 (98–118). But if I have understood him, his move here is *not* to argue that de re modal truths are not grounded in the being of things, but rather to argue that standard contemporary construals of the view that truth depends substantively on being are *inconsistent* when it comes to their handling of de re modal truths. (This is worth pointing out because it could be missed. See, for example, the otherwise fine and helpful reviews by Ben Caplan, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* <<https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23355-truth-and-ontology/>> [16 Feb 2008], which is ambiguous on this point, and that by Ross Cameron, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 58, no. 232 [2008]: 544–46, which seems to miss it entirely.) For, those who think truth depends on being in more

2 Does Merricks's Position Undercut the Grounding Objection?

The grounding objection to middle knowledge only makes sense if one assumes some type of relational or correspondence theory of truth, at least for counterfactuals of human freedom. This is an alleged liability of the grounding objection. As the foregoing discussion has shown, there are putatively many kinds of truths (besides true counterfactuals of human freedom) that do not depend on being in a more-than-trivial way. Therefore, correspondence (in all its various permutations) must be rejected as a *theory* of truth, for theories must account for their explananda globally. Because one cannot universally maintain that propositions (or acts of judgment) need to be grounded in what positively is to be true, the burden of showing why counterfactuals of human freedom are among the truths requiring a grounding in the actual is shifted on to proponents of the grounding objection, and it may even be the case that Merricks's thesis undermines the grounding objection altogether. Thus, while Merricks's express aim is not to subvert the grounding objection (or broadly, to deal with questions of creation, providence and human freedom), his book does have significant and direct ramifications for the evaluation of middle knowledge and Báñez's argument against it.

While a decisive assessment of Merricks's position would require a degree of attention that would range beyond the limits of this appendix, my concern is whether Merricks's critique of correspondence-type truth theories blocks Báñez's grounding objection to middle knowledge. I think it does not—at least not decisively.¹⁵³ Here I will explain why.

than a trivial way should think that de re modal truths are true in virtue of the actual de re modal properties of things. But instead, standard accounts attempt to reduce de re modality to the truth of propositions (committing a vicious regress, for in virtue of *what* are such propositions true?) or to *abstracta*, or they reify merely possible worlds. These moves are diametrically opposed to the core intuition behind truthmaker-type theories. If I have understood, Merricks thinks there are de re modal properties and that de re modal propositions depend for their truth on the real, existing modal properties of things. While Merricks rejects the idea that truth globally depends on being in a more-than-trivial way, he does not reject the idea that some truths so depend, and de re modal truths are an example of one such kind of substantively being-dependent truth. Merricks point seems to be simply that one does not need to commit to all the problematic baggage of truthmaker-type theories to have de re modality.

153 I admit however, that it poses a strong and interesting challenge to Báñez.

2.1 *Aquinas's adequatio is not a Correspondence Theory in the Modern Sense*

First, the idea of truth Báñez assumes is that which Aquinas attributes to Isaac Israeli (855–955): Truth is the *adequatio intellectus et rei*.¹⁵⁴ But the idea that truth is an analogous making-commensurate of intellect and thing is not, in every respect, a correspondence theory of truth in the modern sense—the sort of theory Merricks's arguments target. This is not to deny that there are any relevant similarities between Aquinas or Báñez and modern correspondence theorists, or to deny that in that some broad sense, Aquinas and Báñez hold what may be called a kind of 'correspondence' theory. But to claim that 'true' {verum} and 'being' {ens} are convertible in reality and that truth is the making commensurate of intellect and thing is not precisely the same as claiming, for example, that 'facts' correspond to sentence parts. Consequently, Aquinas's notion of truth (which is probably assumed not only by Báñez, but Molina and Suárez as well) may not have all of the same liabilities as a modern conception of correspondence. While Merricks's argument, which is directed at shortcomings in correspondence theories formulated over the last century, may also be decisive against the view of truth Báñez's criticism of middle knowledge supposes, it is moving too fast to assume that Merricks's position is decisive in this way. The notion that truth is an *adequatio intellectus et rei* may have a versatility that allows it to accommodate at least some of Merricks's counterexamples without sacrificing the idea that truth—at least of speculative thinking—depends on what is.¹⁵⁵

2.2 *De-motivating the Idea there are Groundless Counterfactuals of Human Freedom*

Second, the motivation for including counterfactuals of human freedom among the sorts of truths that do not depend in any substantive way on being stems from the following two commitments: First, the idea that free choices as such

154 The authenticity of this attribution is often called into question. But for an opposite view, note Lawrence Dewan's comment, "Is Truth a Transcendental for St. Thomas Aquinas?" *Nova et Vetera* 2 no. 1 (2004): 5 n. 6. For Báñez's stance on truth, see *Sch. com. in ST I* qq. 16–17 (228a–235b).

155 Moreover, as suggested above, I am not aware of any reason to think Molina, Suárez or any sixteenth-century proponent of the Jesuit position thought of truth as anything besides an *adequatio intellectus et rei*, or rejected the convertibility of *ens* and *verum*. Thus, if Báñez's objection supposes a theory of truth his opponents would accept, that objection seems to have traction at least within the parameters of the *de Auxiliis* debate.

are not determined by any antecedent or concomitant condition other than the free choice itself, and second, the idea that divine providence is universal in scope and efficacious. Therefore, if it were possible to show how these two commitments could be upheld without recourse to middle knowledge, then the view that there are groundless counterfactuals of human freedom would, in the absence of independent reasons for it, be unmotivated, even if there are other kinds of groundless truths. As I hope to show in the final two chapters of this study, there is a way to do justice to libertarian concerns while affirming a strong (traditional) notion of divine providence without having recourse to middle knowledge.

2.3 *Reasons to Doubt that there are Any Speculative Truths not Grounded in the Being of Things*

Third, there is a real question as to whether there are any truths—at least truths of speculative knowledge—that do not depend on the being of things. Merricks's thesis is not uncontroversial, and at least *prima facie*, it appears possible to understand negative existentials, propositions about the past and future and dispositional conditionals as grounded in the being of things.

2.3.1 Negative Existentials

Negative existentials, rather than being understood as propositions, can be more precisely understood as the denial of propositions that are false because the states of affairs they pick out fail to obtain.¹⁵⁶ According to this perspective, (9) and (10) are not two different propositions, but two different expressions of the same proposition, namely, the proposition that picks out the state of affairs of there being carrots in the garden. Sentence (9) differs from (10) insofar as (9) asserts the proposition while (10) denies it. Strictly speaking, assertion and denial are not propositions, but human acts with respect to propositions. Accordingly, assertion and denial are not strictly true or false, but right or wrong. A proposition is rightly asserted if the state of affairs it picks out obtains, and it is wrongly asserted (and rightly denied) if the state of affairs it picks out fails to obtain. The important point is that a proposition's direct or principal truth condition is the positive obtaining of the state of affairs the proposition picks out (and so the existence of the *things* the proposition is about, which constitute that state).¹⁵⁷ Merricks is right to think that no existing

¹⁵⁶ For a more developed articulation of this view, see Grisez, *God?* 43–46.

¹⁵⁷ This view accommodates the reality that to 'be' can be radically different for different sorts of reality (even within the created order, not only across the created and uncreated). Accordingly, while (at least speculative) truth depends on what is, truth conditions can

thing makes it right to hold (10). But the rightness of the denial (10) expresses is derivative from the falsity of the proposition it denies—a proposition that is false just in case there are no carrots in the garden. Truth depends on being; falsity depends on non-being. Thus, it seems possible to meet Merricks's driving concern—the evident wrongness of the idea that something's positive existence makes (10) right—without abandoning the notion that speculative truth depends on what is in more than a trivial way.¹⁵⁸

2.3.2 Propositions about the Past and Future

What is true of negative and positive existentials is true also, *mutatis mutandis*, of propositions about the past and future. Propositions expressed by sentences about the past or future, such as (11) and (12) are not made true by the present existence of anything. However, the truth of propositions such as those expressed by (11) and (12) does depend on the positive obtaining of the states of affairs they are about, which are time-indexed. This is not a requirement that the states of affairs such propositions pick out *now* obtain (when *now* is a different time than that specified for the state of affairs in question), but

differ radically with analogous senses of 'being' depending on the sort of truth in question. For example, the states of affairs formal or cultural or technical truths variously pick out exist or 'obtain' in quite different ways from, say, the states of affairs picked out by truths about physical objects (carrots in the garden is a very different sort of being than that which $2+2=4$, a touchdown, the way to weld—or, for that matter, a proposition—enjoys). On this point, see Grisez's discussion of four irreducible orders of reality—an idea he finds incipient in Aquinas and which he develops somewhat further: Grisez, "Sketch of a Future Metaphysics," *New Scholasticism* 38, no. 3 (1964): 310–340; cf. *God*, Ch. 14 (230–240). A complementary idea seems to be in play in Ross' metaphysics. See for example his, *Thought and World*, 3–5, 7–8, 12.

¹⁵⁸ This view supposes that propositions are not linguistic entities, and so are distinguished from their linguistic expression (in sentence form, for instance). To deny that propositions are linguistic entities is not to completely abstract judgment from language in general—to say, for instance, that propositions can be formed in thought in a completely extra-linguistic way, without even 'mental words'. Rather, it is simply to do justice to the fact that a proposition cannot simply be its linguistic expression, but must be something 'behind' that expression in thought, for the same proposition—the same judgmental thought content—can be expressed in different languages or various ways in the same language (see Grisez, *God?* 40–42). On Merricks's view, it could be that propositions are taken to be linguistic entities, so that (9) and (10) are propositions (and so primary truth bearers) or it may be that sentences, like (9) and (10) (as opposed to propositions) are primary truth bearers. Whatever the case may be, so long as it is reasonable to adopt the view of propositions here, it does not seem necessary to think negative existentials are groundless truths.

only that the states of affairs obtain *at the time designated* by their respective propositions.¹⁵⁹ To the extent a proposition is not about the present, one should not expect the present existence of anything to verify the proposition. But it is still the case that the proposition requires the obtaining of the state of affairs it is about to be true. Thus, while Merricks is right to object to the demand that only something presently existing can fulfill the truth conditions for sentences like (11) or (12), this does not mean that propositions about the past or future are true apart from the positive *time-indexed* existence of what they are about. Thus, I am hesitant to agree that such propositions depend on being in only a trivial way.

2.3.3 Dispositional Conditionals

Somewhat like propositions concerning *de re* modality, the truth of dispositional conditionals, such as those expressed by (13), (14) and (15) is grounded to a large extent in the formal structures of matter, the real natures of things. However, Merricks argues that the natures or properties of things are not what dispositional conditionals are *about*. Rather, such propositions are properly about how a given thing *would* be under stipulated circumstances. Merricks's point concerning 'aboutness' is important: It is true that even if (13) is chiefly about the physical features of page 159, it is not about every one of its physical features (such as the paper's having been manufactured at a mill in Guardbridge along the River Eden), and accordingly, not every feature of the paper is relevant to the truth of (13). Moreover, the truth of (13) depends on more than the physics of combustion and the real natures of page 159's constituent materials: Combustion-prohibiting factors must not also intervene.

Nevertheless, it seems impossible to understand how (13) could be true apart from reference to the way page 159 and fire *are*. Does the subjunctive, contingent nature of dispositional conditionals really make them any less about or grounded in the real natures of things than claims about real possibility and necessity (which, if I have understood, Merricks takes to be grounded in the *de re* modal properties or real natures of things)? The intelligibility of a dispositional conditional (or at least the intelligibility of its verification) seems to rely upon its reduction to a judgment about the ways specified things *are*

159 Propositions about the past are determinately true or determinately false depending on whether the states of affairs they pick out obtained at the specified times. Following the discussion of bivalence and the truth of counterfactuals in the chapter above, propositions about the future, such as those expressed by (12), are (in the past and present) either true-or-false, but are not determinately true or determinately false precisely because the relevant state of affairs have not yet obtained.

in terms of their formal structure (and so their potentialities), plus a negative existential that rules out factors that would cancel expected outcomes. But as the above discussion of (10) showed, negative existentials are not a counterexample to the dependence of speculative truth on being. So, that dispositional conditionals entail negative existentials does not mean that the truth of a dispositional conditional depends no more than trivially on the being of things. The right denial of contravening factors (which a negative existential expresses) assumes the *falsity* of propositions that pick out the existence of those contravening factors, and while truth depends on being, falsity does not.

2.3.4 Practical Truths

There is at least one other particularly good candidate for making the case Merricks wants to make, though he does not develop his argument in this direction.¹⁶⁰ Consider the following:

(16) Friendship is a good to be pursued and promoted.

It might be argued that practical truths, as propositions that are not properly about what *is* but about what *is to be* are not true by virtue of correspondence with any given reality, but rather by correspondence with what is brought into being *through* practical knowledge.¹⁶¹ One might wonder whether this lends support to the case against the idea that truth depends on being, and so indirectly to the case against Báñez's objection to middle knowledge.

A few points can be made in response.

The first is that even granting that practical propositions are not made true by correspondence with the given being of things, the sheer difference between the *kinds* of truth in question (practical truths and true counterfactuals of human freedom) prevents an appeal to the 'truthmaking' of practical propositions from undercutting the force of the grounding objection. For middle knowledge is not a productive principle of what God knows by his middle knowledge. While counterfactuals of human freedom and propositions

160 Merricks is, however, aware of the possibility of developing his argument in this direction: See 167 n. 11. In a different but related vein, Merricks also considers a truth of the cultural/technical order (see 112).

161 See Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends," *The American Journal of Jurisprudence* 32 (1987): 115–117. Cf. Aquinas's discussion of knowledge as a productive principle of things in *ST* I q. 14 a. 8 together with his discussion of the *adequatio* of an intellect to a thing which depends essentially on that intellect (*ST* I q. 16 a. 1).

such as those expressed by (9) to (15) above are clearly different kinds of truths with different kinds of truth conditions, all have this in common: They are not practical, but speculative in nature. They do not bring into being what they are about, but regard being that, whether actual or potential, is in some sense given, relative to the knowing. In light of this difference, one should not expect the truth conditions for propositions like those expressed by (16) to be fulfilled in the same sort of way as for (9) to (15), even granting differences between the ways (9) to (15) are true.

Moreover, there are at least two ways one can even look to existing reality to discover the intelligibility of the truth of propositions like (16). In this way, there is an analogy between the truth of practical propositions and the truth of speculative.¹⁶² While practical propositions are not about what is, but what is to be, what is to be for human persons is based in and conditioned by human nature *as it is*.¹⁶³ Certain things are fulfilling for human persons (and so are to be done and pursued) because of what human persons are. Additionally, if one assumes Aquinas's view of natural law as the rational creature's cognitive tapping-in to God's paternal wisdom ordering the created *οικονομία*, then the truth of propositions like those expressed by (16) also entail the conformity of the human intellect in which those propositions have their being to the divine intellect.¹⁶⁴

2.4 Reasons to Prefer Báñez's Understanding of Truth

If negative existentials, propositions about the past and future, and dispositional conditionals can all be understood in the ways proposed above, it casts doubt on the prospects for a rebuttal of the grounding objection that is based on the idea that there are speculative truths which are not grounded in the real

¹⁶² See Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, "Practical Principles," 117.

¹⁶³ See Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, "Practical Principles," 111, 113–115. See also Robert George, *In Defense of Natural Law* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 85; Rufus Black, *Christian Moral Realism: Natural Law, Narrative, Virtue and the Gospel* (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 48–58; and my earlier piece, "'Is', 'Ought' and Moral Realism: The Roles of Nature and Experience in Practical Understanding," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 24, no. 3 (2011): 311–28.

¹⁶⁴ See Grisez, Boyle and Finnis, "Practical Principles," 117. For Aquinas, "*lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura*: the natural law is nothing else than a certain participation of the eternal law in the rational creature" (*ST* 1–II q. 91 a. 2 c.), and the eternal law is nothing else than divine providence—the *ratio* of the order of things to their end. Natural law then, is created persons' share, as rational, in God's providence. It is also worth noting that for Aquinas, it is human persons' rationality (and consequent freedom) by which they image God.

being of things. Moreover, there are also at least two additional advantages to the understanding of truth Báñez adopts from Aquinas.

First, the idea that truth is being under the aspect of its intelligibility makes truth itself (and so the truth of a particular judgment) more intelligible than does a view which rejects the convertibility of 'being' and 'true'.¹⁶⁵ This is because truth is referred to (and so understood in terms of) something beyond itself, namely, what actually is. And for Aquinas at least, being is what is most intelligible and first grasped by the intellect. This perspective on truth at least seems to offer better prospects for maintaining realism than Merricks's view.¹⁶⁶ However, does the convertibility of 'true' and 'being' entail that truth is not primitive and monadic (unanalyzable) as Merricks claims?¹⁶⁷

Yes, in the sense that 'true' can be gotten behind in more basic terms; it is referred to something beyond itself, namely the *being* of things. 'True' as Aquinas says, adds something, a certain twist or slant, an intelligible note or a new angle to 'being,' namely, a relation to an intellect. So *logically*, truth is not primitive and monadic.

But no, insofar as 'true' is *convertible* with 'being,' for 'true' is 'being' in reality, and existence is primitive insofar as it cannot be gotten behind in more basic terms (even if it can be referred to a cause). So *in terms of its real identity with being*, truth is primitive and monadic.

The second advantage is theological. By understanding 'true' as convertible with 'being' and truth as a making-commensurate of intellect and thing, Aquinas ultimately refers the question of truth to the divine causality that accounts for the being of things. This situates his discussion of truth against a theological horizon, one that connects truth with creation and seeks to interpret the biblical-theological claim that God is true or is the truth.¹⁶⁸ A sensitivity

165 I am not sure whether Merricks in fact rejects the idea that truth is being as related to an intellect, but it seems to me that he does.

166 Merricks is committed to realism, though Ben Caplan questions the ability of Merricks's account of truth to do justice to this commitment in his review of *Truth and Ontology*. It seems to me, Merricks performs the necessary task of announcing the truth about the emperor's new clothes by exposing the limitations of purportedly global accounts of truthmaking, revealing the overly simplistic nature of standard accounts of correspondence. However, he does so in a way that leaves the exact relationship of truth and existence obscure, thus raising questions about whether he can credibly maintain realism.

167 See Merricks, Ch. 8 (170–91).

168 See Jn 8.26; 14.6; 16.13. It is no accident that Aquinas's discussion of truth and falsity is not a freestanding treatise, but an integral part of his theology of God. More specifically, his discussion of the truth of propositions (the principal subject of interest for many contemporary philosophers working on truth) is deeply embedded within framing considerations

to the primacy of being in relation to the true and the ultimate referral of being to God's agency (both crucial features of Aquinas's thought) are *the* driving considerations behind the grounding objection to middle knowledge formulated by Báñez. For how can not only the conceptual primacy of existence within metaphysics, but also the absolute creative primacy of God be upheld on a view that posits determinate contingent truths apart from God's creative act, as Molinism does?¹⁶⁹

of God's creative knowledge and causality. See for example *ST I* qq. 16–17. William Wood provides an instructive overview of truth in Aquinas that focuses particularly on this matter. See his, "Thomas Aquinas on the Claim that God is Truth," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 51, no. 1 (2013): 21–47.

- ¹⁶⁹ On Báñez' s concentration on *esse* as an architectonic metaphysical theme, see his *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 3 a. 4 (98b B–114b F). Note that this passage has been translated into English by Llamzon.

Luis de Molina's Critique of Báñez

[W]hen the will operates by necessity of an antecedent supposition that in no way depends on the will, it does not operate freely.¹

LUIS DE MOLINA

While Báñez's critique of Molina is sound, the soundness of Báñez's own position remains to be more fully considered. I will begin this consideration by exploring here Molina's critique of Báñez.

While Molina criticizes Báñez's account of divine causality and human freedom at various points throughout his work, three opuscula contain the most direct and sustained critique. These are the *Summa haeresium maior* (1594), the *Summa haeresium minor* (1594), and the *Censura contra propositiones vigintitres Patris Fratris Dominici Bannes* (1598).² In this chapter, I shall present Molina's critique of physical premotion by drawing on the relevant censures of the *Censura* along with parallel material from the *Summa haeresium maior* and the *Summa haeresium minor*.³

This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first, I briefly situate in their historical context the documents from which I draw Molina's critique. In the second, I set forth Molina's objection to Báñez's position on the efficacy of divine *auxilium*—the topic with which the Controversy *de Auxiliis* was most directly concerned. In the third part, I set out what Molina considers to be three problematic implications of Báñez's position on the efficacy of divine *auxilium*: first, that God is the sole and adequate cause of conversion and non-conversion; second, that he decides to withhold the grace necessary for salvation from some; and third, that he predetermines the will to the act of sin. Finally, in the fourth part, I consider the alleged determinism that, in Molina's

1 Molina, *Censura*, 514: "quando voluntas operatur necessario ex suppositione antecedente, quae nullo modo a voluntate dependet, non operatur libere."

2 All three of these documents are contained in Friedrich Stegmüller, ed., *Neue Molinaschriften*, vol. 1 of *Geschichte des Molinismus*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters: Texte und Untersuchungen, vol. 32, ed. Clemens Baeumker et al. (Münster, i.W.: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1935): *SH Mai.*, 394–438; *SH Min.*, 439–450; the relevant portion of the *Censura* is found at 480–526.

3 Ch. 6 of Smith (114–126) provides a helpful summary, in English, of the relevant portions of the *Censura*, together with some partial translations of Molina's text. I am reliant on Smith for my presentation of Molina's position in this chapter. The translations provided are my own.

view, is the “root and origin” of the other problems with Báñez’s position. In this part, I also consider two moves Báñez makes to defend his position against the charge of determinism.

1 The Historical Context of Molina’s Condemnation of Báñez

Molina submitted his *Summa haeresium maior* and *Summa haeresium minor* to Gaspar Cardinal de Quiroga, Inquisitor General of Spain, in May of 1594.⁴ To set these two works in context, recall that in 1593, Molina’s *Concordia* (1588) was being scrutinized again, this time for inclusion on an index of prohibited books being assembled by the University of Salamanca, where both Báñez and Zumel held posts. Both the reexamination of the *Concordia* and Molina’s denunciation of Báñez and Zumel to the Spanish Inquisition in his *summae* contributed to the unprecedented escalation of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* that occurred by the end of 1594 and led to the termination of open discussion of the question on divine aid.

The *Censura* was written around 1598, during the Controversy’s second period, and was submitted to the “Holy Office of the Inquisition” in Rome.⁵ To set this work in context, recall that discussion of the question *de auxiliis* had now been reserved to the Holy See and one year earlier, Pope Clement VIII had established a special commission to evaluate the orthodoxy of Molina’s *Concordia*. By March of 1598, that commission had decided to censure Molina’s work when a good deal of new literature arrived at Rome to be examined. Several months later, after further consideration in light of the new evidence, the commission again decided to censure the *Concordia*. Molina was desperate.⁶

4 Molina drafted another short work three months earlier which was also addressed to Quiroga, called the *Delatio quorundam locorum Dominici Báñez*. This work adds nothing substantive to what is contained in the three aforementioned documents. It merely compiles references to Báñez’s work which demonstrate that Báñez actually holds several views that Molina finds problematic. The *Delatio* can be found in Stegmüller, 763–64.

5 Molina addresses the *Censura* to the cardinals of the Congregation of the Holy Office of the Inquisition. The Holy Office was renamed the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) after the curial reforms of the Second Vatican Council.

6 The urgency of his situation is also suggested by the fact that fewer than half (eight) of the twenty-three propositions condemned in the *Censura* directly concern the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. By this point, Molina is taking broad aim at anything questionable he can find in Báñez’s work. This includes Báñez’s views on transubstantiation (477) and the relation between Church and state with respect to the punishment of clerics (546–47). Most of the other propositions concern various aspects of Báñez’s teaching on merit.

Molina's desperation at least partially explains his motivations for writing the three documents under consideration: Molina's strongest condemnations of Báñez came at times when Molina's own orthodoxy was called into question. Thus, the two *summae* and the *Censura*—polemical works—may be understood as defensive measures intended by Molina chiefly to forestall the censure of his own position and to shift scrutiny from himself and to his accusers. I do not mean that Molina's defensive motivations make his critique disingenuous: There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his objections and those objections stand or fall on their own merits.⁷ But understanding the context and motivations for Molina's objections helps us understand the dynamics of the contentious debate of which they were a part. Molina's two *summae* and the *Censura* do not simply represent detached opposition to various aspects of his opponent's theory; rather, they were defensive reactions that undermined, to some extent, not only the credibility of physical premotion (which they directly attack), but also Báñez's critiques of Molina (which they obliquely attack). While Molina's countermeasures failed to secure the Holy Office's condemnation of Báñez's doctrine, they did help to forestall the condemnation of his own, and contributed to the controversy's eventual stalemate.

2 The Central Issue of Dispute: Báñez's View on the Efficacy of Divine Causality

Since the central issue of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* concerned the efficacy of actual grace, Báñez's view of the efficacy of divine causality is a natural starting point for considering Molina's critique of physical premotion. One important discussion of grace's efficacy is found within Báñez's treatment

7 To understand Molina's alarm at Báñez's doctrine, it is essential to note certain similarities between Báñez's views on free choice and those of the Protestant Reformers (at least as these were understood by Molina through the works of Catholic counter-reformers like Tapper, Stapleton and Fisher), and also to recognize that Molina saw Protestantism as the chief heresy of his day. Molina, in fact, did not see how Báñez could avoid incurring excommunication *laetae sententiae* (automatically) for holding the views he did (see *SH Mai.*, 436). Molina saw Báñez (and his followers) as spreading Protestant theology into Catholic Spain at a time when other countries were going Protestant or being divided along Catholic-Protestant lines (see *SH Mai.*, 394, 415, 432; *SH Min.*, 439, 445). Thus, Molina saw Báñez's teaching as a clear and present danger to the Catholic faith, particularly as it existed in Iberia. Incidentally, Spain's determination to remain wholly Catholic may partly explain why Molina only engages the Reformers' writings in fragmentary form through secondary sources by Catholic Counter-Reformers: The original works were probably unavailable in Spain (see Smith's observation, 4).

of divine providence. Following St. Thomas, Báñez thinks providence is the pattern or type {ratio}—the plan—of the order of things directed towards an end. Since God's knowledge is the cause of things in the sense that the divine ideas {rationes} are the patterns according to which God makes things to be, the pattern of the ordering of things—which is divine providence—exists in the mind of God who not only creates the things that are ordered, but also moves those things to their end.

In commenting on the first article of *ST* I q. 22 (whether providence can suitably be attributed to God), Báñez considers the following *dubium*: Whether it pertains to the notion of providence to include not only the order of means to the end, but also the very securing of the end. This *dubium* concerns the efficacy of divine providence: God's providence directs all things to their proper end, but does it ensure that all things actually reach their end? Responding affirmatively, Báñez says,

If providence is considered with respect to the perfect *ratio* of providence, it includes within itself not only the *ratio* of means fitting to an end, but also the *ratio* of definite efficacious means for securing the end. This is proven first, because otherwise providence is imperfect and inefficacious, and all the means were appointed in vain. From which it follows that since divine providence is most perfect, it intrinsically pertains to divine providence that it is the *ratio* of the securing of the end.⁸

Crucial to the interpretation of this passage is Báñez's distinction between perfect and imperfect *rationes* of providence. To understand this distinction, it is necessary to bear in mind that, for St. Thomas, to be provident pertains not exclusively to God but to rational creatures also. That is because insofar as a creature is rational, it can direct or order things to an end in an intentional way, and this just is what it means to be provident, at least in a broad sense. But whereas human providence is imperfect because of the intellectual and causal limitations of human persons, divine providence is perfect because of God's infinite knowledge and power. Since divine providence is perfect, Báñez thinks that it must be a plan that includes the effective realization of the end, and

8 Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST* I q. 22 a. 1 (260b F): "Si prouidentia consideretur secundum rationem simpliciter perfectam prouidentiae, includit intrinsecè non solum rationem mediorum conuenientium ad finem, sed etiam rationem certae efficaciae mediorum ad assequendum finem. Probatur primò. Quia aliàs imperfecta est prouidentia & innificax, & omnia media frustra sunt apposita. Ex quo sequitur, quòd cum diuina prouidentia sit perfectissima, ad illam pertinet intrinsecè, vt sit ratio assequutionis finis."

therefore, a plan that includes not just some means that *befits* the intended end, but *specific* means that are *per se efficacious*.

Molina disagrees. Censuring the above passage from Báñez's commentary, Molina contends that, while the passage has a true sense, Catholics must consider the view of providence it expresses entirely suspect, since it has been seized upon by the Protestant Reformers as "the chief basis of their errors {potissimum suorum errorum fundamentum}."⁹ The sorts of opinions Molina has in mind are Luther's and Calvin's views that providence imposes necessity on things and their attendant denials of human free choice.¹⁰ More specifically, Molina has in mind Calvin's teaching that divine providence consists not only in God's foreknowledge or merely general (causal) ordering of things to an end, but also in God's particular (causal) ordering of each individual thing—including free human persons—by the predetermination of his will.¹¹ Molina contends that Báñez's view of providence "differs little or nothing from Calvin's," and finds support for his conviction in an earlier passage from Báñez's commentary.¹² There, in attempting to show that God's providential governance does not impinge upon, but rather gives rise to human free choice, Báñez says,

Indeed, there antecedes our free operation, an eternal and immutable counsel of the divine will, or an infallible predefinition of divine providence, which predefines all good free operation, nay, even all operation, insofar as it is good and is exercised with respect to the good.¹³

⁹ Molina, *Censura*, 487 35.

¹⁰ See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 397–398; cf. 401 25–402 15; *SH Min.*, 440, 443, 447. Cf. also, for example, Luther, *Bondage of the Will* (Watson trans.), 141, 143, 173, 240, 244–45, 247–48, 258–59, 281, 290, 325, 332.

¹¹ See Molina, *Censura*, 487 35–488 20. Molina thinks that the certainty of divine providence is based on the perfection of God's foreknowledge, and not on God's efficacious predetermination of all things (see *SH Min.*, 447 [*Tertio dicimus*], 448 [*Quinto dicimus*]). Similarly, Molina denies that God's knowledge is the cause of things as the pattern according to which God *predetermines* all things—a significant point of disagreement with Báñez (see *SH Mai.*, 407 15; cf. 403–407 5).

¹² Smith, 116.

¹³ Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255b B): "Antecedit quidem operationem nostram liberam diuinæ voluntatis æternum & immutabile consilium, siue diuinæ providentiæ infallibilis prædefinitio, quæ omnem bonam operationē liberam prædefiniuit, imò & omnem operationem, inquantum bona est & circà bonum exercitur." It should be noted that Báñez's limitation of divine causality is limited to the good aspects of human action. This may mark a difference between Báñez and those Protestant Reformers who, as Molina understood them, held that God predetermines the will to evil.

Molina objects to this view for several reasons.¹⁴ First, it would seem to imply that there is no truly sufficient grace. All grace would have to be either efficacious or inefficacious (and thus, inherently insufficient). Second, if God's grace were infallibly efficacious, it would be impossible for human persons to resist it, as the Council of Trent teaches they can. Conversely, as Molina elsewhere points out, if grace were infallibly inefficacious, it would be impossible for human persons to *accept* God's grace. Third, if there is no truly sufficient grace, God could not have given Adam sufficient means for persevering in original justice. If this is so, then neither Adam nor his descendants were destined {ordinatos} to beatitude by the gift of original justice.¹⁵ Fourth, if providence is the plan of the order of *efficacious* means for securing the end, then everyone who is created for and ordered to beatitude would infallibly attain it. Consequently, only those who are actually saved and none of those who are reprobate would have been created for and ordered to beatitude.¹⁶ But if the reprobate are not ordered to beatitude, then at least three further points follow. First, the reprobate, while on earth, would receive no grace directed toward their beatitude (and thus, sufficient grace would not be made available to all human persons).¹⁷ Second, the failure of the reprobate to attain beatitude would neither be a privation nor cause them to suffer any punishment of damnation. And third, the suffering and merits of Christ would not have been offered for the reprobate (and thus, for all human persons), but only for the predestined.¹⁸

3 Three Problematic Outworkings of Báñez's View on the Efficacy of Divine Causality

In Molina's view, the idea that divine *auxilium* is intrinsically and infallibly efficacious leads to at least three problematic implications. The first of these is the view that God is the sole and adequate cause of conversion and nonconversion. The second is the view that God eternally decides to withhold from some people the grace necessary for salvation. The third is the view that God predestines the will to the act of sin. I will consider each of these issues in turn.

14 See Molina, *Censura*, 488 35–489 20. I present the reasons here in a different order than Molina does in order to show more clearly their logical relatedness.

15 Cf. Molina, *SH Mai.*, 424 15; *SH Min.*, 443 35ff.

16 Cf. Molina, *SH Mai.*, 424 30; *SH Min.*, 444 10.

17 Cf. Molina, *SH Min.*, 444 10.

18 Cf. Molina, *SH Mai.*, 424 25; *SH Min.*, 444 5.

3.1 *God is the Sole and Adequate Cause of Conversion and Non-conversion*

If God, by his providence, ordains not just fitting, but *efficacious* means for securing the end, then, Molina observes, human conversion would be a function of God's preordination of those means. That view, so far as it goes, may not seem particularly problematic, for according to Trent, Orange II and the doctrinal tradition generally, God has the initiative in salvation. However, in Molina's estimation, a view of divine *auxilium* such as Báñez's entails, conversely, that one's non-conversion would be a function of God's refusal of efficacious means. Molina is concerned that such a view of providence collapses human freedom into divine, making God not just the primary agent, but the sole agent, in conversion and thus eliminating real human cooperation in justification and the human initiative in sin. Consider the following passage from Báñez's discussion of reprobation:

But some think that the bestowal of divine aid is not the adequate cause of conversion to God because it is not the sole cause, since free choice simultaneously concurs with divine aid. And this solution pleases some theologians; nevertheless, it is unable to please us.¹⁹

On the basis of this passage, Molina infers that Báñez must affirm the proposition that God is the sole and adequate cause of conversion. Molina then censures this view on the ground that it excludes the possibility of human cooperation in justification. For if God is the sole and adequate cause of conversion, then the human person (or human *liberum arbitrium*) cannot be a cause of conversion, since a sole and adequate cause excludes all other causes. But Trent affirms that human persons do freely cooperate in their own justification by converting themselves to God. Thus, if Trent's teaching is true, God cannot be the sole and adequate cause of conversion.

However, Molina's critique of Báñez on this point may strike a close reader as either disingenuous or uncareful. For, looking at the wider context of the passage cited above, it becomes clear that Báñez's actual view differs in an important way from the one Molina ascribes to him.

The passage in question from Báñez's commentary on the *Prima pars* falls within the wider context of his reply to the argument that, just as God is the

19 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 23 a. 3 (280a C): "aliqui existimant, collationem diuini auxilij efficacis non esse causam adæquatam conuersionis in Deum, quia non est sola causa eo quòd simul concurrat liberum arbitrium cum diuino auxilio. Et hæc solutio quibusdam Theologis valde placet, nobis tamen placere non potest."

cause of one's conversion and penitence through his bestowal of supernatural aid, so too, God would be the cause of one's non-conversion and obduracy if he were to take away all supernatural aid.²⁰ The argument to which Báñez is replying is based on an axiom taken from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* 1.13,²¹ that, just as affirmation is the cause of affirmation (and thus, God's bestowal of grace—an 'affirmation'—is the cause of man's salvation—an 'affirmation'), so too, negation is the cause of negation (and thus God's non-bestowal of grace—a 'negation'—is the cause of man's not being saved—a 'negation').²² In its full context, Báñez's reply is this:

[T]hat maxim ("if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, etc."), is most true, but it is to be understood of an *adequate* cause of an effect [though not necessarily a *sole* cause]. As, for example, it is rightly inferred: "if something is rational, therefore it is risible," because something that is not rational is not risible. But some think that the bestowal of divine aid is not the *adequate* cause of conversion to God because it is not the *sole* cause, since free choice simultaneously concurs with divine aid. And this solution pleases some theologians; nevertheless, it is unable to please us. The reason is that these [theologians] consider free choice as a partial cause, which, conjoined with divine concurrence, produces the effect of conversion. But in fact, things are otherwise. For the very concurrence of free choice is a necessary effect necessarily consequent by a necessity of consequence upon efficacious divine aid, so that that [saying] of the Apostle is true, that one's conversion is not of him who runs, but of God who has mercy [Rom 9.16]; [that it is] not because man is able to convert himself apart from God's will, but because God himself, by his bestowal of mercy, efficaciously converts man's will to himself so that not only the *possibility* of conversion, but the *actual conversion itself* would be an

20 The argument is the sixth negative argument in response to the third *dubium*: whether God abandons anyone to his natural powers, denying him any supernatural aid (see Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST* 1 q. 23 a. 3 [273b F–274a A]). The basis for the third *dubium* is Báñez's fifth conclusion regarding q. 23 a. 3, that, when it is said that the reprobate cannot secure the grace of God, this is meant according to a conditional and not an absolute necessity, insofar as divine reprobation takes nothing away from the reprobate's natural power of free choice (see 268a E).

21 Both the 1614 (Borremanus) and 1934 (Urbano) editions indicate the reference is from Bk. 1 Ch. 3, but this would seem to be a mistake. The correct reference seems to be Bk. 1 Ch. 13. (78b 15–20).

22 The idea is simply that if *x* causes *y* (that is, the affirmation of *x* causes the affirmation of *y*), then the negation of *x* causes the negation of *y*.

effect of divine mercy. Therefore, if it is thought that no other cause concurs with an adequate cause, Aristotle's maxim can never be verified in the case of natural causes, since no cause in any genus is found to concur thus, that no other [cause] in another genus [of causes] concurs [with it]; for causes are mutually causes of one another, (except the first cause, which has no cause in any genus), since [one] cause's effect can be the cause of another effect. It is necessary, therefore, to explicate Aristotle's maxim otherwise.²³

What an analysis of the censured passage in its wider context reveals is that Báñez does not assert God is the *sole* and adequate cause of conversion (and much less of non-conversion!) as Molina charges, but that God is the *adequate* cause. However much Báñez holds for the *adequacy* of divine causality in conversion, he does not posit its *exclusivity*. This is important because Molina's censure trades not so much on the stipulation that Báñez posits the adequacy of divine aid as that he posits its exclusivity. While it would seem that, for Molina, the adequacy of divine aid is a corollary of its causal exclusivity, it is not the adequacy as such of *auxilium* that conflicts with conciliar teaching, but its putative exclusivity, because such exclusivity would rule out the human cooperation in justification which Trent affirms.

23 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 23 a. 3 (280a B–E) (emphasis in translation mine): “[I]lla maxima si affirmatio est causa affirmationis, & c. verissima est, sed intelligenda de causa adæquata effectus. Vt verbi gratia, si quia aliquid est rationale est risibile, quia aliquid non est rationale non est risibile, bene colligitur. At verò aliqui existimant, collationem diuini auxilij efficacis non esse causam adæquatam conuersionis in Deum, quia non est sola causa eò quòd simul concurrat liberum arbitrium cum diuino auxilio. Et hæc solutio quibusdam Theologis valde placet, nobis tamen placere non potest. Quia in huiusmodi solutione consideratur liberum arbitrium ab istis quasi causa partialis, quæ coniuncta cum diuino concursu producit effectum conuersionis, cum tamen aliter sese habeat res. Quia ipsamet concurrentia liberi arbitrij effectus est necessariò consequens necessitate consequentiæ ex diuino auxilio efficaci, ita vt verificetur illud Apostoli, quod illa conuersio non est currentis, sed miserentis Dei, non quia homo possit se convertere, nisi velit, sed quia ipsemet Deus sua miseratione efficaciter hominis voluntatem convertit ad se, ita ut conuersio ipsa actualis sit effectus diuinæ misericordiæ & non solum posse converti. Præterea, maxima illa Arist. si ita intelligeretur de causa adæquata, vt nulla alia causa concurreret, nunquam posset verificari in causis naturalibus, siquidem in nullo genere causæ inuenitur aliqua causa ita concurrere, vt nulla alia in alio genere causæ concurrat, nam causæ sunt sibi inuicem causæ, exceptâ primâ causa, cuius in nullo genere causæ est assignare causam, quamuis [unus] effectus illius possit esse causa alterius effectus. Necessè est igitur aliter explicare maximam illam Arist.”

In fact, Báñez's view is not that humans do not cooperate in their own justification or that God is the sole cause of justification. Rather, his view is that God is the first cause of justification and the human subject is a secondary cause, whole and complete in its own order, but subordinate to the first cause. Thus, Báñez differentiates orders of causality, distinguishes the adequacy from the exclusivity of divine agency, stresses the prevenience of divine agency, calling upon Rom 9.16, and maintains that God is the adequate but not sole cause of man's justification. Moreover, Báñez states the reason he is able to distinguish adequacy from exclusivity while his opponents are not: Báñez relies strongly on a distinction of orders within which the two different causes operate. Because of this distinction of orders of causality, a created cause can be whole in its own proper sphere (the created order) with respect to the production of some given effect, while still being subordinate to another higher cause that is also a whole cause—in its respective sphere of operation—of the same effect. This contrasts with Molina's model of cooperation whereupon different causes producing a single, joint effect are partial and mutually coordinated. By assuming Molina's view of causality, one arrives at the conclusion that the adequacy of divine causality implies its exclusivity. Báñez, as we have seen, neither assumes that view of causality nor holds that God causes justification in a way that excludes the human agent.²⁴

What then, of Molina's inverse charge, that on Báñez's view, God is the sole and adequate cause of *non-conversion*? For the aforementioned reasons, God is clearly not, for Báñez, the sole cause of one's non-conversion. However, given his position on the antecedent, intrinsic efficacy of grace, Báñez must maintain that God's denial of grace is, in some sense, a cause of one's non-conversion. Distinguishing negation from privation, Báñez goes on to say,

... the concession is nothing to be feared that, just as divine aid is the efficacious cause of grace and conversion to God, thus too the negation of efficacious aid is the cause of non-conversion to God, insofar as it is a pure negation of being. Moreover, in this way God is said to blind and harden by denying that efficacious aid, from which denial it immediately follows by a necessity of consequence that someone is not converted.²⁵

24 It should be noted that on Suárez's more nuanced development of Molina's view of divine causality, there is a distinction of orders. Suárez does acknowledge a sense in which each cause is a total cause in its own order. For a brief, but fuller discussion of Suárez's position, see Ch. 7 of this study.

25 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 23 a. 3 (280a F): "nihil verendum est concedere quòd sicut diuinum auxilium est causa efficax gratiæ & conuersionis in Deum, ita negatio auxilij

Molina censures this view as being at least erroneous, for, if God were the cause of one's non-conversion by his denial of efficacious grace such that man's non-conversion follows with a conditional necessity upon that decision to withhold, God would seem to be more the cause of one's perdition by denying grace than one is its cause by one's own rejection of grace.²⁶ Again, Molina's reason is that, for Báñez, one's rejection of grace is necessitated by God's decision. This, according to Molina, contradicts Hos 13.9 ("Your perdition is from you, O Israel; only in me is your help")²⁷ and the testimony of several Church Fathers.

It is important to recognize, however, that on Báñez's view, God is not unqualifiedly the cause of one's perdition, of one's blindness and obduracy. Insofar as these are privations—that is to say, insofar as they are evil—not God, but the human person (through his or her abuse of free choice) is their cause. Once again, God is not the *sole* cause of non-conversion. The human agent exercises a real causality of his or her own, albeit one subordinated to (indeed, conditionally necessitated by) God. That this is so should not surprise us, Báñez says, because theologians commonly maintain that God is the cause of the act of sin without being the cause of sin *per se*. Yet if this position is true, then on similar grounds it can be maintained that God causes the sinner's non-conversion, although he does not cause it precisely as evil.²⁸

Molina objects to this position, however, and argues that it is contradictory to maintain something can cause the negation of a form in a subject that is naturally suited to and indeed requires the reception of that form, and yet not cause the *privation* of that form in the subject.²⁹ For Molina, the subject's natural aptitude and exigency for the form in question makes the negation of such a form a privation. This is the case with grace in respect to the human person: Human persons have a natural aptitude to receive grace and they need grace

efficacis causa est non conuersionis in Deum quatenus est pura negatio entis, imo hoc modo dicitur Deus excæcare, indurare, negando illud auxilium efficax, ex quâ negatione statim sequitur necessitate consequentiæ, quòd aliquis non conueratur."

26 See Molina, *Censura*, 485–86.

27 The text is from the Vulgate as Molina cites it: "perditio tua ex te Israel, tantummodo in me auxilium tuum." It should be noted that the Clementine vulgate excludes the *ex te*. The New Vulgate renders the passage even more differently: "Perdo te, Israel; quis est auxiliatur tuus?" which is more congruent with contemporary English translations, yet which does not seem to allow the passage to do the work Molina calls upon it to do in this context.

28 See Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST* q. 23 a. 3 (280a E–280b B).

29 See Smith, 117; Molina, *Censura*, 487 10–20: "Secundo, quia contradictionem includit haec propositio: Aliquis est causa negationis formae in subiecto [note omitted] quod ilius suapte natura capax est, et tamen non est causa privationis."

to do what God requires of them. Thus, the denial or negation of the grace necessary to do what God requires—a denial which necessitates one's failure—constitutes not only a lack (a negation) but also a *privation*: One cannot act as one ought.³⁰

What can be made of Molina's two censures? I think it is a mistake to interpret Molina's critique as disingenuous, as though he were setting up a straw man. It is also highly unlikely that Molina thought Báñez understood himself to maintain that God is the sole cause of conversion and non-conversion when the text clearly indicates that Báñez thinks of divine-human cooperation in terms of whole subordinated causes and rejected the concurrence of partial coordinated causes. While Molina may not have entirely understood or fully accepted Aquinas's view of divine-human cooperation, he does appear to have read Báñez carefully and he does seem to understand Báñez's interpretation of Aquinas.³¹ What is at issue here is not a misconstrual or a misunderstanding of Báñez's position, but rather a *disagreement* over the implications of it. Báñez maintains God is not the sole cause of justification because the human person actively and (at least on his definition of free choice) freely consents under the divine predetermination. Molina, however, insists that whatever Báñez says about subordinate human agency, there simply *cannot* be genuine human causation at all as long as he conceives of the subordination of human agency in terms of predetermination, despite Báñez's affirmation of a subordinate, but real human agency under God's predetermination. Thus, on Molina's view, Báñez's position is *inconsistent*.

That Molina thinks secondary causation is impossible on Báñez's view (despite Báñez's affirmation of it) is suggested by a passage from his censure of the view that God is the sole and adequate cause of conversion:

And therefore, the human will shall not be the cause of conversion in any way, because clearly, that efficacy of the will [in converting itself] is itself the effect of God alone so determining the will to conversion by

30 Although he makes no explicit reference to it, Molina surely would have had in mind Pius V's 1567 bull, *Ex omne afflictionibus*, which condemned the Baianist proposition that it is not Augustine's view, but rather Pelagian to maintain that God does not demand the impossible (see DS §1954)—an error subsequently repeated by Cornelius Otto Jansen (and again condemned by the Holy See—see DS §2001). Trent had earlier taught that God does not command the impossible, citing the same text from Augustine that Baius claimed was really Pelagian (see DS §1536, cf. §1568).

31 Indeed, as Smith points out (114), Molina's failure to understand and accept Aquinas's teaching that God operates in every agent cause (*ST* I q. 105 a. 5) is most likely due to the fact that he encountered that teaching only cast in terms of physical premotion.

efficacious aid that, in the composed sense, it [the will] would be unable to dissent, as Báñez himself affirms...³²

If one cannot do otherwise, then one does not settle the determination of one's own will. If one does not settle the determination of one's own will, one cannot be the cause of one's own conversion. One's converting or not converting is simply not up to one. Only God can be the cause of one's conversion or non-conversion insofar as the decision settling whether one will accept or reject grace is in his hands alone. Molina continues,

Which view [the view that God is the sole cause of conversion], only Calvin and other heretics assert, although they do not deny the will actively concurs in its acts and even physically produces them... The reason, therefore, they assert God alone to be the cause of the will's act is that although the will actively concurs, it nevertheless concurs *as determined*, so that it is unable to oppose the motion of God which efficaciously operates that act...³³

Once again, for Molina, to admit that the will concurs by eliciting a vital act and that it could do otherwise only in the sense that God could have not pre-determined it to act as he in fact has is not enough to establish that human persons are a cause, in the relevant, moral sense, of their own conversion. Molina contends that God is the sole cause of conversion and non-conversion on such a system because it is solely up to God whether or not one converts. One's own turning is merely the result of what God has 'predeliberated', to use a term employed by Báñez.

3.2 *God Decides to Withhold Grace Necessary for Salvation from Some*

Just as Molina objects to Báñez's way of conceiving the divine initiative in salvation on the grounds that, conversely, it makes God responsible for the

32 Molina, *Censura* 482 10–15: "Atque ideo voluntas nullo modo erit causa conversionis, quia videlicet ipsa efficientia voluntatis est solius Dei effectus, auxilio efficaci ita voluntatem dererminantis ad conversionem, ut in sensu composito non possit dissentire, ut ipse Bannes affirmat..."

33 Molina, *Censura*, 482 15: "Quod solum contendunt Calvinus et alii haeretici, cum non negent voluntatem active concurrere ad suos actus eosque physice producere, ut de Calvino et aliis docet Bellarminus lib. 6 de libero arbitrio cap. 9 vers *secundo docent* (note omitted). Quare ideo Deum solum asserunt esse causam actus voluntatis, quoniam licet voluntas active concurrat, ita tamen determinata currit, ut Dei motioni quae efficaciter illum actum operatur, refragari non possit..."

non-conversion of sinners, he likewise objects to Báñez's closely related view that God decides from all eternity and apart from any foreknowledge of the human will's free response, to withhold from some persons the grace necessary to attain salvation.³⁴ Molina objects to this view, first, on the grounds that such a divine decision would render salvation impossible for some. For if God denied someone the grace necessary for salvation, that person would lack a sufficient principle (*pace* Báñez) for attaining salvation.³⁵ Once again, what God requires of all, he would not make possible for some.³⁶ Second, if one lacks a sufficient principle for performing some deed, it follows that one is not culpable for the non-performance of that deed—it is simply not in one's power to perform it, and this due to no preexisting fault of one's own—at least in the

34 The censure is of Báñez's final conclusion in his response to the third *dubium* of the commentary *ST* I q. 23 a. 3: the view that God, from all eternity, decides by his consequent will not to give to everyone the grace necessary for salvation {*Deus ab aeterno statuit voluntate vel absoluta vel consequenti non dare omnibus supernaturalia auxilia, videlicet eis qui reuera non erunt recepturi*} (278a C; cf. Molina, *Censura*, 489 20–492 10).

35 See Molina, *Censura*, 490 25ff. Recall that Báñez insists the human will is formally sufficient—is sufficient *as a principle*—in virtue of its own nature, which is indifferently disposed toward a multiplicity of goods, for the performance of the requisite good act. Therefore, God adds nothing *per modum principii* when he moves *liberum arbitrium* (the human capacity for free choice) to act; rather what he adds is a *motion* whereby the already formally sufficient principle is determinately actuated. See Ch. 2, above. Molina seems to consider grace a 'principle' of the act of conversion simply in the sense that grace is a requisite for the performance of that act. When he speaks of actual grace as a 'form', as he does in the previous censure of the *Censura*, he does seem to conceive of it differently than Báñez. Whereas Báñez thinks of habitual grace as a form, he conceives of actual grace as a motion. In any case, whether or not actual grace is a 'principle' of conversion, Molina's point in the present context is simply about the range of one's ability: Without grace, one is not able to do as one ought. The difference between Molina and Báñez on this point reveals an important aspect of the debate. Báñez realizes the problem with saying one is unable to do as one ought and so he deals with the difficulty by distinguishing one's formal sufficiency as an agent (whereby one *is* able, in the divided sense, to do as one ought because of one's natural capacities) from one's actual *insufficiency* (whereby, despite one's natural capacities, one is unable to *actually settle* for any one option in the absence of a divine premotion). Thus there is a disagreement over how to conceive of the human person's freedom. For Molina, free choice consists in the power to act *of oneself*.

36 That is, in the sense that one has any power or control over the determination whereby one either accepts or rejects grace. Again, Báñez maintains it is abstractly possible—that is, in the divided sense—by nature, for all human persons to act as they ought, although he does not consider it *actually* possible—that is, in the composed sense—given God's eternal decree to withhold grace from this individual person, that that individual person turn to God.

first instance.³⁷ Thus, Molina holds that for Báñez, God's denial of necessary help eliminates moral responsibility on the side of the human person, who cannot do what God requires without that help. Finally, just as moral responsibility for nonconversion is removed from the human person when the human person lacks a sufficient principle to act as he or she ought, that responsibility would seem to be shifted on to God in the sense that God, who denies grace, is the first to desert, rather than the human person who has been denied grace.³⁸ This means God has the initiative not only in conversion, but also in sin, a situation which, at least with respect to persons already justified, contradicts Trent's teaching that God does not desert a person unless that person has deserted him first.³⁹ Molina observes that physical premotion thus compromises Báñez's ability to account for how the evil of sin originates with the sinner and thus, how there exists an asymmetry between God's causal involvement in sin and his causal involvement in good acts. It is this general observation that Molina's twentieth-century confrere, Bernard Lonergan, was later to succinctly express.⁴⁰ For Báñez, there is a two-lane highway: "along one lane there is what God effects, and that must be; along the other lane is what God does not effect, and that cannot be."⁴¹ As Lonergan goes on to point out, "[t] his solution does not appear to be perfect, inasmuch as it gives the impression that, though God does not cause the sinner's sinning, he does make it impossible for him to do what is right [note omitted]."⁴² On Báñez's account of physical premotion, the human person's sin is the direct and determinate consequence of God's decision to negate, a unilateral decision over which the human person has no control.⁴³

3.3 *God Predetermines the Will to the Material Act of Sin*

Just as Molina objects to the view that God withholds grace apart from any consideration of human will and thereby conditionally necessitates one's non-conversion, he objects in a similar way to Báñez's view that God predetermines the will materially to the act of sin.⁴⁴

37 See Molina, *Censura*, 491 10.

38 See Molina, *Censura*, 491 30.

39 See DS §1537.

40 For a fuller discussion of Lonergan's critique of Báñez as well as Lonergan's own interpretation of Aquinas, see Ch. 5 of this study.

41 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 111.

42 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 111.

43 A crucial supposition is the thought that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise.

44 See Molina, *Censura*, 523 20–526 25; cf. *SH Mai.*, 416 25–423 30.

However, it may initially seem puzzling why Molina objects so forcefully to Báñez's view on this latter point. For Molina himself thinks it is heretical to deny that God causes the material act of sin.⁴⁵ Also, Báñez is careful to distinguish act from privation and to limit God's causal involvement in sin to the former.

The object of Molina's critique is the way in which Báñez conceives of God's causation of the act of sin: For Báñez, God *predetermines* the will to the act of sin, such that the human person cannot *not* sin under the influence of that predetermination. Molina differs from Báñez in that Molina maintains God causes the act of sin not by a predetermination of the will, but only by general concurrence, an indifferent causal influx whereby God neutrally brings about the existence of the human action, whether that action be good or bad, for this or for that.⁴⁶ As shown above in Chapter Three, on Molina's view, the determination that characterizes the action as this or that and thus gives the act its moral species is settled by the human person alone. This allows Molina to explain how God is not responsible for the malice of sin.⁴⁷

To understand Molina's critique of Báñez on God's material predetermination of the will to sin, it is helpful to realize that, because of the way Báñez conceives of the subordination of human causality to divine, the censures considered above on God's denial of grace and the present censure on God's predetermination to sin are like two sides of the same coin (or, to again borrow Lonergan's simile, like two lanes of one highway): Whereas the above censures concern the connection between God's non-action and sin, the present censure concerns the connection between God's action and sin. Accordingly, what Molina finds problematic is basically the same in both cases: a determining of the human will by exogenous antecedents which eliminates the agent's ability to do otherwise at the moment of choice. Molina finds such a determinism problematic because it makes sin unavoidable *for the sinner* (even if it is not unavoidable absolutely). This unavoidability is inconsistent with the essence of sin and it eliminates the basis for merit and demerit, since moral responsibility, for Molina, is inextricably linked to an agent's ability, *of himself*, to do otherwise at the moment of choice.⁴⁸ Molina also contends that Báñez's

45 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 417 33–35.

46 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 417–18, 421.

47 As we saw, however, Báñez turns Molina's espousal of a merely indifferent concurrence against him and uses it to charge him with semi-Pelagianism: for if God is no more responsible for an act's being sinful than its being good, it seems that human persons have the initiative in good acts and not only in sins. This makes the basis for merit in the first instance the human will rather than God's grace.

48 See, for example, Molina, *SH Mai.*, 410, 417, 419, 422.

position is tantamount to that of Luther and Calvin, who (at least as Molina understood them) held that God predetermines all one's evil acts as well as the good, and that, due to the depravity of human nature, one cannot but sin in all one's acts without God's predetermining aid.⁴⁹ Molina thinks such views are problematic not only because of their implications for moral responsibility, but also for dogmatic reasons: In Molina's view, Báñez's position contradicts the teachings of the Second Council of Orange and the Council of Trent, which respectively condemn the views that God predestines some to evil and that he not only permits, but actually causes one's wrongdoing just as he causes one's salutary deeds.⁵⁰

However, in my estimation, while the main lines of Molina's critique are plausible, his assessment of Báñez's orthodoxy is not sufficiently nuanced, for there is a way to reconcile Báñez's position with the teachings of the Second Council of Orange and Trent.

The Second Council of Orange anathematizes the view that God predestines the will to evil. As shown above in Chapter Two, Báñez maintains that God does not predetermine the will to evil per se, but only to the good aspects of an evil act. Again, for Báñez, God causes both the substance of the act {naturalitas} and its moral species, but with respect to the moral species, God's causality extends only to the act's natural contrariety (its distinction from other acts by kind) and not to its moral contrariety (its distinction from good acts by lack of rectitude). Since Second Orange condemns only the view

49 See, for example, Molina, *SH Mai.*, 394–97, 399, 401, 419, 422–23, 444. Molina contends that Báñez departs not a fingernail's breadth from the teaching of Luther in maintaining that God determines the will to the act of sin (*SH Mai.*, 420 40). The irony, whether Molina was aware of it or not, is that Báñez claimed that he had never departed even a fingernail's breadth from the teaching of St. Thomas (see Volz, 248).

50 See the conclusion of Second Orange's teaching (DS §397): "However, not only do we not believe that anyone is predestined to evil by divine power, but also, if there are any who wish to believe such an evil thing, we say to them with all aversion, 'be excommunicated!' {Aliquos vero ad malum divina potestate praedestinos esse, non solum non credimus, sed etiam, si sunt, qui tantum mali credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus}." See also Trent's sixth canon on justification (DS §1556): "If anyone should say that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that God operates the bad acts just as he operates the good, not only permissively, but also properly and per se, such that the betrayal of Judas no less than the vocation of Paul would be his [God's] work: let him be excommunicated {si quis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis vias suas malas facere, sed mala opera ita ut bona Deum operari, non permissive solum, sed etiam proprie et per se, adeo ut sit proprium eius opus non minus proditio Iudae quam vocatio Pauli: anathema sit}."

that God predetermines the will to evil and Báñez does not hold that view, Báñez's teaching does not contradict Second Orange. Nevertheless, Molina's objection is plausible inasmuch as the evil to which God does not predetermine one is unavoidable on the hypothesis of God's non-predetermination of the will to the avoidance of evil.

Trent's sixth canon on justification anathematizes the view that God causes one's evil acts *just as* he causes one's good acts. Báñez does maintain that God causes one's evil acts, but he denies that God causes them *just as* he causes the good. Again, for Báñez, God does not cause one's acts *as evil*; the evil that characterizes sin as such arises solely from a divine permission together with a creaturely defect. That permission along with God's positive causation and a creaturely defect is what results in an *act of sin*. Since the divine permission of evil is lacking in the case of good acts, there is an asymmetry between God's causation of good and evil acts.

Molina builds a case on Trent's phraseology, '*mala opera*', arguing that God does not positively cause one's evil *acts*, as Báñez maintains, but instead only permits them. Molina's reading of Trent, however, seems forced. First, it is not at all clear that Canon Six intends to deny that God causes whatever positive reality there is in an act that is sinful. The intent of the passage is instead to deny that God causes sin *in the same way* he causes good acts, and to deny that God *intends* anyone to sin. Canon Six is not concerned with the asymmetry between God's causal involvement in different aspects of the act of sin; it is rather concerned with the asymmetry between God's causal involvement in good acts and acts of sin.⁵¹ Thus, the passage Molina calls upon is not meant to do the work he wants it to do. Molina's interpretation of Canon Six is facilitated by his own metaphysical presuppositions about free choice and divine causality. If the specification of a human free choice eludes the scope of divine causality as Molina thinks it does, Molina's reading of Canon Six is understandable. While both sides agree God does not cause the formal malice of sin, Molina can further maintain—as he seems to in the passage under consideration—that God does not positively cause, but only permits the sin *as operation* because, in his view, God does not cause the specification of our free choices at all.⁵²

51 Moreover, given the extent of Aquinas's influence over the teaching of Trent, it seems very unlikely (in the absence of reasons to the contrary) that the council fathers intended to teach that sin has no positive reality, or that the positive reality of sin is not caused, but only permitted by God. Cf. *ST* I–II q. 79 aa. 1–2.

52 See Molina, *Censura*, 526; *SH Min.*, 447. Molina is right to attribute significance to '*opera*', but I do not think the council's use of the word implies that God only permits the positive

Still, despite these weaknesses in Molina's interpretation of Trent, his criticism of Báñez on divine causality and sin is not without merit. It is true that for Báñez, the actual direct or per se cause of that failure (malice) which makes an act to be sin is not God but the human person: God literally does nothing to bring about the evil of sin. Left to his or her own, the human person cannot but fail. Thus, on Báñez's account, nothing God *does* necessitates sin in any way, whether conditionally or absolutely.⁵³

But on that account, what God does *not* do, does, under the relevant circumstances, conditionally necessitate sin, for efficacious grace is a necessary precondition for the avoidance of sin in circumstances calling for free choice, and God's non-action is a necessary precondition, a *sine qua non*, for the human person's defection. While, for Báñez, God is not a cause of sin because he is not a direct or per se cause of sin, it remains that God's non-action under certain circumstances indefectibly results in sin.⁵⁴ This is why Molina thinks that on Báñez's view, the occurrence or non-occurrence of sin is not truly up to the human agent. It is principally the human person's lack of dominion over his or her own acts which Molina finds objectionable on Báñez's view.

While Báñez affirms an asymmetry between God's causal involvement in good acts and in bad, what Molina points out is that Báñez does not conceive of that asymmetry in a way that gives human agents the initiative in their own wrongdoing. It is only 'in the power' of a human agent to make his or her ways evil in the sense that it is possible for God to so determine the human

reality of sin (i.e., the act of sin *as act*) as Molina at least suggests. That goes one step too far. In Aquinas's treatment of God's causation of the act of sin (*ST* I–II q. 79 aa. 1–2), Aquinas distinguishes the privation that makes an act to be sin from the underlying act as such, which is a positive reality. But contrary to what one might expect, Thomas does not say God causes sin *as act* but not *as sin*. Rather, he says that while God causes the *act* of sin, he is no wise the cause of *sin*. Thus, in line with what Molina observes about the way Canon 6 is formulated ("*mala opera*," not just "*malitia operum formaliter*") Aquinas too says God does not cause sin—full stop—not just that God does not cause the malice which makes an act to be sin. However, when q. 79 a. 1 is read together with a. 2, Aquinas's precise position becomes clear and ends one stop short of the position Molina at least suggests: 'Sin' names an act under the aspect of its malice, which malice God does not cause, even while he does cause the act, as such, of sin. God's non-causation of *sin* then, does not imply that God only allows, rather than intends, the *positive reality* of the act sin.

53 This view of the divine permission of sin leads, by extension, to an account of 'negative' reprobation: a kind of single predestination scheme wherein God predestines only the elect, does not positively damn anyone to hell (unlike double predestination), but reprobates some persons to hell through his non-action (thus, 'negative' reprobation).

54 While unwilling to call God a cause of sin, Báñez does reduce the occurrence of sin (and reprobation) principally to the divine will. See *Tractatus* II c. 4 §5 (403).

agent's will while withholding the *auxilium* necessary for the human agent to choose rightly, that the human agent would sin, even though by nature, the human agent is the sort of being that could also be predetermined by God to choose rightly.

It is worth noting in this regard that it is not original sin (whether understood formally, as the privation of original justice, or materially, as concupiscent) nor is it the guilt of personal sin that accounts for the human person's defection in the absence of the needed physical premotion. Rather, precisely what accounts for the human person's defection in the absence of the needed physical premotion is the human person's creaturely finitude. On Báñez's view, the contingency of human free choice reduces to the contingency of creation itself and is not really something over and above it.

Human persons possess free choice because they can act or not act, or act in this way or that. But they only act or not act, or act in one way or another just in case there either is or is not a physical premotion from God motivating their capacities for action. To say this is to say more than that creaturely freedom is rooted in God as a participation in divine freedom or causation (*pace* Báñez). Báñez does regard creaturely freedom as a participation in divine. But the question is whether the way he understands this participation amounts to a reduction of created freedom to divine freedom. Molina argues plausibly that it does: Human decision reduces to God's decision to move or not move the human free will to act. The implication of this in the case of sin is that the imperfection that gives rise to sin is principally not moral imperfection but creaturely finitude, the causal indigence of created agents as such. What Molina indicates then, is that Báñez, in reducing human freedom to divine, collapses moral imperfection into creaturely limitedness.⁵⁵

4 The Root of the Problem: God Predetermines All Human Actions

Thus far I have shown that Molina objects to the view that God ordains *per se* efficacious means in directing persons to their end. Such a view of *per se* efficacious means implies one's conversion or non-conversion is a result of the

55 See Báñez's reply to the fourth argument, where he contrasts two senses in which the will is a power to sin: first, as from God, and second, as from nothing {*ex nihilo*}. Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la 1-II* q. 19 a. 4 §67 (242). As something created by God, the will is an operative power, an efficient cause in its own right. As something created *ex nihilo*, however, the will is contingent and defectible; not so much an efficient cause as a deficient cause—a *defectus peccandi*, or impairment for sinning.

efficacy of the means God provides, thus making one's conversion or non-conversion unilaterally up to God. In the case of non-conversion or sin, one's evil action is the necessary outcome of both God's decision to withhold the grace one needs to do as one ought and his material predetermination of the will to act as it does. The common thread running through all the elements of Báñez's position which Molina considers objectionable is the determinism they express or presuppose. It is this determinism which Molina, in the most important of his censures, identifies as the "root and origin {*radix et origo*} of the most pressing and divisive theological errors of his day."⁵⁶

As shown in Chapter Two, the divine predetermination of human free choices is central to Báñez's account of divine governance. Báñez contends not only that human choices are no less free for being determined by God, but that those choices would not obtain at all if they were *not* determined by God: *Omne quod movetur oportet ab alio moveri* (see *ST* I q. 2 a. 3 c.), and according to Báñez, God's movement of the will necessarily includes his physical predetermination of it. Molina sums up Báñez's view in the following words, and censures it:

No second cause can operate unless it is efficaciously determined by the first cause, and no second cause can escape the determination of the first cause.⁵⁷

This proposition, derived from statements in Báñez's commentary on the *Prima pars*,⁵⁸ indicates, first, the necessity of divine predetermination for human operation, and second, the efficacy of that predetermination. For Báñez, creatures cannot escape or resist the predetermination of God because otherwise, God would be determined by creatures. In Garrigou-Lagrange's words, there is a dilemma: "*Dieu déterminant ou déterminé*"; God is either determining or determined. There can be no alternative.⁵⁹

56 See *Censura*, 512: "Haec doctrina est radix et origo multorum errorum quos docent heretici nostrae tempestatis"; cf. *SH Min.*, 439.

57 Molina, *Censura*, octava propositio (511): "Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter a prima determinata; et nulla causa secunda potest exire ab eius determinatione."

58 Molina quotes the exact passages from the Rome edition of 1584. See his *Censura*, 511–512.

59 This was the theme of a series of articles by Garrigou-Lagrange which appeared in *Revue thomiste* and *Revue de philosophie* from 1925–27. A translation of Garrigou-Lagrange's conclusion is published as the epilogue to vol. 2 of his *God, His Existence and His Nature: A Thomistic Solution of Certain Agnostic Antinomies*, trans. Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B. (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1936), 529–562.

While expressions of Báñez's theological determinism can be found throughout his work, one example comes within a list of propositions formulated by Báñez in 1594 to summarize the Dominican teaching on actual grace. In the fourth of Báñez's propositions, he speaks of the divine 'predeliberation' of human free choices:

God predeliberates all good human acts of free choice before they are deliberated by man. Neither by this is man's free concurrence and cooperation with God destroyed; rather the freedom of man in that operation is helped and perfected by the efficacious aid of God.⁶⁰

Molina does not cite Báñez's fourth proposition in his *Censura*, but Báñez's proposition captures well the notion to which Molina was so deeply opposed: that human choices are ultimately settled by God rather than by their human agents.⁶¹ However much Báñez insists that God's predeliberation *perfects* human freedom, Molina contends that if God antecedently makes up our minds—predeliberates our decisions—and moves our free choice determinately and efficaciously in accord with that predeliberation, then we do not have the *dominion* over our acts that free choice requires.⁶² In other words, the problem with Báñez's view is that according to it, one's choices are not really up to oneself; it is not one's act of choosing which irreducibly settles one's choice's being for this rather than that. Rather, one's choices are settled by created exogenous antecedents (physical pre-motions). Given such a pre-determining antecedent, one cannot do otherwise.⁶³ The result, in Molina's view, is that human agents are reduced to the status of mere instruments and are in fact no more free than a pencil in an artist's hand.⁶⁴ As indicated above,

60 Báñez, *Las proposiciones*, 579: "Deus praedeliberat omnes actus humanos bonos liberi arbitrii prius quam deliberentur ab homine. Nec per hoc destruitur liber concursus et libera cooperatio hominis cum Deo, quin potius hominis libertas in illa operatione adjuvatur et perficitur auxilio efficaci Dei."

61 I think Báñez would resist this characterization of his view and insist that human choices are not up to God *to the exclusion of the human agent*. However, while Báñez affirms the activity of the human agent in divinely predeliberated choicemaking, on his account, the particular determination of the choice is ultimately not up to the human agent, but rather to God. This is precisely the point to which Molina objects. Thus, Báñez's affirmation of the active and putatively free human role in making choices does not answer to Molina's concern.

62 See Molina, *SH Min.*, 445–46.

63 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 396, 431.

64 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 415.

human freedom is reduced to divine freedom on Báñez's account so that only divine free choice remains, because only God's choices are not predetermined by exogenous antecedents.⁶⁵

There are two crucial moves, however, which Báñez makes to defend his account against the charge of determinism. The first is his appeal to the distinction between the composed and divided senses. By restricting the necessitation of *liberum arbitrium* to necessitation in the composed sense (mere de dicto necessity), Báñez denies that the way the human will is necessitated on his account does any harm to freedom. Báñez's second move is to appeal to the transcendent efficacy of God's will, particularly as set out in *ST* I q. 19 a. 8: Because God's will is the universal cause of being, God's causality extends not only to the substance of his effects, but also to the contingent or necessary mode in which those effects obtain. It is important to explore these two aspects of Báñez's teaching, because the success of either move could acquit Báñez of determinism. Moreover, the second move is important because the thesis for which I will argue at the end of this study also appeals to divine transcendence to ground the claim that God causes human choices that are genuinely free. The following two sections will consider each of Báñez's two moves in turn.

4.1 *Báñez's Appeal to the Distinction between the Composed and Divided Senses*

Báñez's appeal to the distinction between the composed and divided senses is extremely important because it allows him to affirm simultaneously that free choice is indifferently disposed toward alternatives and that it is determined by God *ad unum*. Unsurprisingly however, Molina objects to the way in which Báñez interprets the distinction of the composed and divided senses to save the indifference of the human will.

We have seen in Chapter Two that, on Báñez's view, human persons are necessitated to choose as they do in the composed sense. But because human persons are not necessitated to any one course of action absolutely, or in the divided sense, Báñez maintains that they remain truly free. *Conditionally*, human *liberum arbitrium* is necessitated; *absolutely*, it is not. *By nature*, free choice is indifferently disposed toward alternatives; *under God's auxilium*, it is not. Since the only kind of necessity that impinges upon free choice is absolute necessity, God's predetermining *auxilium* does not impinge upon the will's freedom in Báñez's view.

65 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 397, 403, 410, 414–15; *SH Min.*, 440, 444–45, 449; *Concordia* III d. 40 §24 (254); IV d. 50 §9 (Freddoso, 135–36); d. 53 m. 2 §6 (Freddoso, 217), §19 (Freddoso, 227).

However, Molina argues that Báñez's appeal to the distinction between the composed and divided senses is not apropos in meeting his objection to theological determinism. Molina says:

Neither of any significance against what we have said are the instances which they habitually adduce to prove that necessity of supposition or [necessity] in the composed sense does not impede freedom. For they only show that necessity in the composed sense *and from a supposition which depends on the will or in some other way involves or respects its free consent* is not an impediment to freedom, because necessity from a supposition of such kind—[i.e.,] necessity that depends on [one's] freedom—*intrinsically supposes the free determination of the will* and therefore, cannot destroy it.⁶⁶

Molina's point is this: "when the will operates by necessity of an antecedent supposition that in no way depends on the will, it does not operate freely, especially if that supposition is intrinsic."⁶⁷ On the other hand, when the will operates by necessity of an antecedent that does depend on the will's own self-determination, the will operates freely. Molina, then, distinguishes two kinds of antecedents to free choice: those that depend on the free operation of the will and those that do not.⁶⁸ Both conditionally necessitate the will, but if the will is conditionally necessitated by the former, the freedom of one's

66 Molina, *Censura*, 515 (emphasis in translation mine): "Nec instantiae quae adduci solent ad probandum necessitatem ex suppositione seu in sensu composito non impedire libertatem, sunt alicuius momenti contra ea quae diximus. Solum enim ostendunt, necessitatem in sensu composito et ex suppositione dependente a voluntate vel aliquo modo involvente aut respiciente liberum eius consensum non esse impedimento [sic.—Molina appears to slide into Spanish here] libertati, quia necessitas ex huiusmodi suppositione dependente a libertate intrinsece supponit liberam determinationem voluntatis et ideo illam non potest evertere."

67 *Censura*, 514: "quando voluntas operatur necessario ex suppositione antecedente, quae nullo modo a voluntate dependet, non operatur libere, praesertim si suppositio sit intrinseca." Molina's point by the "*praesertim si*" aims at the internal influence on the will which physical premotion is according to Báñez's account. Molina thinks that any such internal influence—influence that, while *ab extra* touches the will itself, that is, internally and directly—would violate the will's freedom. Instead, Molina holds that God merely arranges external circumstances in accord with which the will autonomously chooses as it does, without any encroachment into its own proper sphere of operation.

68 See Molina, *SH Min.*, 447–48.

choice is left intact, whereas if it is conditionally necessitated by the latter, free choice is eradicated.⁶⁹

What kinds of antecedents depend on free choice? On Molina's account, there are, first, the state of affairs picked out by the antecedent of a future conditional (namely, the circumstances in which one finds oneself at the time of choice), and second, God's knowledge (and/or the truth) of that future conditional which concerns one's choice.⁷⁰

Recall the counterfactual form:

- (1) If person *P* were in non-determining, complete circumstances *C* at time *t*, he would (freely) perform action *A*.

If (1) is true, then the state of affairs picked out by:

- (2) *P* is in *C* at *t*

69 Note that insofar as Báñez understands *auxilium* to be a physical premotion, Báñez's appeal to *necessitas consequentiae* differs in a crucial way from that of Aquinas. For Aquinas, the antecedent of the necessary consequence picks out the same state of affairs as the consequent, as in: (1) *If Socrates is sitting, then Socrates is sitting* (cf. *ST* I q. 14 a. 13, q. 19 a. 3); or else the antecedent picks out God's transcendent will—which will extends not only to the particular determination of the effect, but to the mode in which that effect is brought about—with respect to the state of affairs picked out by the consequent, as in: (2) *If God wills Peter to choose A, then Peter chooses A* (cf. *ST* I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1, q. 22 a. 4 ad 3; I–II q. 10 a. 4 ad 3). For Báñez, however, the antecedent of the relevant necessary consequence does not pick out just the creature's free choosing nor does it pick out just the transcendent will of God. Rather, on Báñez's account, what the antecedent picks out is the existence of a created motion distinct from both the creature's free choosing and the divine will, as, for example, in: (3) *If there is a divine premotion of Peter to choose A, then Peter chooses A* (or, *If God effectively wills Peter to choose A, then there is a premotion of Peter to choose A; if there is a premotion of Peter to choose A, then Peter chooses A*). The crucial difference between (2) and (3) is that arguably, for Aquinas, God's will that Peter choose *A* does not put in place any created determining precondition to Peter's free choice of *A*, but directly brings exactly that and nothing short of that about (i.e. Peter's freely choosing *A*). On (2), when making a choice, one has the ability, of oneself, to do otherwise. Molina's observation is this: When making a choice on (3), one does not have the ability, of oneself, to do otherwise. Thus, the crucial difference between (2) and (3) is that (3) is deterministic. For a similar, contemporary critique of Báñez's appeal to the distinction between *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis* cast in terms of the corresponding distinction between the composed and divided senses, see Tanner, 151–52. See also the related discussions in Chs. 6 and 7 of this study.

70 See Molina, *Concordia* III d. 40 §25 (254); IV d. 52 §30 (Freddoso, 185–86).

necessitates:

(3) *P* (freely) performs action *A*.

For if (1) is true, (2) cannot obtain and (3) be false. Thus, (2) antecedes (3) and necessitates it. Still, (2) does not necessitate (3) in a way that compromises *P*'s freedom because (2) only necessitates (3) if (1) is true, and (1) is only true *if in fact it is the case* that if person *P* were in complete, non-determining circumstances *C* at *t*, he would (freely) perform action *A*. But *P* and *P* alone makes it to be the case that he performs action *A* in *C* at *t* rather than not. The truth of (1) depends ('counterfactually') on the de facto but hypothetical free self-determination of *P* and nothing else.⁷¹ *P* is not determined by any factor exogenous to *P*'s own free choosing. Precisely because the truth of (1) depends counterfactually on *P*'s free choice, neither the truth of (1) nor the state of affairs picked out by (2) are antecedent conditions that compromise *P*'s freedom in performing action *A*.

Thus, Molina does not deny that an act of free choice can be necessitated in the composed sense *when the antecedent that is supposed is or in some way depends on the act of free choice*. But he denies that an act of free choice can be necessitated in the composed sense by an antecedent that is independent of that free choice. The problem again with Báñez's understanding of the composed sense is that on Báñez's understanding, free choices *are* necessitated by factors other than and independent of themselves, namely, God's created movements of the human will. This is why Molina alleges that Báñez's understanding of the composed sense does not locate free choice in human persons, but only in God. The freedom of a human person's choice is reduced to the freedom or contingency of the antecedent factor that necessitates it, but the free choice itself follows that antecedent with ironclad necessity. Thus, on Báñez's view, a human choice is free only with the freedom of God's decision to determine the will as he does.⁷² One's choice could have been otherwise only insofar as God could have settled one's choosing as for *that* rather than

71 By 'counterfactual dependence' I mean to pick out the relationship of (1)'s logical dependence on (2) and (3). This dependence is 'counterfactual' because the states of affairs picked out by (2) and (3) do not actually obtain—those propositions are 'counter to fact'.

72 Note too how with respect to the question of God's free choice to save some and not others, we are warned not to seek any answer other than the divine will itself. Only God's free choices have no sufficient reason; creaturely free choices can always be accounted for in terms of an antecedent sufficient condition: the *praemotio physica*, moving the will to choose this rather than that.

for *this*, given the nature of human *liberum arbitrium* to be directed toward an alternate good. For Báñez, human self-determination always depends upon divine pre-determination, and so human free choice, determined by God, is said to participate in divine free choice insofar as it is by divine determination that the human capacity for free choice is actuated.

What Molina's distinction of antecedent conditions makes clear is that the composed sense can be understood in two ways. Whether a free choice is necessitated by anything other than itself when it is said to be necessary 'in the composed sense' depends upon in which of these two ways the composed sense is understood. It has already been shown that this distinction of ways of understanding the composed sense is important because Báñez's way of understanding it appears to reduce human freedom to divine. But it is also important because Molina further contends that Báñez's understanding of the composed sense does not accord with Trent's teaching on justification, which maintains that the human person can freely resist God's grace.⁷³

4.1.1 The Composed Sense in Trent's Teaching on Justification

Trent's fourth canon on justification, for instance, teaches:

If anyone should say that man's faculty of free choice, moved and awakened by God, in no way cooperates by assenting to God awakening and calling, by which assent one disposes and prepares oneself for obtaining the grace of justification, and that one is not able to dissent if one wishes, but like an inanimate object does nothing at all and is merely passive: *anathema sit*.⁷⁴

Canon Four not only affirms that the human person freely cooperates in assenting to God's prevenient grace; it also anathematizes the view that the human person is merely passive with respect to God's prevenient grace and consequently, that he or she is unable to reject it. This point about the human

73 Indeed, Molina goes so far as to say he cannot see how Báñez avoids incurring an automatic (*latae sententiae*) excommunication for his views. See *SH Mai.*, 436 20. Molina also cites a number of other sources in support of his position, including the provincial reform council of Sens (1528), and dozens of Church Fathers and scholastics (see *Censura*, 505–11).

74 DS §1554: "Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam iustificationis gratiam se disponat ac praeparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quodam nihil omnino agere mereque passive se habere: an. s."

person's ability to actively cooperate with or resist God's prevenient grace is made earlier in a crucial passage from the council's *Decree on Justification*, which precedes Canon Four. In Chapter Five of the *Decree*, the council fathers teach,

[The council], moreover, declares that the beginning of said justification in adults should be understood to be from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ; that is, from his vocation, whereby they [adults] are called through no existing merits of their own, that those who were turned away from God by sin, through his awakening and adjuring grace, are disposed to turn themselves to their own justification by freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace in this way: That with God touching the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, neither does man himself (who is by all means able to reject that [inspiration]) do nothing at all while receiving that inspiration. Nevertheless, neither without the grace of God would [man] be able to move himself to justice in God's sight by his own free will. Whence in sacred Scripture it is said: "Turn to me and I will turn to you" [Zech 1.3], we are reminded of our freedom; whereas when we respond: "Convert us, Lord, to yourself, and we shall be converted [Lam 5.21], we confess that the grace of God prevenes us.⁷⁵

The council clearly teaches that human persons have the ability to actively and freely reject God's prevenient grace. The human person is free in the composed sense—understanding the antecedent (with which the consequent is composed) as prevenient grace—to dissent from that same grace. This teaching of Trent, Molina argues, contradicts Báñez's assertion that, "[m]an's faculty of

75 DS §1525: "Declarat praterea, ipsius iustificationis exordium in adultis a Dei per Christum Iesum praeveniente gratia sumendum esse, hoc est, ab eius vocatione, qua nullis eorum existentibus meritis vocantur, ut qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per eius excitantem atque adiuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum iustificationem, eidem gratiae libere assentiendo et cooperando, disponantur, ita ut, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse nihil omnino agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui illam et abicere potest, neque tamen sine gratia Dei movere se ad iustitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate possit. Unde in sacris Litteris cum dicitur: "Convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos" [Zach 1.3], libertatis nostrae admonemur; cum respondemus: "Converte nos, Domine, ad te, et convertemur" [Thr 5.21], Dei nos gratia praeveniri confitemur."

free choice, moved and awakened by God, is not able to dissent in the composed sense."⁷⁶

To determine whether Molina's claim is sound, one must understand why Báñez maintains the position he does and how he understands that position in light of the council's earlier teaching.

Báñez is aware of Trent's teaching on justification and has no intention to contradict it. Thus, Báñez thinks the council's teaching must be interpreted in one of two ways. Either Trent's teaching on the resistibility of grace presupposes the divided sense and the intrinsic efficacy of grace, or it abstracts from the question of grace's efficacy altogether (in which case, the relevant passage need not be understood to assume the divided sense). Báñez thinks the council's teaching must be understood along one of these two lines because it would be contradictory to maintain that free choice can dissent in the composed sense from grace that is per se efficacious.⁷⁷ Both of the two interpretations proposed above allow for the view that free choice is unable to dissent from efficacious grace in the composed sense.

4.1.2 Báñez's First Way of Interpreting Trent's Teaching on Justification
Could the council be speaking in the divided sense when it teaches on the resistibility of grace? That depends on how the antecedents to free choice are understood. Recall from above that the antecedents to choice can fall into one of the two following categories: (1) those things identical with or dependent on the act of free choice (such as God's middle knowledge), or (2) those things independent of the act of free choice (such as intrinsically efficacious prevenient grace). If the antecedent supposed in a future contingent proposition about a human free choice is the will's own free act or something dependent on it, then the council could be (and indeed, surely would be) speaking in the divided sense, or else a contradiction would be implied. For on the supposition of the will's act, the will's act cannot be otherwise: Anything that is, while it is, must be.⁷⁸ But according to the plain sense of the text, the antecedent to choice of which the council speaks is God's prevenient grace, not the free choice itself or middle knowledge (or something similarly dependent on the

76 The formulation is Molina's, but accurately captures Báñez's opinion. See Molina, *Censura*, 498 27: "Liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum non potest dissentire in sensu composito." Cf. (for example) Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 23 a. 3 ult. concl. (279b C); a. 7 ad ter. (309a D–E). For Molina's opinion also see *SH Mai.*, 429ff. and *SH Min.*, 449–50.

77 See Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 23 a. 5 (291a–b). Cf. Alvarez, *De aux.* III d. 23 §30 (223a).

78 See *ST I* q. 14 a. 13 ad 2; cf. Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* IX (19a 20–25).

act of free choice). Báñez's stance is that if the council's teaching refers to efficacious grace, then it must be speaking in the divided sense only, for efficacious grace by definition infallibly moves the will to consent.

Molina argues that Báñez interprets Trent's teaching on human cooperation in justification unsoundly {sinistre}⁷⁹ and contrary to its intended meaning {aperte contra sensum et verba ipsius Concilii}.⁸⁰ Molina offers several reasons against the view the council's teaching assumes the divided sense.

First, the plain sense of the text indicates that the council is speaking in the composed sense.⁸¹ For, in discussing the human person's ability to resist, the council presupposes the presence of God's aiding and exciting grace, which prevenes the human act of free choice.

Second, Molina argues it is incoherent to speak about the resistibility of grace in the divided sense, because the very notion of resistance presupposes the presence of something to resist. Thus, the council's teaching must presuppose the composed sense in order to be meaningful.⁸²

Third, if the council is speaking of efficacious grace (and therefore, in the divided sense), then it would be teaching that God's efficacious will could be resisted in the divided sense. This is problematic, first, because it is impossible to faithfully maintain that God's efficacious will can be resisted in any sense. Here, Molina cites Esth 13.9: "*non est qui possit tuae resistere voluntati*" in defense of his position.⁸³ Second, any talk of efficacious grace's resistibility is not only heterodox, but simply incoherent, because grace is either per se infallibly efficacious, and thus, irresistible (Báñez), or else its efficacy presupposes the consent of free choice (Molina), which consent is not simultaneously compatible with resistance.⁸⁴ In either case, it makes no sense to speak of the resistibility of efficacious grace. Grace that is truly *efficacious* is either intrinsically irresistible or has already been accepted. Thus, the council cannot be teaching that efficacious grace is resistible in the divided sense.

Fourth, if the council's teaching is understood in the divided sense, the council would have no force against the views of Luther and Calvin.⁸⁵ But

79 Molina, *SH Mai.*, 433 30; *SH Min.*, 450 5. Besides the plain sense of the text itself (by which it is seen that one can resist on the supposition of prevenient grace), Molina makes numerous references to the *Acta* of the council to demonstrate the mind of the council fathers (see *Censura*, 503–04).

80 Molina, *Censura*, 501 20.

81 Molina, *Censura*, 501 25–35.

82 See Molina, *Censura*, 501 35–502 15.

83 "There is no one who can resist your will." See Molina, *Censura*, 502 15.

84 See Molina, *Censura*, 502 15–25.

85 See Molina, *Censura*, 502 30–504.

the purpose of the council's teaching was to reject and correct the views of Luther and Calvin. Therefore, the council's teaching cannot be understood to assume the divided sense.

Luther and Calvin do not oppose the idea that the will is not necessitated in the divided sense.⁸⁶ Their position is that grace is irresistible in the *composed* sense: the will, *moved by God's grace*, cannot dissent. Also, at least the eminent Lutheran scholastic, Martin Chemnitz affirms the activity of the human subject under God's necessitating grace, and he understands Luther and Calvin to be in agreement with his position.⁸⁷ If Trent's teaching on human cooperation in justification is merely saying that free choice is not necessitated in the divided sense and that the relevant human cooperation is just the vital activity of the human capacity of free choice moved by God's predetermining grace, then Trent is not saying anything Luther and Calvin would substantively disagree with. However, Molina reasonably thinks Trent does intend to offer a position on justification that differs substantively from that of Luther, Calvin and Chemnitz.⁸⁸

Before considering Báñez's second way of interpreting the council's teaching, I shall comment on Molina's response to Báñez's first way of interpreting the council's teaching.

My first point concerns Molina's appeal to the plain sense of the council's teaching. Báñez could admit that the council, when speaking of prevenient grace, speaks in the composed sense and that the prevenient grace of which the council speaks is merely sufficient grace, which can indeed be resisted. Thus, it could be maintained that the council implicitly assumes the divided sense with respect to subsequent efficacious grace in its explicit teaching about the resistibility of prevenient sufficient grace in the composed sense. In other words, the council's teaching is explicitly about sufficient grace in the composed sense, not efficacious grace in the divided sense. Still, the council fathers may implicitly suppose Báñez's position on efficacious grace, or more to the point, it is at least possible to interpret the council in accord with Báñez's position on efficacious grace.

86 See, for example, Luther's critique of Erasmus's appeal to necessity of consequence and necessity of the consequent to save free choice in *The Bondage of the Will*, (Packer and Johnston trans.) 82.

87 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 400 10. The original source for Molina's claim (as cited in the Stegmüller edition) is Chemnitz's *Examen Concilii Tridentini* (Berolini, 1861) loc. 7 §1 a. 2 n. 3 (133).

88 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 435 40–436 15; *Censura*, 500 20.

The second point concerns the coherence of speaking about the resistibility of grace in the divided sense or the resistibility of efficacious grace. Here, a fair reading of Báñez requires that one not understand ‘dissent’ too rigidly, or else one risks missing Báñez’s point (as perhaps Molina does). Molina is correct to say that actual dissent presupposes something to dissent from. However, Báñez does not mean to suggest that the will can actually dissent from grace when there is no grace to dissent from. Rather, Báñez simply means that apart from God’s predetermining grace the will can (and indeed will) do otherwise than it *would* do by a conditional necessity under God’s predetermining grace. Insofar as the will is able to do in the divided sense that which contradicts what it must do in the composed sense, ‘dissent’ is possible *in sensu diviso*. ‘Dissent’ then must be understood more broadly than in its ordinary usage.

While Molina’s critique offers us helpful guidance in terms of discovering the intent of the council’s teaching and identifies potential liabilities of Báñez’s position, at least Molina’s first three points are not decisive against Báñez’s position. Let us now consider Báñez’s other way of interpreting Trent’s teaching on justification.

4.1.3 Báñez’s Second Way of Interpreting Trent’s Teaching on Justification

According to Báñez’s other way of interpreting the council, Trent’s discussion abstracts from the question of grace’s efficacy since it speaks of grace as preceding justification, whereas the efficacy or inefficacy of grace can only be known subsequently from the consent or dissent of the will.⁸⁹ Why might such a reading be preferred? First because the council’s teaching gives no explicit indication that it presupposes the distinction between ‘sufficient’ and ‘efficacious’ grace. Furthermore, if the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace is not in play, the council fathers can be understood to be speaking in the composed sense. This is an advantage, for as we have just seen, such a reading better fits the plain sense of the text.

However, the problem is this: Even if the council does not, in its decree, explicitly advert to the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace, Báñez must be able to understand the council’s teaching in terms of that distinction, for he maintains that distinction is a good one. Thus, necessarily for Báñez, the prevenient grace of which the council speaks is either efficacious or sufficient. But if it is efficacious, the council must be understood to speak of the human ability to resist in the divided sense (this is Báñez’s first way of interpreting the council, discussed above). The problem with this, as we have

89 See Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 23 a. 5 (291a F).

already seen, is that such a reading does not easily comport with the plain sense of the text. Alternatively, it may be that the council is speaking in the composed sense of the human ability to resist, in which case, the prevenient grace to which the council refers must be merely sufficient. As Molina indicates, the problem then is that,

the ability to consent is verified only when assistance is intrinsically efficacious, but then it is impossible to dissent. Moreover, the ability to dissent is verified only of assistance that is intrinsically inefficacious, but then it is impossible to consent. Thus, from the consent or dissent of free choice, one recognizes a posteriori whether the preceding assistance was intrinsically efficacious or intrinsically inefficacious.⁹⁰

Since merely sufficient grace does not efficaciously bring about one's free consent, it can be rejected. However, not only *can* it be rejected; it *will* be rejected unless additional, efficacious grace is also provided, insofar as merely sufficient grace is intrinsically inefficacious for effecting one's free consent.⁹¹ Not only is one not free to *dissent* under efficacious grace; one is not free to *consent* in its absence. Again, the problem is that on Báñez's view, the human person is able to reject sufficient grace only insofar as God is able to not provide efficacious grace. Whether one accepts or rejects God's grace turns upon what type of grace God antecedently bestows.⁹² Thus, when the council's teaching is read in terms of Báñez's categorization of actual grace into intrinsically efficacious and merely sufficient, it is difficult to make sense of the council's teaching on the *human* ability to *either* accept *or* reject prevenient grace in the composed sense.⁹³ Moreover, on Báñez's view, it is not up to one whether the grace one receives is efficacious or merely sufficient. Because one's acceptance or rejection of grace is, therefore, a function of grace's intrinsic efficacy or inefficacy—a factor beyond one's control—Molina's concern that one's response to grace is

90 Molina, *SH Mai.*, 435 5–10: “quod posse consentire verificetur solum quando auxilium est de se efficax, sed tunc dissentire non possit; posse vero dissentire verificetur solum de auxilio ex se inefficaci, sed tunc eo non possit consentire; atque ita ex consensu vel dissensu liberi arbitrii a posteriori cognoscatur quando auxilium praecedens fuerit ex se efficax et quando fuerit ex se inefficax.”

91 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 435 5.

92 See Molina, *SH Mai.*, 431 20ff.

93 It should be remembered, however, that on Molina's system, it becomes difficult to make sense of the council's teaching on the divine initiative and the prevenience of grace.

not up to one is credible. Once again, Báñez seems to collapse human freedom into divine.⁹⁴

4.2 *Báñez's Appeal to the Transcendent Efficacy of the Divine Will*

The second move Báñez makes to show how physical predetermination does not take away free choice is to appeal to the transcendent efficacy of the divine will and to maintain that God's causality is such that it causes not only the particular determination of creaturely free choices, but also their free mode. This second move, which I will now consider, is important because by maintaining God's causation of human choices includes his causation of their free mode, Báñez may be able to counter Molina's objection that God's physical predetermination of the human will is incompatible with free choice.

In the context of a discussion of absolute and conditional necessity in his commentary on *ST I* q. 14 a. 13 (whether God knows future contingent things), Báñez explains that God does not simply cause human choices, but that he causes those choices *as free*:

[I]t is to be noted that the concurrence of the first cause is so efficacious for determining secondary causes that at the same time it suavely conforms itself with the natures of secondary causes so that it brings about the necessity of necessary causes and the contingency of contingent causes. And there are two reasons for this. First, because God is the author of all nature. On this account, he is able to move any nature whatsoever according to its mode so that the efficacy of the first cause and the mode of operation proper to the second cause are at once saved. The second reason is that which St. Thomas assigns below (*ST I* q. 19 a. 8); that is, the sublime efficacy of the first cause, which is able to produce the effect which it intends not only as to its [that effect's] substance, but also as to the entire mode by which he wills that effect to be produced; that is, necessarily or contingently. Therefore, the first cause does not determine my will to reading willy-nilly, but to reading *freely*. It follows from this that it is as necessary in the composed sense that *I*, in this way, read *freely* as that I read absolutely. The reason is that *both* fall under the most efficacious determination of the first cause determining my will that I would read freely.⁹⁵

94 See, for example, Molina, *SH Mai.*, 435 25–30.

95 Báñez, *Sch. Com. In ST I* q. 14 a. 13 (215b C–E), emphasis in translation mine: “Sed est notandum, quod concursus primæ causæ ita est efficax ad determinandum causas secundas, quod simul est suavis conformans se cum naturis secundarum causarum, ita vt cum

Báñez explains that God's causality does not impair free choice but is rather the ground of its very possibility. Báñez's view is not that God merely causes the capacity for free choice. For Báñez, God not only causes the capacity; he also causes its act and the very freedom of that act. Thus, God's causality extends not only to the particular effects God brings about, but also to the *mode* in which those effects are brought about, or, more precisely, part of the effect God wills to bring about *just is* the mode in which effects are brought about by secondary causes. That is what Báñez means by saying that God causes the "substance" and the "mode" of that which he causes. What God causes includes the causing of the secondary cause and the manner of the secondary cause's causing, not just the secondary cause's effect, narrowly understood.

This line of thinking, drawn directly from St. Thomas, has great potential. If God's physical predetermination is modally inclusive (that is, if God does not just determine my will to reading, but to reading *freely*), then Molina's opposition to such theological determinism might be unwarranted. After all, if God predetermines my will to act *freely*, that is no ordinary predetermination of my action. God's predetermination would not be like any predetermining cause we encounter in experience because no created cause can efficaciously cause both: (1) some effect through a secondary cause, and (2) the contingent mode of that secondary cause's operation.

However, whether Báñez's claim that God predetermines the free mode of human choices effectively rebuts Molina's charge of theological determinism depends upon how Báñez understands the free mode of our choices which is included within the scope of God's causality. For if Báñez understands the free mode of our choices in a fundamentally different way than Molina, he is unlikely to really meet Molina's concern.

The way in which Báñez understands our choices to be free is at least partially explained in one important section from his discussion of divine free choice in the commentary on *ST I* q. 19 a. 10. There, Báñez replies to the

causa necessaria necessitem efficiat, & cum contingenti contingentiam. Et hujus rei est duplex causa. Prima quoniam Deus est auctor totius naturæ. Et idcirco potest mouere naturam quamlibet iuxta modum eius, ita quod simul saluetur efficacia primæ causæ & modus operandi proprius causæ secundæ. Secunda causa est, quam D. Tho. assignat infra q. 19. art. 8. scilicet efficacia summa primæ causæ, quæ non solum potest producere effectum, quem intendit quantum ad eius substantiam, sed etiã quantum ad omnem modum, quo ipsa vult producere, videlicet, necessariò aut contingenter. Itaque prima causa determinat meam voluntatem ad legendum non vt cumcui sed ad liberè legendum. Ex hoc sequitur, quod tam necessarium est in sensu composito, quod ego modo liberè legam, quã quod absolutè legam. Quoniam vtrumque cadit sub determinatione efficacissima primæ causæ determinantis meam voluntatem, vt velim liberè legere."

argument from certain texts in Aristotle that God lacks free choice. Arguing for divine free choice on the basis of other passages in Aristotle, Báñez goes on to say that, by understanding *divine* free choice, the novice theologian (presumably, his main audience) will learn three valuable lessons by which many theological difficulties can be dispelled.

The first lesson is that free choice does not require the ability to sin. The second is that free choice is not compromised by the will's being naturally necessitated to will the end. The third lesson is the most important and touches on the very nature of freedom. Speaking on the 'root' of freedom, Báñez says, "the freedom of the act of will, which exists formally in the will, arises from the act of the intellect—that is, from the act and judgment of the intellect—as from a root."⁹⁶ Báñez goes on to explain the way in which the act of intellect is the root of free choice in the will: Freedom is rooted in the intellect because the intellect proposes the object of choice to the will, and this object lacks a necessary connection to the end intended. Because of the absence of a necessary connection between the object of choice proposed as a means and the end intended, the proposed object is said to be 'indifferent' with respect to the securing of the end.⁹⁷ Báñez then explains that the judgment of the intellect on the means to be chosen is twofold:

We therefore understand it to be necessary for the freedom of the act of will, that the intellect judges the indifference of the means to be chosen, and at the same time, judges that certain particular means are to be directed to the end. [This is] [b]ecause it certainly is a practical judgment, and it is necessarily conjoined with the choice of the will just as the efficacious root whence the actual liberty of the will's operation originates.⁹⁸

96 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255a C): "libertas actus voluntatis, quæ in ipsa formaliter existit, consurgit ex radice actus intellectus, videlicet ex tali actu & iudicio intellectus."

97 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255a C–D): "Proponit enim intellectus voluntati obiectum, quod de seipso indifferens est ad assecutionem obiecti voluntatis, neque cum illo necessariam connexionem habet, & nihilominus iudicat ordinabile esse ad finem voluntatis, vel ad assecutionem illius, vel ad participandum aliquam bonitatem ex fine & tunc iudicat vt ordinetur ad finem, & tunc voluntas eligit, & in tali electione formaliter est libera. Quæ libertas oritur tanquam ex radice ex prædicto intellectus iudicio."

98 Báñez, *Sch. com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255a D–E): "Habemus itaque necessarium esse ad libertatem actus voluntatis, quod indifferentia medij eligendi iudicetur per intellectum, & simul iudicetur tale medium determinandum ad finem. Quod quidem iudicium practicum est, & cum electione voluntatis necessariò coniunctum tanquam radix efficax vnde originatur actualis libertas operatis per voluntatem."

The intellect is the root of free choice not only insofar as it judges multiple possibilities to be choiceworthy, but also insofar as it judges *this* means to be chosen out of all the possibilities. Báñez describes this twofold judgment as the “efficacious root” of free choice, which is “necessarily conjoined” to the will’s operation. The point is, while Báñez locates freedom formally in the will, the will has this freedom only insofar as, *radicitus*, the intellect, by its twofold judgment, presents an indifferent object to the will as to-be-chosen. This twofold judgment is the essential requirement for free choice. This leads Báñez to maintain:

Whenever an act of will arises from the aforesaid root of judgment, it will always be free. Whence in turn I infer that whatever precedes, accompanies or supervenes on the act of will does not destroy freedom of operation if it does not take away that judgment of means with respect to the end. This consequence is evident because while the definition of the free act stands, it is necessary for the act to be free.⁹⁹

The will’s freedom is a derived freedom. Its source is the judgment of the practical intellect. This is not to deny the will itself is formally free; it is to specify origin of the will’s freedom. For Báñez, the will is free because the practical intellect judges indifferent means. As long as nothing destroys the twofold judgment of indifferent means, the freedom of choice cannot be taken away.

The significance of this point should not be overlooked. In an important parenthetical remark, Báñez explains that the indifference essential to free choice is on the part of the object, rather than the acting subject:

(And it is to be observed, in passing, that we place indifference in that object judged; but it is not necessary that we understand indifference to be in the intellect itself or in its act: Just as we have said already, it [indifference] is not to be found in the divine intellect.)¹⁰⁰

99 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255b A): “Quotiescunque actus voluntatis oritur ex prædicta radice iudicij, semper erit liber. Vnde rursus colligo. Quicquid antecesserit, vel comitabitur, vel superuenerit ad actum voluntatis, si non tollat iudicium illud circa medium, respectu finis, non destruet libertatem operationis. Hęc consequentia euident est. Quia stante definitione actus liberi necesse est actum esse liberum.”

100 Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255a D): “(Et obseruandum est obiter quod indifferentiam collocamus in ipso obiecto iudicato, non autem opus est vt in ipso intellectu vel in actu ipsius indifferentiam esse intelligamus: sicut iam diximus in diuino intellectu non reperiri.)”

Thus, as long as choice arises from the ‘root of judgment’, its freedom is not taken away, even if there is no indifference on the part of the acting subject. All that is required for free choice is an indifference on the part of the object—the absence of a necessary connection between that object and the intended end—and, on the part of the subject, a judgment of this objective indifference and a judgment proposing certain determinate means to be chosen.

Molina censures this view on the grounds that free choice requires more than Báñez postulates: In Molina’s estimation, free choice requires a disposition toward opposites on the part of the acting subject such that the acting subject (or the acting subject’s will) is not determined *ad unum* by any extrinsic factor.¹⁰¹ For Molina, Báñez’s account of free choice is insufficient precisely because it does not exclude the possibility of the will’s being exogenously determined *ad unum*. That free choice requires the will to be indifferently disposed toward opposites is something Molina considers demonstrable from Scripture,¹⁰² the provincial Council of Sens and the ecumenical Council of Trent,¹⁰³ as well as the teaching of numerous Church Fathers and scholastics.¹⁰⁴ However, following the passage cited above, Báñez goes on in his commentary on *ST I* q. 19 a. 10 to assert that God predetermines all free operations, and that this predetermination does not take away free choice precisely insofar as it does not compromise the judgment which is the root of free choice.¹⁰⁵ Consequently, Molina

101 See Molina, *Censura*, 492 20–30.

102 The passages are Deut 30.15, cf. v. 19 (“I have set before you life and death”); Josh 24.15 (“decide whom you will serve,” the Lord or false gods); 2 Sam 24.12 (God tells David to choose which of three punishments he will have inflicted upon him); and Sir 15.14 (God made man subject to his own free choice), 17 (the alternatives of fire and water, life and death, cf. Deut 30); 31.10 (the good rich man who could have sinned but did not). See Molina, *Censura*, 494 35–495 5. The Council of Sens, which Molina also cites in support of his position, adduces other NT texts as well.

103 The Council of Sens, also commonly known as the Council of Paris (which was a suffragan see of Sens), was a local, pre-Tridentine reform council convened under the headship of Cardinal Antonio of Prato from 1527–28 to respond to the spread of Lutheranism. Ch. 15 of its Decree on Faith addresses the topic of free choice. See Johannes Dominicus Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* v. 32 (Paris: Huberti Welter, 1902), 1176–77. Available online at: *Documenta Catholica Omnia* <http://www.veritatis-societas.org/200_Mansi/1692-1769_Mansi_JD_Sacrorum_Conciliorum_Nova_Amplissima_Collectio_Vol_032_LT.pdf> (27 April 2009). See also Molina, *Censura* 495 5–10.

104 See Molina, *Censura*, 495 35ff.

105 See Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 19 a. 10 (255b B, cf. C).

thinks that Báñez's account of free choice says nothing that the Reformers, who deny free choice, would have any significant disagreement with.¹⁰⁶

The problem, at least from the texts cited above, is actually twofold.

First, it would seem that Báñez's account does not eliminate the possibility of intellectual determinism, and may even suggest it. Intellectual determinism is the view that the will chooses necessarily what the intellect judges is to be chosen. On such a view, freedom does not reside in the will.

The texts cited above provide some reason to think Báñez was not an intellectual determinist. He affirms, for example, that freedom resides formally in the will. Also, as shown above in Chapter Two, Báñez articulates a position that is not intellectually deterministic in his commentary on *ST* I q. 83. There,

106 Molina goes on to note that Báñez's view implies that Trent was mistaken in condemning the Reformers' views on free choice in its session on justification. See Molina, *Censura*, 493 25. Note Alvarez asserts that the error of Luther and Calvin lies not in their affirmation that God determines the human will, but rather in their denial of the freedom of the will under God's predetermination. See for instance *De aux.* III d. 22 §30 (194a). Like Báñez and Alvarez, Luther concludes that God's being the omnipotent creator entails that he predetermine the human will. See for example, Luther, 244–48 (all references to Luther's *On the Bondage of the Will* in this note are to the Watson translation). But unlike Báñez and Alvarez, Luther regards God's predetermination as incompatible with free choice of the will (332). Consequently, Luther declares that human free choice is a mere fiction, an empty concept, a "reality in name only" (142, 148, 151–52, 156, 175–76, 279, 292). In a twist of irony, this leads Alvarez—who, like the Reformers, holds for the divine predetermination of the human will—to compare Luther (and Calvin) to Pelagius: Both the Protestant Reformers and Pelagius thought God's predetermination destroyed human freewill. However, that same conviction gave rise to opposite positions: for Pelagius, it led to the denial of divine predetermination in order to secure human free choice, whereas for Luther, it led to the denial of human free choice in order to secure the divine prerogative (see Luther, 141, 143, 258–59, 290, 325; cf. 173). Compare Smith's conclusion to *Freedom in Molina*, which in a similarly ironic way, draws a comparison of Molina to Luther. The scandal of this conclusion delayed the publication of Smith's dissertation (as a monograph) for decades. Smith was a Jesuit. The important thing to note is that Báñez and Alvarez understood the nature of free choice differently from Luther, so that (aside from being more sophisticated) it comports with divine predetermination. It is significant that Báñez and Alvarez do not deny free choice of the will, for this (among other things) keeps their position within the bounds of Catholic teaching. But realize the substantive underlying similarity of their affirmation of divine predetermination with that of the Protestant Reformers: Báñez and Alvarez's view is not Protestant, but it does bear an undeniable affinity with the classical Protestant position on God's movement of the human will. It does seem to me that at least Luther—and probably Calvin—could adopt Báñez's view of free choice with few (if any) really substantive alterations of their own general position on divine causality.

Báñez maintains that the will remains indifferent with respect to the judgment of the practical intellect.¹⁰⁷

However, there is a question about what the freedom of choice Báñez affirms amounts to. If the freedom of choice derives solely from the intellect's judgment but otherwise requires no indeterminacy on the part of the acting subject, then Báñez's position could support intellectual determinism while still maintaining the formal freedom of the will. In any case, the question of whether the will is indifferent with respect to practical judgment is rendered moot by Báñez's claim that an act is free *so long as* it proceeds from a judgment of objectively indifferent means. As long as this root of freedom is present, it does not matter whether the choice that follows is indifferent or necessary with respect to that judgment (or indeed, with respect to anything else—such as a physical premotion). So, even if Báñez was not an intellectual determinist, what he says in the commentary on q. 19 does not appear to pose any problem for intellectual determinism.

The second problem has to do with Báñez's location of indifference in the object judged rather than in the intellect itself or in its act (or for that matter, in the will or in the will's act). By locating the indifference required for free choice outside the free agent himself, it is easy for Báñez to maintain that the free agent's actions are determined exogenously yet remain indifferent. But Molina does not see how free choice can remain in an agent when that subject lacks indifference of either intellect or will.

However, by at least the time of the *Tractatus*—published two years after Molina's *Censura*—it is possible to discern a progression in this aspect of Báñez's express position. In the *Tractatus*, Báñez distinguishes active, passive, negative and privative indifference. Whereas in Báñez's commentary on *ST* I q. 19 a. 10, divine actuality is the basis for positing no indifference on the side of the acting subject (since free choice must, in the first instance, be predicable of God), in the *Tractatus*, Báñez affirms a negative and wholly active indifference in God. Moreover, in addition to a passive indifference on the part

107 Interestingly, *Apologia* I c. 12 §2 (167) seems to support intellectual determinism: "Et tamen stante illo imperio rationis ita determinatur voluntas ad eligendum, ut impossibile sit voluntatem non eligere stante tali rationis imperio . . . Implicat enim contradictionem quod stante illo imperio, voluntas non eligat." This is either one point at which the view expressed in the *Apologia* differs from Báñez's own, or Báñez's view underwent development between the time of his commentary on the latter questions of the *Prima pars* (1588) and the *Apologia* (1595). My own inclination is to take the former view on the grounds that the *Apologia* was a collaboratively written document and may express what was the more common opinion on this point, and also that it attributes a position to Báñez that is arguably more defensible.

of the object willed, Báñez also affirms in the *Tractatus* a passive and an active indifference on the part of the acting subject. Human persons are passively indifferent insofar as they must be moved to act by the first cause. Human persons must be moved to act by the first cause because unlike the first cause, they are not their own act. Rather, they undergo a change from potency to act in transitioning from rest to operation. Yet, because God moves human persons to move themselves in the act of free choice, the indifference of the human subject is also said to be active. Thus for Báñez, human persons are *actively*, and not just passively indifferent insofar as they elicit their own vital act of choice under the influence of God's determining physical premotion.

What we can gather from this however, is that while Báñez ultimately affirms an active indifference on the part of the human subject, that affirmation does not change Báñez's position in a way that would shield it from Molina's critique. The human person's choice is still passively determined by God's antecedent motion of the person's capacity for choice.

Therefore, when we probe Báñez's understanding of a choice's free mode, his appeal to God's transcendent efficacy fails to parry Molina's critique. For, on Báñez's view, the free mode of a choice does not demand the indifference of the will in the presence of all antecedents to choice besides the choice itself (and any other factors conditioned by the free choice). In fact, free choice *excludes* such indifference on Báñez's view. Rather, what makes an act of will to be free in Báñez's estimation is simply the will's natural disposition toward a multiplicity of objects, which, in different ways, the intellect recognizes as good. For the will to elect one of these goods requires God's efficacious physical premotion. That premotion does determine the will *ad unum* in the composed sense, but since the will is not determined to one thing *by nature*, Báñez holds that it is free.

In other words, by saying that God determines the free mode of human choices, Báñez is not saying that God leaves the choice as a determination of *this* rather than *that* up to the human agent. Rather, he is merely saying that God causes human acts of choice in accord with human nature, and human nature does not determine human persons to just one particular object of choice. Human nature instead leaves human persons indifferently disposed toward a variety of alternative goods. That is why the human agent actually pursues one of these goods only by being determinately moved by God. Yet, in determining the human will, God does not change the constitution of human nature such that human persons no longer have an openness toward a range of different goods. God so determines me to reading such that I could have, by nature, done otherwise *in abstraction from* God's physical premotion of my will to reading, though I could not have done otherwise on the supposition

of that physical premotion. Báñez's appeal to the transcendent efficacy of the divine will is an ineffective response to Molina because while Báñez nominally affirms the free mode of human choices, he and Molina do not have the same understanding of what the free mode of human choices is. Rather, the 'free mode' of human choices is a notion that is applied equivocally from one perspective to the other.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored Molina's critique of physical premotion.

In the first part of this chapter, I briefly sketched the historical context of the documents under investigation. Molina's critiques of physical premotion occur at many places throughout his works. The most concentrated and sustained critiques are found in three opuscula: the *Maior* and *Minor Summae Haeresium* of 1594 and the *Censura* of 1598. The several objections raised in the two *summae* can, for the most part, be correlated to the eight relevant censures of the 1598 *Censura*, which are the most developed and focused. The preceding discussion draws from all three sources and is structured around the eight censures of 1598, although it presents these censures in an order that attempts to show their logical relatedness more clearly than the original text.

In the second part, I explored Molina's central objection, which concerns Báñez's view that God's providential plan includes not only fitting means, but means that efficaciously secure the end God has in view for each creature. On this view, God's providential plan predetermines all creaturely acts, including human free choices. Báñez's position on the nature of efficacious grace—the central question of the controversy—is a direct consequence of his view of divine providence. Because God plans and ordains efficacious means for securing the end, all *auxilium* is predeterminative of and efficacious for the end God intends it, and efficacious grace is, by consequence, intrinsically and infallibly efficacious.

In the third part, I set out some of the implications of Báñez's claim that all acts of human free choice require the intrinsically and infallibly efficacious premotion of God. Because, for Báñez, an act of human free choice depends on a divine predetermination, God, on Báñez's account, is the sole *decisive* cause of conversion and nonconversion, and God's withholding of grace conditionally necessitates the evil of sin, even if it does not strictly cause it. Moreover, God materially predetermines the will to sin *as act*, but again, in a way that leaves the will unable to avoid sin as such in the composed sense.

In the fourth part, I focused on Molina's main allegation, namely, that God's physical predetermination of the human will undermines human free choice. Whereas Báñez argues that physical premotion provides an account of the way in which unparticipated divine freedom is the basis for participated human freedom, Molina argues that Báñez actually collapses human freedom into divine. In so doing, Báñez winds up reducing human persons from the status of self-determining agents to mere passive instruments in an artist's hand.

Báñez, for his part, however, affirms that human persons do have free choice and the dominion over their own acts which that freedom entails. Báñez therefore makes two moves to show how God's predetermination of the human will does not take away free choice. The first is an appeal to the distinction between the composed and divided senses. Báñez maintains that free choice does requires indifference only in the divided sense. Báñez's second move is an appeal to the transcendent efficacy of the divine will. Báñez claims that God's causality reaches not only to the substance of the effects he causes (to the human choice itself, the election of *this* rather than *that*), but also to their mode (to the choice's *being free*).

I then set out two arguments Molina makes to counter Báñez's first move. The first counterargument is that Báñez's appeal to the distinction of the composed and divided senses does not explain how human choices remain free in the relevant sense. Báñez understands the composed sense differently than Molina. Consequently, Báñez's appeal to the distinction of senses fails to address Molina's concern about determinism. In the second counterargument, Molina urges that Báñez's understanding of the composed and divided senses fails to agree with Trent's teaching on justification, according to which one can, in the composed sense, consent to or dissent from God's prevenient grace. I showed that Trent's teaching on justification can be interpreted in a way that agrees with Báñez's position, but also that Trent does not demand this interpretation and that Báñez's interpretation of the council's teaching is implausible.

The success of Báñez's second move turns on how he understands the free mode of human choices. Here I showed that, while Báñez does ascribe an active indifference to the human person, the free mode of human choices ultimately reduces to the human person's ability to be determined by God to one of a multiplicity of goods on account of the human will's native indeterminacy. The will is indifferent, therefore, only in abstraction from God's predetermination, and any human self-determination presupposes God's antecedent predetermination of the human capacity for free choice to that act. Molina convincingly

argues that this kind of indeterminacy is insufficient for free choice, calling upon the witness of Scripture, conciliar teaching, various Church Fathers and scholastics to support the view that an act of free choice cannot be determined by an exogenous antecedent.

Where, then, does the preceding investigation leave us? I think that Báñez and Molina succeed in their critiques of each other, but that both their positive accounts of God's causation of human free choices are flawed. While Báñez and Molina correctly identified flaws in each other's accounts, neither grasped what was lacking in his own. The soundness of each critique indicates that while each side had certain fundamental assumptions right, both sides failed to integrate these assumptions within the wider perspective of the analogy of faith. In consequence, Báñez and Molina each grasped part of the mystery, but both failed to grasp its whole truth.

With this conclusion, I now turn to a more recent attempt to recover Aquinas's original teaching.

Physical Premotion or Aristotelian Premotion? The Proposal of Bernard Lonergan

[T]he will has its own strip of autonomy, yet beyond this there is the ground from which free acts spring; and that ground God holds and moves as a fencer moves his whole rapier by grasping only the hilt.¹

BERNARD LONERGAN

The previous chapter considered Molina's critique of Báñez. While my approach was historical, Molina's critique was principally theoretical, rather than historical or interpretive. Molina's concerns were dogmatic and philosophical, and he saw determinism as the fundamental problem with physical premotion. But although Molina also indicated that he regarded physical premotion mistaken as an interpretation of Aquinas, his own divergences from Aquinas prevented him from developing that line of thought.²

Bernard Lonergan, however, does develop an historical critique of physical premotion and he does so within the context of advancing an alternative, more historical reading of Aquinas. Lonergan thinks his reading of Aquinas avoids

¹ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 147.

² However, Molina indicates five points of divergence between Báñez and Aquinas in his eighth censure (see *Censura*, 522–23). The fourth point is the most interesting for the discussion in the final two chapters of this book, as the divergence highlighted by Molina concerns the immediacy of God's production of his effects: "To this, [the view that the will is always predetermined by God], *SCG* III c. 70 would have at least said that each effect is truly and immediately produced by both God and the inferior agent. In contrast, the aforementioned physical predetermination would be a medium, by reason of which God immediately acts more in inferior causes than in their effects. [If this were true,] [n]either would *SCG* III c. 66 §5 have taught that the secondary agent determines the action of the first agent, using these words: {*Ad haec* 3 c.g.cap. 70 minime dixisset, eundem effectum produci tum a Deo tum ab inferiori agente, verum ab utroque immediate. Nam media esset illa praedeterminatio, ratione cuius Deus immediate ageret in causam inferiorem potius quam in effectum. Nec 3 c.g. cap 86 ratione 5 docuisset secunda agentia determinare actionem primi agentis, illis verbis: secunda agentia sunt quasi particulares et determinantes actionem primi agentis} (Molina, *Censura*, 522). The last reference to *SCG* III is actually to c. 66 §6. As Lonergan points out, (*Grace and Freedom*, 301), Aquinas maintains that God does not act by a *res media* (see for example, *sss* II d. 15 q. 3 a. 1 ad 3).

the theoretical pitfalls of both physical premotion and Molinism by breaking with the mistaken presuppositions both Báñez and Molina shared and which framed the Controversy *de Auxiliis*. The historical divergences between Báñez and Aquinas are thus theoretically significant. Lonergan's study is important because through a close historical engagement with Aquinas's texts, Lonergan intends to recover Aquinas's authentic thought unencumbered by the categories of the sixteenth-century controversy. In this way, Lonergan's study differs from previous attempts to deal with the issue of divine causality and human free choice which accepted the presuppositions of the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, and it is the first significant attempt to forge a new way through the impasse created by those presuppositions.

It is also important to consider Lonergan's view because it has garnered surprisingly little critical attention in recent work on divine causality and human freedom. In recent years, philosophers (especially Anglophone analytic philosophers of religion), rather than theologians, have tended to take up issues of God and human freedom. But Lonergan's view, despite its importance, tends to be almost universally ignored within the philosophical literature, while among the relatively few theologians who have recently dealt with the topic, most accept Lonergan's reading of Aquinas, taking it as more-or-less definitive.

The ultimate aim of the present chapter is to explore whether Lonergan does successfully forge a new way through the *de Auxiliis* impasse and, if he does not, to indicate why. Before evaluating Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas however, I shall begin by examining both Lonergan's critique of Báñez and Lonergan's own alternative interpretation of Aquinas on the divine causation of human free choices. Accordingly, this chapter will be divided into three parts.

In the first part, I will explore four neuralgic points of Lonergan's critique of Báñez. In the second part, I will highlight and explain aspects of Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas on divine operation in the human will that are most crucial to the present investigation. Third, I shall attempt a constructive critique of Lonergan's reading of Aquinas. While I will not undertake an historical-textual critique of Lonergan's interpretation in this chapter, I will offer a textual argument for an alternative reading of Aquinas in the next chapter.

The thesis of this chapter is that Lonergan understands, and on at least two decisive points, cogently critiques Báñez, but that his own interpretation of Aquinas on the divine causation of human free choices is ultimately inadequate (even if instructive and on many points, salvageable). The inadequacy of Lonergan's proposal stems from its attempt to explain the divine causation of human free choices in terms of 'Aristotelian premotions' arranged by God according to the pattern which is fate, rather than understanding God's action in terms of creation—God's immediate and transcendent causation

of *esse*. Despite Lonergan's stress on divine transcendence in the context of his discussion of fate, he cannot consistently maintain that free choices are not necessitated by created antecedents. For Lonergan also holds that God infallibly causes free choices indirectly by created means. So, Lonergan is vulnerable to one of his own critiques against Báñez.

The main texts for this investigation are Lonergan's 1941 doctoral dissertation *Gratia Operans* and the consolidated monograph version of that study, *Grace and Freedom*. Both of these works are currently published together in the same volume under the title, *Grace and Freedom* (University of Toronto Press, 2005). Other relevant works are Lonergan's treatises, *De ente supernaturali* (1947) and *De scientia atque voluntate Dei* (also known as *De praedestinatione*, 1950) as well as his 1946 book review, "On God and Secondary Causes."³ In what follows, I rely most heavily on the first two sources, since they are fundamental and Lonergan's later work seems consistent with them.

1 Lonergan's Critique of Báñez

To criticize physical premotion from an historical standpoint is difficult because Báñez never tried to provide an original account of divine and human operation. He meant only to expound Aquinas's teaching without departing "a fingernail's breadth" from it.⁴ The result, as Lonergan concludes, is that "Bannezian thought, point for point, corresponds to the thought of St Thomas," although "between the two there is a notable difference which arises from the arrangement of the points."⁵ Four points of difference between Báñez and Aquinas are particularly relevant for this investigation.⁶ The first concerns the

3 The two treatises are published bilingually in *Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael Shields, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 19, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 60–255 and 262–411 respectively. Lonergan's review is included in *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 4, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 53–65.

4 See Volz, 248.

5 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 448.

6 There are other important points of divergence than those mentioned here (see Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 448–49, for example), but they are not as directly relevant to the aims of this chapter. For one, Báñez arguably differs from Aquinas in his conception of free choice. Lonergan identifies four criteria of a free act in Aquinas (*Grace and Freedom*, 96; cf. 320) and accuses Báñez of reducing these to an indifference on the part of the object willed or the intellectual judgment of that object. While this interpretation of Báñez is understandable, it may not correspond to Báñez's actual thought, at least in the later stages of his career.

distinction between an agent's ability to act and its actual operation. The second concerns the nature of causation or motion. The third concerns a difference in how Thomas and Báñez conceive the transition from *posse agere* to *actu agere* to take place: Báñez and Aquinas have different concepts of premotion. The fourth point of divergence concerns the ways in which an acknowledgement of divine transcendence plays out on each account.

1.1 *The Distinction between an Agent's Ability to Act and Actual Operation*

According to Lonergan, one of the most fundamental differences between Báñez and Aquinas concerns whether, as a matter of principle, an agent's transition from being able to act to actually acting involves a real change in the agent. For Báñez, the transition does involve a real change. As we have seen, in Báñez's view, the agent who is actually acting is in a metaphysically more perfect state than the agent who is merely able, or poised to act. The significance of this position is that if the agent undergoes a real change in moving from *posse agere* to *actu agere*—a lower to a higher metaphysical state—then it is necessary to invoke some factor to account for this change. And that is exactly the function of the *praemotio physica* on Báñez's system. As we have seen, the *praemotio* is a reality distinct from the agent's action which accounts for that action's emergence. It is a metaphysical impulse passively received into the agent which places that agent in a higher state of actuality.

From the footnotes of the 2000 edition of Lonergan's work, it would seem he was working with the 1584 Ruffinellum (Rome) edition of Báñez's commentary, or possibly the 1934 Urbano (Madrid) edition. Neither of these contain Báñez's commentary on the latter fifty-five questions of the *Prima pars*, among which are included the questions on will and free choice. Báñez's commentary on these questions was first published in 1588, although the Urbano edition does not include them because its production was halted by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Had Lonergan read Báñez's commentary on q. 83, he would have seen that Báñez does acknowledge a subjective indifference of the will (see Báñez, *Sch. Com. in ST I* q. 83 a. 1 dub. 2 *sec. conc.* [375b]), and had the *Tractatus* been available to Lonergan when he wrote his dissertation, he also would have seen that Báñez there affirms a certain 'active' indifference of the will (in addition to a passive indifference), as shown in Ch. 2. Lonergan's own account of the criteria for a free act suffers from the fact that it leaves open the possibility that the act of free choice is necessitated by something other than itself. As we shall see, Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas ultimately requires this, but it can be argued that what Aquinas meant by the fourth criterion (a will that moves itself) is that free choice is a first cause in its own order and even though it supposes the will of the end as a precondition, is not merely an effect produced by a distinct, previous act of will (i.e. the volition of the end—an internal Aristotelian premotion, discussed below) in conjunction with other causes (external Aristotelian premotions, also discussed below).

Lonergan, however, argues that it is a mistake to maintain that the transition from *posse agere* to *actu agere* implies a real change in the agent, for if the transition from *posse agere* to *actu agere* implied a real change in the agent, every mover would be moved; consequently, there could be no unmoved mover, no first principle of motion. To hold as a matter of principle there is a real distinction between the ability to act and actual operation is, therefore, to imply creation introduces a change in God.⁷ Instead, Lonergan argues, for Aquinas, what the transition from *posse agere* to *actu agere* implies is not the addition of a metaphysical perfection to the agent, but merely a formal content, a conceptual relation which Aquinas expresses as *ut ab agente in aliud procedens* {as from the agent proceeding into another}.⁸ Lonergan thinks the reason confusion so easily arises on this point is that in fact, there is an objective difference between *posse agere* and *actu agere*. This objective difference can lead one to think there must be an objective change in the agent. However, Lonergan maintains that, for Aquinas, this objective difference does not imply a real change in the agent; rather, it is accounted for by the real emergence of the agent's effect. The emergence of the effect, then, is the "real difference in the objective field" that is implied by the transition from *posse agere* to *actu agere*.⁹

The denial of change in the agent is important for the discussion at hand because supposing that there is change in the agent is the metaphysical presupposition that requires one to posit physical premotions to account for that change. However, if the agent does not undergo a real change in transitioning to actual operation, the need for physical premotions is obviated. Instead, the emergence of the effect—that is, the actual operation—accounts for the objective difference.

1.2 *The Nature of Causation*

The second important point concerns a divergence between Aquinas and Báñez over the nature of causation. According to Lonergan, for Aquinas, causation can be variously considered as either a relation of dependence in the effect or a formal content attributed to the cause as causing (which Aquinas describes as *ut ab agente in aliud procedens*). What causation is not, for Aquinas,

7 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 253–54, 265. Lonergan takes up the issue of whether the lack of a real change in the agent applies only in the case of God but not in the case of creatures, and concludes that the transition to actual operation does not imply a change in the agent as a matter of principle.

8 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 70 n. 23, 71, 91–92.

9 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 266–67.

is a third product in addition to cause and effect; something added to the cause as causing, or something that obtains between cause and effect.¹⁰ For Aquinas, causation just is the *emergence* of the effect that is caused, not some distinct, additional reality.

In contrast, Báñez conceives of causation as a *tertium quid* besides cause and effect. God's causation of the act of free choice is by means of an ontological reality (the *praemotio physica*) which is distinct from God and the act of free choice God causes. The *praemotio physica* then, is not simply the emergence of the human act of free choice or, expressed differently, the human free choice's relation of depending on God. The human act of free choice is a vital act produced by the vital potencies of intellect and will actuated by the *praemotio physica*. Thus, the *praemotio physica* is something, in one sense, added to the human agent as causing (it is that which accounts for the supposed real change in the agent from *posse agere* to *actu agere*), and at the same time, in another sense, it is a *tertium quid* between God, the divine agent, and God's effect, which is the human agent's causing.

According to Lonergan, what makes it so easy to make the mistake of thinking that causation is a *tertium quid* is that Aquinas's thought on causation underwent development over time, but while Aquinas's thought developed, his terminology remained the same.¹¹

On Lonergan's reading, Aquinas, in his earlier works, rejected the Aristotelian notion that causation is a relation of dependence in the effect, maintaining instead that action and passion are two distinct accidents in two distinct subjects. Action, then, was something in the agent and it was really different from passion. What allowed Aristotle to conceive of action as something in the patient was the idea that action and passion are the same reality viewed under different aspects: The road from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes is the same road. The road is motion. Motion is the one reality of which, under different aspects, can be considered as either action or passion. Still, this is not to conflate action and passion, for logically, they are distinct:

Going from Thebes to Athens is not the same thing as going from Athens to Thebes... [s]imilarly, though the reality of *actio* and *passio* is basically the single entity *motus*, still this one reality in the relativity of its

10 See Lonergan, "On God," 55–57, 59.

11 Thus it is possible to find in Aquinas suggestions that causation is something in between agent and patient. See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 67–73.

dynamism has two terms, an origin and a subject; inasmuch as it is from the origin it is *actio*, inasmuch as it is in the subject it is *passio*.¹²

According to Lonergan, the shift in Aquinas's thinking on causation occurred in the course of commenting on Book III of Aristotle's *Physics*, where Aristotle analyzes the meaning of 'motion'.¹³ Aristotle's analysis of motion is decisive because what allows him to place action in the patient is the thought that action and passion are the same motion: The action of the agent exists not only in the agent, but in the patient too, although there as a relation of dependence. What complicates matters from an interpretive standpoint is that after Aquinas adopts Aristotle's understanding of causation, Aquinas retains his earlier terminology, which signifies action as something in the agent. Whereas Aristotle conceives of action as "a relation of dependence in the effect," Aquinas conceives of action as "a formal content attributed to the cause as causing"¹⁴ which he describes as *ut ab agente in aliud procedens*.¹⁵ As Lonergan points out, although "[e]vidently the two terminologies differ completely... these differences only serve to emphasize the fundamental identity of the two positions: both philosophers keenly realized that causation must not be thought to involve any real change in the cause as cause."¹⁶ Instead, for Aristotle and Aquinas, causation involves simply the emergence of the effect that is caused: the motion of the mover is the movement of the moved.¹⁷

The importance, for the present discussion, of the divergence between Báñez and Aquinas on the nature of causation is that, according to Lonergan, Aquinas's view of causation does not lead him to posit the existence of physical premotions in addition to the known motions of the will "after the fashion of astronomers who reasoned to the existence of other planets from known planetary motions".¹⁸ Instead, Aquinas simply arrives at "a profounder understanding of motions already known or supposed."¹⁹ Aquinas's insight is thus "like the discovery of the principle of work, and not like the discovery of a new planet or continent": It is not the discovery of a new thing, but a deeper insight

12 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 262.

13 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 261.

14 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 72.

15 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 70 n. 23.

16 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 72.

17 See Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* III.4 (305–06). Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III c. 3 (202a 10–202b 30).

18 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 90.

19 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 90.

into the given data.²⁰ For Aquinas, since the motion of the mover (action) and the movement of the moved (passion—the emergence of the effect) are one in reality, while divine and human action remain distinct because an effect's dependence on its cause (divine action) is not the same thing as the effect itself (human action) in which that dependence relation inheres, God's causation of the human will's causing just is the emergence of the human will's causing, not something distinct from or in addition to it. The emergence of the human will's causing simply *depends on* God as its cause. But the actual emergence of the human agent's causing, the relation of the human agent's causing to God, is not the metaphysical impulse (the *praemotio physica*) that Báñez posits to explain the emergence of the human agent's causing.²¹ For Aquinas, there is no tertium quid between God and his effects; there is only the relation of God's effects to God.

1.3 Aristotelian Premotion and Bañezian Premotion

The third point of divergence between Báñez and Aquinas concerns the nature of premotion. While opponents of physical premotion have been keen to point out that the term '*praemotio*' never occurs anywhere in the corpus of Thomas's writings, Lonergan maintains Aquinas did actually hold for a type of premotion, which he took from Aristotle and referred to as 'application'.²²

20 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 337.

21 Still, it must be pointed out that Aquinas himself sometimes uses 'impulse' language when speaking of motion (see for example *SCG* 111 c. 152 §4). In a similar vein, Aquinas elsewhere speaks of a divine 'influence' or 'imprint' (see, for example, *QDV* q. 8 a. 13). Does it follow that 'motion' and 'impulse' are convertible terms for Aquinas? Perhaps. In fact, I suspect it is quite likely in certain contexts. If so however, does it then follow that Báñez's '*impulsio*' (the *praemotio physica*) is nothing more than Aquinas's '*motio*'? The answer is no. For however much Aquinas uses motion language (which terminology perhaps invited the confusion that ensued during the 16th c. and later), Aquinas clearly conceives of God's causality, and therefore God's motion, in terms of creation (see *ST* I q. 8 a. 1), whereas Báñez and other defenders of physical premotion clearly distinguish premotion from creation and assign a metaphysical status to the premotion that is different from the status Aquinas assigns to the creation relation that inheres in God's effect (*ST* I q. 45 a. 3).

22 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 75–79. In his dissertation, *Gratia Operans*, Lonergan understandably referred to Thomas's premotion as a kind of 'physical premotion'. However, in the condensed and published version of the dissertation, *Grace and Freedom*, Lonergan preferred to use the term 'Aristotelian premotion'. Here I use 'Aristotelian premotion', reserving 'physical premotion' for premotion in the Bañezian sense. Lonergan cites several references to Aristotelian premotions in Aquinas's work. These include Thomas's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, lect. 4; *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 and *SCG* 111 c. 67.

What is Aristotelian premotion? Whenever an agent acts in time, something must explain why the agent acts now and not before, given that the agent was able to act all along. Aristotelian premotion explains why action emerges when it does.²³ On Lonergan's reading of Aquinas, an agent already able to act does not need to be further perfected by a metaphysical impulse in order to act. However, for action to occur, the agent and the patient must be brought into proximity. Aristotelian premotion is that movement, temporally prior to an agent's action, whereby agent and patient are brought into proximity with one another so that action takes place. It is the "right disposition, relation, proximity between mover and moved" without which "motion cannot take place now" but with which "motion *automatically results*."²⁴ Fire, for example, cannot ignite unless it is brought into proximity with straw. However, once fire and straw are brought into proximity (regardless of which, or whether both are moved), ignition automatically occurs. Fire does not require any further perfection to ignite the straw;²⁵ fire, just as it is, will ignite straw, provided they are sufficiently close to each other.²⁶

There are several differences between *praemotio physica* and Aristotelian premotion.²⁷ First, whereas physical premotion as Báñez understands it is invoked to explain a creature's causation, Aristotelian premotion is invoked to explain a creature's causation *in time*. Second, whereas a physical premotion is temporally simultaneous with but causally antecedent to the creature's action, an Aristotelian premotion is temporally prior to the creature's action. Third, whereas a physical premotion gives the created agent a further actualization, a heightened participation in the act of being, Aristotelian premotion affects the agent or patient indifferently and, rather than metaphysically

23 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 73–75.

24 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 86 (see also 74). Emphasis has been added because I think the expression that "motion automatically results" tellingly reveals a deep problem with Lonergan's interpretation, which is discussed below (the antecedents necessitate the consequent). Note that since the effect of Aristotelian premotion is a certain relation that subsequent movement *presupposes*, that relation is distinct from the dependence relation which is the subsequent movement (i.e., what is in question is a caused causing, a dependent dependence; thus a premotion is a relation which serves as the condition for the possibility of the subsequent relation, which is secondary causation).

25 Lonergan (*Grace and Freedom*, 77–78) addresses the 'anomaly' of the influence of the celestial spheres in Aquinas's cosmology.

26 Note the proximity of Lonergan with Molina, on this point: see *Concordia* II d. 26, esp. §§2, 9.

27 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 74.

perfecting the agent, simply terminates in a relation, disposition or proximity between agent and patient which allows the former to act on the latter.

The importance of the foregoing for the present discussion is this: First, in Lonergan's view, Aquinas does hold for some type of premotion of the will. Second, however, the 'drawing near' of agent and patient that is Aristotelian premotion is not the metaphysical impulse that is Báñez's *praemotio physica*. The two conceptions differ radically, and Aquinas does not accept the latter.

1.4 *Physical Premotion and Divine Transcendence*

The fourth point of divergence between Báñez and Aquinas concerns the way each of them regards divine transcendence. Recall that Aquinas maintains it is because of God's transcendence as creator that he is able to cause both the substance and the mode of his effects. God, being subject neither to necessity nor contingency, makes both the necessary and contingent to be with equal efficacy.

Because Báñez posits a *res media* between God and the human action God causes, necessarily, either the human action does not follow with infallible certainty (if the premotion is impeditable), in which case, however, it can be free; or the human action does follow with infallible certainty (if the premotion is irresistible), in which case, however, it cannot be free; or else Báñez must implicitly ascribe transcendence to the *res media* so that contingent (free) effects can follow from it with infallible certainty.²⁸ But it will not do to ascribe transcendence to a *res media*, because a *res media* is necessarily not God. Necessarily, the *res media* is something created (as the *praemotio physica* admittedly is). But neither will it do to say that effects either follow freely but not infallibly, or infallibly but not freely. Báñez's position leads a dilemma, the source of which is his failure to see through the implications of divine transcendence. God, as transcendent creator, does not use means in causing.²⁹ Strictly speaking, there is no *res media between* God and his effects, just the dependence of God's effects on God.

28 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 110, 148; *De ente*, 220–21; *De scientia*, 340–41.

29 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 301. Cf. sss 11 d. 1 q. 1 a. 5 ad 11; d. 15 q. 3 a. 1 ad 3. Lonergan considers Aquinas's use of the term, '*actio media*' (for instance, in the first passage just cited in the sss), pointing out that it *actio media* is never ascribed to God (see *Grace and Freedom*, 273–74). Lonergan is aware of Aquinas's statement in *ST* 1 q. 45 a. 3 ad 2 that "creation is signified as a medium between the creator and the creature" but rightly understands this not to signify a third thing between God and the creature, but rather a relation in the creature referring it to God as cause of the creature.

Because Aquinas grasps the implications of God's transcendence, he does not posit the existence of physical premotions. Accordingly, on Aquinas's account, transcendence is strictly attributed to God alone. The important point for the purposes of the present discussion is that admitting physical premotions is incompatible with consistently affirming divine transcendence. Báñez's failure to grasp the implications of divine transcendence is a shortcoming of his account.

The main point that can be taken away from the preceding discussion is that Aquinas does not posit the existence of physical premotions as Báñez understands them, and that Báñez's positing the existence of such motions in addition to the human operations God causes is one of the principal theoretical shortcomings of his account.

2 Lonergan's Interpretation of Aquinas

The preceding review of Lonergan's critique of Báñez shows that Aquinas holds that God operates in the operations of creaturely agents by premotions of a certain kind, but that such Aristotelian premotions differ in several ways from Báñez's physical premotions. Given that God does not operate in the human will by physical premotion, it remains to be explained how God operates in the human will by Aristotelian premotion.

I will not attempt to exhaustively present Lonergan's reading of Aquinas here, but will focus instead on two main aspects of it. The first aspect concerns God's premotion or 'application' of the human will. The second aspect concerns fate, or the plan of divine providence as it exists in things. On Lonergan's understanding, fate is the dynamic pattern of Aristotelian premotions, the complex web of created causation that exists in the world according to God's plan.³⁰ Whereas the first aspect of Lonergan's interpretation focuses on God's individual premotions of the will, the second aspect steps back to look at the bigger picture of divine providence into which all the individual premotions fit.

The core thesis of Lonergan's interpretation is that God causes the human act of free choice indirectly by means of a complex pattern of Aristotelian premotions.³¹ In this way, "[a]s a man wields a whole sword though he grasps

³⁰ See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 291–96.

³¹ It should be noted that although Lonergan thinks God does not cause human free choices *immediatione suppositi* (by being causally immediate as an acting subject to the free choices he effects), he does think God causes free choices *immediatione virtutis*—by an

only the hilt,” so too God, by grasping the human will “beyond the limits of liberty,” infallibly causes it to choose just as he wills while still leaving the will its own “strip of autonomy” within which it chooses freely.³² Aristotelian premotion and fate, then, are the two keys to understanding how, on Lonergan’s interpretation, God grasps the human will from outside the bounds of freedom and makes it freely to do exactly as he wills.

2.1 *Aristotelian Premotion of the Human Will*

It has been shown that Aristotelian premotion is a motion antecedent to the agent’s act whereby agent and patient are brought into proximity with one another such that the agent actually operates an effect. Above, the examples of heating and burning were used to illustrate the nature of Aristotelian premotion. But how is Aristotelian premotion to be understood in terms of God’s causation of human choices? How are agent (will) and patient (object willed) brought into ‘proximity’ so that choice results? According to Lonergan’s interpretation, God moves the will to the act of choice through the combined influence of a series of internal and external Aristotelian premotions.³³

Aristotelian premotions are denominated ‘internal’ if they are internal to the will and ‘external’ if they are external to the will.³⁴ Hereafter, ‘premotions’ will refer to ‘Aristotelian premotions’. The qualifier will be dropped for simplicity’s sake.

The internal premotion of the will is God’s direct causation of the will of the end.³⁵ Recall that the choice of means presupposes the will of the end. It is through an engagement with the *Eudemian Ethics* that Aquinas arrives at the notion that God, in the first instance, must move the will to willing the end.³⁶ There, in considering the genesis of deliberation {initium consiliandi}, Eudemus grapples with the problem of an infinite regress: What accounts for the *initium consiliandi*? The choice of means presupposes counsel; counsel presupposes a willing of the end, motivating the intellect to take counsel. But what moves the will to willing the end? If it moves itself to willing the end, this self-movement presupposes a previous act of counsel, which in turn

immediacy of his power. Thus, while the free choice has immediate causes other than God, God is more a cause of the free choice than the secondary cause(s), since those act only through his power.

32 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 445, 147; cf. 116–18.

33 In addition to the passages from *Grace and Freedom* cited below, see *De scientia*, 320–21.

34 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 101–02, 370–73.

35 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 378–79.

36 See *ST* I–II q. 9 a. 4; q. 109 a. 2 ad 1.

presupposes the willing of a further end. Since the regress cannot go on infinitely lest the will never will anything at all, a mover external to the will—namely, God—must be posited to account for the will's first willing of the end and the subsequent *initium consiliandi*. This first impetus from God moving the will to will the end initiates the process of deliberation and subsequent will acts.

God moves the will to will the end in one or both of two ways: by nature or by grace. God moves the will to willing the end in the order of nature by creating the will with the form it has. Since a thing acts by its form, whatever causes a thing's form also causes its act. By nature—by the will's own essence or natural form—the human will is oriented to happiness or to the good in general.³⁷ The will only wills anything as desirable; that is, under the aspect of good. However, God also “moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace.”³⁸ While all seek happiness, not all concretely seek happiness in that which is genuinely fulfilling. The greedy man desires to be happy, but in taking money for his end, does not will that which is truly perfective of him. In the case of conversion, God turns the heart of one who heretofore concretely willed an evil end so that he or she now wills some particular good end.³⁹ For example, by grace, God transforms the heart of a Scrooge from the love of money to a love of neighbor, or he moves the will of a drunkard to desire a life of sobriety. God moves the will in these cases by causing a new inclination to succeed a previous one, by causing a change of heart, a reorientation of the will's desires.⁴⁰ Such premotions, by which God moves the will directly to the willing of a new end, Lonergan calls ‘internal premotions’.

In addition to the internal premotions of the will, there are also premotions external to the will. It is important to note that while ‘external’ Aristotelian premotions are external to the will, they are not necessarily external to the acting person (subject). Accordingly, I will designate those external premotions that are exterior to the acting person ‘objective’ and those that are interior to the acting person (though still exterior to the will) ‘subjective’.

37 See, for example, *ST* I–II q. 1; q. 94 a. 2.

38 See *ST* I–II q. 9 a. 6 ad 3.

39 Prior to conversion, the evildoer's will still naturally will's the good in general, but the evildoer takes as his concrete end in acting something that is not genuinely good (even though he could not take it for his end unless he considered it under the aspect of good—that is, worthy of pursuit).

40 See *ST* I–II q. 111 a. 2.

Premotions external to the will are necessary because other conditions in addition to the willing of the end must be fulfilled in order for the will to will the means (choose). One could, for example, will the end actually and yet still not will the means because one lacks knowledge of possibilities.⁴¹ Thus, the illumination of the intellect, whereby it grasps potential objects of choice (and thus, possible courses of action) is a subjective external premotion. Concretely, such cognitive illuminations could result from ill health, admonition, or perhaps witnessing a certain event.⁴² Other subjective external premotions include one's being in a psychological state compatible with choice (i.e., not being impeded by depression, addiction, compulsion, or the cognitive inability to grasp possibilities for action as such etc.), as well as—it seems to me—one's being in a physical state compatible with choice.⁴³ Such a physical state would include the organic prerequisites to the psychological preconditions for choice, such as sufficient brain development, at least a limited ability to encounter the world through sense experience, and so forth.⁴⁴ Besides the subjective external preconditions of choice, there must also be objective possibilities for choice. One's intellectual grasp of possibilities presupposes their objective existence.

According to Lonergan's interpretation then, the act of choice presupposes the willing of the end, knowledge of possibilities, and the fulfillment of all the other subjective and objective conditions necessary for choice (including those conditions necessary for the willing of the end and grasp of possibilities, both of which choice presupposes). Lonergan understands the fulfillment of these preconditions as the 'Aristotelian premotion' (or 'Thomist application') of the will. The various ways in which each of these preconditions is fulfilled, then, are called 'Aristotelian premotions'. Aristotelian premotions are secondary causes. They cause choice. The complex intersection of internal and external premotions required for choice leads directly to the second important aspect of Lonergan's account, which is fate.

2.2 *Fate*

Fate, for Aquinas, is divine governance as it exists in the governed.⁴⁵ Divine governance is the execution of providence, or the plan according to which

41 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 378.

42 See, for example, Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 101–02.

43 See Stebbins, 245–48.

44 It seems inconceivable that one who was never able in any way to encounter the world through sense experience, however limited, would be able to grasp possibilities for action.

45 See *ST* I q. 116 aa. 1–2.

God knows and makes the world to be.⁴⁶ Hence, the order of the world as it exists in the divine intellect is called 'providence' and is identical with the divine essence. As it exists in created things, however, this world-order is called 'fate'. It is crucial to note that while Aquinas admits the existence of fate, he does not conceive of it as opposed to the contingency of events in the world. As Aquinas understands it, fate includes the genuinely contingent because God transcendently causes even the mode of his effects.

If what has been said in the preceding subsection concerns Aristotelian promotions taken individually, fate concerns the seriation or complex pattern of such promotions taken collectively as a set. If Aristotelian promotion terminates in the proximity between a created agent and patient that "enables mover to act upon moved", then "fate is simply the dynamic pattern of such relations."⁴⁷ Fate "is the order of secondary causes; it is their disposition, arrangement, seriation; it is not a quality, and much less is it a substance; it is in the category of relation."⁴⁸ Fate, then, is the relation (pattern) of relations (of proximity between movers and moveds), the macro-scale pattern or web comprising every combination or interference of secondary causes (among which are included Aristotelian promotions).⁴⁹

According to Lonergan's interpretation, *fate*, not physical premotion, is the *intentio* of *ODP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7, by which God works in all the operations of creaturely agents by premoving them (in the Aristotelian sense).⁵⁰ Fate, for Lonergan, is not a secondary cause apart from other secondary causes; rather, it is the very order or pattern of secondary causes. Fate is, therefore, a cause only in conjunction with the secondary causes it orders.⁵¹ As we saw above, any one act of choice depends on a *complexio* of Aristotelian promotions. What is more, the act of choice is conditioned upon which promotions obtain and when. *This* act of choice requires *these* Aristotelian promotions to obtain and not others, at *these* times and not others.

Fate is the key for understanding how, on Lonergan's interpretation, God can cause free choices with infallible certainty. For Lonergan, God applies the will to the act of choice through a complex combination or series of internal and external promotions by which he respectively controls both the will's exercise and its specification and thus brings it about that the will chooses

46 See *ST I* q. 22 a. 1; q. 103 a. 1.

47 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 86.

48 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 86.

49 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 84.

50 See Lonergan, *De ente*, 218–19, 252–53.

51 See *ST I* q. 116 a. 2.

exactly when and as it does. By controlling every “combination or interference” of secondary causes, God controls the act of choice down to the last detail, but he does so without causing the act of choice directly.⁵² By manipulating only conditions outside the act of choice, God leaves the will with its own “strip of autonomy” whereby it remains free, for “what exerts an effect by fulfilling conditions does not influence the essence of the effect, but rather its existence.”⁵³ God maneuvers the human will by grasping it outside the bounds of freedom, just as a swordsman moves the tip of the sword by grasping only the hilt.⁵⁴

Still, the question arises as to how the will remains free if the antecedents to choice determine choice. For even if God does not cause choice directly, if choice is determined by the created antecedents God puts in place, free choice seems to be lost. How does Lonergan deal with this difficulty?

The answer is, through an appeal (a) to the *per accidens*, and (b) to the theorem of divine transcendence.⁵⁵

Lonergan explains that, in the divided sense (that is, understood in abstraction from providence or fate) the seriation of Aristotelian premotions from which choice necessarily results is a merely accidental arrangement. No one Aristotelian premotion causes the act of choice and the web of premotions working in concert that does cause choice is not a *causa per se*.⁵⁶ Therefore, there is no created, *per se* cause that necessitates choice. Consequently, choice remains free.

On the other hand, considered in the composed sense—that is, together with providence or fate—the complex web of premotions that cause choice is not accidental, but is rather an intelligible, intended ordering. This does not compromise freedom of choice, however, because of divine transcendence: God makes both the necessary and the contingent to be.⁵⁷ Thus, while understood as intended by God, the pattern of premotions which is fate is not an accidental arrangement, God’s intending the arrangement does not take away its contingency as an arrangement. Since God’s intending the arrangement does not undermine its contingency, the contingency of what follows from the arrangement is not undermined either. Thus, just as a choice caused by a merely accidental arrangement of secondary causes would remain contingent, so too a choice occasioned by a divinely arranged set of secondary causes does not

52 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 82; see also 116–17, 445.

53 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 147.

54 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 445.

55 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 79–82.

56 See Lonergan, *De ente*, 194–95.

57 See Lonergan, *De ente*, 196–97; *De scientia*, 274–81.

lose its contingency by virtue of the divine arrangement, since the only necessity in which that arrangement of secondary causes is rooted is the conditional necessity of the divine *fiat*, which does not destroy contingency, but rather gives rise to it, since God, as transcendent creator, causes both the necessary and the contingent.⁵⁸

3 A Constructive Critique of Lonergan's Interpretation

As indicated at the outset, several features of Lonergan's reading of Aquinas recommend it. Lonergan rightly perceives that the *de Auxiliis* dilemma is occasioned by the shared mistaken presuppositions of Báñez and Molina, and he attempts to break with these presuppositions through a fresh, historical reading of Aquinas. Lonergan's critique of physical premotion is cogent and indicates difficulties Molina touched upon, but did not develop in detail. Lonergan also rightly acknowledges that one must focus on divine transcendence to resolve the controversy. He moreover intends to affirm, on some level, free choice as self-determination and goes further than Báñez in maintaining that the antecedents to choice are not "rigorous determinants" of choice.⁵⁹ Finally, Lonergan draws our attention to the myriad specific ways in which choice is conditioned by created antecedent conditions, thus allowing what is true in compatibilism to be wholeheartedly affirmed rather than being given a mere heuristic nod. Lonergan's study of Aquinas on operative grace is brilliant and instructive. Its strengths are the basis for its salvageability, but the strengths and salvageability of Lonergan's interpretation also make it difficult to critique, for the chaff must be separated out from among much wheat. Such a constructive separation is required, however, in order to save the wheat and suggest a more satisfactory alternative to physical premotion. I shall try to carry out such a separation and suggest a more satisfactory proposal in the chapters that follow.

This part will be divided into two sections. In the first section, I will identify what I consider to be a crucial problem with Lonergan's interpretation. In the second section, I will then explore the underlying ideas whence this problem arises. Here, I argue that a crucial flaw of Lonergan's interpretation is that, according to it, a free choice is necessitated by created antecedents other than the free choice itself. I further argue that the origin of this mistake is a neglect of the full implications which the doctrine of creation has for our understanding of the divine causation of human free choices.

⁵⁸ See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 81–82, 117–118.

⁵⁹ Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 117.

Because Lonergan neglects the full import of creation, he attempts to explain the divine causation of human free choices in terms of the seriation of created antecedents to choice. His attempted explanation inevitably conceptualizes divine and human causality as contrastive (albeit in a more subtle and plausible way than Báñez or Molina): For Lonergan, God causes human free choices only indirectly, by manipulating conditions outside the act of free choice in order to leave the will with its own “strip of autonomy.”⁶⁰ However, to conceive of divine and human causality in such a way is a mistake, for creaturely agents never exist in causal autonomy from God; all their operations depend immediately on God’s creative causality.

3.1 *Lonergan’s Interpretation does not Successfully Save Free Choice*

According to Lonergan, God maneuvers the human will by grasping it outside the bounds of freedom just as a swordsman moves the tip of the sword by grasping only the hilt: By manipulating only conditions outside the act of choice, God is able to leave the will its own “strip of autonomy” because “what exerts an effect by fulfilling conditions does not influence the essence of the effect, but rather its existence.”⁶¹ It is left to the human free will to determine the essence, the specification of the choice. God alone causes the existence per se of the choice.⁶² But when it comes to *how* God causes the existence of the human free choice, Lonergan’s theological compatibilism comes to the fore. For while the human person is the per se cause of the specification of his or her free choice,

God too is a cause per se of this same specification of the will, since the specification is itself intelligibly contained in the antecedents of that free act. But there is a triple intelligible nexus between this free act and its antecedents; therefore, since God causes the antecedents, he also causes the specification of the free act.⁶³

60 The ultimate problem I have with this expression, as I hope to show in the subsequent section, is that creatures never exist in causal autonomy from God; they are utterly dependent on him for their operations; God causes the whole reality of creaturely acts, including human acts of free choice. One might say, therefore, that he causes them “all the way down.”

61 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 147, 445.

62 See Lonergan, *De ente*, 184–85; *De scientia*, 318–19, 338–39. Note a certain affinity of Lonergan’s position here with that of Molina, discussed above in Ch. 3. Also, in light of Lonergan’s theological compatibilism, it is worth recalling how, paradoxically, Molina has often been accused of espousing a ‘determinism of the circumstances’.

63 Lonergan, *De scientia*, 328–31.

A bit later, speaking of the various kinds of Aristotelian premotions described above, Lonergan continues,

The specification of this choice by a particular individual is intelligibly contained in the light in which one deliberates, in the end towards which one deliberates, in one's love for the end which motivates one's deliberation and decision, in the exterior and interior circumstances about which one deliberates, and in one's habits and dispositions of the body, the senses, the intellect, and the will itself; in accordance with all of these, deliberation and decision will spontaneously be made, unless external divine providence or interior divine grace intervenes.⁶⁴

For Lonergan, the specification of the choice is contained in its antecedents. But he then goes on to explain how, despite this, the choice remains free:

Yet this nexus, although intelligible and determinate, is not a necessary one. The nexus in an explanatory and probative syllogism is not the same as the nexus in a rhetorical or dialectical syllogism. Each nexus is intelligible and determinate; but the former is necessary, the latter contingent.

Since, therefore, this nexus is contingent, freedom remains. But since it is intelligible and determinate, there is causality, causality on the part of God who alone is the proper cause of all the factors that contribute to the specification of the choice.⁶⁵

Lonergan's account is brilliant. But it is compatibilist.

On Lonergan's interpretation, the antecedents to choice are secondary causes of the act of choice. Lonergan maintains that God causes the act of free choice by manipulating these antecedents to free choice. It must be admitted, Lonergan's position is not hard determinism. Lonergan maintains that none of the antecedents to choice are "rigorous determinants" of choice.⁶⁶ Moreover, Lonergan realizes that Aristotelian premotions are created realities, and he rightly maintains that divine transcendence cannot be ascribed to any created reality. Lonergan's restriction of transcendence to God alone lies at the heart of his objection that Báñez implicitly ascribes divine transcendence to a created reality by positing a physical premotion between God and the human act of free choice. Lonergan, aware of this mistake, denies that Aristotelian

64 Lonergan, *De scientia*, 330–31; see also 334–35, 370–71.

65 Lonergan, *De scientia*, 330–33.

66 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 117.

promotions cause free choice with infallible certitude. If Aristotelian promotions caused free choice with infallible certainty, the choice would not be free; if they caused the choice as free, they could not cause it with infallible certainty. Only God can do that, and Lonergan maintains that God, and God alone, does do that. Lonergan is no openist; for him, the will chooses exactly as God wills it to choose.⁶⁷

As shown above, fate is the key to understanding Lonergan's account of how God causes free choices with infallible certitude. While Aristotelian promotions do not cause free choice with infallible certitude, *the whole set of Aristotelian promotions, as an arranged set*, does. But the arrangement of the whole set of Aristotelian promotions—by virtue of which arrangement, the promotions attain their effect efficaciously, working in concert—is nothing other than fate, and fate is just divine providence as it exists in things. Because of God's transcendence, providence does not impose necessity on things, and just as providence does not impose necessity, neither does fate: Fate includes both the necessary and the contingent. Thus, while the set of Aristotelian promotions (which, for Aristotle, was a merely accidental or happenstance arrangement, because Aristotle did not have the notion of a provident God), for Aquinas reduces to the providential plan of God, the universal cause, God's purposefully intending the arrangement of Aristotelian promotions does not, on Aquinas's account, compromise the contingency of that arrangement, for God stands outside the bounds of necessity and contingency, making both the necessary and the contingent to be.⁶⁸ For Aquinas, the arrangement of secondary causes is not happenstance as it is for Aristotle. Still, the contingency of the arrangement is not lost with Aquinas's provident God. The reason is that Aquinas understands God to be the universal cause of all being, both necessary and contingent. Thus, creation and divine transcendence do play an important role in Lonergan's account: They explain how God causes human choices without detriment to their freedom.

If this reading of Lonergan is correct, at least three philosophical criticisms can be made of his view (postponing momentarily the question of how accurate a reading of Aquinas it is).

The first is that while Lonergan rightly acknowledges the created antecedents to choice cannot be "rigorous determinants" of choice, he seems to ignore the fact that the whole providentially arranged set of secondary causes antecedent to choice *as an arranged set* is itself a created antecedent to choice.⁶⁹

67 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 336.

68 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 81–82, 104–111.

69 Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 117.

However, it is not unreasonable to consider the relevant secondary causes that antecede choice as a unified created reality precisely insofar as they constitute a single state of affairs. But if that is so, then there is a created antecedent which necessitates choice: Namely, the set of all (relevant) created antecedents to choice. For that set is clearly not God (therefore it is created), and the set, considered under the aspect of fate, infallibly causes choice. If this argument is sound, then Lonergan's account is liable to one of the same objections he makes to Báñez's: that transcendence is implicitly ascribed to a created reality.

Someone might object that Lonergan's position needs to be described more accurately as follows: Neither created causes individually nor as a set necessitate choice. Rather, the (conditionally) necessitating factor is the *arrangement* as such of the relevant antecedents, and this arrangement is not any one of the antecedents nor is it precisely the conglomeration of them. Rather, it is the form of their relations to each other. But while this may more plausibly render Lonergan's position, I do not think it saves his account. For the order 'impressed', as it were, on the antecedents to choice is as much a created effect of God as the antecedents themselves, whether taken individually or as a group.

The second point is that whether the Aristotelian premotions antecedent to choice are considered as a single, efficacious cause or as individual, partial or inefficacious causes, it remains the case that free choices are, on Lonergan's account, a function of exogenous antecedents. By viewing free choice as an effect necessitated by a set of antecedents distinct from itself, Lonergan neglects the fact that the act of free choice precisely as such, cannot be accounted for by anything other than itself. To affirm this point is not to deny that each free choice presupposes many external influences and necessary preconditions. Nor is it to deny that every act of free choice, just as it is, depends on God. But it is to say that nothing accounts for one's free choice's being a choice for this rather than that except one's very act of free choosing. By focusing on free choice as an effect of causes other than itself, Lonergan overlooks the important truth that free choice is not just an effect, but is at the same time, a cause—a kind of cause of itself.⁷⁰ To cause one's own act of free choice is not merely to will the end and know possibilities for action; one's causing one's own act of free choice just is one's free choosing.

In contrast, the caused-causing on Lonergan's schema is not the act of free choice as immediately caused by God, but the volition of the end, the intellection of possibilities, and the other subjective and objective exterior premotions of the will. These are all secondary causes of the act of free choice which are themselves caused by God. Thus on Lonergan's interpretation there is a

70 See Herbert McCabe, *God Matters* (London: Mowbray, 1987), 11–14, esp. 13.

sense in which the agent causes his own act of free choice: The agent's own capacities of intellect and will, and acts of these capacities *other than choice* cause the act of choice. But this 'self-causing' is not self-determination in the morally relevant sense, for one's free choices are, in this case, determined by aspects of one's self over which one has no control.

The third point is closely related to the first and second: While Lonergan's interpretation may give an account of the *contingency* of choice, it fails to account for the *freedom* of choice. Aristotle was able to save contingency through an appeal to the *per accidens*, but while he did have a notion of the voluntary, he arguably never arrived at the precise notion of free choice. Similarly, by understanding choice as the product of a contingent arrangement of antecedent causes, Lonergan can show how choice is contingent, but he cannot show how choice is free in the relevant sense. Choice is contingent because its proximate cause—the antecedent nexus of relevant secondary causes—is contingent. But while the antecedent nexus of relevant secondary causes may be contingent, choice is not contingent with respect to that antecedent; rather it is contingent with the contingency of that antecedent. The resulting problem, again, is that such a choice is not up to its agent. Rather, it results from factors beyond the agent's control.

Someone might object that if Lonergan maintains free choices are necessitated by created antecedents, then he would seem to be committed to exactly the sort of "two-lane highway" with respect to the divine permission of sin which he identifies and explicitly rejects in Báñez.⁷¹ According to this view, God is (putatively) the first cause of one's sins through his non-provision of the antecedent(s) necessary to avoid sin, just as he is first cause of one's good acts by his provision of the necessary antecedent(s). Lonergan, however, explicitly opts for a "three-lane highway" according to which sin, as such, is a surd whose first cause is the human agent, not God. The three-lane view presupposes that free choices are up to their agents; this is how human persons can be the first cause of their own sins rather than God. If my critique of Lonergan is sound, how can I account for Lonergan's position on the divine permission of sin?

I think Lonergan's "three-lane" account of the permission of sin is sound. But it does not seem to me consistent with what he says—or at least implies—about the causation of free choices by Aristotelian premotion and fate. Two factors might at least partially explain this inconsistency.

Because Lonergan is attempting an historical analysis of Aquinas rather than advancing his own theory, he may have introduced the inconsistency without noticing that he was doing so. Had he been developing his own theory

71 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 111–12.

from the ground up, internal inconsistencies would have been less likely. Interpretation, however, adds a layer of complexity, for one works with a given text and set of ideas. It is possible that Aquinas's underlying account is both correct and internally consistent, and that Lonergan's reading of Aquinas is generally accurate, but defective on some points, such as the divine causation of human free choices.

Assuming that is so, how could Lonergan overlook the inconsistency in his interpretation of Aquinas? I think it is because Lonergan failed to see the whole providentially ordered set of Aristotelian promotions as itself a created antecedent to choice, or possibly because he sees the set as a contingent cause. Regarding that set of factors as itself contingent facilitated mistakenly supposing that the contingency of the occurrence of the choice they necessitated implied its freedom, so that sinners sin freely and are the first and only cause of their sins.

3.2 *Lonergan does not Understand God's Causation of Human Free Choices in Terms of Creation*

On Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas, God does not cause the act of free choice directly, but rather by exercising control over choice's created antecedents. I argued that this view is incompatible with the view that free choices are truly up to those making them. Here I will suggest that the root of this problem is that Lonergan fails to take sufficient account of divine transcendence and the idea of creation.

While divine transcendence and the idea of creation are presupposed by Lonergan's proposal, he does not mention the immediacy with which God causes human free choices. For Lonergan, God's being transcendent creator does explain how he can cause human choices as free, for as the creator, God causes both the necessary and the contingent, and only the creator has oversees all created causes: Thus, only God can arrange the determining seriation of antecedent causes.⁷² But to give an account of the divine causation of human choices in terms of divinely arranged antecedents is not to affirm that God, as creator, immediately causes the whole state of affairs of one's determining oneself in the act of choice in such a way that one's self-determination is not written in to the set of factors antecedent to the choice.

Lonergan advances a much more robust account of *how* God causes human free choices than anything explicit in Aquinas.⁷³ An explanation of the

⁷² See Lonergan, *De ente*, 184–85; *De scientia*, 332–33.

⁷³ Note too that when Lonergan gives his account of the 'how', it is markedly different from the account(s) explored in Ch. 7 below. Transcendence and the doctrine of creation have

'mechanics' of divine causality is ruled out in principle, however, for how God operates is as incomprehensible as the divine essence itself. Moreover, any attempted explanation of this *how* necessarily requires the introduction of a tertium quid (between God and the effect he causes), which, as has been shown, compromises both divine transcendence and human free choice. By developing an account of God's causation of human free choices only in terms of choice's antecedents, Lonergan's view is defective (though elements of it may be sound and salvageable). God's application of the human will to the act of free choice should not be thought of as indirect, through the manipulation of created antecedents only, but rather direct and immediate: God *creates* human acts of free choice in making human persons to be in the moment of their free choosing, just as he creates any conditions antecedent to a choice. God's immediate causation of the whole created universe (including someone's free choice) does not stop at the moment prior to that person's free choosing.

While Lonergan recognizes a certain connection between creation and application,⁷⁴ he does not seem to understand application—God's operation in the operations of created agents—in terms of creation. However, as I shall argue in the following chapter, both conservation and application are really aspects of God's creative causality. That is so because *esse*—the being of things—is God's proper effect,⁷⁵ so that all of God's activity *ad extra* should be understood as creative.

This does not mean that application should be reductively collapsed into creation (or conservation) any more than conservation should be reductively collapsed into creation. But the purpose of distinguishing conservation from creation is not to affirm a difference in divine activity. Rather it is to deny that creatures, while distinct from God, are independent of him.⁷⁶ But while it is necessary to affirm conservation to avoid placing mistaken limitations on God's causality, Aquinas understands conservation as ongoing creation of the universe, not some different mode of divine causation.⁷⁷ Similarly, the purpose of distinguishing application from creation and conservation is not to affirm

a role to play on Lonergan's account, but Lonergan never actually seems to develop the view that God immediately creates our acts of free choice (see, for example "On God," 56–57). Rather, his account of God's giving *esse* to our free choices is always articulated in terms of the created antecedents to choice.

74 See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, 86–90.

75 See *ST* I q. 8 q. 45 See also T.C. O'Brien, "Esse".

76 This was a mistake of the Deists: To think God creates without sustaining.

77 See *ST* I q. 104 a. 1.

a difference in divine activity, but rather to deny that the actual operation of creatures, while distinct from God, is independent of him.⁷⁸

Again, while it is necessary to affirm application as distinct from creation and conservation in order to avoid placing mistaken limitations on divine causality, if conservation is rightly understood as continual creation, application—God's operation in the operations of all creaturely agents—also should be understood in terms of creation: Divine application just is God's creative causality at work in the operations of creatures. Just as to think of God creating and then leaving alone without conserving is to misconstrue the nature of creation, so too to think of God conserving an agent in being but not making its operation to be is to misconstrue the nature of conservation: It is to separate acting subjects from their acts. In conserving a creature, God makes it to be at every moment of its existence. By implication, if a creature operates, God gives that creature its *esse* just as it is in the moment of its operation, which includes its very operating and its operating as it does.⁷⁹

Someone might object that God's making something to be does not necessarily exclude the activity of secondary causes. In fact, the activity of secondary causes is one thing that distinguishes creation—understood as God's causing the world at the first moment of its existence—from his causing the subsequent existence of the world. Creation is something God does alone without the use of means. Providence, however, is executed by means of created intermediaries.⁸⁰ For this reason, the objection would conclude, God causes the human act of free choice through created intermediaries—the antecedents to choice—as Lonergan maintains.

God's governance of the world, to some extent, can be explained by created causes. How does God cause the erosion of these dunes? In part, through the action of the tides. How does God cause the action of the tides? By the relative positions of the earth and moon, and so on. In affirming the mediated execution of providence, Aquinas affirms the real causal power of creatures. Creaturely operation is real and serves a real purpose; it is not a mere appearance or occasion of divine activity. But while God causes some things by means of others, his causation should be understood as properly creative, for God does not stand first in a causal chain as, perhaps, the 'big bang' does, or the way the moon's gravitation of the waters antecedes the action of the tides. Rather, God, as creator, immediately and eternally makes the whole order of

78 This was a mistake of William Durand of St. Pourçain: To think God creates and sustains creaturely powers but does not *apply* those powers to actual operation.

79 See James Ross, "Creation II," 128–35.

80 See *ST I* q. 103 a. 6.

secondary causes to be. While the tides really erode the dunes, God immediately and eternally creates the state of affairs of the dunes' eroding due to the tides.⁸¹

Does God then create human acts of free choice emerging from secondary causes antecedent to choice? The answer is yes insofar as antecedents bring free agents to the point where they must choose to act or not act, to choose this or that. But with respect to human agents' very free choosing, the answer is no. As we have just seen, there is no problem in principle with saying God immediately creates the emergence of certain effects from secondary causes, but as Molina's critique of Báñez convincingly shows, if free choices emerge with necessity from exogenous antecedents, the true freedom of the choice—and so the agent's moral responsibility—is undermined. Within the theological context of the *de Auxiliis* debate, that is enough reason to reject the possibility that God brings about the existence of free choices through the mediation of exogenous antecedents.⁸²

One important caveat must be made to the response given in the last paragraph, however: While it cannot be admitted that God causes agents to choose or not, and to choose this or that through created antecedents, this does not mean that such choosing is an exception to the teaching that providence is executed through created intermediaries. Rather, it is a unique case of that teaching. A human free choice is made by a human agent, though nothing but the agent's choosing determines it to be specified as it is. Inasmuch as free choices are determined by nothing but themselves, the act of free choice is understood to be a cause of itself. But in that case, one's free choosing is as much a cause as an effect, and so it can still be maintained that God causes free choice by means of a created intermediary, namely, the free choice itself.

81 See *ST* I q. 104 a. 2 ad 1.

82 Moral responsibility, which the context of the *de Auxiliis* debate assumes, is one reason for holding on to free choice. However, there are other reasons as well. While I do not think it possible, strictly speaking, to demonstrate free choice (understood in a non-compatibilist sense) philosophically, there are extremely strong philosophical reasons for thinking such a thing exists. It has been cogently argued that determinism cannot be reasonably maintained. See for instance, Joseph M. Boyle, Germain Grisez and Olaf Tollefsen, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), note in particular, the discussion of divine causality and human free choice (97–103); cf. Grisez, *Christian Moral Principles*, vol. 1 of *The Way of the Lord Jesus* (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 2-B (42–45) and Appendix 3 (63–67). Interestingly, while Boyle et al. argue for what in other respects would be a libertarian position, they maintain that free choices are divinely caused. For a less technical presentation of a similar line of thought, see McCabe, 10–24. See also McCabe's discussion of creation (2–9) and evil, (25–38).

Moreover, one could grant that the Aristotelian promotions to which Lonergan draws attention are necessary preconditions for choice and indeed influence it (even determining the options for it). But antecedents do not infallibly determine free choice. Moreover, just as one does not have to give up mediated governance to uphold free choice, neither does one have to give up the idea of fate. Fate must be conceived differently than Lonergan conceives it. Fate, rather than being limited to the order and disposition of the relevant antecedents to choice, includes the agent's free choosing itself. Fate is providence as it exists in things, and providence, as the plan of God's creative causality, extends immediately to free choices. Fate, then, just is the order of the world as it is—not only in the moments of its existence antecedent to a person's choice, but also in the moment of a person's free choosing. So, much of what Lonergan says about Aristotelian premotion and fate can be accepted and understood within the larger context of the doctrine of creation.

4 Conclusion

In interpreting Aquinas's views on operative and cooperative grace, Bernard Lonergan develops a textual critique of Báñez and identifies several differences between Aquinas and his Basque interpreter.

First, Lonergan argues that for Aquinas, an agent's transition from being merely able to act to actually acting does not involve an intrinsic change, a metaphysical perfection, of the agent. An evaluation of this point of Lonergan's critique is difficult for two reasons.

One reason is that the act in question—free choice—is an immanent act. Lonergan argues that the objective difference that comes about through the transition to act is the emergence of the effect. But when acting human beings make free choices, their choosing is an immanent action; its effect is self-determination within the human agent. The interiority of the act of free choice at least makes it harder to see how a person does not undergo an intrinsic change in the act of choice, for an act of free choice is certainly something real. It is difficult, therefore, to see how a choice, as an entity in an agent's will or a residual disposition (*habitus*) of an agent's character, is not a metaphysical perfection of the agent. Free choice, as an exercise in self-determination, truly is transformative of the chooser: Choosing is more a matter of who we become in and through our choices than simply of what we do. Choices last as dispositions of the self.

Another complication is that Lonergan argues if the transition to act did involve an intrinsic change in the agent, then there would be no unmoved

mover.⁸³ In making that argument, however, Lonergan generalizes about efficient causation from what must be true of God's causing. But the proposition that God cannot be changed in causing creatures to change hardly implies that creatures need not undergo change in causing changes in themselves and in one another. This aspect of Lonergan's critique of Báñez at least requires one or more premises that Lonergan has not supplied.

Second, Lonergan argues that Aquinas and Báñez conceive of causation differently. Whereas for Aquinas, causation is the emergence of the effect in relation to its cause, for Báñez, causation is a mediate entity—something added to the cause as causing. This point of Lonergan's critique seems fair and grounded.

Third, Lonergan argues—soundly—that a proper appreciation of divine transcendence excludes recourse to physical premotion: God can antecede a human free choice and cause it without detriment to its freedom, but a physical premotion, as a created antecedent to choice, cannot similarly necessitate the choice without detriment to its freedom.

In contrast to Báñez's position, Lonergan offers his own alternative reading of Aquinas, which attempts to recover Aquinas from the anachronistic suppositions of later scholastic controversy. Central to Lonergan's account are the ideas of Aristotelian premotion and fate. While Lonergan rejects the physical premotion of Báñez, he does discover a kind of premotion in Aquinas: In the case of free choice, agent and patient are, as it were, brought into proximity by the intersection of a range of requirements and conditioning factors of choice internal and external to the agent. These include the willing of the end, awareness of objective possibilities, the existence of objective possibilities themselves, and so forth. None of these factors is itself capable of resulting in a determinate choice, but the whole arrangement of these antecedent factors—an arrangement God alone can orchestrate in his role as transcendent creator—does, *as an arrangement*, result in a determinate (and conditionally necessary) choice. Still, Lonergan argues that choice remains free because this arrangement of antecedent factors is merely *per accidens* (at least considered in abstraction from divine providence). This nexus of antecedent factors is not a *per se* cause of choice. This position is incompatible with what I hold to be true, namely, that when people make free choices, no difference except that in their choosing itself accounts for the fact that they choose rather than not choosing and choose this rather than some alternative.

Lonergan gets many things right philosophically and historically, and his work genuinely advances our understanding of the *de Auxiliis* problematic.

83 For the five ways, see *ST* I q. 2 a. 3 c.

First, Lonergan is clear that causation is attributed to God by “extrinsic denomination.”⁸⁴ Second, he identifies efficient causality as a real relation, not some intermediating entity between cause and effect.⁸⁵ Both of these points support Lonergan’s further claim that it is on account of God’s transcendence (as the cause of *esse*) that his causal efficacy extends to the contingent or necessary mode in which his effects obtain.⁸⁶ Lonergan also maintains that God can cause the action of a secondary cause and in the case of interior actual grace, the grace just is the creature’s own (vital) secondary act.⁸⁷ Beyond this, Lonergan also has a penetrating awareness of the way choice is conditioned by many antecedent factors. Finally, Lonergan rightly pointed out that both sides in the Controversy *de Auxiliis* were deficient, and this deficiency was due to certain shared preconceptions. Lonergan’s critique of Báñez is convincing so far as it goes, though one cannot help but notice he is much harder on Báñez than on Molina. This is initially surprising insofar as his position seems to be as much a corrective to Molina’s view as to Báñez’s.⁸⁸

Despite the strengths of Lonergan’s work, his proposal is like other forms of theological compatibilism. As such, it is liable to the same fundamental criticism as other forms of theological compatibilism, including the principal objection Molina levels against Báñez’s view. Lonergan’s position is unsatisfactory because incompatible with a strong sense of freedom—the sort of freedom that we experience in choosing, that is required for moral responsibility, that is defensible by philosophical argument and that is plausibly confirmed by some passages of Scripture and the teaching of the Council of Trent.

Finally, I suggested in closing that a more satisfactory account of divine causality and human free choice must attend to the full implications of divine transcendence and the doctrine of creation. I shall attempt to develop such an account in the final two chapters.

84 See for example, Lonergan, *De ente*, 198–99, 200–01; *De scientia*, 272–73, 326–27.

85 See for example, Lonergan, *De ente*, 182–83; *De scientia*, 316–319; “On God,” 55–57, 59.

86 See for example, Lonergan, *De ente*, 196–97; *De scientia*, 274–81.

87 See for example, Lonergan, *De ente*, 184–85, 230–31, 234–35.

88 This is less surprising, however, in light of Lonergan’s background and the context in which his work on divine causality and human free choice developed. Lonergan’s own theological formation was Jesuit and scholastic; the *De ente* and *De scientia* were developed for courses taught at the Jesuit College of the Immaculate Conception in Montreal and Regis College, Toronto.

Creation, Causal Priority and Human Freedom: Revisiting Thomas Aquinas

[S]trictly speaking, “necessary” and “contingent”, follow upon “being” as such. Whence the modes of contingency and necessity fall under the providence of God—who is the universal provider of all being.¹

[I]t is to be said of creation that, according as it is signified as change, the creature is a terminus, but according as it truly is—a relation—the creature is its subject and is prior to it in existence, just as a subject to an accident. But it [creation] has a certain notion of priority on the part of the object to which it is referred, which is the principle of the creature.²

THOMAS AQUINAS

The position proposed in this and the next chapter comprises two related theses, one historical, the other, speculative. The first thesis—the subject of the present chapter—is that Thomas understands God’s movement of the human free-choice capacity {*liberum arbitrium*} as an instance of God’s creative causality. The second thesis—the subject of the final chapter—is that this understanding is philosophically preferable to the two main alternatives in play within Catholic thought since the late sixteenth century, namely, the theory of physical premotion championed by such Thomists as Domingo Báñez and Diego Alvarez on the one hand, and on the other, the theory of general concurrence with middle knowledge proposed by such Jesuits as Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez.

This chapter has three parts. In the first part, I will set forth the first thesis and some apparent difficulties it. In the second part, I provide textual support for the first thesis. In the third part, having argued that God’s motion of the human will is, for Aquinas, a variation on the theme of creation, I will offer an interpretation of *ST I q. 45 a. 3*. This text is pivotal in because an attentive reading of it allows one to discern Thomas’s authentic position on the ontological status of God’s creative causality.

1 *ST I q. 22 a. 4 ad 3*.

2 *ST I q. 45 a. 3 ad 3*.

1 The Thesis that Aquinas Understands God's Motion of the Human Will as an Exercise of God's Creative Causality

The first thesis I wish to defend is that for Aquinas, God's causation of human free choices—his movement of human *liberum arbitrium* to act—must be understood in terms of creation. By this, I mean that for Thomas, God *creates* human acts of free choice: His causation of them must be understood as a creative act. By 'creative act' I mean an act that results in the existence as such of the effect—not just the effect's being this or that, or its being in a particular kind of way, but its being as such. Such an act—the imparting of *esse*—is necessarily *ex nihilo* and therefore immediate, and it is within the power of the creator alone to perform.³

There appear to be, however, at least two serious difficulties with this position.

1.1 *This Position is not Explicit in Aquinas and is Arguably Anachronistic*

The first difficulty for the thesis that God's movement of human *liberum arbitrium* is a creative act involves two related challenges. First, Aquinas nowhere explicitly articulates the view I attribute to him. Second, the question that frames the present inquiry was never a central preoccupation for Aquinas as it was for his interpreters from the sixteenth century onward. With one exception—a short letter to the abbot of Monte Cassino on divine foreknowledge and human freedom, which Thomas wrote on his way to the Council of Lyons shortly before his death—Thomas devotes no work or extended treatise within a work to the relationship of human freedom to God's providence or causality.⁴

By contrast, there are many sixteenth-century texts, some running hundreds of folio pages or even multiple volumes with some inflection of *liberum arbitrium* in the title. Luis de Molina's *Concordia*, for example—which sparked the Controversy *de Auxiliis*—is mainly an extended and original commentary on *ST I q. 14 a. 13* and a few closely related articles.

The decisive event which, more than any other, accounts for this shift, was the Protestant Reformation. The Reformers' teaching on justification *sola fide*—the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*—with their attendant teachings on predestination and merit, forced the question of divine causality and

³ Note this is Thomas's view, but Suarez disagrees.

⁴ For a translation of the *Epistola ad Bernardum* together with commentary, see Benedict Guevin, O.S.B., "Aquinas's Last Words: To the Monks of Monte Cassino," *American Benedictine Review* 55, no. 3 (2004): 265–272.

human free choice to the forefront as it had never been before.⁵ Thus, one must not expect from Aquinas a clear resolution of questions about divine causality

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- 5 In his essay, "Determinismo y libertad: sobre la existencia del libre arbitrio en F. Suárez y D. Báñez" (presented at *Más Allá de lo Medieval: La Mondernidad de los Pensadores del Siglo de Oro Español*, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, ES, 25–26 Sept. 2008), Father García Cuadrado insightfully traces the modernity of Báñez's (and Suárez's) thought on freedom to Luther's denial of free choice, which set the context for the discussion. Luther's views on the bondage of the will were central to his theology and marked a paradigm shift in Christian reflection on divine governance and human liberty. The result was that thinkers after him had to confront a series of questions distinct from those faced by earlier medieval thinkers, such as Aquinas. On the theological importance of Luther's *De servo arbitrio*, see J.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston, "Historical and Theological Introduction," in Martin Luther, *The Bondage of the Will: The Masterwork of the Great Reformer*, trans. J.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston (Grand Rapids, MI: Fleming H. Revell, 1993), 40–52. Note finally certain crucial factors that underlie Luther's stated position on free choice. The concerns of the *De servo arbitrio* are overwhelmingly theological as opposed to philosophical. Luther's interest is not in the nature and reality of free choice in itself; rather, his interest in the question is occasioned by questions of sin and grace. Still, despite the specifically theological concerns of the *De servo*, Luther cannot avoid landing in a certain philosophical position on freedom and divine causality by default. It seems the kind of freedom Luther is most concerned to deny is not the libertarian's definition of freedom (ability to do otherwise in the presence of all antecedent factors except the choice itself), but rather, freedom as the ability to do good after the fall in the absence of grace. In his denial of a Pelagian view of freedom, Luther winds up espousing a determinist or compatibilist view of freedom that leads him to reject libertarian definitions by implication. Note that Pelagianism and libertarianism are not the same and if the former presupposes the latter, the latter does not presuppose or entail the former. Relatedly, to reject Pelagianism, one need not be a compatibilist (or a determinist). How Luther gets in to his position on freedom can be understood chiefly from the following two factors: Remotely, there is the influence of nominalist positions on freedom of the will, merit and the optimistic view of the human person's ability to do good without grace. Luther is both formed by this tradition and reactive against it. Proximately, there is Erasmus's imprecise definition of free choice, which is the immediate occasion for Luther's writing of the *De servo* (this is unfortunately compounded by Luther, whose own attempt to deal with the issue is hindered by a lack of philosophical precision). According to Erasmus, free choice is the "power of human will by which man can apply himself to things which will lead to eternal salvation or turn away from them" (see the Rupp translation of Erasmus' *Diatribes*, 47). Erasmus frames the question in a way that unnecessarily invites the objection that free choice is a Pelagian concept and Luther assumes the parameters of discussion set by Erasmus. In sum, Luther (1) denies free choice (as Erasmus defines it); (2) believes the will still retains, in the postlapsarian state, some kind of mutability or perhaps even capacity for self-determination in respect to trivial, mundane things not bearing upon salvation (freedom in respect to things below); and also (3) believes the will is necessitated by either God or sin, but still is not violated insofar as it is not coerced. Crucially, Luther distinguishes necessity from coercion and maintains that

and human freedom that were shaped directly by the Protestant Reformation and indirectly by the approach to theological discourse that took root still earlier—in the fourteenth century. To think, for example, that Thomas had already resolved the Controversy *de Auxiliis* in the thirteenth century would be simplistic. It would fail to appreciate the force of the contending claims that drove the controversy, as well as the earnestness of the protagonists' efforts at developing an account of those claims' coherence.⁶ The context in which Thomas worked was quite different from that of the sixteenth-century debates over human free will and the efficacy of grace. However, this turns out to be an advantage, for, as I shall try to show, Aquinas also does not share the presuppositions that made the sixteenth-century controversy an insoluble dilemma.

Still, questions of divine governance and human free choice, especially theological questions about the intersection of grace and freedom in justification, predestination and merit, were posed before the Protestant Reformation and Thomas devoted limited, though careful attention to each of these issues. But insofar as those issues were never his central preoccupation, the details of his position on the coherence of the universality and infallibility of God's action with human free choice remains largely implicit and must be inferred from his writings.⁷ However, while Aquinas offers no explicit resolution of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* and his use of the 'motion' idiom when speaking of God's causation of free human acts invites misinterpretation (while in other respects being not only helpful, but necessary), a careful explication of truths drawn from Thomas's works makes it clear how the Controversy *de Auxiliis* could have been avoided or resolved.

the will is necessitated but not coerced. He maintains that the will is bound in the sense that it is necessitated to doing as it does, but this is not tantamount to coercion. The distinction of necessity from coercion (which Calvin seems to accept) opens the door for others to maintain a kind of theological compatibilism: The human person is determined to act as he does by God, but he is at the same time still 'free' insofar as his will remains uncoerced—no violence is done to it.

6 Alfred Freddoso has made a similar observation in his unpublished paper, "Introduction to the Problem of Free Will and Divine Causality," originally presented at the 2013 Aquinas Philosophy Workshop at Mount St. Mary College, Newburgh, NY <<http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddoso/papers/freedom%20and%20God.pdf>>.

7 Thus, the potential liabilities identified here—latency and anachronism—do not pertain exclusively to the position I defend, but also to physical premotion. This is important to note, because whatever may be said in response to the alleged difficulties, the position I defend is at least in no worse a position than that defended by Báñez.

1.2 *Thomas Expressly Uses the Idiom of 'Motion'*

The second difficulty with the first thesis proposed above is this: When Thomas deals with God's causation of human free choices, he usually speaks in terms of '*motion*' (or sometimes '*application*'), not '*creation*'. Moreover, it was shown above how proponents of physical premotion, intending to follow Aquinas, explicitly reject the idea that God's causation of a human free choice is an act of creation.⁸ They do so for two principled, related reasons.

1.2.1 'Motion' does not Mean the Same Thing as 'Creation'

The first reason is that '*motion*' presupposes the existence of the subject that is moved, while creation, being *ex nihilo*, does not presuppose the existence of the subject that is created. Whereas creation results in the inception of a thing, motion is the *change* of an existing subject. Thomas is careful to distinguish creation from motion and to maintain that creation is *not* motion, as, for example, in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3. God's causation of a human free choice does not seem to be an instance of creation, but of motion, for when God causes a human free choice, he brings about a change—the actualization of an existing potency—namely, the '*vital potency*' of *liberum arbitrium*. The human person and his or her free will are presupposed by God's moving that will to act.

Someone might, therefore, argue that it is a category mistake to think of motion as a kind of creation. '*Creating*' and '*moving*' are two different relational predicates ascribed to God and the predications assume two different frames of reference, which must be kept distinct. According to this objection, to say that divine moving is an instance of God's creative causality conflates the two different relational predicates of '*moving*' and '*creating*'. It is one thing to ask, assuming Aristotle's potency-act doctrine, what (ultimately) *moves* the will. It is another thing to ask, assuming the doctrine of creation, what (ultimately) makes a free choice *to be*. The distinction of frames of reference arises from the distinction of the apprehended effects, which are the bases for the questions and their respective answers. The first question asks about the cause of a *change* (change being the apprehended effect, the basis for the relational predication), whereas the second asks about the cause of *existence* (contingent existence being the apprehended effect, the basis for the relational predication).

Questions have to be answered from within the frame of reference that the question assumes. It is not enough for the truth of an answer to a question that the answer just accurately pick out the way things are. The answer must

8 See Ch. 2, 1.2.

also take into account the terms in which the question is posed and be framed in equivalent terms: The answer must *level with* the question. Otherwise, the answer does not meet the question and is irrelevant, even if it does pick out the way things are, and to that extent, is true *on its own terms*, if not *as an answer to the question*. To the question of what changes the will, then, an answer cast in terms of creation might seem to be no answer at all.

1.2.2 The 'Motion' Idiom is Philosophically Preferable to 'Creation'

The second reason for denying that God's causation of human free choices should be understood in terms of creation is this: To the extent that the created subject which undergoes change is presupposed by God's action of changing it, the real agency of the created subject as a secondary cause under God's motion is upheld. This is because motion, as an actuation of an existing potency, allows for a clear distinction between God and the existing created potency he actuates, and to that extent, between his act and its act. In contrast, what is created is not brought about by secondary causes.⁹ Thus it may seem that if human free choices are created by God, then God is the sole agent of those choices so that they are not *human free* choices at all. Presupposing the existence of the subject that is moved by God to act is thus thought necessary to avoid occasionalism.¹⁰

In light of these two points, Thomas's use of 'motion' as the idiom for talking about the divine causation of human actions is motivated. But what does 'motion' mean when used to signify God's transeunt action? How does Thomas conceive of motion when the mover is the transcendent creator? I think that in the final analysis, 'motion' in these contexts is simply a way of referring to God's creative causality. This is important because while motion language, rightly understood, is perfectly appropriate (indeed necessary), it can also invite confusion, especially if the demands of the unique subject matter—divine action—are not borne in mind. When this is not borne in mind, a distorted understanding of divine causality is the result, and the inescapable alternatives become *Dieu déterminant ou déterminé*, as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange observed.¹¹

9 See *ST I* q. 45 a. 8.

10 See Ch. 2, 1.2; cf. *QDP* q. 3 a. 8 s.c. 2.

11 See Garrigou-Lagrange, "Epilogue," in *God, His Existence and His Nature*, 2:529–562.

2 A Textual Argument for Understanding God's Motion of the Human Will as an Exercise of His Creative Causality

Despite the apparent difficulties, there are good textual grounds for thinking that Aquinas understands God's motion of the human free will as an instance of God's creative causality. Textual support for this position may be grouped under four main headings. First, there is the connection between God's ineffable simplicity and his *esse*-communicating causality. Second, there is a contextual shift in the sense of 'motion'. In this connection, Thomas's appeal to the same simile (light in the air) and the same biblical passage (Is 26.12) across different contexts argues for a common understanding of divine causality in those contexts. Third, Thomas's rationale for maintaining that God can produce contingent effects as contingent is the universal scope of God's agency as creative and the subordination of modality to being. Fourth, there are several passages where Thomas raises the same kind of question about God's governing activity as he raises about creation, namely, whether God's action is something in his effects. Attention to these passages suggests a common understanding of the ontological status of divine causality.

In this part, I will consider in turn each of these features of Aquinas's thought.

2.1 *Divine Causality is Inherently Creative*

First, divine transeunt action is inherently creative. In order to understand what Thomas says about God moving something, one must place it within the wider context of his teaching on God and creation. Thomas maintains that, "since God is existence itself by his very essence, it is necessary that created existence is his proper effect."¹² Because God's nature is his very being—indeed, is existence itself—God's proper effect is the being of things. It is important to grasp the full import of this claim, for in some way, all causes have being {*esse*} for their effect. What, then, sets God apart from created causes? Thomas's claim is not just that God causes things to be this or that, to be such or otherwise.¹³ His claim is more radical: It concerns the very act whereby things besides God are, full stop, not just are *what* they are, whether essentially or accidentally. Thomas's point is not about substantial or accidental form, but about *esse*. God causes beings *as beings*, not just as beings *of a certain kind or specification*.

12 See *ST I* q. 8 a. 1 c.: "Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius." Cf. *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 c.; See also T.C. O'Brien's essay, "*Esse*: the Proper Effect of God Alone."

13 See *ST I* q. 44 a. 2.

God causes the being of things *as such*. This is not to say creation is an indeterminate bestowal of *esse*, that God causes existence without delimiting it, as though there could be finite but indeterminate *esse*. Rather, it is to say that God's creative causality reaches beyond the formal and accidental specification of a thing to its very existing at all. God's causality is total and inclusive of everything positive there is—of every thing and everything positive in a thing.

Thus, for Thomas, "it is necessary to say that everything which in any way is, is from God."¹⁴ Whatever is, but is not its own existence, exists in complete dependence on what exists of itself—on that which is *ipsum esse subsistens*. What is singular about divine causality is precisely that it is *not* a moving or a making—is *not* a matter of merely effecting change, of drawing something new from given realities. Rather, it is a matter of communicating sheer existence—of causing a thing to be, all the way down. Because of what God is, whenever God acts *ad extra*, he acts creatively.¹⁵

2.2 *The Terms 'Motion' and 'Creation' have Different Senses in Different Contexts*

The claim that because of what God is, whenever he acts *ad extra*, he acts creatively, merits explanation, however, because God's transeunt activity seems to include things besides creation. God does not only bring a creature about at its inception, he also sustains it in being and governs it over the course of its existence. And Aquinas explicitly talks about divine governance, at least, in terms of motion. 'Motion', however, means different things for Aquinas in different contexts. When Thomas's aim is to distinguish God's action from the actions of creatures, he juxtaposes creation and motion in order to illustrate how God's action is different. In other contexts, where Thomas's aim is not to distinguish divine and creaturely action, but differing instances of divine action, he uses 'motion' to illustrate how God's application of creatures differs from his making them to be at their inception and his conserving them in being. 'Motion', then, has different senses: Sometimes it specifically designates creatures' way of causing, whereas at other times it signifies a mode of divine causality.

Crucially, however, divine causality can only be parsed into distinct 'modes' from a creaturely perspective. That is because *time* is the prism which refracts the clear light of God's *esse*-communicating action into the spectrum of

14 ST I q. 44 a. 1 c.: "necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse."

15 See ST I q. 103 a. 5 where Thomas explicitly connects the theme of creation as explained here to divine governance in general and to God's causation of human free choices in particular.

creation, conservation and application.¹⁶ Whereas creation marks the beginning of time, conservation and application are only intelligible within the context of time. Conservation is the holding in being, through a duration, of what existed before, while application is the motion (change) of an existing being, and change implies before and after. Thus, time allows a principled distinction to be made between creation in the strict sense (hereafter ‘creation *de novo*’) and a broader understanding of God’s creative causality as conservation and application. The crucial point, however, is that despite these distinctions, what God is up to in each case is fundamentally the same: He is making to-be. Temporality is a feature of God’s effects, but it is not a feature of God himself (or his action, insofar as that is identified with the divine essence).

What this reveals is that just as Aquinas understands motion differently in different contexts, so too he understands creation differently in different contexts. For Thomas, creation is not only the initial making to be of a thing (what I have above called ‘creation *de novo*’). Besides this narrow sense, an attentive reading suggests that Thomas also understands creation in a broader way, such that the conservation of things and even their application to act are instances of God’s creative causality. Creation, for Thomas, is architectonic and pertains to creatures’ ongoing relation to God, not only their dependence on him for beginning to be.

2.2.1 Thomas Re-tools the Concept of Motion When Speaking of God’s Action

According to *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 c., God operates in the operations of creatures in the following ways: First, by creating (*de novo*) the causal powers of created agents. Second, by conserving the causal powers of created agents. Third, by moving, or applying to act, the causal powers of created agents.¹⁷ Fourth, by giving the created agent a certain participation in his own causal power. In this fourth way, God operates in the operations of creatures “as a principal agent is the cause of the action of an instrument.”¹⁸

In enumerating four ways God causes the action of a created agent, Thomas does not limit the discussion to creation, conservation and motion (the first three points). Rather, he goes one step further by linking motion to participation and instrumentality, which he treats as a distinct, fourth point. However,

16 Is God’s transeunt action one or manifold? From the side of God, it is unitary and eternal, whereas from the side of his effects (that is, predicated relationally of God), it is manifold and timed.

17 I take ‘motion’ and ‘application’ to be interchangeable for Aquinas.

18 *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 c.: “sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrumenti.”

while Thomas's discussion of participation and instrumentality is distinct, following upon the third point about motion, context makes it clear that this fourth point about participation and instrumentality is best understood as an elaboration of the third: It is precisely a primary agent's *moving* or *applying* a secondary, instrumental, cause to act that makes the instrument *participate* in the causality of the primary agent. In his fourth point, then, Thomas invokes Proclus's doctrine of participation and instrumentality to expand in an original way on Aristotle's doctrine of potency and act. When the scriptural doctrine of creation is added to the synthesis, the result is that an instrumental cause cannot transition to act except by the power of God, because the transition to act is an emergence of being, and being is the proper effect of God alone. As the texts examined above indicate, being is God's proper effect because of divine simplicity: God's very essence is to-be.¹⁹

Because Thomas's teaching on application is not simply an instance of Aristotle's potency/act doctrine, but a synthesis that combines Aristotle's teaching on motion with biblical assumptions about creation, what creation entails about the divine nature, and Proclus's doctrine of participation and instrumentality, it does not involve a category mistake to read Aquinas's teaching on divine application as an expansion of his teaching on God's creative causality. For Thomas, the question of change is ultimately a question about the *being* of change. It will not do to read Aquinas on divine application strictly in terms of Aristotle's potency/act doctrine without noticing the difference creation and divine simplicity make to the idea of God's moving. Aquinas re-conceptualizes divine motion as a creaturely participation in God's making to-be.

2.2.2 God's Creative Causality is 'Like Light in the Air'

Textual support for this view can be found further along in *ST* I q. 8 a. 1. After arguing that God's proper effect is the being of things because he is being by nature, Thomas continues: "God causes this effect in things [i.e. existence] not only when they begin to be, but whenever they are conserved in being, just as light is caused in the air by the sun whenever the air remains illuminated."²⁰ God's creative activity—his communication of *esse*—does not pertain only to the inception of things, but also to their continued existence. Just as air is

19 See part 2.1 above; see also *ST* I q. 8 a. 1; q. 44 aa. 1–2; q. 103 a. 5.

20 "Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illuminatus manet."

illuminated by a source of light only so long as the light source continues to shine, so too, creatures exist only so long as God causes them to exist.

This same idea also appears in *ST* I q. 104 a. 1 ad 4 where Thomas explains that God's conservation of a thing is not by some new or different action than that by which he initially brought the thing about, but is simply a continuation of that initial *esse*-communicating action. Conservation, in other words, is continuous creation.²¹ But in identifying conservation as continuous creation, Thomas is not espousing occasionalism or denying the identity of a created thing through time. His point is precisely that a given thing lasts (with its substantial identity) through time due to God's ongoing causation of its existence. Aquinas's position really encompasses the following two related points: (1) While the existence God gives created things is not his own divine existence, but rather their own distinct act of being, (2) precisely insofar as that act by which created things exist is *given* by God, it always remains a dependent, received existence.²² The idea of participation thus forestalls occasionalism: The creature exists through time by an act of being which is its own continuous act of being, even while the creature is not the *source* of its own continuous act of being. Thomas illustrates this point once again by the example of illuminated air: The illumination of air is distinct from the principle of that illumination (light in the air is not the sun), but the air cannot go on being illuminated if the principle of its illumination stops shining. If the light source stops shining, the air becomes instantaneously dark.²³ Similarly,

21 Thomas is not here espousing occasionalism or denying the identity of a created thing through time. His point is simply that precisely how a given thing persists through time is by God's continuous communication of existence to it. While the existence God communicates is not divine existence, but the creature's own distinct act, still, the act by which the created thing is, is a participated (read: 'dependent') existence. Thomas borrows the Platonic 'participation' idiom, but re-tools it intensionally to work within the context of the Christian doctrine of creation.

22 On the theme of participation and the influence of the *Book of Causes*, see Sr. Louise-Marie Antoniotti, O.P., "La premotion divine: Saint Thomas D'Aquin et l'auteur du liber de causis," in *Atti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale*, Studi Tomistici 17 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982), 65–66. See also Michael J. Dodds, O.P., "The Doctrine of Divine Causality in Aquinas and the *Book of Causes*: One Key to Understanding the Nature of Divine Action," paper given to the Summer Thomistic Institute at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, July 2000 <<http://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/tioo/dodds.htm>> (14 July 2008).

23 Note how Thomas contrasts the example of light in the air with the example of heat (*ST* I q. 104 a. 1), which continues in the object heated after it is removed from the heat source, diminishing only gradually, and opts for the former as a simile for God's creative causality. Thomas's appeal to the example of light in the air is intelligible on a common-sense level.

when God imparts being, the creature at once begins to exist, and it would instantly cease to exist were God to withdraw his agency, so radical is the creature's dependence on God.

Aquinas's claim that conservation is the same reality as creation, just understood in a broader sense, may also be extended to God's application of creatures. This is supported by Thomas's use of a simile to illustrate divine application in *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 that is almost identical to the one used in *ST* I q. 8 a. 1 and q. 104 a. 1 ad 4 (considered above) to illustrate conservation. In *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7—the locus classicus for physical premotion—Aquinas compares God's agency applying secondary causes to act to “colors in the air” or “the power of art in the instrument of the artisan”. Thus, the *intentio sola, habens esse quodam incompletum* which has been at the heart of centuries of controversy, is but an extension of God's creative and conserving causality.

The substantive similarity of the “colors in the air” simile of *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 to the “light in the air” simile of *ST* I q. 8 a. 1 and q. 104 a. 1 ad 4 may be seen from comparison to *ST* I q. 105 a. 5—a parallel text to *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7, concerning God's operation in the operations of secondary causes. The two similes converge in *ST* I q. 105 a. 5 in a way that shows Aquinas's appeal to each simile illustrates the same point about divine causality. In the context of *ST* I q. 105 a. 5, Thomas argues that God not only applies creatures to act, moving them to operation like a woodsman's applying an axe to cutting (another example also employed in *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7); God creates and conserves those powers by which a creature acts. Thus, there is a short discussion of conservation embedded within a discussion whose principal focus is divine application. In the course of this brief interlude about God's conservation of created powers, Thomas's likens God's conserving activity to the sun, which “is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors insofar as it bestows and conserves the light by which colors are manifested.”²⁴ Whereas in *ST* I q. 8 a. 1 and q. 104 a. 1 ad 4 God's conserving activity was likened to light in the air and in *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 God's applying activity was likened to colors in the air, here (in *ST* I q. 105 a. 5), God's conserving activity is likened to light by which colors are made manifest. The passage from *ST* I q. 105 a. 5 links the other two similes and suggests that the point is the same in each context whether Thomas is

It must of course be borne in mind that Thomas did not know that light travels through the air at a certain speed (however great) and thus that illumination is not strictly instantaneous. His point about divine causality (or created things' relation to God) is that it is immediate and instantaneous.

24 *ST* I q. 105 a. 5: “prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis colorum, inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores.”

talking about creation, conservation or application: Creatures depend on God in the same immediate kind of way for their continuance and operation as for their inception—it is like the way light in a diaphanous body or the reflection of color depends immediately and constantly on a source of illumination. The dependence of creatures on God in operating is but an extension of their dependence on him in being.

2.2.3 Recourse to a Common Scriptural Passage: Is 26.12

The claim that creation can be understood in this wider sense (as extending to conservation and application) is further suggested by Thomas's recourse to the same scriptural passage—Is 26.12—in *ST* I q. 8 a. 1, q. 105 a. 5 and *QDP* q. 3 a. 7.²⁵ One might expect to see recourse to Is 26.12 in the context of *ST* I q. 105. a. 5 and its parallel, *QDP* q. 3 a. 7, for those contexts concern God's operation in secondary causes, and the relevant part of the passage from Isaiah asserts, "it is you who have accomplished for us all our works."²⁶ But it is curious that Thomas cites this passage in the *sed contra* of *ST* I q. 8 a. 1, which is ostensibly about God's omnipresence as creator and conserver of things. In fact, Aquinas appeals to Isaiah to *ground* the claim God is everywhere, for "an agent is wherever it operates" and as Thomas interprets the passage, Isaiah at least implies that God operates in all things. It is arresting that Is 26. 12 is invoked to support the claim of *ST* I q. 8 a. 1 that God operates in all things *making them to be*, for the manifest claim of Is. 26.12 is that God operates *in human persons making them to act (operate)*.

The citation of Isaiah is not so curious however, if one observes how fluidly Thomas moves between creation, conservation and application, conceptually linking them. Just as Thomas addresses conservation in the context of a discussion of application, so here he addresses application in the context of a discussion principally centered on creation and conservation. The thought in *ST* I q. 8 a. 1 would seem to be that if God operates *even* in the operations of creatures, then clearly he must operate in them so that they simply exist. It is as though it should be obvious to the reader that application is inclusive

25 Another interesting passage in which Thomas makes reference to Is 26.12 is, unsurprisingly, his commentary on Phil 2.13: "It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish {Deus est enim, qui operatur in vobis et velle, et perficere}." Conversely, Thomas's commentary on Is 26.12 refers to Phil 2.13. In the Philippians commentary, however, Thomas cites the Isaiah passage not to stress divine causality, but rather the reality and integrity of distinctly *human* agency under divine causality—the point of emphasis being it is *our works* God accomplishes in us.

26 "[O]mnia enim opera nostra operatus es nobis."

of (or demands) conservation and creation, whereas it might not be so clear that creation and even conservation include or demand application.²⁷ The idea of application, as an extension or implication of creation, reveals how thoroughgoing a claim the doctrine of creation is: God's causation of a thing is total. Things depend on God *all the way down*, inclusive of their operations. The claim that God applies creatures to action—particularly *free* creatures—is perhaps the most radical claim of creation.²⁸

2.3 *Aquinas Explains God's Ability to Produce Contingent Effects in Terms of His Creative Power*

A third reason for understanding God's application of human persons to the act of free choice as a mode of his creative causality is discovered by reading *ST* I q. 19 a. 8, on the divine will, in light of *ST* I q. 22 a. 4, on divine providence.

In *ST* I q. 22 a. 4, Thomas considers the question of whether God's providence imposes necessity on things subject to it. Thomas concludes that divine providence imposes necessity on some things, but not all: God wills certain effects to happen necessarily, so he prepares necessary causes for them, whereas he wills other effects to happen contingently, so he prepares contingent causes for them.²⁹ Comparison with *ST* I q. 19 a. 8 (concerning whether God's will imposes necessity on what he wills) reveals that Aquinas's position comprises two complementary points.

The first is that the contingency or necessity of a particular effect is a function of that effect's proximate cause. Thus, modality is relativized to secondary causes. God is not *within* the domain of contingency and necessity—the domain of created being—because he is not *a* being, but transcendent *ipsum esse subsistens*.

The second point, however, is that the modality of an effect, while directly related to the modality of its proximate created cause, cannot be attributed

27 Consider, for example, the perspective that God merely creates causal powers or (like Durand's view) creates and conserves them. For a good related discussion, see Alfred Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough," *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991): 553–85. See also his, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects," *ACPQ* 67 (1994): 131–56.

28 In respect to this, consider the force of Thomas's remark in the commentary on Jn 15.5 ("apart from me, you can do nothing {sine me nihil potestis facere}"): "For look what the Lord says here, that without him not only are we unable to do great things, but neither are we able to do little things; indeed we are able to do nothing {Ecce enim Dominus hic dicit, quod sine ipso non solum magna, sed nec minima, immo nihil facere possumus}" (*Sup. Ioan.* c. 15 l. 1).

29 Cf. *ST* I q. 23 a. 6.

solely or even principally to the proximate created cause. Instead, contingency and necessity are ultimately rooted in the divine will, which is perfectly efficacious.³⁰ Thomas explains:

When any cause is efficacious for acting, the effect follows the cause not only according to that which is done, but also according to the mode of occurring or being...[s]ince, therefore, the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things are done which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way God wills them to be done.³¹

Aquinas makes two important points in this passage. The first is that God's will extends not only to what obtains, but also to the manner (or mode) in which it obtains. The very modality of an effect is an aspect of the effect, considered holistically, that God brings about. That modality is included within God's total intention. The second and equally important point is that God's ability to bring about the mode of his effects is due to the efficacy of his will. Paradoxically, it is precisely the perfect *efficacy* of the divine will that accounts for the contingency of things, not some fallibility or limitation (even a self-imposed limitation) of the divine will.³²

30 Thus, while *ST* I q. 22 a. 4 emphasizes the proximate created cause as the source of the contingency or necessity of an effect, Thomas could safely make this point in q. 22 because he had already forestalled its almost certain misinterpretation in *ST* I q. 19 a. 8, which traces the ultimate source of contingency and necessity to God. *ST* I q. 19 a. 8 does not deny that the proximate created cause is the source of the contingency or necessity of an effect, it simply denies the proximate created cause is the *ultimate* source of contingency or necessity of the effect. Thus, the article on providence does not contradict the earlier article on the divine will, but supposes it and differs in its point of emphasis.

31 *ST* I q. 19 a. 8 c.: "Cum enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum fiendi vel essendi...[c]um igitur voluntas divina sit efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult."

32 Does it not then follow that all effects are necessary with respect to God? In a sense yes, but one must appreciate what Aquinas is actually claiming. It is *not* that the infallibility of God's will simply makes what God wills to be necessary, but rather that in some cases, what God's willing 'necessitates' is the very *contingency* with which something obtains. God's will is infallible and God wills some things to be contingent, which means that some things are infallibly contingent. In the background here is the distinction between the composed and divided senses of 'necessity'. An effect that is contingent in the divided sense can be necessary in the composed sense, but in the composed sense, necessity does not properly pertain to the consequent itself, but to the *consequence* as a whole—that is,

On its own, however, this second point (about the efficacy of God's will) does little more than assert that God causes the necessity or contingency of things. It claims that God causes the contingent and the necessary because he has the effective power to cause the contingent and the necessary, but it does not offer any explanation of this power. No substantive rationale is offered for *why* God's will extends efficaciously to the mode of his effects. However, the reason why God's will extends to the mode of his effects can be seen in *ST* I q. 22 a. 4.

In *ST* I q. 22 a. 4, Thomas explains that contingency and necessity are "grades of being" {gradus essendi} and that it is conducive to the perfection of the universe as a whole that it include every grade of being. For this reason, divine providence, insofar as it concerns the good of the universe as a whole, ordains both the necessary and the contingent.

What is meant by the identification of contingency and necessity as *gradus essendi* emerges more clearly in Thomas's reply to the third argument. There, Thomas urges the reader to,

[c]onsider that, strictly speaking, 'necessary' and 'contingent', follow upon 'being' as such. Whence the modes of contingency and necessity fall under the providence of God—who is the universal provider

to the consequent's *following from* the antecedent. Hence the corresponding distinction of *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis* or de dicto and de re necessity (for the earlier discussion of these pivotal distinctions see Ch. 2). Add to this that God's willing of some effect—precisely because it is efficacious and productive of the total effect—just is the obtaining of that effect (in relation to God). The result is that the kind of necessity a contingent effect has on the condition God efficaciously wills it (necessity of consequence), is comparable to the kind of necessity Socrates' sitting has in and while he is sitting (*ST* I q. 19 a. 3; q. 14 a. 13 ad 2): Anything that is, while it is, must necessarily be (see Aristotle, *On Interpretation* 19a 23). But this is just to claim that a contingent state of affairs is necessary *in its very obtaining*, not that it is necessitated by its antecedents—temporal or natural—such that it could not be otherwise. Understood this way, the manner in which God's will 'necessitates' a putatively contingent effect does nothing to undercut the real contingency of that effect. In light of this, note further that God's willing the contingent as such does not thereby exclude the particular determination of the contingent effect (as *this*, when it might have been *that* or *not*) from the scope of God's will, as though by willing something to happen contingently, God has to 'step back' and let the cards fall where they may. Rather, God's will envelops the total effect—both what specifically obtains and the manner in which that specific thing obtains. His will's extension to the former aspect does not compromise in any way his will's extension to the latter, and vice-versa.

[i.e. the universal providence, the universal cause] of all being—not under the provision of any particular providers [i.e. particular causes].³³

The crucial idea here is the identification of contingency and necessity as *modi* or *gradus essendi*. As ‘modes’ or ‘grades’ of being, contingency and necessity are features of being, subordinate to it. This finally explains why God can cause both the contingent and the necessary as such: As the creator, God is the cause of the total being of things. Therefore, God is the cause of whatever positively pertains to or characterizes being—whatever, as Thomas says, *consequitur ens*.³⁴ The perfect efficacy of God’s will in *ST* I q. 19 a. 8 can now be understood. God’s will is perfectly efficacious because it reaches to the very bottom of what is innermost in things, namely, their *esse*.³⁵ And God’s creative power—his ability to be the cause of the total being of things—is rooted in his simple, transcendent essence, which Thomas signifies as *ipsum esse subsistens*. Creation implies God’s simplicity, God’s simplicity explains his creative power, and his creative power explains his ability to produce contingent effects precisely as *contingent*.³⁶ The key, again, is to appreciate what a total, radical claim

33 *ST* I q. 22 a. 4 ad 3: “Et considerandum est quod necessarium et contingens proprie consequuntur ens, inquantum huiusmodi. Unde modus contingentiae et necessitatis cadit sub provisione Dei, qui est universalis provisor totius entis, non autem sub provisione aliquorum particularium provisorum.” It is noteworthy that Thomas employs the present active participle in the cited passage, not the infinitive *esse*. The translation above is prompted by the similarity of this passage to other passages where Aquinas considers qualifications of the term ‘being’ {ens}, such as ‘good’, ‘one’ and ‘true’ (*ST* I q. 5 aa. 1–2, q. 11 a. 1, q. 16 aa. 3–4). It is interesting that in these passages Thomas considers not whether *bonitas*, *unitas* and *veritas* are convertible with *esse*, but rather whether *bonum*, *unum* and *verum* are convertible with *ens*. In these contexts, Aquinas focuses on the terms and especially the *rationes* by which they signify, and the logical sequence of these *rationes*. Although in the present context, Thomas does not say that ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’ are convertible with ‘being’, his claim that ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’ ‘follow upon’ being is reminiscent of his claim that ‘true’ is logically prior to ‘good’ and that ‘being’ {ens} is logically prior to both. In each case, ‘ens’ signifies the fundamental reality. The other terms simply pick out *ens* under various *rationes* or aspects. The point, therefore, is that contingency and necessity are features of created being, which, in its totality, is God’s proper effect. Modality is subordinate to being as such.

34 By ‘positively pertains’ I mean to exclude privation. Aquinas makes a strong case in other contexts for the asymmetry of God’s causal involvement in bringing about good effects and his permission of evil. See, for example, *ST* I q. 49 aa. 2–3; cf. I–II q. 79 aa. 1–2.

35 Thus God is said to work *interiorly* in the will.

36 And necessary effects as necessary.

the doctrine of creation is: God causes things all the way down, through their very core.

2.4 *The 'God's-action-in-created-effects Texts'*

Fourth, the idea that God's movement of the human will to the act of choice should be understood in terms of creation is supported by a set of texts I shall call the 'God's-action-in-created-effects texts'.³⁷ Attention to these texts connects God's application of creatures to operation with creation by highlighting a peculiar turn of phrase that surfaces in passages concerning creation, conservation and governance.

2.4.1 Is Creation Something in the Creature?

In *ST* I q. 45 a. 3—a passage that will be the focal point of the final part of this chapter—Thomas considers a peculiar question: Is creation is something in the creature? The origin of this sort of question can be traced to the discussion of motion in Bk. III of Aristotle's *Physics*.³⁸ There, Aristotle ponders what sort of reality motion, or 'change', is. Aristotle considers motion relatively as either action or passion—two of the nine categories of accidental being (motion is not itself a category). But given that action and passion are motion, *where* is motion to be found? Is action something in the agent and passion something in the patient, or are both something in the patient? I do not wish to delay over the details of Aristotle's account, but simply to note the origin of the otherwise curious sort of question Thomas poses about creation.

Thomas's answer to the question distinguishes an active sense of 'creation' from a passive one and identifies 'creation' in the active sense with the divine essence (plus a conceptual relation to the creature), while positing that 'creation' in the passive sense is a unilateral real relation (in the ordinary predicamental sense) of the creature to God.³⁹ Thus, 'creation', passively understood,

37 My consideration of these texts below is not meant to be exhaustive.

38 See Aristotle, *Physics*, 202a 25.

39 A relation is 'predicamental' or 'categorical' if it is understood in terms of Aristotle's discussion of relations as accidents in the *Categories*. Predicamental relations stand in contrast to 'transcendental relations', which are discussed again below in the context of Suárez's view of efficient causality. This distinction is important because there is controversy over the ontology of transcendental relations, whether the present context concerns a predicamental relation or a transcendental relation, and whether Thomas even admits the existence of transcendental relations. See the appendix to Krempel's study, *La doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas: Exposé historique et systématique* (Paris: Vrin, 1952), 645–670. Thomas does not seem to have ever employed the terms 'transcendental relation' (or 'transcendental respect', 'habitude', etc.). The terms, or at least the concept

is something in the creature: Creation is in the creature as an accident inheres in a subject.

2.4.2 Is Predestination Something in the Predestined and Governance Something in the Governed?

But the text on creation (*ST* I q. 45 a. 3) is not the only place Thomas raises the issue of whether God's action is some reality in God's effects. In densely laden *ST* I q. 23 a. 2, Aquinas considers whether predestination places anything in the predestined. His position is that predestination is not something in the predestined because predestination is an aspect of divine providence, and providence pertains to God's knowledge: Providence is the divine idea {ratio} of the direction of things to their fulfillment, what Thomas elsewhere calls the 'eternal law' and likens to prudence.⁴⁰ In short, providence is God's

of transcendental relation seems to have arisen with Scotus. See Mark G. Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 78–82. However, it is commonly held by some of Aquinas's later interpreters, rightly or wrongly, that his relations *secundum dici* refer to transcendental relations. The admission of transcendental relations, therefore, does not seem to correspond to one specific school (with Thomists, for example, rejecting them, and Scotists or Suarezians admitting them). Many Thomist authors (including Báñez), accept an idea of transcendental relation, though there is debate among Thomists on whether the creature's real relation to God in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 should be understood as a predicamental or transcendental relation. There also seems to be disagreement at least between Thomist commentators and Suárez on the nature of transcendental relations. For at least some Thomist authors, transcendental relations are relations *secundum dici*. However, it seems to me relations *secundum dici* are not relations in the strict sense at all, but relative names for the *relata*. This is quite different from the way Suárez talks about transcendental relations in his discussions of efficient causality in the *DM*. However, it is difficult to arrive at a clear understanding of these issues given the present state of our knowledge of early modern scholasticism, much less of discussions about the ontology of relations during this period. Interesting and relevant as the issue of transcendental relations is for understanding creation, it seems manifest from context that for Aquinas, creation passively considered is a predicamental relation (*ST* I q. 45 a. 3).

40 See *ST* I q. 22 a. 1; I–II q. 91 a. 1; q. 93 aa. 1, 4. Thomas defines providence as the type {ratio} of the order of things to their end. By identifying providence as a *ratio*, Aquinas situates providence within the discussion of the divine ideas (see q. 15, esp. aa. 2–3). But rather than being the idea of say, the form of some created substance, providence is the idea of the *direction* of created substances to their fulfillment, the *pattern* of the trajectory of things to their good. Providence is the divine master plan, the idea of the order of the universe. As an aside, it is this reality of which the natural moral law is an aspect. For Aquinas, the natural moral law is the rational creature's cognitive tapping-in to the Father's ordering wisdom. Note how this defines Aquinas's fundamental stance toward moral norms as truths about the good to be observed for the sake of fulfillment rather

ordering wisdom, the sapiential pattern according to which God *governs*, or moves creatures to their end.⁴¹ Predestination, by comparison, is the divine idea of the ordering of those who in fact are ultimately saved to their salvation. Predestination is thus a more circumscribed domain than providence. It is a specification of God's universal providence. Because predestination is an aspect of providence, and providence pertains to God's knowledge, predestination pertains to God's knowledge. And because knowledge is in the knower, not in the known, predestination is not something in the predestined, but in God. Likewise, providence is not in the things subject to providence, but in God.

However, providence is one thing and its execution—which Aquinas calls 'governance'—another.⁴² There is the divine plan, on the one hand and, on the other, there is its carrying-out. Thomas thus qualifies in an important way his position that predestination is not in the predestined: While providence (and by extension, predestination) is not in things, but in the divine intellect, *governance*—the actual implementation of providence, *is* in things. Moreover, in the present context (*ST* I q. 23 a. 3), like in the discussion of creation surveyed above (*ST* I q. 45 a. 3), Thomas distinguishes active and passive senses of 'divine governance' and explains that governance is passively in the thing that is governed just as creation is passively something in the creature. By extension, one might reasonably infer that active governance, like active creation, just is the divine essence with a conceptual relation to the creature (the creature that, in this case, is governed, or *moved* by God).

2.4.3 Is Fate in Things?

The same sort of question about whether God's action is something in his effect appears again in *ST* I q. 116 a. 2 on fate. There, Thomas considers whether fate is in created things. Thomas understands fate to be the impression of providence in secondary causes.⁴³ Fate is the nexus, the sequence as such, of secondary

than as an assertion of rules to be obeyed merely of the basis of the ruler's power or to avoid punishment.

41 Note the important connections here between governance, motion and application: God's applying creatures to act, his *moving* them—including in the act of free choice—is an aspect of his broader universe-governing activity. In *ST* I q. 103 a. 1 ad 1, 3, Aquinas vividly likens God's governance to the 'impression' imparted to an arrow by the archer who shoots it (with an important caveat about divine governance, which is interior and non-violent, in contrast to the 'impression' an archer imparts to his arrow).

42 See *ST* I q. 22 a. 3 c.; I-II q. 93 aa. 1, 3–4.

43 Note the connection of the 'impression' metaphor here to *ST* I q. 103 a. 1 ad 1, 3, noted above, where governance (divine motion) depicted as a sort of 'impression'. 'Impression'

causes that converge to produce some determinate effect precisely insofar as they are ordered in that way. Fate then, is the disposition, the relation of secondary causes one to another, which is such that some determinate result follows.⁴⁴ As an impression of providence, fate is providence as it exists in certain things, namely, secondary causes. Fate is thus a specification, a more circumscribed domain, of governance, for governance is providence as it exists in things; it is a sort of impression of divine providence stamped into the created order somewhat like the way a minter's die strikes the ruler's image into a soft metal blank to make a coin.

Thus, there are at least two important ways fate differs from providence and one important way it differs from governance. Fate differs from providence, first, insofar as providence is universal in scope, whereas fate concerns only what is brought about by secondary causes.⁴⁵ Second, fate differs from providence insofar as providence is in God, whereas fate, like governance, is in things. But while fate is like governance insofar as it is in things, fate also differs from governance insofar as the scope of governance is universal (since governance is the execution of providence, which is universal) while fate concerns only those things wrought by secondary causes.⁴⁶

2.4.4 The "*intentio*" of QDP q. 3 a. 7 ad 7

To summarize: In his discussion of creation in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3, Aquinas argues that creation is something in created things. Similarly, in discussing predestination, Aquinas argues that divine governance is something in created things. And in his treatise on divine governance, Aquinas argues in exactly the same way that fate is in created things. Now, whereas creation in the narrow sense (creation *de novo*) concerns the inception of things, divine governance concerns God's motion of things to an end, including his application of them to act. Thus, when it comes to identifying what or where God's transeunt action is Thomas talks about God's motion or application of creatures in the same way that he talks about creation: God's action, be it creation (*de novo*) or application, is a reality in his effect. This is a further reason for thinking Thomas under-

is thus a metaphor for divine action moving creatures to act, insofar as that divine action exists in creatures.

44 See *ST* I q. 116 a. 2 ad 3.

45 See *ST* I q. 116 a. 4. Thus, Thomas points out that whatever is immediately done by God, such as creation and the glorification of spiritual substances is not subject to fate, because such things are not subject to secondary causes.

46 See *ST* I q. 22 a. 2.

stands divine motion as a kind of broadly creative act. Moreover, this idea of God's transeunt action being a reality in the creature is strongly corroborated by contexts where Aquinas likens God's action to a kind of causal influx, such as the power of a workman in his tool, or the impression an archer imparts to an arrow he shoots.⁴⁷ Perhaps the most important of these passages is *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7—the locus classicus for physical premotion.

3 Aquinas on the Status of God's Creative Action: An Exposition of *ST* I q. 45 a. 3

Given the close relationship between the governance texts that affirm God's motion is a reality in the thing moved—especially *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7—and *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 where Aquinas affirms God's creative action is a reality in the thing created, I would suggest a careful analysis of *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 holds the key to the interpretation of the celebrated passage from *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 and thus in no small part, to the intelligibility of the mystery of divine causality and human free choice. For *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 and the governance texts are both about the same fundamental reality, namely, God's transeunt action. And it is in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 that one finds the most basic and precise discussion of the ontological status of God's transeunt action. Therefore, in this part, I will exposit *ST* I q. 45 a. 3. For the sake of the exposition, it is worth reproducing the passage in full:

Arg. 1 It would seem that creation is not something in the creature. For just as 'creation' understood in a passive sense, is attributed to the creature, 'creation' in an active sense is attributed to the creator. But 'creation' understood in an active sense is not something in the creator, because it would thus follow that there would be something temporal in God. Therefore, creation, understood in a passive sense, is not something in the creature.⁴⁸

Arg. 2 Furthermore, nothing is a medium between the creator and the creature. But creation is signified as a medium between both, for it is not the creator, insofar as it is not eternal, but neither is it a creature, because

⁴⁷ See *ST* I q. 105 a. 5, 1. 103 a. 1 ad 1; cf. q. 23 a. 1.

⁴⁸ "Videtur quod creatio non sit aliquid in creatura. Sicut enim creatio passive accepta attribuitur creaturae, ita creatio active accepta attribuitur creatori. Sed creatio active accepta non est aliquid in creatore, quia sic sequeretur quod in Deo esset aliquid temporale. Ergo creatio passive accepta non est aliquid in creatura."

it would then be necessary on the very same grounds to posit another creation by which creation is itself created, and so on ad infinitum.⁴⁹

Arg. 3 Furthermore, if creation is something besides the created substance, it must be an accident of it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore, the created thing would be the subject of creation and the thus the same thing would be both subject and the terminus of creation. And this is impossible because the subject is prior to the accident, and maintains the accident. But a terminus is posterior to the action and passion of which it is the terminus, and with that terminus existing, action and passion cease. Therefore, creation is not some thing.⁵⁰

s.c. On the contrary, it is greater for something to come about according to entire substance than according to substantial or accidental form. But generation, whether taken in a strict sense or in a qualified manner, by which something is according to its substantial or accidental form, is something in the generated thing. Therefore, so much more so is creation—by which something is according to its whole substance—something in the created thing.⁵¹

Corp. I reply, it is to be said that creation places something in the created thing according to a relation only, because that which is created is not by motion or change. For what is by motion or change is from something preexisting, which certainly happens in the particular productions of some things. But this cannot happen in the production of total existence by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Whence God, by creating, produces things without motion. However, subtracting motion from action and passion, nothing remains except relation, as was said.

49 “Praeterea, nihil est medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatio significatur ut medium inter utrumque, non enim est creator, cum non sit aeterna; neque creatura, quia oporteret eadem ratione aliam ponere creationem qua ipsa crearetur, et sic in infinitum. Creatio ergo non est aliquid.”

50 “Praeterea, si creatio est aliquid praeter substantiam creatam, oportet quod sit accidens eius. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo res creata esset subiectum creationis. Et sic idem esset subiectum creationis et terminus. Quod est impossibile, quia subiectum prius est accidente, et conservat accidens; terminus autem posterius est actione et passionem cuius est terminus, et eo existente cessat actio et passio. Igitur ipsa creatio non est aliqua res.”

51 “Sed contra, maius est fieri aliquid secundum totam substantiam, quam secundum formam substantialem vel accidentalem. Sed generatio simpliciter vel secundum quid, qua fit aliquid secundum formam substantialem vel accidentalem, est aliquid in generato. Ergo multo magis creatio, qua fit aliquid secundum totam substantiam, est aliquid in creato.”

Whence it remains that creation in the creature is nothing other than a certain relation to the creator, as to the principle of its [the creature's] existence, just as in passion, which is with motion, a relation to the principle of the motion is imported.⁵²

Ad 1 To the first, therefore, it is to be said that creation, actively signified, signifies the divine action, which is his essence with a relation to the creature. But a relation in God to creatures is not real, but according to reason only. However, the relation of creatures to God is a real relation, as was said above, when treating of the divine names.⁵³

Ad 2 To the second, that is to be said because creation is signified as a change just as was said. But change is a certain medium between mover and moved. Therefore also creation is signified as a medium between creator and creature. Nevertheless, creation taken passively is in the creature and is a creature. Neither however is it necessary that it [the relation that is creation] be created by another creation, because relations are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves (since by their very nature, they are postulated toward another), just as was said above when treating of the equality of the divine persons.⁵⁴

Ad 3 To the third, it is to be said of creation that, according as it is signified as change, the creature is a terminus; but according as it truly is—a relation—the creature is its subject and is prior to it in existence, just as a subject to an accident. But it [creation] has a certain notion of

52 "Respondeo dicendum quod creatio ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum. Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per mutationem. Quod enim fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti, quod quidem contingit in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium; non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius esse a causa universali omnium entium, quae est Deus. Unde Deus, creando, producit res sine motu. Subtracto autem motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse; sicut in passione quae est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus."

53 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creatio active significata significat actionem divinam, quae est eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed secundum rationem tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra dictum est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur."

54 "Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia creatio significatur ut mutatio, sicut dictum est; mutatio autem media quodammodo est inter movens et motum, ideo etiam creatio significatur ut media inter creatorem et creaturam. Tamen creatio passive accepta est in creatura, et est creatura. Neque tamen oportet quod alia creatione creetur, quia relationes, cum hoc ipsum quod sunt, ad aliquid dicantur, non referuntur per aliquas alias relationes, sed per seipsas; sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de aequalitate personarum ageretur."

priority on the part of the object to which it is posited, which is the principle of the creature. Nevertheless, neither is it necessary that whenever the creature would be, it should be said to be created, because ‘creation’ conveys a habitude of the creature to the creator with a certain novelty or inception.⁵⁵

3.1 *The Initial Arguments*

Each of the arguments Aquinas considers at the outset of *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 either conclude or entail that creation is not something in the creature.

The first argument distinguishes an active from a passive understanding of creation and argues on the basis of a certain parity between them that active creation cannot be something in God, since it takes place in time (and, one might add, is contingent), whereas God is eternal (and necessary). Now, the interlocutor reasons, because active creation is not something in God, conversely, passive creation cannot be something in the creature. The crucial piece of this argument is the interlocutor’s distinction of the active and passive senses of creation.

According to the second argument, creation is not something in the creature because it is not any thing real at all. Creation is *signified* as motion or change, that is, as a medium between two termini (creator and creature), but in reality, there can be no medium between creator and creature because the creator produces the creature in its totality, *ex nihilo* (and so immediately). The creature just is *constituted* in the act of creation. Why then even signify creation as a motion—a medium between agent and patient? The answer is because creation ostensibly cannot be God or a created thing. Creation cannot be God because, as in the first argument, it is temporal (and contingent), whereas God is eternal (and necessary). Yet, the interlocutor reasons, creation cannot be a creature, or else there would be an infinite regress of creations of creation. Thus, creation is only *signified* as a medium; it is not so in reality. Yet, as the reasoning of the argument shows, creation cannot be God or a creature.

Three points of the second argument are noteworthy. The first is the question it raises about the sort of reality creation is: Is it truly neither God nor the created thing? This question takes on special significance in light of the

55 “Ad tertium dicendum quod creationis, secundum quod significatur ut mutatio, creatura est terminus, sed secundum quod vere est relatio, creatura est eius subiectum, et prius ea in esse, sicut subiectum accidente. Sed habet quandam rationem prioritatis ex parte obiecti ad quod dicitur, quod est principium creaturae. Neque tamen oportet quod, quandiu creatura sit, dicatur creari, quia creatio importat habitudinem creaturae ad creatorem cum quadam novitate seu incoptione.”

first argument's distinction of active from passive creation. Second, whatever creation is in reality, it is signified as a change, a medium between creator and creature. Is such signification appropriate if creation is not really a change? Third, there is the alleged problem of an infinite regress if one affirms that creation is a created reality.

The third argument assumes the view of the second—that it is necessary to consider creation as change. The interlocutor in the third argument does not argue for this view of creation, but the reasoning of the second argument may be assumed: Creation must be a change, a mediating reality, between creator and creature because it is distinct from both. This view implies that creation is prior to the creature insofar as creation is the way to the created substance. The created substance is the *terminus ad quem*, the finish point in which the motion that is creation is consummated. On the other hand, however, if creation is not God or the created substance, it seems it can only be an accident inhering in the created substance. But if creation is an accident inhering in the created substance, then the creature is prior to creation the way any subject which supports or hosts an accident that inheres in it has ontological priority to that accident. Thus, the interlocutor confronts an aporia: The very reasoning which leads one to conclude that creation is metaphysically prior to the creature—reasoning which is warranted by the second argument—also seems to entail the contradictory conclusion that creation is metaphysically posterior to the creature.

There are two noteworthy aspects of the third argument. The first is the identification of creation as an accident and relatedly, its ontological posteriority, as an accident, to the created substance. The second is the recognition of the priority of creation to the created thing when creation is signified as change. As will become evident, these points take on special significance in light of the point in the second argument about the sort of reality creation is, and the first argument's distinction between active and passive creation.

3.2 *Aquinas's Basic Position*

Aquinas stakes his position on a comparison of creation to the production of the substantial or accidental forms of a substance.⁵⁶ If generation in either the strict or mitigated sense is something in the thing generated, then a fortiori, creation, which is the total production of the *suppositum*, not just its delimitation as 'this' or 'such', is something in the created thing.

56 Generation in the strict sense is the production of a thing's substantial form, or the production of a thing according to its substantial form, whereas the production of accidents (accidental forms) may be called 'generation' only by analogy.

However, Thomas qualifies the sense in which creation is in the creature: It is *in* the creature only as a *relation*. Creation's being a relation makes intelligible how creation can be *in* the creature because relations (at least predicamental relations) are accidents, and accidents have their being by *inhering* in subject.⁵⁷ In Thomas's view creation is in the creature only *as a relation* because creation is not the changing of a given thing, but the production of the total substance of the thing from nothing.⁵⁸

Now, action and passion are different ways of referring to the same reality, namely, motion. The road from Athens to Thebes is the road from Thebes to Athens, even while there is an objective logical difference between going from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens. Similarly, the proportion, 1:2 is the same as the proportion, 2:1 even though there is an opposite relation of the terms, and the slope of a line is the same whether it goes up or down.⁵⁹ In all of these examples, the underlying reality signified by the terms—a road, a ratio, a slope—is the same, though there is an objective difference in the relation of the terms. So too with action and passion in respect to motion. What defines the difference between the two ways of characterizing motion is relation. For the terms of a motion (the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*) are reciprocally related to each other *in* or *by* motion. Motion constitutes the terms in relation to one another. Motion itself can thus be viewed relatively as either action or passion depending on whether it is considered in respect to the agent or the patient.

What this indicates is that in a motion, besides the motion itself, there are a pair of reciprocal relations consequent upon the motion: That of the agent to

57 It is clear from Thomas's replies to the arguments that he is thinking of relation here in the ordinary Aristotelian sense—that is, as 'predicamental' relation, (sometimes also called 'categorical' or 'categorical' relation, from Aristotle's *Categories*). However, while this seems to be the plain sense of the text, the matter has been controversial. See Gilby's extensive footnote on *ST I* q. 45 a. 3 in the bilingual 1965 edition (8:38–39). Gilby discusses the pedigree of the interpretation that the creation relation is a predicamental relation, though also advocates a reading more open to the idea that creation is a transcendental relation (at least in the Thomist sense of a relation *secundum dici*).

58 Moreover, whereas some particular things are produced by secondary causes through change, the total production of every thing is from God. Thus it is not that some things result from secondary causes (which produce by way of making—that is, changing—given realities) and other things from God. Rather (as suggested by numerous other contexts where Thomas discusses secondary causality), all things are from God and some things are from secondary causes also.

59 For these examples, see Aristotle, *Physics*, 202a 15–b 30; cf. Gilby's note on *ST I* q. 45 a. 3.

the patient and that of the patient to the agent.⁶⁰ The motion can be viewed under either of these aspects and so variously designated ‘action’ or ‘passion’.

If then, action and passion are abstracted from motion, action and passion are reduced to relation. This is Thomas’s point: because creation is not really a change (even if it is sometimes signified as such) it can only be a relation.

3.3 *Aquinas’s Reply to the First Argument*

Now, in his reply to the first argument, Aquinas explains that the relation which is creation is a real relation in the creature only. It is a relation of the creature to God. However, Thomas does not simply deny God is related to creatures, for he affirms God is related to creatures by a conceptual relation (though he denies God is related to creatures by a real relation). In order to understand Aquinas’s claim in the reply to the first argument, it is necessary to first understand his distinction between real relations and conceptual relations, or “relations of reason.” And, in order to understand that distinction, it is useful to first become acquainted with Thomas’s view of relations in general.

3.3.1 Aquinas’s Teaching on Relations

Outside of the present context, Aquinas’s teaching on relations is found most importantly in *ST* I q. 13 a. 7, concerning human persons’ real but limited ability to talk about the transcendent creator, and in the first three articles of *ST* I q. 28, concerning the immanent relations that constitute the transcendent creator triune.⁶¹ The background for Aquinas’s teaching on relation is Aristotle’s *Categories*. There, having divided being into that which exists of itself (substance) and that which has its existence only in another (accidents), Aristotle then goes on to classify nine different ways of being in another: quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, habit, action and passion. Thus, ‘relation’ (literally, *πρός τι* or, for Aquinas, *ad aliud*—literally, ‘being toward’ or ‘respect to’ another) is one of the nine categories of accidental being.

While as an accident, a relation is a reality which exists by inhering in a subject, one important way relation differs from the other eight categories of accidents is that whereas the other categories, by their very nature, signify realities that are only intelligible as existing *in* a subject (take quality or quantity

60 See *ST* I q. 28 a. 4; cf. 13 a. 7, q. 41 a. 1 ad 2, q. 45 a. 2 ad 2.

61 For Aquinas’s teaching on relations, see also Henninger, *Relations*, 13ff.; “Aquinas on the Ontological Status of Relations,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25, no. 4 (1987): 491–515; as well as Jeffrey Brower, “Medieval Theories of Relations,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/relations-medieval/>>.

for instance), relation is intelligible apart from the notion of inherence in a subject insofar as ‘relation’ strictly designates not (or at least not principally) *aliquid in*, but simply *ad aliquid*.⁶² Put differently, relation, taken in a conceptually pure way, signifies not *aliquid*, so much as *ad*—reference-to. Whereas the other genera of accidental being concern aspects of a subject that are inward where the inwardness (inherence) is itself partly constitutive of the *ratio* of the genus of accident in question, the defining characteristic of relation as such is not inherence but ‘being toward’ another. Relations happen to inhere. But by their very *ratio*, relations do not point to themselves or to their subjects of inherence (like in the case of the other categories of accidents), but terminate in some other.

Thus, as Aquinas teaches in *ST* I q. 13 a. 7, relations have two ‘extremes’ {extrema}. The *extrema* of a relation are the subject in which the relation inheres and the terminus to which that subject is related.⁶³ The subject is related to the terminus *by* the relation that inheres in it, and this relation obtains or supervenes on some *fundamentum*. There must be some foundation that grounds the relation of the subject to the terminus, and this is the basis for positing the relation. For example, one piece of quartz bears a relation of similarity to another on the basis of its particular crystalline structure and chemical composition (which distinguish it, say from limestone or a diamond). Thus, classical interpretations of Aquinas have identified four “notes” of a (predicamental) relation; namely, the subject, the foundation, the relation itself and the terminus.

In *ST* I q. 13 a. 7, Thomas explains that relations can be real—by which he means entities in the order of nature—or they can be conceptual {relationes rationis}—by which he means intentional beings, entities in the order of thought. Thomas distinguishes three ways in which a relation is real or conceptual. This determination is made on the basis of its two extremes.

First, a pair of mutually opposed, or reciprocal, relations are conceptual when the order between the related extremes only obtains in reasoning. In this case, though the relations are objective, they are not real in the physical order; they do not have a natural existence in the extremes. Rather, such relations exist only in thought insofar as one extreme is referred to the other in

62 The words *aliquid in* are my own, but cf. *ST* I q. 28 a. 1 c.

63 In the case of a relation, the two extremes are terminologically differentiated as ‘subject’ and ‘terminus’, whereas in the case of motion, the two extremes are both identified as ‘termini’—the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*. Relation, unlike motion, is not envisioned as a medium between the extremes, but is the very reference of one extreme to the other.

reasoning. For example, a thing has a relation of identity to itself in thought only, for reason projects as two *relata* something that is one in the physical order.⁶⁴ Similarly, Thomas appeals to the example of the relations of genus and species—classifications which are consequent upon an act of reasoning—as illustrative of conceptual relations.

Second, relations may be real in both extremes, as for example, relations that follow upon motion or some real foundation in both extremes, such as quantity. Such relations have a physical existence in the extremes and are accidents in the true and proper sense.

Third, relations can be mixed—real in one of the *relata* and conceptual in the other. This happens when the two *relata* do not agree in the same order. The paradigmatic example (from *ST* I q. 45 a. 3) is the mixed relation of God (who does not belong to the order of finite being) and creatures (which belong to the order of finite being). Similarly, mixed relations obtain when one *relatum* is ordered to the other, but the two are not mutually ordered to each other. For example, consider a ship's relation to Polaris. If the *Maryland Dove* changes course so that Polaris is now to its aft instead of to its fore, there is a real change in the ship's position, but there is no real change in Polaris (at least not with respect to the ship's having changed course).⁶⁵ Polaris remains as before. 'Behind the *Maryland Dove* is not something real in Polaris, whereas 'toward Polaris' is something real in the *Maryland Dove*.

3.3.2 Summary

So far, I have introduced Thomas's distinction of creation from motion, his twofold, relative understanding of motion as action and passion, his general ontology of relations as a category of accidental being with four 'notes' or crucial aspects, and the distinction of real relations from conceptual relations. The most significant points so far have been, first, the distinction of creation from change, and second, the identification of creation as something real, namely, a relation in the created thing.

Beyond this, three important points can be gleaned from Thomas's reply to the first argument. The first is that the creation relation is real in the creature but only conceptual in God; the second is Aquinas's distinction of active from passive creation; and the third is his identification of 'creation' in the active sense with the divine essence. I will now touch on each of these three points in greater detail.

⁶⁴ See *ST* I q. 13 a. 7 c., q. 42 a. 1 ad 4.

⁶⁵ In reality, this example is somewhat more complicated than I have suggested because stars change position. But take the example on the common-sense level.

3.3.3 Crucial Points of the First Reply

First, because God and creatures do not belong to the same order (insofar as God is his own existence whereas creatures exist only by participation), creatures are really related to God, but God is not really related to creatures. God is related to creatures as the source of their existence, but by a conceptual relation only. Though ‘creator’ only becomes predicable of God when he creates, the name ‘creator’ does not signify a change in God, but rather signifies the unchanging divine essence insofar as creatures are related to it (somewhat like the *Maryland Dove*’s respect to Polaris). ‘Creator’ is thus an extrinsic denomination of God.

Second, the distinction of active from passive creation must be understood against the backdrop of the earlier distinction of creation from motion. While creation is not motion, one can only begin to get a cognitive purchase on creation by thinking about it in terms of motion, which is better to know. Creation is, after all, *sui generis*, and must be reasoned to reflectively, whereas change is much more immediately available to experience.⁶⁶ Just as motion can be conceptualized in terms of action and passion, the same is true *mutatis mutandis* for creation. Thus, the distinction between active and passive senses of ‘creation’ is a way of characterizing creation as motion, albeit with the necessary qualifications.⁶⁷ Just as Thomas understands divine motion in terms of creation, conversely, Thomas here adapts the idea of motion to talk about creation.

Third, whereas creation in the passive sense is a real relation in the creature, referring it to God, on whom it depends for its existence, creation in the active sense is the divine essence itself, for God is his own action. Active creation, however, is not God’s essence *simpliciter*, but with a certain respect—a conceptual relation—to the creature.

66 We see change—local motion, for instance—everywhere in the world around us. This is almost certainly why Aquinas’s first way centers on motion: He starts with what is what is most obvious to us.

67 This manner of signifying creation as motion also appears in Thomas’s replies to the second and third arguments. It is important to realize in these contexts Aquinas more corrects than rejects the characterization of creation as motion. This is in keeping with his general approach to theological discourse, which is not purely apophatic, but over-archingly, a qualified positive theology. On the limits of Aquinas’s negative theology, see Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., “Aquinas and the Limits of Agnosticism” in *The Philosophical Assessment of Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston*, ed. Gerard J. Hughes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1987), 37–63. See also Rudi te Velde, *Aquinas on God: The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 65–93.

3.4 *Aquinas's Reply to the Second Argument*

In his reply to the second argument, Thomas explains that the real relation of a creature to God which he identifies as passive creation, is itself a created reality. However, as indicated above, this affirmation seems to pose the problem of an infinite regress: If God's creative action is created, then it seems there must be another creative action to bring it about, and so on. Aquinas evades the charge of an infinite regress by appealing to the nature of relations. While it is true relations are created realities, the relation that is creation does not need to be referred by a still prior creation relation because the initial creation relation, precisely by virtue of its nature as a relation, just is what refers both itself and the subject in which it inheres to God. Thomas's position here hinges on the point that relations are beings which principally point beyond themselves and their subjects to an other.

3.5 *Aquinas's Reply to the Third Argument*

Finally, there are four important points of Thomas's reply to the third argument.

First, the priority of creation to the created thing changes diametrically, depending on whether creation is conceived in terms of motion or as a relation. If creation—divine action—is signified as a motion between two termini, then it is prior to the created effect—the *terminus ad quem*—as the way to it. But, as Aquinas points out, creation is motion only figuratively. In reality, creation is not motion, but rather a relation. And conceived as a relation, the terminus of creation is not the created thing, but God. In this case, the created effect is the subject, not the terminus of creation. Accordingly, however counterintuitive it may seem, the created effect has physical (read 'natural' or 'ontological') priority to the divine action by which it is brought about, insofar as that creative action is conceived as a relation that inheres in the created thing as an accidental form. Crucially, what the terminus of creation is depends, therefore, on how creation is conceived: The terminus could either be the *terminus ad quem* (as when creation is conceived as motion), or directly opposite to this, it could be the *terminus a quo* (as when creation is conceived as a real relation in the creature). In the former case, there is a priority of creation to created effect, whereas in the latter, there is a priority of created effect to creation. The priority of God's transeunt action must be understood in this light.

Secondly, however, Thomas makes an important qualification to the first point about the priority of God's effect to his creative action. While strictly, the creature has physical priority to God's creative action, still, God's creative action has "a certain notion of priority on the part of the object to which it is posited {dicitur}." The object to which the relation—which Aquinas identifies with God's creative action—is posited, or expressed, is the terminus of

the relation. That terminus is *God*, the “principle of the creature.”⁶⁸ Thomas’s point is that while strictly speaking, God’s creative action is naturally posterior to his created effects, God the creator is not. Drawing on Thomas’s earlier distinction of active and passive creation, this can be expressed differently as follows: Creation in the active sense—which is the divine essence itself (with a conceptual relation to the creature)—is prior in nature to the created effect. But creation in the passive sense—which is a real relation of the created effect to God on the basis of the created effect’s participated act of existence—is posterior in nature to the created effect.⁶⁹

Crucially, Aquinas characterizes God’s action only as either (1) God himself, and in this sense alone as prior to the created effect, or (2) as a predicamental relation in the created effect, and in this sense, as something distinct from God and naturally posterior to the created effect. What is conspicuously absent from Aquinas’s account is the extremely intuitive, but also imaginative and misguided idea that God’s action is a reality both distinct from the divine essence *and* naturally prior to God’s effect—that it is some force, influx, energy or impulse from God that terminates in the created effect.⁷⁰ Thomas’s theology has no room for such an intermediate, created, divine causality. On Aquinas’s account, to the extent God’s action is conceived of as a created reality, it is subordinate to his effect. Only God himself (and not some created causality) is prior to his effect.

This shows that Aquinas acknowledges the force of the position set forth in the third argument. The action by which some effect comes about *must* in some sense be prior to that effect. Aquinas accepts the priority of divine action,

68 Notice how this idea is obscured in the typical Shapcote translation: “Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed, which is the *beginning* of the creature” (emphasis mine). By rendering ‘*principium*’ as ‘beginning’ (think: ‘inception’) rather than as ‘principle’ (think: ‘cause’ or ‘point of origin’) Father Shapcote’s translation conjures up an image of creation as (an influx?) prior to the creature and terminating in the creature: The coming-to-be of the creature is the *terminus* of God’s action. In fact, Thomas’s point is that creation has a notion of priority from *God* who, *as cause*, is prior to his effect. God, not the effect, is the terminus of the relation in question. For Thomas, the relational direction is exactly opposite to that suggested by the translation.

69 On the created effect’s *esse* as the foundation for the creation relation, see Henninger, “Aquinas on the Ontological Status of Relations,” 513–15.

70 Lonergan also places imagination at the root of this problem. See for example, *De scientia*, 362–63; “On God,” 62. See also de Lubac, *The Mystery of the Supernatural*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroad Herder, 1967), 208 (166).

but he does so by identifying divine action with God and thereby corrects the mistaken conclusion of the third argument's right underlying conviction.

Third and finally, Thomas explains the narrow sense of 'creation' (what was called above 'creation de novo'): 'Creation' in its strict sense, denotes a relation of the creature to the creator at the creature's inception. It is not necessary, therefore, to think that so long as a creature exists, it must be said to be created afresh (de novo) by God. This is a relevant consideration because if creation is conceived as a motion, as the third argument proposes, then creation terminates in the inception of the creature, whereas if creation is a relation inhering in the creature—the view Thomas advocates—then it seems that as long as the creature is, so too is creation. Yet this latter conclusion is unpalatable insofar as 'creation' typically denotes the coming to be, not the continued being of the creature.

In response, it is significant that Thomas does not deny that the creation relation continues beyond the inception of the creature. Rather, he holds that it is not necessary to affirm that the creature is *created* so long as it exists, since the term 'creation' (in the narrow sense) has special reference to the beginning of a thing. Thomas's reply to the concern embodied by the third argument is on the terminological, not the metaphysical level. As seen from the discussion of *ST I* q. 104 above, Aquinas does hold that the relation of a creature to God persists as long as the creature exists. His point here is simply that it is not necessary to always call this relation 'creation' because 'creation' has a more circumscribed meaning.

4 Conclusion

Aquinas appropriates the concept of motion to talk about God's operation in the operations of creatures. For Aquinas, when God causes a human free choice, he *moves* the human will to act. But the precise metaphysical import of the 'motion' idiom is controversial, and Aquinas's account of God's causation of human free choices is not explicitly developed to the level of detail and precision demanded by post-Reformation-era polemics. Physical premotion, while well established in the history of interpretation, is far from incontestable as a reading of Thomas's position. In this chapter, I have set forth reasons why an alternative reading is preferable.

For Aquinas, because God is his own nature and God's nature is his act of existence, God's proper effect (and his alone) is the very existence of things. God makes a thing not just to be one way or another, but to be in its totality.

This is the central claim of the doctrine of creation. Because God's proper effect is the being of things as such, and contingency and necessity are pursuant upon being as features of it, the very contingency or necessity of a particular effect is included within the total effect God intends: God's causality reaches to the very mode in which things obtain.

Thomas's recourse to the same simile—light in the air—when explaining God's initial creation of a thing, God's conservation of it in being and its dependence on him in its operation strongly suggests that Thomas understands divine causality in the same way across the three cases: Divine causality is creative; it is a making-to-be. Thus, in the context of divine application, 'motion' is best understood as a mode of creation. If motion obtains within the created order, then God, as the universal provider of being, must cause it. In this way, God can be said to 'move' creatures to act. But strictly speaking, God does not cause the changing *as such* of things; rather, he causes the *being* as such of things, and change by derivation, as a logical consequence of his causing the being of things. God's 'changing' is his making change *to be*.

This perspective is further corroborated by the way Thomas approaches a series of questions regarding the status of God's action in his effects. Just as creation is something in the creature, so too, governance is in the governed; more narrowly, fate is in the things wrought by secondary causes; and more narrowly still, predestination is something in the predestined.

The ontological status of God's motion of the human will, then, is clarified by Aquinas's discussion of the ontological status of God's creative action. For Aquinas, God's creative action may be considered either in an active sense, as the divine essence itself (with a conceptual relation to the creature—for it is reference to the creature which frames the question of God's *transeunt* causality), or it may be considered as a predicamental relation of the created effect to God, which relation is inherent in the created effect and founded on the created effect's act of received existence. Understanding God's action in the former way (actively), God's action has a priority to his effect and is uncreated. Understanding God's action in the latter way (passively), God's effect has a priority to his action, for the created effect is the subject in which God's action inheres. Also, in this latter sense, God's action is itself something created. Crucially, it does not appear to be the case for Aquinas that God's action is both something created and prior to God's effect.

In this chapter, I have argued for a certain reading of Aquinas. In the following chapter, I will show why the position represented by this reading is philosophically preferable to both the theory of physical premotion developed by Báñez and the Jesuit doctrine of general concurrence developed by Suárez.

God Creates Human Free Choices: An Explanation and Defense

In him we live and move and have our being

AC 17.28

Imagination is the master of falsity as coach for the understanding¹

JAMES ROSS

It will be useful to have a name for the position I set out and defend in this chapter. I shall call the view that God creates human acts of free choice *total personal creation* (TPC). Various forms of TPC have been advanced and defended by several earlier thinkers working independently from one another. While all of them rely on Aquinas—especially Aquinas’s doctrine of creation—and while several develop their position in a philosophically systematic way, none offers a sustained account of their position as an interpretation of Aquinas. A textual argument of that sort was developed in the previous chapter.

In the present chapter, I will argue that TPC is philosophically preferable to physical premotion and to the theory of divine concurrence developed by Molina and—in a more sophisticated way—Francisco Suárez.

This chapter is divided into four parts. After outlining the origins of the thesis that God creates human acts of free choice in the first part, I will explain that thesis in the second part, briefly consider five objections to it in the third part and consider at length a sixth objection, proposed from a Suarezian perspective, in the fourth and final part.

1 See Ross’s brilliant, if idiosyncratic essay, “Real Freedom,” in *Faith, Freedom and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today*, eds. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 96. Ross later continues: “*Infatuation with imagination* is a nearly fatal disease for philosophy”—“a sure cause of neuroses, like exposing children to pornography” (sic! 96, n. 159). For the origin of the idea that imagination is the master of falsity, see his *Thought and World*, 158 n. 8 (204).

1 Literary Origins of the View

After Aquinas, the idea that God creates human acts of free choice was perhaps first suggested, though not systematically developed, in 1925 by Antonin Sertillanges, O.P. in his two-volume work, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*.² A half-century later in 1975, the idea was developed in a philosophically systematic way by Germain Grisez in *Beyond the New Theism* and in a co-authored work published the following year, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument*.³ Essentially the same position was subsequently advanced by James Ross in his 1988 essay, "Creation II" and his 1996 piece, "Real Freedom," as well as by Hugh McCann in a 1995 article titled, "Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom" and his 2012 book, *Creation and the Sovereignty of God*, although these thinkers differ from Grisez and from one another in their points of emphasis. Despite the substantive similarities of these articulations of the idea that God creates human acts of free choice, none of the aforementioned thinkers mentions Sertillanges, and neither Ross nor McCann mentions Grisez or one another.

Kathryn Tanner's position in *God and Creation in Christian Theology* (1988), as well as those of Rudi te Velde in his 1995 study, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas*, and Harm Goris (who relies on te Velde) in *Free Creatures of an Eternal God* (1996),⁴ also have substantive affinities with the position suggested by Sertillanges and developed more systematically by Grisez, Ross and McCann. Tanner ostensibly develops her position independently from Grisez and Sertillanges, and there seems to be a mutual independence of her work and that of Ross. Te Velde appears to work out his position independently from Tanner, Ross, Grisez and Sertillanges. Likewise, McCann apparently develops his position independently from all the others.

The same basic position seems to have been independently articulated by Herbert McCabe, O.P. in a series of talks given in 1980, later published as the first two chapters in his collection, *God Matters*. McCabe's essays manifest a sophisticated understanding of the position defended here, though they do

2 See A.G. Sertillanges, *S. Thomas d'Aquin*, vol. 1, 4th ed. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1925), 255ff.; see esp. 265–68.

3 *Beyond the New Theism* is currently in print with only a (substantive) new introduction as *God? A Philosophical Preface to Faith* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2005). Grisez is thus the first person, so far as I am aware, to offer a philosophically systematic articulation of this view (at least in English).

4 See also Goris's 2005 essay, "Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination and Human Freedom" in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 2005), 99–122. Rudi A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1995).

not develop it in detail. A position like McCabe's is presented by his literary executor, Brian Davies, O.P. in *The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil* (2006).⁵ In developing his own arguments, Davies relies on McCabe and he also invokes James Ross for support. Davies' works suggest in general that he is also thoroughly familiar with Grisez's *Beyond the New Theism*. Finally, the position being defended here has been articulated most recently by W. Matthews Grant in his 2002 Fordham dissertation, directed by Davies, "Aquinas and the Freewill Defense." Perhaps the most trenchant articulation of the position to date is Grant's 2010 article, "Can a Libertarian Hold that our Free Acts Are Caused by God?"⁶

David Burrell, c.s.c. has explicitly and consistently situated the issue of divine causality and human freedom within the context of creation and has stressed the constant necessity of attending to divine transcendence in several works concerning divine causality and human freedom.⁷ Brian Shanley, O.P. has also emphasized the centrality of divine transcendence in this regard.⁸ The positions set forth by both thinkers, at the very least, compliment the position set forth here, if they are not identical with it. In his works on creation and freedom, Burrell, a former student of Lonergan, repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to Lonergan. Shanley has likewise acknowledged his debt to Lonergan. This suggests the views of Burrell and Shanley may be intended to restate Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas, and so, according to the reasoning set forth in Chapter Five, their view may, in fact, be different from the position I defend in this chapter.⁹ Yet, neither Burrell nor Shanley deals with Lonergan's account of precisely how God moves the human will in

5 See Brian Davies, *The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil* (London: Continuum, 2006), 77ff., 116–39; cf. his *Thinking About God* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985), 209, 220–21.

6 Grant, "Can a Libertarian Hold That Our Free Acts Are Caused By God?" *Faith and Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (2010): 22–44. Grant has also written a number of other fine essays on this topic. See also his, "Aquinas on How God Causes the Act of Sin Without Causing the Sin Itself," *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 455–96, as well as his "Counterfactuals of Freedom, Future Contingents and the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge" and "Aquinas Among the Libertarians and Compatibilists" cited above.

7 See for example, his *Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions* (Notre Dame, IN: UND Press, 1993).

8 See for example, his "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas," *ACPQ* 72, no. 1 (1998): 99–122 and "Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom," in *Freedom and the Human Person*, ed. Richard Velkley, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 48 (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2007), 70–89.

9 A careful reading reveals that Lonergan does not advance the position articulated variously by Grisez, Ross, McCann et al., despite certain affinities between the two perspectives.

the act of free choice. So, their explicit positions may be effectively indistinguishable from the position I defend here. In contrast to Burrell and Shanley, the positions of Grisez, McCabe, Ross, Tanner, te Velde, McCann, Goris, Davies and Grant on God's causation of human free choices seem to be developed independently of Lonergan, despite the substantive similarities between their stated views and those of Burrell and Shanley.¹⁰

Finally, the position set forth here should be distinguished from the more-or-less similar views first developed and defended during last century by Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P. and subsequently by other Thomists including Charles Journet; Jacques Maritain; Mark Pontifex, O.S.B.; Philippe de la Trinité, O.C.D.; William Most and Michael Torre.¹¹ According to these views, God does

Unlike these latter thinkers, Lonergan attempts an express, fairly detailed account of how God moves the will in the act of free choice. It is precisely in this endeavor that Lonergan runs into the problem of determinism (though in his own estimation, he avoids this unhappy result by recourse to the *per accidens*—as suggested above, I do not think this move eliminates the problem). Lonergan sees his interpretation of Aquinas as a development of the position first suggested by Sertillanges (see *Grace and Freedom*, 315), which I think is continuous with the position I defend here—a position I distinguish from Lonergan's. Insofar as Sertillanges did not systematically develop his position in either direction, it is reasonable to see his position as anticipatory either of Lonergan's view or TPC, though given what we have to go on in Sertillanges—which places a strong emphasis on creation—I think Sertillanges view more plausibly anticipates TPC.

- 10 Goris and Grant cite Lonergan in their work, but their position on the issue of God's causation of creaturely acts does not reflect any distinctively Lonerganian influence. Goris' position seems to rely much more on TeVelde's work and Grant's position seems much more characteristically aligned with, for instance, McCabe, Grisez and Ross, than with Lonergan, Stebbins and others who hold for a Lonerganian reading.
- 11 The list is not exhaustive. Importantly, Marín Sola is the original source of this view. For an account of Marín Sola's position, see the impressive studies by Michael D. Torre, *God's Permission of Sin: Negative or Conditioned Decree?* (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2009) and *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call: Francisco Marín-Sola on Sufficient Grace* (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2013). See also Charles Journet, *The Meaning of Grace*, trans. A.V. Littledale (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1962) and Jacques Maritain, *God and the Permission of Evil*, trans. Joseph W. Evans (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966). Maritain considered his book on the permission of evil his greatest work. Torre recounts that it was Journet who introduced Maritain to Marín-Sola's work on grace, and he (Torre) argues there are certain important differences between Marín-Sola and Maritain. See his "Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P. and the Origin of Jacques Maritain's Doctrine on God's Permission of Evil," *Nova et Vetera* 4, no. 1 (2006): 55–94. For another author arguing a position identical with or at least similar to Marín-Sola, see William Most, *Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions* (Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, 1997). Most published the original Latin version of his book in 1963.

physically premove the will, but his physical premotion is not irresistible. It can be impeded by human free choice. This position avoids the implication of Báñez's view that a person's sinning corresponds to God's antecedent non-provision of intrinsically efficacious grace (and conversely, that God's antecedent non-provision of intrinsically efficacious grace necessitates a person's sinning).¹²

Defenders of impendible premotion advance their position as an interpretation of Aquinas and correctly identify certain shortcomings in the classical interpretation of Aquinas represented by Báñez. However, their attempts to find a way through the *de Auxiliis* impasse are blocked by their acceptance of the original categories of the debate. As Lonergan rightly pointed out, to dissolve the *de Auxiliis* dilemma requires breaking with the problematic assumptions which gave rise to the controversy, and this means (among other things) not just modifying, but breaking with the idea of physical premotion.¹³

Defenders of impendible premotion concentrate on the *theological application* of a certain presupposed view of divine causality more than on articulating a theory, a philosophical or theological metaphysics of divine causality itself. They are concerned principally with questions of immediate import for Christian life, such as God's permission of sin, predestination, the fate of the unbaptized and the sufficiency of grace. But a really satisfactory attempt to deal with these questions requires a reexamination of what divine causality is. The underlying question of the metaphysical status of God's transeunt action must be addressed head-on in order to get any traction on the theological questions that are more obviously important for Christian life. Physical premotion cannot be assumed to be an adequate category for conceptualizing God's transeunt action. God's movement of the will must be re-conceptualized in terms of his creative causality.

Thus, while I believe many of the conclusions and at least some of the embedded commitments of views like Marín-Sola's would overlap with the position I shall defend here, I do not think there would be a real alignment of *theories*. A theoretical alignment is blocked as long as positions like

¹² This problem was explored above in Ch. 4; also, cf. the last part of Ch. 2.

¹³ It would require more research than I have done to get inside Marín-Sola's view. However, my sense is that impendible-premotion views are patched-up forms of Báñezianism, when what is really needed is a fresh approach. Parts—perhaps even significant parts—of these views may be (indeed, must be) salvaged for the new project. But my suspicion is that impendible-premotion views are fundamentally inadequate as *theories* of the divine causation of human free choices. Nevertheless, a more careful study of Marín-Sola's position might persuade me to revise at least some aspects of this assessment.

Marín-Sola's presuppose essentially the same ontology of physical premotion as Báñez (even if they disagree with him on its intrinsic efficacy), and I have taken it to be the case that defenders of impedible premotion do accept the same basic ontology as Báñez of God's movement of the human will (i.e. that God's action is a physical premotion in basically the sense set forth in Chapter Two). However, while this is my impression, I am not absolutely certain views like Marín-Sola's accept Báñez's ontology of physical premotion, even while they preserve its idiom. Torre—the most knowledgeable recent defender of impedible premotion—clearly appreciates the fact that all our talk about God's action *ad extra* is relational predication and he grasps on a deep level the implications this has for how we think about God's causal priority to his effects.¹⁴ This accords in a significant way with the view defended here and further research might require me to modify the foregoing discussion of views like Marín-Sola's.

2 What it Means to Say Human Acts of Free Choice are Created by God

Grisez very briefly reframes the issue of divine causality and human free choice in terms of creation thus:

[T]o say our free choices depend on God for their reality is not to say that God settles which option we take when we seem to ourselves to be making a free choice. . . . Admittedly, if God knows and wills something it is necessarily so . . . but it does not follow that the choices one experiences oneself as making freely actually are necessary. For God's creative causality does not bear upon one's choosing option *A* so that one cannot choose option *B*. Rather, God creates a whole: one's being able to choose option *A* or option *B* and freely choosing *A*, or one's being able to choose option *A* or *B* and freely choosing *B*.¹⁵

¹⁴ See for example Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call*, 259–63.

¹⁵ Grisez, "Human Free Choice and Divine Causality" (Edith Stein Lecture, Department of Philosophy, Franciscan University of Steubenville, 29 March 2000), 3. Available online at <<http://twotlj.org/OW-FreeChoice&DivCausality.pdf>>.

In other words, “the creator causes the obtaining of the human person’s free choice precisely as such.”¹⁶ But what does it mean on this account for a choice to be free? For, apart from further explanation, the above passage could be interpreted in terms of Báñez’s view: One is indifferently disposed toward both *A* and *B* by nature, and insofar as this is so, God’s causing one choosing *B* by determining one to *B* is his causing one to choose *B* freely, because what free choice requires is merely a natural indifference toward *A* and *B*. This is not Grisez’s view. For Grisez,

[o]ne has free choice only if he deliberates about possibilities genuinely open to him, chooses to realize one of these possibilities, but—all the antecedent and concomitant conditions other than his very choice remaining the same—could also have realized some other possibility.”¹⁷

Choice that is free in this robust, broadly libertarian sense is the sort of human action Grisez is claiming God creates in its total reality. This is clearly different from the picture proposed by Báñez, for as has been shown, Báñez is not willing to grant an indifference to the will in the presence of all antecedent and concomitant requisites for choice besides the very act of choice itself. Still, Grisez admits in the former passage that if God knows and wills something, it is necessarily so. So there is for Grisez a conditional necessity—a necessity of consequence—to a human free choice willed by God. God’s knowing and willing a human person’s act of choice is compossible with its being free in the sense described above because the act’s being free in that sense is precisely an aspect of the whole reality God brings about: a human self-determination to one of at least two possibilities. The very *freedom*—in the strong sense described above—with which Peter *determines himself* to *A* is as much an aspect of the whole reality God creates when he ‘moves’ Peter to exercise *liberum arbitrium* as is Peter’s settling on *A* rather than *B* in that act.

What may cause difficulty however, is the realization that while the strongly free mode of the act is a feature of the totality God makes to be, the specific determination of the act as a choice of *A* rather than *B* is certainly also a feature of the totality God brings about. This fact is likely to invite the thought that God’s causing Peter to choose *A* does preclude Peter’s choice of *A* from being free in the sense described by Grisez above.

16 Grisez, *God*, 281. Or this: “to hold that God causes free choices is to claim that God brings into being the whole reality of a human person’s freely choosing this alternative rather than another” (*Free Choice*, 102).

17 Grisez, *God?* 275.

At this point, therefore, two apparent problems can be distinguished. The first is that what God wills when he wills Peter to choose *A* includes the particular determination of Peter's *liberum arbitrium* to *A*. The second difficulty is that what God wills is conditionally necessitated by his willing it. Thus it is necessary to return to the pivotal distinction between necessity of consequence and necessity of the consequent, and attend to how this distinction is applied differently on TPC than on the theory of physical premotion. I will now consider these two difficulties in turn.

2.1 *God Wills the Whole Reality of a Human Person's Free Choosing, Including the Particular Determination of the Person's Choice*

What God wills when he wills Peter to choose *A* includes the *A* on which Peter, by exercising *liberum arbitrium*, settles. This seems to preclude Peter's choice being genuinely up to Peter, for the specific determination of Peter's choice is included in the scope of God's action. Again, if God causes Peter to choose *A* (freely), it is still the case that God causes Peter to choose *A* (and not *B*).¹⁸

However, as James Ross observes, framing matters in this way ("God causes Peter to choose *A*") is likely to result in misunderstanding precisely insofar as it suggests that God (or God's agency, or will, and so on) is a determining antecedent to Peter's act of choosing *A*. The problem, in Ross's view, is that the statement "God causes Peter to choose *A*" characterizes divine causality in terms of its ontological "shadow," namely, the real states of affairs God brings about.¹⁹ States of affairs, Ross explains, are not the basic constituents of reality, but are rather "parasitic on" the actual entities, the *things* God makes to be. By talking about God's causality in terms of the states of affairs God brings about *derivatively*, statements such as "God causes Peter to *A*" risk confusing the *extent* or *logical consequences* of divine power with what God, or God's power is in itself.²⁰

Ross, here, is in fact identifying two distinct but related mistakes. The first mistake is to confuse what he calls the "ontological shadow" of God's effect with God's proper effect itself. One mistakes the shadow for the effect itself when one thinks of states of affairs as the primary object of God's creative action rather than the things themselves—or perhaps more accurately, the *being* of the things themselves—which, in relation to each other, constitute

18 See Ross, "Creation," *Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 10 (1980): 615–19 for a response to a somewhat similar kind of concern.

19 See Ross, "Creation II," 116–17, cf. 138.

20 For Ross, God's power is God and it results in the *being* of things other than himself. See "Creation II," 118.

real states of affairs. The second mistake is to confuse the extent of divine causality with divine causality itself (which in reality is identical with God).²¹ One confuses the extent with the nature of divine causality when one makes an illicit inference from God's effects to how God must be in himself in order to cause those effects rather than others. One falls in to this mistake by forgetting the limitations of what created effects *relationally* or *extrinsically* imply about God.²²

Ross proposes that a more adequate way to frame the issue is in terms of creation, the divine causation of existence. What God properly does is to cause things to be. By this, Ross means (with Aquinas) not just that God causes things to be this or that (though this is not excluded from God's causal purview). His point of focus is on the sheer existence of things as such, not its specific determination.²³ For Ross, God causes things to be, as it were, from the top down.²⁴ In creating a whole entity as it exists through time, God, in consequence, creates all the features of the entity's existence, including its actions carried out in time. The specific determination of actual states of affairs is merely a logical consequence of God's causing the being of things.²⁵ In Ross's view,

States of affairs are not, except analogously, parasitically and loosely, caused at all. There is only one kind of causation that God exerts as Creator and that is to cause being. In consequence, the contingent states of affairs obtain. But that is parasitic causation. God 'determines' the

21 As Aquinas points out, divine agency can be considered actively or passively. Actively considered, it is identical with the divine essence and has a priority to God's effect. Passively considered, it is a relation of the effect to its divine cause and inheres in the effect. See *ST I* q. 45 a. 3.

22 See, for a clarification of this point, Grisez, *God*, 279–80; cf. Lonergan, *De ente*, 198–201; *De scientia*, 272–73, 326–27; Torre, *Do Not Resist the Spirit's Call*, 259–63. See also the discussion of Grant's position in §3.2 below.

23 See Ross, "Creation II," 130, 133–34.

24 Ross contrasts this with thinking of entities' being constituted from the bottom up, as it were, starting (in the case of physical entities) with some basic subatomic structure. Ross even proposes the fascinating idea that physical entities are constituted by an infinity of recursively nested structures and that a failure to take account of this fact (if it is a fact), is what "left Aristotle's theory of 'prime matter' unconvincing" ("Creation II," 123).

25 Ross, "Creation II," 116–17. Note also how the point here about God causing the specific determination of the real is essentially the same point Aquinas makes in *ST I* q. 22 a. 4 except there, Aquinas focuses in particular on God's causing the necessary or contingent mode of the real—each thinker calls upon the same basic point, in other words, to elucidate one or another side of the equation.

universe by making the *things* that do what they do, including all the free things able to do otherwise.²⁶

States-of-affairs semantics specifies the *range* of God's causality in terms of God's effects. It picks out the scope or extent to which divine power reaches. And it must be noticed that the very freedom which characterizes an act is as much a determinant or feature of what God specifically ordains as the particular object that is chosen within a given set of circumstances.

But states-of-affairs talk does *not* convey positive content that answers the question of what God's causality is in itself and so precisely how it has to be to cause *these* effects rather than others. According to Ross, to say that God creates means that he makes to be all the things that are, and since things, to the extent they are, are for a time, God's making them to be is a making-to-be through a duration. By extension, this includes making things to be *as they are* through time, doing the things they do in time.²⁷ So, as a consequence of creating things that act, God creates things acting, or the acting of things. God's causing the acting of things is just a result or logical byproduct of his making things (which act). This is important because understanding God's causation of Peter's freely choosing *A* as a mere logical consequence of his causing Peter illuminates how God is not the agent of Peter's actions (even while he is the sole agent responsible for the sheer existence of Peter's free choosing of *A*), and so relatedly, how Peter's actions are truly up to Peter (though not in a way that excludes any positive aspect of Peter's self-determination from the purview of God's universal causality). In Ross's view, there is a true sense in which God does not cause Peter's choosing *A*: In fact, God does not cause Peter's choice of *A* in any of the senses of cause normally deployed to account for the kinds of immanent causal relationships grasped in reasoning on experience of the world and which are typically (though often implicitly) imported into discussions of God and human freedom, with problematic results.²⁸

Prescinding momentarily from the question of free choice and turning instead to a less-loaded example of cosmic motion, Ross concedes that,

if God causes the moving sun to be, he also "brings about" or "causes" its moving as it does, the states of affairs that obtain, and so, derivatively, he can be said loosely to cause the motions that are the constituents in such states of affairs.²⁹

26 Ross, "Creation II," 133.

27 See Ross, "Creation II," 128–30.

28 See Ross, "Creation II," 126–28. See also Grisez, "Human Free Choice," 9. Cf. McCabe, 13–15.

29 Ross, "Creation II," 130.

But, Ross goes on to argue,

this is “erector-set” philosophizing. One starts off with the innocent, mundane truth that God causes the moving sun to be, and, with the toys of logic and the states-of-affairs vocabulary, one *derives* statements of the form “God causes the sun to move as it does.” The equivocations on “cause” are undetected and almost harmless until the same device is applied to Adam.³⁰

Ross’s point is that as soon as one mistakes the logical consequences of God’s proper effect (namely, particular states of affairs such as a creature’s doing as it does) for his proper effect itself (namely, the being of things), one transposes ordinary senses of ‘cause’ (such as the sense in which the sun itself moves, or Peter himself freely chooses *A*, or the sense in which any created cause causes) with God’s creative action (which is causation at all only in a strongly analogous sense).³¹ As a result, one at least implicitly juxtaposes divine and creaturely action as competitors in a zero-sum game which excludes contingency, in any real sense, from the created order.³²

Again: God wills the whole reality of Peter, which includes Peter’s freedom and his being through time and so Peter’s exercising his freedom in time. In that sense, God causes the reality of Peter’s choosing and his choosing as he does. But is it not still the case then that Peter’s choice of *A* is necessitated by God’s will, that Peter’s choice is settled by divine freedom rather than Peter’s own? This question leads to the second difficulty identified above.

30 Ross, “Creation II,” 130.

31 Grisez makes essentially the same point, which is that God does not cause motion as such, but *being* as such. God does not cause by moving properly speaking, but by creating. Still there is motion in the created universe: God makes creaturely change *to be*; he *creates* it. Consider the following passage from *God*, 262: “There is some analogy between *Dc*’s causality and that of other causes, for the schema of causality is common. There is always a danger that the analogy will be overextended. For example, physical causes bring about effects which are or involve changes, and physical causes always presuppose something to work upon. A flame heats the water in the kettle; this is a change; moreover, the flame does not heat water unless someone puts water into the kettle. Physical causes themselves are also effects. In terms of the distinction developed earlier in the present chapter physical causality is a mutual-dependence relationship. *Dc* does not bring about changing as such, but *Dc* causes contingent obtaining, which of course includes the obtaining of states of affairs involving change. *Dc* does not presuppose anything to work upon, for what does not obtain cannot be presupposed by the causing of its obtaining. Finally, the causality of *Dc* cannot involve mutual dependence or *Dc* itself would be caused” (emphasis mine).

32 See Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 2.

2.2 *The de dicto Necessity of what God Wills Implies the Logical Equivalence of God's Willing and the Obtaining of what He Wills*

The answer to the foregoing question is no. What God's will necessitates in the composed sense is the whole, *Peter's choosing A freely*, where the strongly free mode is as much an aspect of what God's will 'necessitates' as the particular determination of Peter's action. There is a conditional necessity to what God wills, but because of the radical extent of God's creative causality (which reaches to the very bottom of things), the necessity that is implied by divine omnipotence is not the sort that excludes freedom from the created order. Rather, it is the very basis of the existence of creaturely freedom. In short, the 'necessity' implied by divine omnipotence is not univocal with 'necessity' as juxtaposed with freedom or contingency. As Grisez explains,

The only reason there is for saying that the creator causes someone to make one free choice or another is that one knows from experience that someone has in fact made one free choice or another. Thus, while it is correct to say, "[Peter] makes free choice *A* because the creator causes [Peter] to make free choice *A*," this relationship does not warrant an argument from the attributes of the creator to the characteristics of the choice. One must say that the creator infallibly knows what he knows and that his causality always effects what he freely chooses to cause. But these affirmations concerning the creator cannot be made conditions of his effects by way of the relational predications concerning the creator, for the relational predicates acquire their meaning *from what is related to the uncaused cause*, not from anything affirmed of the creator in himself.³³

The idea that God's causing Peter's choice of *A* entails some form of determinism comes from thinking backwards about God's causation of human free choices. It is not as though one understands what God and his (active) causality are in themselves and can then infer from this an understanding of why God's effects are exactly as they are and not otherwise. If God causes Peter to freely choose *A*, Peter freely chooses *A* and if Peter freely chooses *A*, then God causes Peter to freely choose *A*.³⁴ God's causing Peter to make a free choice of *A* is not some feature or state of affairs internal to God that would be different were Peter not to make a free choice of *A*. God, then, or God's act of causing

33 Grisez, *God*, 279–80. I have changed the name in the borrowed example from 'John' to 'Peter' for consistency with earlier examples employed here.

34 Cf. McCann, *Creation*, 109–110.

Peter's free choice of *A* is not a sufficient reason for Peter's freely choosing *A* because God would be the same even if Peter does not choose *A*. In that sense, Peter's freely choosing *A* is not determined by God or any reality other than God except Peter's own free choice of *A*, though it is true that if Peter chooses otherwise, God causes Peter to choose as he otherwise does. The point is, though Peter in his totality is ultimately explained by God, Peter's choice being of what it is of rather than otherwise is explained neither by God nor by any other natural or temporal antecedent.

There is thus a logical equivalence between God's causing Peter to make free choice *A* and Peter's making a free choice of *A*. But this does not imply some internal, contingent feature of God in terms of which Peter's choice can be understood.³⁵ Nor does it imply the existence of some factor external to God other than Peter's free choosing (such as a physical premotion), which functions as a sufficient reason for Peter's choice. As Ross observes, "logical equivalence, and thus entailment of states of affairs, is simply not a relevant kind of compulsion to create any of the standard puzzles about autonomy and human freedom."³⁶ How this is so can be more readily grasped by reading Ross' point in light of the pivotal scholastic distinction between necessity of consequence and necessity of the consequent explored above. Ross here is implicitly teaching how Aquinas's application of the distinction is to be understood in the context of God's causation of free human acts. It is the *logical equivalence* of God's willing or causing Peter to make a free choice of *A* and Peter's making a free choice of *A* that makes God's willing and Peter's choosing *A* relevantly like Socrates' sitting in the paradigmatic example Aquinas calls upon in *ST* I q. 19 a. 3:

- (1) If Socrates is sitting, then Socrates sits necessarily.

Socrates' sitting—ostensibly a free act of Socrates—is not necessary absolutely, but only on the supposition of his actually sitting, for anything that is, while it is, must necessarily be.³⁷ So too Peter's freely choosing *A*:

- (2) If Peter chooses *A*, then necessarily Peter chooses *A*.

³⁵ See Ross, 117.

³⁶ Ross, 117.

³⁷ See Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 19a 23.

This is so even though Peter's choice of *A* is free in the sense that it was not determined and cannot be explained by any antecedent to his actual choice.³⁸

But as soon as divine causality is introduced as an antecedent in the conditional, one seems to be dealing with a different kind of conditional altogether:

(3) If God causes Peter to choose *A*, then necessarily Peter chooses *A*.

It is true that Peter's choosing *A* here is not absolutely necessary, but is necessary only on the condition God wills it. But whereas in the case of (1) and (2), what is conditionally necessitated is necessitated only on the condition of its own obtaining (so that the kind of necessity in question is merely the necessity of a truism), in (3), the condition seems to be a distinct and antecedent state of affairs, namely, God's willing or causing (or moving, by a physical premotion) Peter to act in a certain sort of way.

This concern is exactly what drives both Luther's and Molina's objections to their respective opponents' appeals to the distinction between the composed and divided senses to save free choice. For both Luther and Molina, that distinction (as it is employed by their opponents), does nothing to show how God's willing does not impose necessity on what he wills. The difference is that whereas this leads Luther to deny free choice altogether (probably because of a failure to comprehend the full implications of divine transcendence), it leads Molina to reject physical premotion in the interest of upholding free choice.³⁹

But does (3) introduce a distinct antecedent state of affairs which conditionally necessitates Peter's freely choosing *A*? The answer is no. If God's willing Peter to freely choose *A* is logically equivalent to Peter's freely choosing *A*, then (3) is relevantly like (1) and (2). God's causing Peter to freely choose *A* is not and does not postulate a distinct antecedent condition to Peter's freely choosing *A* (such as a physical premotion) that would be otherwise were Peter to freely choose *B*. As Hugh McCann states, "[t]he operation of his [God's] will is not an event independent of my willing; there is nothing 'left over' if we subtract my act of deciding from God's act of creating it."⁴⁰ Rather, the antecedent

38 That is, aside from his free choice itself, if that should be posited as the antecedent in a conditional about Peter's choosing.

39 Thus, whereas Luther dismisses the scholastic distinction of *necessitas consequentiae* and *necessitas consequentis* as meaningless sophistry (see *On the Bondage of the Will*, trans. Watson, 120, 240, 244, 247–48), Molina affirms the distinction in principle, but thinks Báñez has misapplied it (see the discussion of Molina's position in Ch. 4).

40 McCann, *Creation*, 105.

of (3)—God’s willing Peter to freely choose *A*—just is the very emergence of Peter’s free choice of *A* as such. As McCann again helpfully explains,

God does not create us by engaging in an act of will which in turn produces us . . . God does not create us or our works *by means of* commanding our existence, where this is conceived as a kind of causal device. Rather, His commanding our existence *is* our production, and we have our being in His very act of creating us.⁴¹

For McCann, what God wills exists not as a metaphysical product of God’s willing “but as its content.”⁴² Thus, my choice of *x* “is not a distinct state of affairs caused by God’s willing that I so decide. Rather, it is the very thing God wills, the actual content of his act of commanding its existence.”⁴³ The upshot of this is that “God’s creative activity does not, even on the eternal level, stand as a determining condition which settles what I shall decide. It is fully manifested simply in my deciding as I do.”⁴⁴ God creates the whole state of affairs of Peter’s freely choosing *A*, or expressed differently, God creates Peter, precisely as he is, in the moment of his freely choosing *A*. Neither the particular determination which characterizes Peter’s choice nor that determination’s being irreducibly settled *by Peter* (and therefore, apart from necessitating antecedents) is excluded from what God brings about when he creates Peter’s free choosing.⁴⁵ Rather, what God brings about in his creative act just is Peter’s free choosing of *A* and nothing short of that.⁴⁶

The logical equivalence of God’s willing and created states of affairs’ obtaining thus illuminates how the infallibility of God’s creative will does not impose any damaging necessity on all that he wills, and it also shows how the distinction between necessity of consequence and necessity of the consequent, so pivotal to the Controversy *de Auxiliis*, is understood differently on TPC than on the theory of physical premotion. It is not that Báñez denies or forgets divine simplicity and thinks that different internal states of God explain, after the

41 McCann, “Divine Sovereignty,” 591–92.

42 McCann, “Divine Sovereignty,” 594.

43 McCann, “Divine Sovereignty,” 594.

44 McCann, “Divine Sovereignty,” 595.

45 Note the distinction of this position from both that of Báñez, who held God does predetermine the will, and that of Molina, who held God cooperates at the level of ‘action and effect’ but whose causality does not extend to the particular determination of a human choice.

46 See Hugh McCann, “Divine Sovereignty,” 582 (abstract). See also his *Creation*, 103.

manner of a sufficient reason, created persons' particular self-determinations being what they are and not otherwise. But while both Báñez and TPC maintain that God is not different whether or not Peter freely chooses *A*, unlike on TPC, Báñez does think that something external to God that is antecedent to a human person's choice explains that choice after the manner of a sufficient reason. That explanatory factor is the physical premotion. In contrast, on TPC there is no bridging entity that links God and the human person's free self-determination.

2.3 *God's Causation of Human Free Choices is One Instance of the Broader Mystery of Creation*

In sum: God's causation of Peter's choice of *A* can be understood as a feature of the total reality of Peter which God makes to be. But *how* God causes the total reality of Peter (including Peter's free choice of *A*)—or anything else for that matter—remains mysterious.⁴⁷ It is true that an account of how God causes some contingent things (states of affairs, etc.) to be can be given in terms of secondary causes when what he makes to be results from secondary causes. In the case at hand, the secondary causes that account for Peter's free choice of *A* are Peter and Peter's (non-predetermining) reasons for acting. And there is no other created reality than Peter himself that accounts for his choice's being of this *rather than that*.

But it is impossible in principle to give an account of the inner workings by which God immediately brings about what he does (including *that* certain effects issue from secondary causes), such as, *that Peter freely chooses A*. This is no liability however, because it is impossible in principle to explain divine action on the very grounds one has for positing it. One can infer about God from what he has made no more than that whatever he is in himself and however he makes whatever else there is, he is in himself what he has to be to account for what he has made.⁴⁸ Whatever God is, he must be what it takes to cause the

47 An account of how God causes some contingent things to be (including, derivatively, states of affairs, etc.) can be given in terms of secondary causes when what he makes to be results from secondary causes. In the case at hand, the secondary cause that accounts for Peter's free choice of *A* is Peter and Peter's (non-determinative) reasons for acting. But this is only a partial account of how the contingent thing in question is caused by God to be. It is impossible to give an account of the inner workings by which God, for example, causes it to be that Peter freely chooses *A*.

48 Note that, while made on the basis of God's contingent effects, this is still a claim about how God is in himself—it is a predication made of God *substantialiter*. All that can be humanly said of God must be said relationally, but that does not mean human language

being of the things that in fact are, including Peter freely choosing *A*. However, while it is possible to say in an analogous sense, for example, that God exists, is one, true, and good; and it is possible to say in a univocal sense that he is not what any creature is (and in this respect is uncaused and eternal, for example), it is impossible beyond this to know what God is in himself such that it comes to pass that Peter freely chooses *A* rather than *B*. For the sort of cause that must be invoked to definitively account for the existence any contingent entity (whether Peter, Peter's free choosing, or some completely unrelated entity or state of affairs) must, on the very grounds one has for positing that cause, be itself uncaused and so utterly different from any kind of cause or entity known in experience.⁴⁹ One cannot therefore infer that it is impossible for a human act of free choice to be free simply because it is caused by God. Divine causation is not relevantly like creaturely causation and the limits of our knowledge of what divine causation is like block the judgment that it is incompatible with human freedom, while the very existence of any contingent reality (including any creaturely act of choice) calls for the affirmation of the existence of divine causality.⁵⁰ Moreover, acknowledging God's radical transcendence and resultant incomprehensibility is not *ad hoc*, but principled, because these come into view from *within* the very line of reasoning that requires one to posit God's existence and so which motivates the question of the relation of human agency to divine creation in the first place. The transcendence and incomprehensibility of God's nature and operations preclude the judgment that it is impossible for a human act of choice to be free simply because it is caused by God.

Understanding God's motion of the human will in terms of creation shows that the perplexity of God's causing Peter to freely choose *A* arises not because

can attain only to relations or creatures and not to God himself. To claim that all human God-talk (including extrinsic denomination) is relational predication is not to claim that all human God-talk is extrinsic denomination. See Gerard Hughes, 47–48. See also Grisez, *God*, chs. 15–17. This is important to clarify because at points in this study I characterize the ascription of causality to God variously as denominative or relational. This might suggest there is not any real difference between these. My point here is that while there is overlap between extrinsic denomination and relational predication, extrinsic denomination and relational predication are not coterminous. The import of this is that the inherently relational character of God-talk does not necessarily limit God-talk from signifying God *substantialiter* (see *ST* I q. 13 a. 2).

49 If one has grounds for affirming the existence of God at all, the grounds one has rule out thinking that his causality is incompatible with human free choice (and, of course, there is no question of the sort being investigated here if one denies the existence of God).

50 See Boyle, Grisez and Tollefsen, *Free Choice*, 101.

of the freedom with which Peter chooses *A*. Rather, God's causing Peter to freely choose *A* is but one instance of the more basic mystery of creation—of how there can be anything other than God at all.⁵¹ As soon as one grasps what is contained in the claim that God causes the being of things—as soon as one grasps what a radical and thoroughgoing claim the doctrine of creation is—the idea that God creatively causes free creaturely acts poses no special difficulty.

3 Five Potential Objections Briefly Considered

Having set forth in the preceding section what TPC claims, the remainder of this chapter will consider several objections to it. In this section, five minor objections to TPC will be briefly considered. In the final section of this chapter, one further major objection will be considered at greater length.

3.1 *TPC is Metaphysically Unsatisfying*

The first objection is that TPC should be rejected because it is metaphysically unsatisfying. Rather than providing a thick account of God's causation of human free choices, TPC seems metaphysically lean and deflationary, even to the point of being obscurantist, because it putatively consigns what is to be explained to the realm of mystery.

Obscurantism is veiling or leaving veiled what can be clearly known or explained. Thus the charge of obscurantism assumes that what TPC claims is mysterious can be clearly known or explained. What TPC claims we can know (and must affirm) is that God creates human free choices. What TPC claims is mysterious is precisely *how* God causes free choices (beyond their being made by their respective human agents). The fault the second objection finds with TPC is that it fails to explain of this 'how'. The objection therefore implicitly supposes that a more robust answer to this 'how' is possible. However, as Brian Shanley observes, an explanation of the workings of divine causality is, in principle, excluded, because God *in se* is humanly incomprehensible.⁵² Paradoxically then, the modesty of TPC thus turns out to be advantageous. There is a profundity in its simplicity. Since it is impossible in principle to know *how* God causes, TPC is actually metaphysically more satisfying than physical premotion and other alternative theories, which purport to explain

51 See McCann, *Creation*, 98–99; Boyle, Grisez and Tollefsen, *Free Choice*, 102; Grisez, *God*, 280; "Human Free Choice and Divine Causality," 4.

52 See Shanley, "Divine Causation," 101.

beyond the principled limits of explanation, and thus get caught on the horns of an insoluble dilemma.

3.2 *TPC Undermines Free Choice*

A second objection is that if TPC were true, the human person would lack dominion over his or her own acts of free choice. TPC, then, would have to be some kind of theological determinism or compatibilism. For if God has the causal initiative in human acts of free choice, then it would seem that human persons themselves do not have control over their choices: If God wills Peter to choose *A*, then Peter chooses *A*; if God does not so will, Peter does not so choose. It would seem then that whether or not Peter chooses *A* is a function of whether or not God creates Peter's choice of *A*. But God's decision to create is entirely up to God, for only God creates. Therefore, it would seem that whether or not Peter chooses *A* is up to God and not up to Peter.

This objection has already been briefly anticipated in the account of TPC above. However, a more detailed reply can be made. Matthews Grant has developed what is thus far the most incisive account of why God's causation of the total human act of free choice does not undermine the freedom of that human act. Grant appeals to the idea of divine action Aquinas sets forth in his discussion of creation (*ST I* q. 45 a. 3, considered in the previous chapter), together with the doctrine of divine simplicity (*ST I* q. 3), in order to explain how it is possible to maintain that human acts which are free in a libertarian sense are caused by God. Without rehearsing every detail of Grant's account, it is worth considering his central argument.

Following the lead of Jeffrey Brower, Barry Miller, Timothy O'Connor and Alexander Pruss, Grant distinguishes what he calls an "internal" from an "external model of divine causal agency," and argues for the external model on the basis of divine simplicity.⁵³ The distinction of an internal from an external model is perhaps most clearly illustrated as follows.⁵⁴

According to the internal model, the truth of a proposition such as "God causes *A*" implies the following:

- (4) God,
- (5) *A*

53 See Grant, "Can a Libertarian?" 24. Note the expression "divine *causal agency*" is not pleonastic insofar as there is divine agency that is not causal, namely, the notional acts which constitute God Trinity.

54 See Grant, "Can a Libertarian?" 27–29.

- (6) Some real intrinsic property, feature or state of God *F* in virtue of which God causes *A* and which state would be different were God not causing *A*
- (7) The cause/effect relation(s) of God and *A*.⁵⁵

As Grant explains, *F* may be variously conceived, but it is some internal feature of God whereby God causes *A*. For example, (6) might be reasonably construed as God's act of willing *A*. Contrast the above view with Grant's "external model of divine causal agency." On the external model, the truth of "God causes *A*" implies only the following:

- (4) God
- (5) *A*
- (7) The cause/effect relation(s) of God and *A*.

The obvious difference between the two models is that on the internal model, differences in God's effects—including whether or not any effect obtains—correspond to differences within God himself. On the internal model, God is different, having created, than he would be had he not created, and God bringing about this effect is different than he would be bringing about that effect.

However, according to divine simplicity, differences in contingent effects cannot be traceable to differences in God. That is because on divine simplicity, God's nature is his act of existence, and God is his nature. God, then, does not depend on another, but is of himself or *a se*.⁵⁶ This makes God radically unlike any entity known in experience, for nothing known in experience is its own act of existence. God, because of his simplicity, does not belong to the world we know. As shown above, it is precisely because God and creatures do not belong to the same order that the reciprocal cause/effect relations of God and creatures cannot be of the same kind.⁵⁷ Because creatures depend for all they have and are on God, and because God, by contrast, is *a se*, creatures are related to

55 For simplicity's sake, I have changed the effect symbol from *E* to *A*; Grant uses each at different stages of his essay. I have also pluralized 'relation' because one should not assume there is only one such relation, or that it is the relation of the effect to the cause, or (for that matter) that it is a real relation. Finally I have substituted 'of' for 'between' in my recasting of Grant's presentation because Aquinas does not strictly think (and one should not assume) that a relation is *between relata*. Rather, as has been shown above, Aquinas thinks that relations normally *inhere* in their *relata*—the exception being the divine subsistent relations.

56 Hence, divine *a-se*-ity.

57 See *ST* I q. 13 a. 7.

God by a real relation whereas God is related to creatures not by a real relation, but by a relation of reason.

While a full defense of divine simplicity is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, it is essential to realize that, for Aquinas, the existence of an entity which is not its own existence demands an ultimate cause which does not undergo any modification in becoming a cause, for only a cause incapable of change could have what it takes to be the ultimate ground for what need not be.

Consequently, even if the world never had a beginning (so that no 'change' from not being creator to being creator is conceivable), God would not be really related to his effects. For even if a real entity that is not absolutely simple never began, it can cease to be, and so it can exist only in dependence on a being that is of itself. If creatures had no beginning, God would be the same whether they existed or not, just as he would be the same had he created different creatures than he has. God's effects, on the extrinsic model of divine causal agency, do not correspond to some logically necessary feature of God that would be otherwise were his effects to be otherwise. On the extrinsic model, God's transeunt agency is not an internal feature of God.

The importance of the difference between the internal and external models of divine causal agency becomes evident when *A* is a human act of free choice and one considers what is required for *A* to be free in a libertarian sense. For *A* to be free in a libertarian sense, there must not be any antecedent to *A* (whether temporal or natural—what Grant calls 'causal') that is logically sufficient for *A*.

On the intrinsic model, there is a factor prior to *A* that is logically sufficient for *A*: The intrinsic state or feature of God, *F*, whereby God causes *A* is both naturally prior to *A* and logically sufficient for *A*. *F* is prior to *A* insofar as *F* is intrinsic to God and God is prior to *A* as cause is prior to effect. *F* is logically sufficient for *A* insofar as *A* is logically necessary for *F*: *F* would be different were *A* to be different. If *F*, then *A*. Conversely, if *A* does not obtain, then neither does *F*.

On the extrinsic model, by contrast, there is no factor prior to and logically sufficient for *A*. God is prior to *A*, but since (in possible-worlds semantics) God is the same "across worlds," he is not a logically sufficient condition for the occurrence of *A*. *A*'s occurrence or non-occurrence does not correspond to any difference in God. This can be more clearly seen by considering the objection that the extrinsic model of divine causal agency surreptitiously introduces a factor prior to and logically sufficient for the occurrence of *A*. Grant considers three ways in which such a factor might be introduced.

First, one might argue that the truth, or something implied by the truth, of the proposition "God causes *A*" introduces something prior to and logically sufficient for *A*. But whether this is so turns upon whether any of the truth

conditions for the proposition, “God causes *A*” are prior to and logically sufficient for *A*. When one considers what is necessary for the truth of “God causes *A*”, one finds on the extrinsic model no factor that is both prior to and logically sufficient for *A*. Recall that according to the extrinsic model, “God causes *A*” implies only (4) God, (5) *A* and (7) the cause/effect relation(s) of God and *A*. Again, God is prior to *A*, but not logically sufficient for it, since according to divine simplicity, God is the same whether or not *A* obtains. *A* is of course logically sufficient for *A*, but insofar as *A* is simply identical with *A*, it is not prior to it. What of the cause/effect relation(s) of God and *A*? Recall that the only real relation in question is that of *A* to God, for the relation of God to *A* is not something in God, but something only in thought and moreover, it presupposes the existence of the created thing as term. The real relation of *A* to God is logically sufficient for *A*, but not prior to it. If anything, *A* has priority to its relation to God insofar as a subject is naturally prior to its accidents and a relation is an accident. The truth of “God causes *A*” is therefore not prior to and logically sufficient for *A*.

Second, what about God’s action of causing *A*? Might it be prior to and logically sufficient for *A*? In order to answer this question, one must first identify what God’s causation of *A* is. Recall that on the extrinsic model, the only candidates are God, *A*, and the cause/effect relation(s) of God and *A*. Perhaps the most likely candidate, *F*, is ruled out. *A*, of course, is logically sufficient for but not prior to *A* because it is simply identical with it. What about God? One can infer that Aquinas, in a certain respect, does identify God’s action of causing *A* with God, for (as shown above) he considers creation in an active sense to be the divine essence with a logical relation to the created effect. However, even if God is prior to *A*, God, being absolutely simple on Aquinas’s account, is not logically sufficient for *A*, as also already shown. Moreover, it is not simply the divine essence that Aquinas identifies as God’s transeunt action, but the divine essence *considered as the principle of its effect*. The logical relation by which God is related to his effect is not prior to the effect and moreover, that relation is not a real relation. What then of the real relation of *A* to God? This Aquinas clearly does identify with God’s transeunt action (creation in the passive sense), and it is logically sufficient for *A*. However, the real relation of *A* to God is not prior to *A*. On the extrinsic model, therefore, there is no factor prior to *A*—even temporally simultaneous and only naturally prior—that is also logically sufficient for *A*.

Third, however, might God’s action of causing *A* be prior in the order of explanation to *A*? Grant does not definitively deny that God’s causing of *A* is explanatorily prior to *A*, chiefly because of the difficulty in providing a full account of explanatory priority. Grant does, however, provide at least two

strong reasons which render dubious the claim that God's action of causing *A* is explanatorily prior to *A*. First, one might assign explanatory priority to divine action because one thinks God's action explains his effects by causing them. But God's action does not explain his effects by causing them, however intuitive such an idea might initially seem. It is true that sometimes effects are caused by means of more basic actions: The woodsman swings his axe to chop the wood. But this is not always the case: One does not choose (to swing an axe or to chop wood) by means of some more basic action. Even if that choice—*electio*, an internal, elicited act—must be *executed* by means of command {imperium} and 'use' {usus}—an exterior act—(here, the bodily movement of axe-swinging), the choice itself just is the action of choosing. To claim that God's effects are caused by means of his actions is tautologous. It is to claim God's effects are caused by means of his causing them.⁵⁸ Secondly, however, there is a certain intuitive appeal to the thought that God's action is explanatorily prior to his effects. As Grant explains, this is surely due, at least in part, to the fact that "because God caused *A*" seems to be a satisfying answer to the question, "why does *A* obtain?" But notice that "because God caused *A*" explains *A* not by referring *A* to causality, but to a cause, and however God (the cause in this case) explains the existence of *A*, it is not by being a sufficient reason for *A* (such that *A* necessitates God's being the way he is). Thus, it is dubious that God's action or causality has an explanatory priority to *A*.

3.3 *TPC Implicitly Denies the Universal Purview of Divine Causality*

Another objection to TPC can be launched from the opposite angle. This objection charges that TPC presupposes a libertarian view of free choice and to that extent, implicitly denies the universal purview of divine causality, thus undercutting divine sovereignty. If God does not predetermine one's choices and, at the moment of choice, one retains the ability to do otherwise of oneself, then it seems God does not retain control over one's free choices, and hence, over all that happens in the world. What is more, McCann and Grant explicitly deploy their versions of TPC as a defense of libertarian free will.⁵⁹

58 See Grant, "Can a Libertarian?" 37.

59 Note however, McCann also acknowledges there is a sense in which his position might be called 'compatibilist' though in reality his position is neither libertarian nor compatibilist in the way these are usually understood. McCann thinks the matter of whether the position he defends is called 'libertarian' is ultimately merely verbal (*Creation*, 109). Grant makes a similar claim about Aquinas's position: It is neither libertarian nor compatibilist. See his essay, "Aquinas Among the Libertarians and Compatibilists."

In response, it is important to realize that TPC differs in a decisive respect from libertarianism as it is typically defined. As typically defined, libertarianism maintains that a free choice must, simply speaking, be caused only by the subject making that choice. TPC is similar to this position in that it maintains there is no sufficient, immanent principle that causes one's free choice other than one's act of free choice itself. In terms of created causes, it is true to say on TPC that one's act of free choice is not caused by anything other than itself.⁶⁰ Where TPC differs from typical libertarianism is that whereas on typical libertarianism free choices are not caused by God, TPC maintains that free choices are caused by God. According to TPC, God causes free choices all the way down, in their entirety. While according to TPC God does not predetermine one's choices, it is (again) not the case that the determination of one's choices falls outside the purview of what God causes. God creates human acts of free choice just as they are, both as free and as having the particular species (determination) they have. Because human free choices do not elude the scope of divine causality on TPC, they likewise do not elude the scope of God's sovereign direction.

It is a mistake, therefore, to think that in giving being to one's free choosing without predetermining what one chooses, God's causal contribution is something abstract and indifferent, along the lines of Molina's general concurrence. In the production of one's act of free choice, God does not contribute indeterminate *esse* while the human agent supplies the determinate *essentia*. To maintain such a dichotomy of being and essence is to misconceive of both. It is to reify or 'essentialize' the act of 'to be' as if it were a *something* that could be supplied indeterminately (but then *what* is God providing?); and it is to hypos-tasize essence, supposing that it too is *something* that can be supplied without affecting actual existence (but then *what is* it the human agent provides?). God and the human agent do not produce a human free choice according to a coordinated, partial causes scheme. God does not supply the *esse* while the human agent supplies the specific determination in a causally autonomous way, as though these were two distinct parts of the human act of free choice. Being and essence are not two things that can be supplied by two different agents. Rather, God and the human agent are both causes of the whole act of free choice, but according to different orders of causality.

It would also be a mistake to confuse TPC with the mere conservationism defended by William Durand.⁶¹ On a cursory look, TPC may appear relevantly

60 See McCabe, 13

61 For a summary of Durand's position, see Freddoso's "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough" as well as "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects."

like Durand's conservationism, especially as Ross presents TPC, insofar as Ross urges that God's causation of human free choices is simply an implication of his holding the acting person in being through time by continuous creation. However, TPC differs crucially from mere conservationism insofar as Durand understands conservation restrictively whereas for TPC, conservation (like creation, of which it is an aspect) is comprehensive. For Durand, human persons are autonomous insofar as God merely creates their powers of self-determination and holds these powers in being, leaving the actual exercise of these powers up to the human agent. Durand, in effect, posits a sphere of autonomy for human agency by the way he characterizes and appeals to conservation. For him, God creates and conserves, but does not really apply free creatures (as such) to act. In contrast, on TPC, God's conservation of a power extends to and includes that power's actual operation so that God does apply creatures to act. According to TPC, creation, conservation and application are all of a piece and God's causality over whatever positively obtains is total. Thus, TPC does not exempt any positive reality—including creaturely free choices—from the universal scope of divine governance.

3.4 *TPC is a Form of Occasionalism*

According to this objection, TPC is to be rejected as a form of occasionalism. Occasionalism maintains that creaturely agents are not agents in any real sense, but are instead mere occasions for, or instantiations of divine activity. On occasionalism, God does not make secondary causality to be; rather, he is the only cause there is. Thus, according to a classic example of occasionalism, fire does not heat the kettle; it is God in the fire who heats the kettle.⁶² On this view, fire has no proper causal powers. With respect to human agency, occasionalism maintains that God causes human acts of free choice in such a way that he alone and *not* the human person is the proper subject—that is, the efficient cause—of the act. Arguably, on such an account, human agents are reduced to the status of mere puppets. This is the force of the objection that TPC is occasionalistic.

The objection gets traction from the fact that insofar as creation is *ex nihilo* and the work of God alone, there might seem to be no place for human agency on TPC. If God does everything, how can human persons do anything? The advantage of the motion idiom—in contrast to creation—for articulating an account of God's application of creatures is precisely that it includes the

62 Cf. *SCG* III c. 69. For a good related discussion, see Freddoso, "Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary Causation in Nature," in *Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism*, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 74–118.

notion that *creaturely agents, with their own set of causal powers* are presupposed by divine action. This is an attractive notion because it allows for a clear account to be given of how secondary causes produce effects by an agency of their own when they act under divine power. In contrast, creation, insofar as it is *ex nihilo*, presupposes nothing. It may seem impossible, therefore, to explain how secondary causality is preserved under divine application if application is to be understood as a specific instance of God's creative causality.

This is a particularly important objection because, as shown in Chapter Two, Báñez and other defenders of physical premotion have historically rejected the notion that God creates human acts of free choice precisely because they thought that such a view would compromise the real agency of human persons.⁶³ The objection gains additional traction from the fact that McCann, whose work was adduced above in support of TPC, appears to defend a nuanced form of occasionalism in an earlier work co-authored with Jonathan Kvanvig.⁶⁴

First, it is important to clarify the sense in which God's action does and does not presuppose the human agent on TPC.

Metaphysically, God's application of a creature does not suppose the pre-existence of the creature, for divine application is an instance of God's creative causality; God's action is constitutive of the creaturely agent as such, even in the moment of its acting. Apart from God's creative causality, there quite literally *is* nothing. However, while the creature is not *metaphysically* presupposed by divine application, nothing about TPC compels one to deny that the creature is *temporally* presupposed by divine application. On TPC, the creature God moves to act is temporally prior to God's moving it to act.⁶⁵ In fact, it is

63 See Herrera, (in Báñez, *Com. inéd. a la 1-11*) q. 111 a. 2 §8 (190–91) and Garrigou-Lagrange, "Premotion physique," 39–41, as well as the discussion above in Ch. 2.

64 See McCann and Jonathan L. Kvanvig "The Occasionalist Proselytizer: A Modified Catechism," *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991): 587–615.

65 Peter, created *de novo* at t_1 is temporally prior to Peter, conserved at t_2 and applied at t_3 . In this sense, Peter is presupposed by God's conservation and application of him. But metaphysically, there is no Peter apart from God's action, for God's action is constitutive of Peter. It is in this sense that Peter is not presupposed by God's action. Rather Peter, as he exists at any moment, is God's effect. Here is another attempt to present and clarify the distinction between a creature's being temporally, but not metaphysically presupposed by divine action: While God's conservation of Peter at t_2 does (temporally) presuppose Peter at t_1 , it does not presuppose Peter at t_2 as though Peter's existence at t_2 were taken for granted by God's conserving activity. Presupposing Peter's existence at t_2 would construe conservation as merely a modification of Peter or some other distinct, additional action on God's part over and above a more basic making-to-be, when instead, God's conserving action simply constitutes Peter at t_2 —it is a making-to-be of Peter at t_2 . Likewise,

this temporal priority of the creature to divine application that makes the very idiom of 'motion' intelligible as a name for God's creative causality, for motion implies a subject that undergoes change.

Recall that God's transeunt action is itself unitary, comprehensive and *ab aeterno*; it is inherently creative, able to be refracted into the distinct modes of creation de novo, conservation and application only through the prism of time. Since time (something on the side of creation, not something on the side of God) is the basis for parsing God's causality into creation de novo and application, the existence of the creature God moves to act is a relationally posited and temporal supposition of God's application of that creature, not a metaphysical one.

But it is a mistake to read time back into divine action as an inherent characteristic of it, as if Peter's temporal pre-existence at t_1 (the moment of his inception) or t_2 (a subsequent moment at which he is preserved in being by God) were metaphysically presupposed by what God is doing when he is making Peter-acting to be at t_3 . From the perspective of the effects he brings about (which are distinct and temporally sequenced), God is doing something different at t_2 and t_3 than he is doing at t_1 , for a creature's continued being is something beyond its inception and its operation is something beyond both. Time is a feature of God's effects. But time is not a feature of God, and it must not be projected back on to him from the temporality of his effects. From the perspective of the agent, God is not up to something different when he conserves a creature or applies it to action than when he makes it begin to be. What God is doing is essentially the same at t_1 , t_2 and t_3 : He is making-to-be.

The upshot of this with respect to the charge of occasionalism is that if the distinction of temporal from metaphysical priority makes it possible to understand conservation as continuous creation without denying the substantial identity of the creature through time, then it is equally possible to understand

God's application of Peter at t_3 (temporally) presupposes Peter at t_1 and t_2 , but it does not presuppose Peter's existence at t_3 , as though application were some distinct, additional action over and above God's making Peter to be at t_3 . Rather, divine application is just constitutive of Peter at t_3 . God's causation (including application) is thus not a changing in the proper sense, but the occurrence of change is one of his effects; God makes change to be by making changers-acting. As on Báñez's view, TPC assumes God is eternal and unchanging. Thus, God's making Peter at t_1 , t_2 and t_3 are not discrete, sequenced actions of God, but rather facets of a single, creative act made from eternity but executed in time. As Hugh McCann points out (*Creation*, 103), God's will "is, in itself, *immediately* efficacious in the task of creation, so that all there is, including rational creatures and all that they do, find their being in the very act through which they are created" (cf. 105; note the point of contact with Ross's view of creation, 201.)

divine application in terms of creation without denying that it is really the creature who acts under God's transcendent agency. In other words, it is no more occasionalistic to understand application in terms of creation than it is to understand conservation as continuous creation.⁶⁶

Understanding divine application as a relational specification of God's creative causality does not render creaturely agency illusory. God's causing Peter's action *ex nihilo* and from eternity does not entail that Peter is not the agent of his action because precisely what it is God brings about, according to TPC, is the whole reality of Peter, including his acting. God is the sole agent in creation, but God is not the agent of Peter's actions; God is the agent who makes *Peter* acting to *be*.⁶⁷ Peter's action is wholly attributable to God and wholly attributable to Peter, though in different ways insofar as God and Peter belong to different orders of causality. Because of this distinction between divine and creaturely causality (a mere implication of the more basic God/world distinction foundational for TPC but at least implicitly rejected by occasionalism), God's universal agency does not sublimate the would-be creaturely agent into a mere occasion for God's own causing, but is instead the very ground, the very cause of the created agent's causing.

In contrast, in its attempt to stress the sublimity of divine agency, occasionalism paradoxically ends up collapsing the God/world distinction which is foundational to TPC. Creaturely causes are assimilated to the divine, thus losing their integrity and particularity as agents. Occasionalism affirms the creator at the expense of denying creation.⁶⁸ The core insight that drives occasionalism, but the truth of which occasionalism distorts, is that divine and creaturely causality are fundamentally different and the latter depends radically on the former.⁶⁹ The mistake underlying occasionalism is the supposition of a univocal idea of divine and creaturely causality.⁷⁰

It seems that this is precisely what led McCann to espouse a nuanced form of occasionalism. If causation is conceived of univocally and identified with creation, since only God creates, creaturely causation is not causation at all.

66 Aquinas clearly maintains the latter view of conservation, and he equally clearly rejects occasionalism outright. Moreover, if the argument advanced in the last chapter is correct, the most reasonable way to interpret Aquinas's teaching on application is to understand application in continuity with creation and conservation, as simply a further extension of God's creative causality.

67 See Ross, 130.

68 See Tanner, 86. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *God: His Existence and His Nature*, 2:522, cited by Tanner.

69 See David Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 69.

70 See Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 69.

McCann's occasionalism is nuanced: he does not want to deny the relevance of scientific laws and therefore the apparently causal relationships that obtain within creation, but he does mean to distinguish sharply between such 'causal' relationships and the causation which is creation. McCann is right to distinguish creation from created causality, but it is unnecessary to assume (if in fact he does) that just because creatures cannot create, creatures cannot cause. The view that creatures do not really cause at least requires an argument that McCann and Kvanvig do not supply in the context of their essay. Therefore, if real creaturely causation can be affirmed in a way that also maintains its distinction from creation, then the supposition that causality is univocal is reasonably denied. As shown above, it is possible to give an account of creaturely causation that does not conflate creaturely causation with creation. According to Aquinas, both God and creatures really cause being, but only God causes being properly and per se; this is to create. Creatures, on the other hand, do not cause being properly and per se, but they do cause being to be 'this' or 'such'.⁷¹ Creatures are, therefore, real causes of being, even though they do not produce being ex nihilo. Creatures are causes of being in a limited, analogous sense. This affirmation of creaturely causality and distinction of it from divine seems reasonable and it also allows one to make sense of both the causal relationships known in reasoning on experience and the predictive power of scientific laws. One should not think therefore that God's creative causality in any way threatens creaturely agency. To think it does is to fail to attend to God's transcendence.

3.5 TPC Makes God Responsible for Sin

The final objection to be considered here is that TPC, by claiming that God is a total cause of our free acts, implies that he causes our sins.

A reply to this objection can be gleaned from what has already been said in response to the foregoing objections as well as from certain elements of Báñez's own treatment of divine causality and the act of sin, covered in Chapter Two.⁷² A reply to this objection comprises two main points.

The first is that while God creates Peter's free choosing, Peter remains the subject of his choice. Because God's decision to create Peter's choosing does not displace Peter's own free act of choice, Peter's free choices remain up to

⁷¹ See te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, Ch. 9, esp. 176–83; *ST* I q. 44 a. 2.

⁷² Besides *ST* I–II q. 79 aa. 1–2, see also Grant, "Aquinas on How God Causes the Act of Sin Without Causing the Sin Itself;" McCann, *Creation*, 113–32; Davies, and Grisez, "The Problem of Evil and Divine Incomprehensibility: An Introduction to the Course, *Suffering and the Problem of Evil*" <<http://www.twotlj.org/OW-Evil&DivIncomp.pdf>> (3 Dec 2014).

him and consequently, he retains moral responsibility for them. Insofar as God's action is not a necessitating precondition of Peter's, God does not necessitate Peter's sinning.

The second point is that what God creates in creating Peter's free choosing is not the evil that makes Peter's choice to be a sin. God creates whatever is good—whatever positively exists—in Peter's act of sin. God creates Peter's act of sin *as act*. But the evil which makes Peter's sin to be sin is a privation, a lack of what ought to be and so is not created. The privation which characterizes Peter's sin as sin has as its origin in Peter's own freedom: He could have acted rightly but did not.

It is essential to recall here that because God's will to create is not a necessitating precondition of Peter's free action, God's not deciding to create Peter's choosing well is not a precondition that necessitates Peter's sinning.⁷³ Peter's sinning is up to him. God creates whatever is good, whatever has being in Peter's action. Finally, it should be noted that whatever objections may be raised against TPC with respect to divine responsibility for sin, TPC certainly fares no worse than physical premotion in this regard, for TPC has a more plausible way of maintaining that my free choices are up to me.

4 **A Suarezian Objection and Counterproposal: Divine Concurrence Revisited**

As the foregoing exposition has shown, understanding God's moving of the human will to the act of free choice in terms of creative causality has a distinct advantage over the theory of physical premotion defended by Báñez.⁷⁴

73 Moreover, the standard libertarian free will defense fares no better than TPC on the question of divine responsibility for sin. See McCann, "Divine Sovereignty," 588–89.

74 This is because Báñez considers God's motion of the will to be a distinct reality from both God and from the will's own act of self-determination. Being identical with neither, the physical premotion is an entity that mediates between God and the human free choice God causes. It is a created reality prior in nature to and determinative of the human act of choice: The human person's self-determination (choice) is explicable in terms of the physical premotion by which it is caused. The physical premotion is thus a sufficient reason for the choice's being a choice of what it is of. In contrast to physical premotion, understanding God's motion of the will in terms of creation entails that the human person's self-determination is explicable only in terms of its own existence (and not some created antecedent), but which existence is nonetheless a dependent, participated existence. Human persons determine themselves, but through acts which nevertheless have God as the principal cause of their total existence.

However, while the position advanced here is not subject to the weaknesses of physical premotion, it may be subject to other flaws. In fact, Suárez explicitly rejects the view that God's creative causality—whether understood in the strict sense of creation *de novo*, or in the broader sense of conservation and application—can be understood as the divine essence or as a predicamental ('categorical') relation to God that inheres in God's effect. Suárez's position on divine causality is worth attending to especially insofar as it "represents a genuine advance in precision and detail" over Molina's account, explored above.⁷⁵ Suárez does not reject outright the idea that God's causality, in some extended sense, may be identified with God himself (plus a relation of reason to the effect) or with a predicamental relation of the already-constituted effect to God, but he denies that either of these ideas corresponds to divine action in the strict and proper sense. The reason for his position is his view that both the divine essence *per se* and a predicamental relation (whether real or logical) lack the proper character of a causal action.⁷⁶

4.1 *Suárez on the Nature of Action, or Efficient Causality*

Because the following discussion focuses on efficient causality (particularly creation, which may be understood *analogically* as causality, and specifically, efficient causality), the terms 'causality', 'causation' and 'action' will be used interchangeably unless the context indicates otherwise.

For Suárez, divine action, or efficient causality, is an influx, something in the manner of a flow that emanates from God.⁷⁷ As such, divine causality is a sort of medium between God and his effect which functions as an "ontological connector" that links them.⁷⁸ Adopting an idiom like Aristotle's to describe motion, Suárez portrays causation as a "path that stretches out toward the effect" which "dwells between cause and effect as if between two termini."⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Freddoso, "Introduction," cxv.

⁷⁶ See Suárez, *DM* 20 §4.2 (65), §5.8–9 (97); 22 §3.3, 7 (cf. 20 §4.25 [81]), §4.2 (169). Page numbers indicated in parentheses are to Freddoso's translations of *DM* 17–19 (*On Efficient Causality* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994]) and *DM* 20–22 (*On Creation, Conservation and Concurrence* [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2000]).

⁷⁷ Suárez refers to divine action as an 'influx' in numerous locations. See for example, *DM* 12 §2.13; 20 §5.9 (97), §4.31 (89); 22 §2.1 (169). For helpful overviews of Suárez on efficient causality, see in addition to Freddoso's introductions to *DM* 17–19 and 20–22, see also the recent dissertations by Jacob Tuttle, "Suárez's Metaphysics of Efficient Causation" (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 2013) and Brian Russell Pinkston, "Francisco Suárez on Efficient Causation" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 2012).

⁷⁸ See Freddoso's n. 37 to *DM* 20 §4.22 (81). See also *DM* 48 §1.10–11, 15, 18.

⁷⁹ *DM* 18 §10.6 (252). See also *DM* 20 §4.14 (74), 16–17 (76–77), 30 (88); 48 §1.12.

Expressed differently, causation is the very coming to be of the effect, its emanation from the cause.⁸⁰ Conceiving of causation in this way, it is distinct from the effect and prior in nature (though not necessarily in time) to the effect.⁸¹ On account of this natural priority of causation to effect, rather than being a predicamental relation that has the effect for its subject and the cause as its terminus, causation has for its terminus the effect, or more precisely, the *esse* of the effect, according to Suárez.⁸² Crucially, the human person's action is *not* God's effect: God works *with* the human agent, not *on* the human agent.⁸³

4.1.1 Intuitively, Action must be Naturally Prior to Effect

Suárez was plainly moved by the very intuitive image of causation as a positive emanation from the cause that terminates in the effect and thereby mediates between them as a kind of metaphysical bridge. For Suárez, it is so obvious that God's action cannot simply be identified with God or a predicamental relation in God's effect that it is "scarcely believable" Thomas adopted the position he did in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3.⁸⁴ Suárez thinks that in addition to the predicamental relation an already-constituted subject bears to the creator, the fact that God's action just is the passive emanation of the effect is a view "everyone concedes."⁸⁵

80 Note how it is for this reason in *DM* 20 §4.27 (86) causation is said to belong to the category of substance, since as the very coming to be of the substance, causation is a mode of it. See also Freddoso's n. 48 to *DM* 20 §4 and *DM* 21 §3.14 (139). Note also the at least superficial similarity of Suárez's idea that causation is an incomplete entity with Aquinas's characterization of divine action as an intentional entity "having a certain incomplete being" in *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7. Note finally however, the explicit divergence between Suárez's view and that of Aquinas: Suárez thinks the view of *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 is inadmissible and that Aquinas himself probably abandoned it by the time he wrote the parallel text, *ST* I q. 105 a. 5. See *DM* 22 §2.52 (203–04). The apparent justification for asserting such a shift in Aquinas's position is the absence of any explicit mention of the *intentio* of *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 in *ST* I q. 105 a. 5. With Alvarez, I find the assertion of a shift in Aquinas's view on this point unconvincing. For Alvarez's assessment, see *De aux.* III d. 18 §10 (136b–137a).

81 See *DM* 20 §4.16 (76), 22 (80ff.).

82 See *DM* 21 §1.7 (112), cf. Freddoso's "Introduction" to the same volume, 94 and *DM* 18 §11.7 (264–65). Following the practice of the authors I am engaging, I will use 'predicamental relation' in the ensuing discussion to signify what other authors sometimes signify by the expression, 'categorical relation' or 'categorical relation': That is, relation understood as one of the nine categories (or 'predicaments') of accidental being as set out in Aristotle's *Categories* (or *Praedicamenta*, in the Latin).

83 See *DM* 20 §4.29 (88).

84 See *DM* 20 §4.24 (84).

85 See *DM* 20 §4.11 (70).

The reason for Suárez's view is the natural priority he ascribes to causation (mentioned above) and the natural posteriority a predicamental relation must have to its subject insofar as that relation is an accident.⁸⁶ Consider, for example, the following passage from *DM* 12 §2.13:

[Causation] is nothing else than that influx or concurrence by which each and every cause in its genus actually bestows *esse* into the effect. But this concurrence must necessarily be something distinct in reality or based on the nature of the thing from the relation of that same cause, since that thing which is denominated 'cause' can remain in reality without this actual influx—which is a certain sign of distinction based on the nature of the thing, as was seen above. But this influx cannot be only a predicamental aspect [i.e. a categorial relation] of the cause to the effect. For this [predicamental aspect], whatever it is, results from that very influx of the cause as terminated in the effect, namely, in the way it is commonly said that a relation arises when the foundation and terminus [of that relation] are posited. Therefore, that influx is something prior to the relation. And according to that [causal influx], the cause is also naturally prior to its effect, while nevertheless according to the [predicamental] relation they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore, that influx is a certain medium between an entity and the relation of the cause.⁸⁷

In this passage, Suárez clearly indicates that the predicamental relation of a cause to its effect follows upon the causal influx by which the effect is brought about.⁸⁸ This predicamental relation arises on the condition that its foundation

86 See *DM* 20 §4.11 (70), 15–16 (75–76), 24 (84), cf. 20 (79); 48 §1.13.

87 *DM* 12 §2.13: "[H]oc autem nil aliud est quam influxus ille seu concursus quo unaquaeque causa in suo genere actu influit esse in effectum; hic vero concursus necessario oportet ut sit aliquid distinctum in re seu ex natura rei a relatione ipsius causae, cum possit res illa quae causa denominatur in re manere sine hoc actuali influxu; quod est certum signum distinctionis ex natura rei, ut in superioribus visum est. Non potest autem hic influxus esse sola ratio praedicamentalis causae ad effectum; nam haec, qualiscumque illa sit, resultat ex ipso influxu causae ut terminato ad effectum, eo, scilicet, modo qua dici solet posito fundamento et termino consurgere relationem; est ergo ille influxus aliquid prius relatione; et secundum illum etiam causa est prior natura suo effectui, cum tamen secundum relationem sint simul natura. Est igitur ille influxus aliquid medium inter entitatem et relationem causae." I am indebted to Fred Freddoso and Sydney Penner for exchanges that enabled me to grasp the idea of the penultimate sentence of this passage.

88 While here, Suárez discusses a cause's predicamental relation to its effect, the same reasoning could be applied to draw the same conclusion about the effect's predicamental

and terminus have been posited. In the case at hand, the terminus of the mentioned relation is the effect and the foundation is the cause's action, its causation of the effect.⁸⁹ Because the predicamental relation presupposes the cause's causal influx as its foundation, the predicamental relation cannot itself *be* action, it cannot be the cause's causality. The causal influx must be prior to the predicamental relation as the basis for it. Moreover, it is with respect to this antecedent causal influx that the cause—the *terminus a quo*—may be understood to be naturally prior to the effect—the *terminus ad quem*, despite the fact that if considered with respect to the predicamental relation pursuant on the causal influx, the cause and effect are naturally simultaneous insofar as the obtaining of the predicamental relation presupposes the simultaneous existence of both *relata*—effect as terminus and cause as subject of inherence. As noted above, while Suarez here is speaking of any efficient cause's predicamental relation to its effect, all of the above is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of an effect's predicamental relation to its cause, including the predicamental relation a creature bears to the creator.

4.1.2 Substances are Quasi-Material Causes of Their Accidents

It has just been shown how, for Suárez, causation cannot be a predicamental relation because a predicamental relation results from causation, presupposing causation as something naturally prior, namely, the foundation of the predicamental relation. Additionally however, the very fact of inherence disqualifies a predicamental relation from being considered causation in Suárez's view. As explained above, a predicamental relation, as such, is an accident. And an accident is an entity which exists not of itself, but only by inhering in a substance. Because accidents exist in this way, Suárez believes they are in some sense caused by their respective subjects.⁹⁰ The thought seems to be that

relation to its cause. It is of course relation that runs in this latter direction that is especially relevant to Aquinas's doctrine of creation. Suárez's concern in the immediate context of the passage is not divine causation *per se*, but efficient causation in general. What he says, however, applies to divine causation also.

89 See also *DM* 20 §4.16 (76), 24 (83). A puzzling aspect of Suárez's view is how the relation of a cause to the effect is founded in something that is not in the cause but which is a mode of the effect (and so to that extent, 'in' the effect). Suárez holds the cause's action to be the foundation of the predicamental relation the cause bears to the effect and it is clear from other contexts that he understands action to be a mode of the effect, so if anywhere, 'in' the effect. His position would be easier to understand (at least in light of the received idea of predicamental relations) if he were talking about the effect's relation to the cause rather than the cause's relation to the effect.

90 See *DM* 20 §4.27 (87).

subjects are material or quasi-material causes of their accidents.⁹¹ The problem then is this: How can what is caused be the cause of the causality by which it is caused? For this is exactly what is being claimed if causation is a predicamental relation of (and hence, an accident in) the effect, and accidents, by virtue of inherence, are caused by their respective subjects.

4.2 *Suárez's View of Divine Concurrence Compared with Physical Premotion*

Suárez marshals several reasons in support of his view that divine causation cannot be what Aquinas says it is in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3. Nevertheless, while Suárez envisions God's causality as a reality in some sense distinct from and prior to God's effect, Suárez correctly identifies that the fatal weakness of the position defended by Báñez is the claim that God's action is an entity really distinct from and naturally prior to the action of the human person. It is this characteristic of the classical Dominican position that putatively subverts the human person's own capacity for self-determination under God's causal influence.⁹² But how can Suárez criticize Báñez's position in this way given his own emphasis on the priority and objective distinction of divine transeunt action in respect to God's effect? The answer lies principally in two related differences between the views of Báñez and Suárez. First, they disagree about the nature of the distinction of God's action from his effect. Second, they disagree about the nature of the effect.

4.2.1 God's Action is a Mode of His Effect

With respect to the first point, whereas for Báñez, God's transeunt causality is entitatively (and so really) distinct from his effect, for Suárez, God's transeunt causality is really identical with his effect. This identification of God's action with his effect is a crucial qualification of Suárez's position, mentioned above, that God's action is in some sense distinct from and prior to his effect, and it

91 See Tuttle, 49, 51. Tuttle claims that medievals generally held that substances were material causes of their accidents, but he presents this in the manner of common knowledge and does not provide textual evidence for this view. I am not certain it was a commonly held view, or to the extent something like it was, I am not certain that precisely what was held was that subjects are straight-on material causes of their accidents. Rather, what may have been the common view is that there is a kind of analogy between material causality and a subject's supporting of its accidents.

92 See *DM* 22 §2.13 (177–78), cf. §1.6–13 (152–57) for one important instance of Suárez's critique of Báñez. Suárez is also rightly suspicious of the ontological status of the physical premotion. For his charges that the premotion is “utterly obscure”, groundless, unreal, superfluous and not fully intelligible, see *DM* 22 §2.47 (200), 14 (179), 23 (185); §3.4 (211).

raises a question about the coherence of Suárez's position: Is God's action the same as his effect, or something different from and prior to it? The answer is that, for Suárez, God's action is identical in reality with his effect, but as a distinct mode of it.⁹³ As a mode of the effect, there is sameness and difference of God's action and his effect. On the one hand, a mode is just a certain manner, or way, of a thing's being. In this respect, the mode is not really other than the thing. On the other hand, a mode is not simply identical with the entity of which it is a mode, precisely insofar as its very identification as a specific *mode* of that entity is a certain contraction or limitation or aspect of the entity of which it is a mode.

4.2.1.1 *Causality is Therefore Modally Distinct from Effect*

Thus, for Suárez, God's action is *modally distinct* from his effect. Unlike a real distinction, which, for Suárez, requires two-way separability of the *relata* (each *relatum* must be able to exist independently of the other) or a mere distinction of reason, which requires no separability (the two *relata* can only be distinct in thought), a modal distinction requires one-way separability: *A* can exist without *B*, but *B* cannot exist without *A*. For Suárez, items that are modally distinct are distinct "in reality" (that is, *a parte rei* or *ex natura rei*) insofar as they are not merely distinct in thought. However, items that are distinct in reality (*a parte rei* or *ex natura rei*) are not therefore *really distinct*—that is, they lack two-way separability. In the case at hand, Suárez believes that a particular influx of divine causality cannot exist without the effect which is the terminus of that causal influx, for the influx—the coming-to-be of the effect—just is a mode of the effect. If the mode obtains, so too does the particular effect of which it is a mode. But the effect could obtain without *this* particular influx of divine causality, for Suárez thinks that God could cause the exact same effect by a numerically distinct influx of his efficient causality.⁹⁴

4.2.1.2 *Causality is Transcendentally Related to Cause and Effect*

This mode of the effect, which Suárez identifies as action or efficient causality—a path between two termini—is related to the cause and to the complete effect by a pair of special relations.⁹⁵ Crucially, these relations are not

93 See for instance, *DM* 20 §4.28 (87).

94 Hence one-way separability and a distinction that is in reality insofar as it is not only in thought, but which is not a therefore a distinction of two independent entities (a 'real distinction'). See *DM* 20 §4.12–13 (72–74), 32 (90); §5.9 (97); 12 §2.13.

95 See *DM* 18 §10.8 (255); 20 §4.14, 19–20, 24, 26–27, 31–32 (74, 78, 82–84, 86–87, 90); 21 §1.11 (114–15); 48 §1.8, 12–14, 17–19. Notice (1) how Suárez uses the terms "special" {specialis}

predicamental relations (accidents, in the strict sense, of the mode or of the effect), but rather trans-predicamental (i.e. trans-categorical), or 'transcendental'

and "peculiar" {*proprium*} together two times in *DM* 20 §4.7 (87) to describe the way causation is related to its effect. His point is that the relation by which causation is related to the effect is not a relation in the ordinary, predicamental sense, but a *transcendental* relation (see below). Note (2) Suárez's observation that some Thomists interpret the creation-relation of *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 as a transcendental relation because they are alive to the intuitive implausibility of Thomas' stated view that creation is a predicamental relation. See the discussion above in Ch. 6 including Gilby's commentary on *ST* I q. 45 a. 3 and the issue of transcendental relations and relations *secundum dici* in Aquinas. Finally, note (3) that there is some ambiguity in Freddoso's translation as to whether causation is a transcendental relation or whether it *bears* or *posits* (bespeaks, expresses, postulates etc.) {*dicit*} transcendental relations. While this might seem a minor point, it actually is important for getting clear on Suárez's precise view of the nature of efficient causation. In the Freddoso translation, Suárez at one point identifies the mode in question (i.e., [God's] efficient causality, which Suárez sometimes calls a 'dependence') as a relation: "Hence, just as [the dependence], insofar as it is a path or relation of dependence..." (*DM* 20 §4.22 [80]). A similar identification of efficient causation as a transcendental relation appears in n. 48 to *DM* 20 §4 (83–84). However, another way to render the original text is as follows: "whence, just as according to the relation of dependence or of a path, it [God's creative causality] can, in its own genus, antecede, even if it does not inhere in a subject, so too can it antecede under the aspect of an action {unde, sicut secundum habitudinem dependentiae seu viae potest in suo genere antecedere, etiamsi non insit subiecto, etiam poterit in ratione actionis}." Rendering the passage this way, it is clear Suárez is not identifying efficient causation as a transcendental relation. Rather, this reading shows how Suárez's point here in *DM* 20 §4.22 overlaps with the idea of the last part of *DM* 12 §2.13 explored above: There, *secundum influxum*, a cause is naturally prior to its effect. Because the influx of the cause justifies ascribing priority to the cause, there is an implicit priority of the influx to the effect, even though the manifest point of concern is not the priority of the influx to effect, but the priority of cause to effect. Here (in *DM* 20 §4.22), priority is ascribed to the influx on the basis of a pair of transcendental relations, one it bears to the cause (*habitudinem dependentiae*) and one it bears to the effect (*habitudinem viae*). The way these habitus characterize (God's) efficient causality as *between* cause and effect justifies ascribing priority to it: As a kind of medium or metaphysical link, efficient causality has an aspect of priority with respect to the effect. To the extent action can be relatively denominated a 'path' or 'dependence', and a path or dependence can be seen to antecede the effect, so too can action be seen to antecede the effect. Insofar as this rendering of the passage avoids the identification of causality with the pair of transcendental relations causality bespeaks, it also shows how this passage comports with other contexts where the distinction of efficient causality from its transcendental relations is clearer, such as *DM* 20 §4.24. The ontology of relations in early modern scholasticism is still quite underexplored territory, despite its importance. For a direct discussion of Suárez's view, see *DM* 47, esp §§2, 4. Doyle's translation (Milwaukee:

relations.⁹⁶ It is not that the mode in question *is* itself a relation, despite the fact that Suárez often calls the mode a ‘dependence’.⁹⁷ More precisely, Suárez’s view seems to be that the mode (which is efficient causality or action) *bears* relations to the cause and to the effect.⁹⁸

4.2.1.3 *Action and Dependence are Only Formally Distinct*

By virtue of the pair of transcendental relations causality bears to the cause and to the effect, causality can be denominated ‘action’ (considering it with respect to the cause) or ‘dependence’ (considering it with respect to the effect).⁹⁹ Action and dependence are thus, for Suárez, the same in reality and only formally distinct.¹⁰⁰ The two terms ‘action’ and ‘dependence’ do not respectively signify the mode’s transcendental relations to the cause and to the effect, but rather the mode itself under different formalities—either as related to the cause, or as related to the effect.¹⁰¹

Marquette University Press, 2006) includes a brief but helpful introduction and the full Latin text. For two fine discussions of Suárez on relations, see Sydney Penner, “Suárez On the Reduction of Categorical Relations,” *Philosopher’s Imprint* 13, no. 2 (2013): 1–24 and Jorge Secada, “Suárez on the Ontology of Relations,” in *Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays*, ed. Daniel Schwartz (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 62–88.

96 Predicamental relations will not do. They cannot inhere in a stretching-toward that is incomplete in being—something not yet constituted—but require instead a substance as subject of inherence. Yet, the intelligibility of a stretching-toward requires relations of a sort to define a stretching-toward as such, to pick out what it is a path from and to. These relations, necessary for the intelligibility of the mode that may be characterized as a stretching-toward or coming-to-be, need only signify or bespeak that mode under the aspect of its origin and its terminus. They need only signify relationality, not inherence. For the plausibility of a relation’s signifying relationality apart from inherence, consider the doctrine of subsistent relations in Aquinas’s theology of the Trinity and the distinction (in that context) of the *esse-ad* and the *esse-in* of a relation (see for example, *ST* I q. 28 a. 2; see also Henninger, “Aquinas on the Ontological Status of Relations” esp. 501–07).

97 I am grateful to Jeffrey Brower and Sydney Penner for conversations that drew my attention to this distinction.

98 See for instance, *DM* 20 §4.27 (87), 21 §3.15 (139), 48 §1.15. This is an important point in light of the fact that on Aquinas’s view in *ST* I q. 45 a. 3—which Suárez rejects—God’s action or transeunt causality *is* a relation (and a predicamental one at that).

99 See *DM* 18 §10.6 (252); 21 §3.24 (145).

100 For Suárez’s understanding of the various kinds of distinction, see *DM* 7, trans. Cyril Vollert, s.j. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947).

101 See *DM* 48 §1.16; 18 §10.8 (254–55) Suárez specifies that God’s efficient causation is a substantial mode (a mode of the substance which is the effect) that “takes on the manner of an accident through its relation to the agent” (*DM* 20 §4.28 [87], Freddoso’s translation). Suárez’s point is to resolve the tension between Aristotle’s account of action as an

4.2.2 What the Effect of God's Action is

With regard to the second point, there is a difference between Suárez and Báñez regarding what the effect of God's action is. Whereas for Báñez, the effect of God's transeunt action is a human act of free choice, for Suárez, the human action is not God's effect. Rather, God and the human agent operate together, *concurrently* to produce a single, joint effect. According to Suárez, God acts *per se* and immediately in creatures' actions, not by means of some created motion other than the creature's own act.¹⁰² For Suárez, God's action does not result in the human person's action. Rather, God's action is the same as the human person's action.¹⁰³ This is because action just is the emergence of the effect, and there is one effect cooperatively produced by the two agents.¹⁰⁴ In Suárez's view, there is only a distinction of reason between a cooperatively produced effect's dependence on God and its dependence on the human agent. That is to say, God's concurrence and the human action are only distinct in thought, not reality. God's concurrence *is* the human action. This position differs significantly from that of Báñez.

4.3 *Summary Restatement of Suárez's Position on Divine Causality*

In sum: For Suárez, divine causality—God's concurrence with or motion or application of a created cause—is a mode of the effect. Namely, it is a path, an influx, the coming-to-be of the effect. Divine causality is relatively denominated the 'action' of God or the 'dependence' of the effect on God. These are all the same. Moreover, while an agent's action is *modally* distinct from its effect, that action is only *formally* distinct from the effect's dependence on the agent. Again, action and dependence are the same reality and differ only formally. In the case of multiple cooperating agents, the single, jointly produced effect's dependence on any one of the agents (and so the action of any one of the agents) is only *logically* distinct from that effect's dependence on any of the other agents (and so from the action of any one of the other agents).

4.4 *A Critique of Suárez's Position on Divine Causality*

Aquinas's teaching on divine causality in *ST I* q. 45 a. 3 may be the key to a more plausible understanding of God's movement of human *liberum arbitrium* than the theory of physical premotion defended by Báñez. However, Suárez sets

accident and his own account of it as a mode, a path to the complete substance which is the effect.

102 See *DM* 22 §1.6, 16 (152, 158), §2.16 (179–80).

103 See *DM* 22 §2.15, 17–18, 50 (179–81, 203), §3.10 (214), cf. §3.3 (210).

104 See *DM* 20 §4.13 (73); 22 §2.50 (203).

forth two crucial reasons why Aquinas's position on divine causation in this passage (as well as in *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7) is unsatisfactory. Suárez also advances an alternative account that is sensitive to and so strives to avoid certain fatal difficulties inherent in Báñez's position. Thus, anyone who would hold that God's causation of human acts of free choice should be understood in terms of Aquinas's teaching on creation must explain why such a view is preferable to Suárez's account of divine concurrence.

4.4.1 Thinking of God's Action as Physically Prior to His Effect Entails a Dilemma

The first reason to prefer TPC to Suárez's account of divine concurrence is that Suárez's position entails a dilemma by importing a tacit assumption about causality which is shared by his opponents. In order to evade what he takes to be the fatal flaw in physical premotion, Suárez seeks to avoid postulating a *tertium quid* between God and God's effect by denying the existence of a premotion. Instead, Suárez identifies the single, conjoint action of God and the creature as a mode of the unitary effect concurrently produced by both agents.¹⁰⁵

But Suárez does not completely escape the difficulty he identifies in his opponents. Despite the important nuance of Suárez's position, he still clearly thinks of God's causality as something distinct from and physically (i.e. naturally) antecedent to his effect, even though he does this in a way that differs in crucial respects from Báñez. The upshot is that like Báñez, Suárez is constrained to thinking of God's causality as determining or determined by the free human agent with which he concurs. Garrigou-Lagrange was exactly right in this regard: *Dieu déterminant ou déterminé*—there is no other possibility.¹⁰⁶ While, according to Suárez, God's concurrence is not simply indifferent and absolutely determined by the creature, insofar as it is a specific concurrence given in light of God's infallible foreknowledge to realize a specific effect, Suárez's position (like Molina's) does require, in the final analysis, that God's concurrence—like his foreknowledge—be conditioned by the human agent's self-determination.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ In other words, Suárez seeks to avoid the *tertium quid* by both (1) identifying God's action and the action of the secondary cause, and (2) identifying action (including cooperative action) with the effect.

¹⁰⁶ See Garrigou-Lagrange's epilogue to *God, His Existence and His Nature*, 2:529–562.

¹⁰⁷ See *DM* 22 §2.18 (181), §4.14, 24, 29 (225, 229, 232).

4.4.2 Is it Really Problematic for God's *concursus* (and *scientia*) to be *conditionata*?

But is it really problematic for God's *concursus* (and *scientia*) to be *conditionata*? It could be argued that this feature—the being-conditioned—of God's foreknowledge and concurrence on Suárez's account is unproblematic because the specific human determination which conditions God's acts of knowing and concurring is only “relatively speaking and in its own genus” attributed to the human agent.¹⁰⁸ By this, Suárez means (a) to attribute the determination to the human agent, but (b) to relativize this determination—the human contribution—within the wider scope of God's universal causality. While the human agent determines “quasi-materially” God's indifferent concurrence, the human determination depends for its *esse* on God: No actual determination obtains apart from God's concurrence.¹⁰⁹ Thus, God's action is not unqualifiedly determined by the human agent, and may even be understood to have a relative physical priority to it insofar as God's action accounts for the actuality of the human determination.¹¹⁰

In response, however, it remains the case on Suárez's view that the divine concurrence which accounts for the actuality of the human determination is antecedently conditioned by God's foreknowledge of conditional future contingent propositions concerning how the human agent would exercise his freedom. The difficulty is this: For God's concurrence to be *conditioned* on definite knowledge of what person *P* would do in non-necessitating circumstances *C* at time *t*, there must be some kind of de facto determinacy to what *P* would do under the stipulated conditions. But insofar as *P*'s action is purely hypothetical, how can it have any determinacy? It is unintelligible how God's concurrence can be antecedently conditioned by a human agent's hypothetical self-determination, for precisely insofar as that determination is not actual, it is no determination at all—it simply does not exist. Determinacy just is a kind of actuality, and the question is, how can there be any determinacy, any actuality, that is not from the creator?

Thus, while Suárez's account of human action initially seems to be a plausible and more satisfactory alternative to Báñez's physical premotion, Suárez's

¹⁰⁸ *DM* 22 §4.34 (235).

¹⁰⁹ *DM* 22 §4.34 (234–35). “[Q]uasi materialiter” as a qualification of the human determination occurs in the context of Suárez's offering an interpretation of Aquinas that accords with his own position. The thought seems to be that *esse* actualizes the previously merely potential human act like the way form actualizes matter which stands in potency to it. See also *DM* 22 §4.24 (229).

¹¹⁰ See again, for instance, *DM* 22 §4.34 (234–35).

recourse to middle knowledge (or as he frequently calls it, *scientia conditio-nata*) as an indispensable piece of his total theory of divine action betrays that there is necessarily some positive dimension of human agency not touched by God's causality. Suárez appears willing to bite the bullet on this point because it seems to be the only way to affirm the genuine capacity of human persons to volitionally determine themselves. This assumption is a problem both in itself, as a metaphysical standpoint (how can anything positive be exempted from the scope of God's causality?) and in terms of the internal coherence of Suárez's theory (Suárez himself realizes nothing positive—including human free choices—can be exempted from the universal scope of God's causality, and so he develops a sophisticated account of how human free choices, in terms of their *esse*, are caused by God—but then his account of divine fore-knowledge and concurrence demands merely hypothetical human actions to have de facto determinacy). But note this limitation on the scope of divine causality originates from the underlying assumption that divine causality cannot be a dependence relation inherent in the effect, but must rather be a mediate entity that emanates from God and terminates in the effect. Because TPC does not share this assumption about causality, it is not caught on the horns of the dilemma that confronts Suárez and Báñez, and it is also not hindered by any apparent contradiction of the doctrine of creation (which is a liability especially for Suárez).

4.4.3 Is an Accident's Dependence on its Subject Problematic?

Finally, Suárez's reasons for rejecting a view like TPC are not probative. Recall that one concern motivating the assumption that God's causality cannot be a predicamental relation inherent in the effect is the thought that substances are quasi-material causes of their accidents: How can the causality by which an effect is caused depend on that effect in order to obtain? Admittedly, the idea of causality being an accident that inheres in the effect seems incoherent. Is this a problem fatal to TPC? I think it is not, for at least three reasons.

First, there is a question about the sort of causality material causality is, and whether it is the sort that would raise problems for thinking about creation (or efficient causality generally) in the way proposed here, namely as a predicamental relation. It is crucial not to conflate material causality with efficient causality, or to implicitly (or explicitly!) reduce in one's thinking all causality to efficient causality, for the alleged problem is not a question of overlapping, conflicting instances of the same mode of causality, but of two entirely different senses of 'causality'. Because of this difference in mode, it is not immediately obvious that what causes a thing in one respect might not be caused by it in another.

Second, it is not clear to me that inherence actually is an instance of material causality, at least in the straightforward sense. Inherence may simply be analogous to material causality rather than being an instance of it. In the straightforward sense, material causality is a way of explaining the being of things—hylomorphic composites—and accidents are not things (in their own right) but principles, or aspects of things. While accidents do inhere, and so depend upon their subjects, subjects do not seem to cause their accidents as clay, for example, causes the statue (complete with all its accidents). Still, there is a discernable analogy between inherence and material causality which is reflected in Aquinas's claim that "all accidents are compared to the underlying substance as form to matter, and the notion of any accident whatsoever depends on substance."¹¹¹ The important point, however, is that 'material causality' in this context seems simply to be a way of talking about inherence.

But is inherence itself a problem? Is it unreasonable to conceive of causality as a reality that inheres in what is caused (or in cases of mundane efficient causality, in the cause also)? I think that it is not. It is crucial to recognize that it is not causality, but *causes* which cause things. Causality or causation is real only insofar as effects are real in relation to causes. Causality obtains just in the obtaining of an effect: The effect obtains in relation to its cause, and the effect obtains concurrently with the relation it bears to the cause (even if it is the case that the effect bears the relation as the subject in which the relation inheres). Causation, therefore, is only intelligible as a relative reality which, as such, is necessarily subordinate to its *relata*—the cause and the effect.

111 Aquinas *Super Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 5 a. 3 c.: "omnia accidentia comparentur ad substantiam subiectam sicut forma ad materiam, et cuiuslibet accidentis ratio dependeat ad substantiam." Consider also what Aquinas says about the 'susceptive' causality a subject, as such, has in respect to its accidents: "It is to be said that the subject is both the final cause and in a certain sense, the active cause of its proper accident, and it is even like a material cause of it, insofar as it is supportive of the accident. And from this it can be gathered that the essence of the soul is the cause of all [its] powers as [their] end and as [their] active principle, but also [that it is the cause] of certain [powers] as supportive [of them] {dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo active; et etiam ut materialis, in quantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentialiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum}" (ST I q. 77 a. 6 ad 2). The *ut* in the phrase, *ut materialis* relaxes the sense in which Aquinas is identifying the subject as a material cause of its accidents. His point is not so much to univocally or unqualifiedly identify substances as material causes of their accidents, but rather to point out a certain analogy or relationship: a subject is, relatively speaking, a material cause of the accidents that inhere in it precisely insofar as it is 'susceptive' or supportive of those accidents.

Third, even assuming subjects are quasi-material causes of their accidents and so have a physical (natural) priority to them, there is still a different respect in which one can affirm the priority of God's action to God's effects: Namely, insofar as God's action can be identified with God and God, as cause, is prior to his effects. On divine simplicity, God, his nature and his actions are all identical in reality. Thus, there is a respect in which divine causality does have priority with respect to created effects, but that priority is nothing other than the priority of God himself to created effects. Thus, TPC can deliver the priority of divine action that Suárez and Báñez both in different ways acknowledge, but without making their problematic (though extremely alluring) assumption that God's causality is a created antecedent to his effects.

5 Conclusion

The tendency to think of God's causality as a created antecedent to his effects—a kind of energy or influx, like a wave or pulse of energy that emanates from God—is so intuitive it is virtually irrepressible.¹¹² What makes this view of divine causality so intuitive is our knowledge of efficient causation *in nature*.¹¹³ But while God's creative causality is *analogous to* efficient causation, divine causality is not any sort of causality we know from created causes. God's causality is *sui generis*. Divine transcendence must be seen all the way through.

Nevertheless, so strong is the initial plausibility of the idea that God's causality is a created antecedent to his effects that it rendered the *de Auxiliis* dilemma practically unavoidable from an historical standpoint. It is the sort of error in thinking that can only be recognized in hindsight, once the idea's implications have become evident. Only after the wreck can one identify precisely why and where the train jumped the tracks. Somewhat like diagnosing a fault in electrical circuitry, the problem must be traced back to its point of origin by patiently ruling out one possibility at a time.

I would submit that in this case, the point of origin lies outside the parameters of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* as it was originally framed, and lies instead

112 This is of course a gross characterization of the major sixteenth century views on divine causality surveyed here. Nevertheless, however sophisticated and nuanced Báñez's and Suárez's different accounts of divine causality are in contrast to this gross characterization, it does capture the underlying conviction of both accounts.

113 It may be that efficient causation (in nature, not God's creative causality) is just structurally modulated energy, the transference of energy or perhaps matter, which is complexly structured energy (See Ross, *Thought and World*, 132–33, 135).

in an assumption shared by both sides of that controversy, though it played out very differently on the two sides. The assumption in question is that causality, (in this case, divine causality) is a kind of energy or influx that mediates between cause and effect and which, as such, is physically prior to the effect. Such an assumption about causality compelled both sides to think of divine and human action as a “zero-sum game.”¹¹⁴ On these terms, divine causality must either determine or be determined by the actions of human persons. Báñez opts for the former, Molina and Suárez, for the latter.

The core assumption which drove the Controversy *de Auxiliis* manifests that by the sixteenth century, there had been a widespread shift in thinking about causality among interpreters of Aquinas away from Aquinas’s own simpler, if less immediately intuitive view. Given the profound influence Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* had in mediating the medieval scholastic tradition to the moderns, one wonders to what extent the idea of causation that had so captured the imaginations of scholastic thinkers by the sixteenth century—namely, the idea of causation as an intermediate reality, a kind of positive emanation distinct from cause and effect which links them as a kind of metaphysical bridge—may have led to the subsequent rejection of the reality, or at least of the intelligibility, of efficient causality by certain modern philosophers.¹¹⁵

114 Burrell, *Freedom and Creation*, 2.

115 A different version of the last part of this chapter appears in the Fall, 2016 issue of *ACPQ*.

Epilogue

The foregoing considerations suggest is that both Báñez and Molina are right in their critiques of each other and, consequently, that both of their own respective positions are deficient. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to dismiss the debate between Báñez and Molina as a mere “fruitless contention,” a “vain piece of a question,” as is sometimes done. The Controversy *de Auxiliis* indisputably forced a more precise reflection on the relationship of God and human free choices, thus deepening our understanding of the mystery. While neither Báñez nor Molina articulated a fully satisfactory solution to the difficulty, each made a serious, sophisticated and honest attempt to do so and each got an important part of the matter right. For Báñez, it is that God causes our free choices in every respect except for the evil we introduce into some of them. For Molina, it is that we are free in the strong sense that our choices are genuinely up to us.

The problem lies in the shared suppositions that framed the controversy and inevitably brought about the impasse in which it resulted. The chief cause of the impasse was the supposition that divine causality is something distinct from God and his effect that antecedes his effect in the physical order and links the effect with God as its cause. This supposition led Báñez to posit a divine predetermination that undercut human self-determination, and led Molina to an antecedent circumscription of God's causal possibilities that undercut the doctrine of creation. Underlying the problematic supposition was an implicit univocity that crept into how causality was conceived on both views. Divine causality was imagined to be a sort of force, a transference of energy, somewhat like (some) efficient causation *in* nature. The implications of divine transcendence were thus obscured so that no one grasped the true meaning of Aquinas's claim that God, as the universal cause of being, causes the necessary and contingent as such. Eclipsed was the full import of the doctrine of creation: God does not cause by moving or changing, but by imparting existence. God's causing things to move or change is but a logical consequence of his causing their existence.

Yet so intuitive was the idea of causality Báñez and Molina both supposed (each in his own way), that it rendered the Controversy *de Auxiliis* practically unavoidable from an historical standpoint. It was a mistake that was bound to be made, and only in making it was the necessary pressure generated to stimulate deeper reflection on the mystery so that a more adequate account of it could be articulated. That mystery, fundamentally, is the mystery of creation, which is also the key to the mystery of God's grace.

What might be the wider implications of the foregoing investigation? Principally, I think there are three arenas that range beyond the present study and might offer promising avenues for new research.¹ Necessarily, the following remarks are more tentative than what has come before.

First, the fault lines in theological debates about grace and freedom in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are much more complex and trans-confessional than generally realized. The Controversy *de Auxiliis* was one instance of a sort of debate that was being conducted at the time within both Catholic and Protestant confessions. Without obscuring important differences between the quarrels, one cannot ignore remarkable similarities between the positions in the Catholic Controversy *de Auxiliis*, and for example, the Lutheran Synergist Controversy and the Calvinist Remonstrant Controversy. In many respects, the sides in these debates have more in common with one another across confessional lines than they do with their respective opponents within the same confession. In some cases, there was even literary dependence (at times surreptitious) of Protestant authors on Catholic. Some Calvinist factions eagerly awaited the condemnation of Molina as a vindication of their own position. Such relationships are remarkable because disagreements over grace and free choice are also one of the fundamental factors dividing Catholics from Protestants. The persistence of these controversies after the Council of Trent shows that important and Church-dividing questions remained to be answered even in the wake of the council. This suggests that if a more adequate understanding of divine causality and human freedom could be developed today, it might *in principle* be able to generate consensus among at least some Christians to overcome a major doctrinal division between Catholics and Protestants, thereby moving the Church one step closer to the unity and universality that Jesus desired. I believe that TPC answers more than any other available proposal to the best concerns of Thomists and Molinists, Calvinists and Armenians, Gnesio-Lutherans and Synergists, while avoiding the undeniable and deeply problematic shortcomings of each of these positions.

Second, the Controversy *de Auxiliis* seems to have been a much more influential debate in its own day than is usually appreciated today. Research into the philosophy of the early modern period—especially early-modern scholasticism, which was then still dominant—remains a burgeoning field. I suspect that further research would reveal that the questions and positions of the Controversy *de Auxiliis* greatly influenced the development of certain features of modern thought. One specific way this may prove to be so is in modern attitudes toward religion and the development of a secular humanism.

1 For other indications of the wider implications of this study, see Part 1 of the prologue.

Pierre Bayle at least implicitly held for an antinomy between divine causality and human freedom. Physical premotion provided Arouet with fodder for his antagonism against Christian faith, and if Milton's earlier sentiments are at all reflective of the zeitgeist ("Though I may be sent to hell for it, such a God will never command my respect"),² one wonders to what extent troubling positions on predestination, underwritten by a faulty understanding of divine causality and human freedom, may have spawned the notion of later thinkers, such as Feuerbach and Nietzsche, that the existence of God entails the negation of human freedom so that human freedom demands the negation of God. In light of these considerations, TPC contributes to the development of an authentic Christian humanism insofar as it dispels the spectre of an antinomy between God and human autonomy.

Third, it was suggested above that the Controversy *de Auxiliis* resulted in an impasse because of a certain highly intuitive but imaginative and mistaken view of causality, namely the idea that action or efficient causality is a kind of intermediate entity, an influx that links effect to cause. One wonders, in closing, to what extent such a received view of causality in the early modern period may have fueled skepticism concerning the reality or intelligibility of causality on the part of such modern philosophers as Hume. The impossibility of discovering causality as an intermediate real something between cause and effect may have been one factor that, in the estimation of the *philosophes*, decisively discredited medieval scholastic metaphysics.

2 As quoted in Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), 101. I have been unable to locate the source of the original quote.

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Index

- Abelard, Peter 2, 6 n.15
accidents *see* priority
action
actio media 222 n.29
as a mode of the effect 311–12, 315
at a distance 56
distinction of human and divine 178, 220
elicited vs. commanded 45, 46 n.27, 71, 239, 299
first act and second act 38, 51 n.41, 58–59 n.60, 61, 64–66, 67–68 nn.79–80, 69–70, 71 nn.92–93, 72, 241
identity with dependence of effect on cause 314–15
identity with effect 311–15
intellectual 45–46 nn.26–27, 59, 61, 65, 67, 72 n.98, 75–77, 204, 226
interior vs. exterior 53, 239, 299
ministerial/sacramental 1 n.2
passion and 66–67, 80 n.126, 218–20, 259, 264–65, 268–69, 271–72
potency and 9, 49, 52, 67–68 n.80, 79–80, 123–24, 129, 209, 216–17, 239, 246–47, 251, 317
real change involved in transition to 216–19, 239
structure of human 45, 46 n.27, 75–76, 224, 299
ut ab agente in aliud procedens 66, 217, 219
vital 38, 48–54, 56–72, 80, 95, 99, 181, 199, 209, 218, 241, 246
see also creation; free choice; immediacy; intention, as in *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7; judgment; motion; premotion; relation; sin; volition; will; *and related topics under God*
Ad Christi vicarii 6 n.15, 23 n.13
Adams, Robert 11 n.24, 145 n.118, 149 n.129, 150 n.132
Aeterni Patris 34
al-Ghazālī 53 n.45
Alvarez, Diego
as coauthor of the *Apologia* 117 n.43
as representative of Báñez's position 5, 39 n.4, 242
criticism of middle knowledge 102, 117 n.43, 132 n.85, 137 n.96, 142 nn.113–14, 149 n.131, 150, 152–53 n.139, 153 n.142, 156
criticism of Molina on free choice and divine causality 125, 126 nn.69–71, 127, 128 n.77
on divine causation of the act of sin 91 n.148, 94 n.161
on free choice 207 n.106
on free choice 75 n.105, 79 n.125
on priority of *auxilium* 44 n.23
on *QDP* q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 49 n.37, 308 n.80
on the designation 'physical' 41 n.12, 43 n.20, 43–44 n.22
on the distinction of composed and divided senses 84 n.134
on the immediacy of divine agency 54 n.49, 55 n.51, 56
on the interpretation of consequences 138 nn.99–100, 138 n.102, 139 n.103, 140 n.108, 141 n.109
on the ontological status of physical premotion 51 n.40, 51 n.41, 52 n.43, 53 n.47, 58–59 n.60, 67–68 n.80, 71
on Trent's doctrine of justification 197 n.77
anachronism 240, 243–45
analogy 80, 163, 285, 287, 293, 305, 307, 320
of faith 6, 212
of inherence and material causation 311 n.91, 319
of truth 161
see also relational predication; univocity; *and under causality*
antinomianism 106
Antoniotti, Louise-Marie 252 n.22
Apologia 9, 11 n.22, 32, 116–19, 208 n.107
Apostolicae providentiae officio 6 n.15
application
Aquinas on 37–38, 49–51
as a logical consequence of creating 284–87, 322
Lonergan on 220–23, 226–27
relationship to conservation and creation 15, 236–37, 246, 249–51, 253–55, 259, 261 n.41, 262, 276, 301–04, 307

- application (cont.)
 Suárez on 315
 see also action; motion; premotion; and
 related topics under God
- Aquaviva, Claudius 22 n.8
- Aquinas, Thomas 3, 7, 14–15, 36, 53 n.45, 62,
 113, 125 n.67, 128 n.78, 153–54, 163 n.157
 Epistola ad Bernardum (his final work
 concerning freedom and divine
 foreknowledge) 243
 on efficacious and sufficient grace 46
 n.28
 on God's causation of the act of sin
 186–87 nn.51–52
 on motion as an 'impulse' 'influx' or
 'imprint' 220 n.21
 on natural law 166
 on necessity of consequence and
 necessity of the consequent 193 n.69
 on predestination 28, 117, 260–61
 on providence as 'predefinition' 125 n.67
 on truth 161, 165 n.161, 167–68
 on vital act 48 n.32
 QDP q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 as a locus classicus
 49–50, 52 n.43, 220 n.22, 250–51,
 253–54, 262–63, 308 n.80, 316
 relationship to the Controversy *de Auxiliis*
 243–45
 views on application a Jesuit stumbling
 block 109 n.20, 180, 308 n.80, 316
 see also under application; natural law;
 premotion
- Arianism 16
- Aristotle
 anything that is, while it is, must be 257
 n.32, 289
 appeal to the *per accidens* 232, 234
 Categories 259 n.39, 268 n.57, 269, 308
 n.82
 doctrine of potency and act 246, 251
 Eudemian Ethics 224
 Metaphysics 42, 76, 149 n.131, 153, 154
 n.143
 Nicomachean Ethics 76
 on action 218, 314–15 n.101
 On Interpretation 149 n.131, 197 n.78, 259,
 289, 257 n.32, 289 n.37
 on motion 66–67, 70 n.85
 Physics 43 n.19, 66–67, 219, 259, 268 n.59
 Posterior Analytics 176
 sea-battle future contingents 153
 view of premotion *see under* premotion
 (other forms)
 view of prime matter 285 n.24
- Arminianism, Jesuit theological influence on
 5 n.6, 323
 see also Remonstrant Controversy
- Arouet, François-Marie (Voltaire) 324
- Arrese, Juan de 22
- Arujo, Francisco VIII
- Asselt, Willem J. van 150 n.133
- atheism *see under* Controversy *de Auxiliis*
- Athens to Thebes *see* motion, Aristotelian
 analogies of
- atonement, limited 7, cf. 4 n.11
- Auctorem fidei* 34 n.43
- Augustine 2, 3 n.8, 18 n.3, 19, 23, 48 n.32, 98,
 117, 180 n.30
 shifting views on free choice 2 n.5
- Augustinianism 3
 as a monastic order 5, 19
 as a third position in the Controversy *de*
 Auxiliis 3 n.8, 34
- Auriol, Peter 2, 6 n.15
- Austriaco, Albert Cardinal 30
- Autrecourt, Nicholas of 53 n.45
- Auvergne, William of 53 n.45
- auxilium* 5, 37–73
 actual vs. habitual 40–42, 45
 as physical premotion 42–44
 distinction from creation 39–40
 efficacious vs. sufficient 5, 46–47, 96,
 169, 174 ff., 201, 210
 general idea of 37–39, 99
 generale (concurrence) 52, 107
 moral 44, 94
 natural vs. supernatural (grace) 44–45
 operative vs. cooperative 45, 96
 prevenient vs. subsequent 45
 see also grace; premotion
- Averroes *see* Ibn Rushd
- Avicenna *see* Ibn Sīnā
- Bac, J. Martin 150 n.133
- Backus, Irena 2 n.5, 128 n.80
- Baianism 4, 18, 23–29, 106 n.12, 180
 see also 'Bay, Michael de'
- Baius *see* 'Bay, Michael de' and 'Baianism'

- Báñez, Domingo
 as a subject of this study 8–10
 as an interpreter of Aquinas 9, 12, 185
 n.49, 213 n.2, 215
 debate with Montemayor 19–23
 life and work 8 n.17
 orthodoxy questioned 33, 170–71 ff.
 proximity to Protestant views 31, 88, 185
 n.49, 207 n.106
 scrutiny of Molina's *Concordia* 30–31
- Bañezianism
 as a controversial title 49
 Billot's semi-Bañezianism and 35
 Marín-Sola's impedible premotion and
 281 n.13
- barge-towing example *see under*
 concurrence
- Basinger, David 11 n.24
- Baudewyns, Maarten {Rythovius} 30 n.33
- Baudry, Leon 23 n.12
- Bay, Jacob du 26
- Bay, Michael de {Baius} 6 n.15, 23–27, 45
 n.25, 180 n.30
see also Baianism
- Bayle, Pierre 324
- Becken, Peter van den *see* Rivo, Peter de
- being *see* existence
- Bellarmino, Robert 5, 17 n.3, 26, 27 n.27, 33
 and Congruism 22, 28
 teacher of Lessius 25 n.21
- Beltrán de Heredia, Vicente *see* Heredia,
 Vicente Beltrán de
- Beza, Theodore 128 n.80
- Bible *see* Scripture
- Biel, Gabriel 3, 53 n.45, 90 n.147
- Billot, Louis 35
- bivalence, principle of 151, 153–55, 164 n.159
- Blanc, Augustin le *see* Serry, Jacques
 Hyacinthe
- Boh, Ivan 136–37, 138 n.98
- Bonner, Gerald 2 n.5
- Boyle, Joseph 165 n.161, 166 nn.162–64, 238
 n.82, 293 n.50, 294 n.51
- Bradwardine, Thomas 3
- Brodrick, James 17 n.3, 26 n.25, 30 n.32
- Brower, Jeffrey 269 n.61, 295, 314 n.97
- Burrell, David 279–80, 287 n.32, 304
 nn.69–70, 321 n.114
- Cabrera, Pedro de
 identity of physical premotion and vital
 act 67–68 n.80, 71 n.91, 71 n.93, 72
 on physical premotion as a quality 41
 n.12, 51 n.41
- Cajetan, Thomas de Vio 91–93, 109 n.20
- Calvin, John 3–4, 106, 173, 181, 185, 198–99,
 207 n.106, 245 n.5
- Calvinism 4, 88, 323
- Cambridge Free-Will Debates 4
- Cameron, Ross 159 n.152
- Cano, Melchior 90 n.147
- Canon Law 33 n.41
- Caplan, Ben 159 n.152, 167 n.166
- Cassian, John 2
- Castaneda, Juan de 19
- causality
 analogous senses of 249–55, 286–87,
 304–05, 320, 322
 and energy 43 n.21, 274, 320–22
 as a path to the effect, a mediate entity
 linking cause and effect 292, 307–08,
 312, 313 n.95, 314 n.96, 315, 318, 320–22,
 324
 as a tertium quid 63, 218–220, 222 n.29,
 236, 241, 274, 291, 316, 324
 as an accident 63, 218, 242, 259–63,
 267–71, 273, 298, 307–11, 314–15 n.101,
 318–20
 as an influx {influxus} 9, 41–44, 49, 102,
 107–11, 120, 125–26, 184, 220 n.21, 263,
 274, 307, 309–10, 312, 320–21, 324
 as distinct from cause 319
causa per accidens vs. *causa per se* 228,
 230, 232, 234, 240, 280 n.9
 coming about of the effect and 274, 308,
 312, 314 n.96, 315
 divine causality as a created antecedent to
 God's effects 55, 100, 240, 306 n.74,
 320–21, 323
 efficient 9–10, 15, 19, 34, 39, 41 n.12,
 42–44, 52, 55, 70–71, 93, 137, 140, 145
 n.118, 148 n.124, 188 n.55, 240–41, 259–60
 n.39, 301, 307–15, 318–20, 322
 instrumental 40–41, 50, 190, 211, 250–51,
 253
 material 310–11, 318–20
 modern science and 43 n.21

causality (cont.)

- primary 38, 44, 50, 56–57, 60 n.63, 90, 93, 111 n.25, 126, 128 n.78, 152 n.139, 175, 177–78, 189, 202, 209, 213 n.2, 216 n.6, 234, 251
 - reality or intelligibility of rejected by modern philosophers 321, 324
 - secondary 38, 40, 42–44, 47, 52, 53 n.47, 54, 55–57, 59 n.60, 100, 108, 111, 117–18, 124, 128 n.78, 178, 180, 202–03, 213 n.2, 215, 221 n.24, 224 n.31, 226–29, 231–34, 237–38, 241, 247, 251, 253–55, 261–62, 268 n.58, 276, 292, 299 n.61, 301–02, 316 n.105
 - subjective (substances as causal of their accidents) 310–11, 318–19, *see also* inherence
 - see also* action; creation; motion; premotion; relation *and under* God
- change *see* motion
- Chemnitz, Martin 199
- choice {electio} 46 n.27, 48, 57–59, 65 n.72, 76, 204, 211, 282–83, 299
- as a kind of self-causing or self-movement 38, 48, 64 n.72, 73, 79, 105, 126 n.71, 216 n.6, 233–34, 238, 300
 - as willing of the means 38, 75 n.109, 224, 226
 - see also* action, structure of human; freedom
- Clifford, Alan 4 n.11
- comma Pianum* 24–25 n.18
- command {imperium} 45, 46 n.27, 299
- see also* action; structure of human
- commission, papal *de Auxiliis* *see* *Congregatio de Auxiliis*
- compatibilism 12 n.26, 15, 36, 60 n.63, 61 n.64, 229–31, 238 n.82, 241, 244–45 n.5, 279 n.6, 279 n.8, 295, 299 n.59
- composed and divided senses {sensus compositus et sensus divisus} 13–14, 73, 83–89, 96, 98–99, 123, 181, 182 n.36, 191–202, 209–11, 228, 256 n.32, 288, 290
- difference between Aquinas and Báñez on 193 n.69, 256–57 n.32
 - futility of recourse to 193–95, 199 n.86, 290
 - see also* conditional propositions; contingent or necessary mode; necessity

Concordia

- approbation of 31, 34
 - as indicative of a new era in theology 243
 - critical edition 35, 103 n.3
 - Lonergan's position and 129 n.81, 213, 221 n.26
 - publication and scrutiny of 18, 22, 29–32, 34, 121 n.56, 170–71
 - structure of 103–04
 - see also* *Tractatus (de vera et legitima concordia)*
- concurrence {concursum}
- Báñez's view of 40–42, 52, 70, 97, 117–19, 126–27, 129, 176, 180, 202
 - barge-towing example 42, 108
 - determination of the will excluded from the scope of divine causality 125–26, 129, 318
 - Molina's view of 27, 30, 104, 107–13, 117–19, 124, 126–27, 129, 176, 184, 242, 300
 - not a transcendental relation 312–14
 - Suárez's view of 70, 110 n.25, 117, 306–18, 117–18, 176, 242, 276–77
 - see also* action; *auxilium*; creation; partial causes; premotion
- conditional propositions concerning future
- contingent states of affairs 2, 6 n.15, 23, 30, 85, 113 n.34, 114 n.39, 115, 117, 132 ff, 197
- actual future and 135, 155
- counterfactual states of affairs and 146–48
- counterfactuals of freedom 114–15, 117, 131–34, 159–62, 164 n.159, 165, 193, 317
- disparate sense of 139–40
- divine will and 134–35, 155
- existential sense of 138–39
- illative sense of 138, 141
- law of excluded middle and 149–50
- truth of not grounded *ex vi consequentiae* 135–143, 155
- see also* composed and divided senses; grounding objection; middle knowledge; necessity
- conditioned knowledge {scientia conditionata} *see* middle knowledge, as *scientia conditionata*

- Congregatio de Auxiliis* 18, 31–34, 39 n.4, 170
 canonical prohibition of publication
 and 33
 termination of 33
- Congruism 22, 116
- consent {consensus} 45, 46 n.27, 46 n.29, 47
 n.31, 57, 58 n.59, 106, 113, 117, 122, 145,
 180, 192, 198, 200–01, 211
see also action, structure of human
- consequences 131, 135–143
 goodness or badness of 137–38
 necessity of consequence {necessitas
 consequentiae} and 140
 ways of interpreting 138–40
see also conditional propositions
 concerning future contingent states of
 affairs; necessity
- conservation 15, 37, 42, 49, 236–37, 250–55,
 259, 275–76, 300–04, 307
- conservationism 300–01
see also Durand of St. Pourçain, William
- contingent or necessary mode 85, 193 n.69,
 202–03, 209–11, 227, 229, 232
 as a logical consequence of creation 285,
 322
 as *gradus essendi* 257–58
 from God 123, 191, 193, 202–03, 211, 222,
 227, 241, 242, 256–57, 276, 283, 285 n.25,
 288
 from the secondary cause 255
see also necessity
- contradiction
 freedom of *see* freedom, of contrariety
 vs. of contradiction
 principle of 150–51, 153–55
- contrariety
 freedom of *see* freedom, of contrariety
 vs. of contradiction
 moral *see* sin, contrariety between sin
 and virtue
- Controversy *de Auxiliis* 4–5
 as involving a dilemma (*impasse*) 15,
 189, 214, 222, 229, 245, 281, 295, 316, 318,
 320, 322, 324
 atheism and 7, 323–24
 broader implications of 7, 323–24
 contemporary philosophy and 15, 36, 214
 contemporary theology and 13, 15,
 35–36, 214
- dogmatic significance 7, 16–17
 ecumenical relevance of 7, 323
 eschatology and 7, 187 n.53
 initiation of 19–23
 modern philosophy and 43 n.21, 321,
 323–24
 modern science and 43 n.21
 practical unavoidability of 320, 322
 presuppositions of 14, 36, 212, 214, 229,
 240, 245, 281, 320–21, 322
 relationship to other controversies 1–5
 resurgences 34–36
 spiritual and pastoral significance of 7,
 17
 termination of 5, 7
see also *Congregatio de Auxiliis*
- conversion 14, 92, 169, 174–83, 188–89, 210,
 225
see also justification
- cooperation, divine-human 1, 5, 27, 37, 42,
 106–13, 118, 175, 177–78, 180–81, 190,
 198–99
see also grace, cooperative; justification
- correspondence theory *see under* truth
- councils, ecclesiastical
 Carthage XVI 6 n.15
 Ephesus 43 n.22
 Orange II 6 n.15, 19, 71, 128–29 n.80, 175,
 185–86
 Pistoia (pseudo-council) 34 n.43
 Quiersy 6 n.15
 Sens (Paris) 6 n.15, 195 n.73, 206
 Toul 6 n.15
 Trent 5, 6 n.15, 18, 25 n.20, 80, 82 n.130,
 88, 106, 129 n.80, 174–75, 177, 180 n.30,
 183, 185–87, 195–200, 206, 207 n.106, 211,
 241, 323
 Valence 6 n.15
 Vatican II 35, 170 n.5
- counsel {consilium} 75–76, 78, 83, 224
initium consilandi 224–45
see also action, structure of human
- counterfactual dependence *see under*
 dependence
- counterfactuals
 of determined action 159 n.152
 of freedom *see* conditional propositions
 concerning future contingent states of
 affairs

- Craig, William Lane 113 n.34, 147 n.121, 148, 149 n.130, 150–54
- creation 7, 36, 49, 56, 115, 154 159 n.148, 167, 188, 241, 292–94, 301, 304–05, 307, 318
 active and passive senses 62–63, 259–60, 266–67, 272, 275–76, 285 n.21, 298, 304
 Aquinas on 220 n.21, 222 n.29, 248 ff., 263–77, 295, 310, 313 n.95
 as a stumbling block for Molinism 126, 129, 143, 146–48, 156, 318, 322
 as an accident in the creature 56–57, 220 n.21, 266–76, 307, 313 n.95
 as the total production of an effect 52, 249, 255–59, 266, 268, 275, 285, 294, 301
 distinction from motion 39–40, 52, 54, 220 n.21, 236–37, 246–47, 266, 301–03
 human action not an instance of 126
 identity with the divine essence 15, 56–57, 62, 250, 259, 261, 266–76, 285, 298, 307, 320
 narrow (de novo) and broad senses of 15, 220 n.21, 236–37, 248–63, 275, 307
 view of Lonergan and 214, 217, 222 n.29, 229–30, 232, 235–39
see also action; application; causality; conservation; relation; total personal creation (TPC); *and under* God; promotion
- Cuadrado, José Ángel García 8 n.17, 48 n.35, 244 n.5
- Cum occasione* 6 n.15
- D'Ailly, Peter 53 n.45
- Davies, Brian 279–280, 305 n.72
- de dicto and de re modality *see under* necessity
- de re modal truths *see under* truth
- Dekker, Eef 11 n.24, 113 n.34
- deliberation *see* counsel
- denomination, extrinsic *see* extrinsic denomination
- dependence
 causal *see* creation; relation
 counterfactual 147–48, 194 n.71
 of truth on being *see under* truth
- determinism 60 n.63, 61 n.64, 62, 104, 130, 169–70, 184, 189–92, 203, 206, 211, 213, 231, 238 n.82, 244 n.5, 280 n.9, 288, 295
- intellectual 78 n.121, 207–08, 215 n.6
- logical equivalence and 288–92
- natural 43, 77, 79, 82–84, 89, 98–99, 121, 143, 155, 209
- of the circumstances *see* middle knowledge
see also compatibilism *and under* TPC
- Dewan, Lawrence 161 n.154
- dilemma
 and the Controversy *de Auxiliis* *see under* Controversy *de Auxiliis*
 and the position that effects have a metaphysical priority to the causality by which they are caused 267, 273–75, 310–11, 318–20
- dispositional conditionals *see under* truth
- distinction
 formal 51 n.41, 68 n.80, 314–15
 logical (conceptual) 312, 315
 modal 58 n.60, 312, 315
 of God from creatures *see under* order
 real 27, 53 n.47, 58 n.60, 59, 72, 110 n.23, 217, 311–12, *see also under* existence
- divided sense *see* composed and divided senses
- divine *see* God
- Dodds, Michael J. 252 n.22
- dominium* *see* freedom, responsibility and
- Donagan, Alan 45 n.26
- Driedo, Jan 30 n.33
- Dum praeterito* 6 n.15
- Dummermuth, Antonin 9 n.19, 109 n.20
- Durand of St. Pourçain, William {Durandus} 76–77, 90 n.147, 237 n.78, 255 n.27, 300–01
see also conservationism
- ecumenism 7, 323
- election 1 n.1, 27
ante praevisa merita 28
post praevisa merita 28, 128
see also predestination; *on* electio *see* action, structure of human; choice; freedom
- Eleutherius, Theodore *see* 'Meyer, Livinus de'
- energy *see under* causality
- equivocation 210, 287

- Erasmus of Rotterdam 3, 4 n.9, 199 n.86,
244 n.5
- erector-set philosophizing 287
- Eriugena, John Scotus 2, 3 n.6
- essence 141, 142 n.112, 225
divine *see under* God
existence and *see under* existence
formal sufficiency of an agent for
acting 40, 48, 49 n.38, 50, 51 n.41, 52,
182–83
individual 145–147, 155
nature and 43 n.19, 158–59, 164, 166
- eternal law *see* providence
- eternalism *see under* time
- eternity *see under* God
- evil *see* sin
- Ex omnibus afflictionibus* 6 n.15, 29
- ex vi consequentiae* 102 n.2, 131, 132 n.84,
135ff., 141–43, 155
see also consequences
- excavator example *see under* immediacy
- excluded middle, law of 143, 150–51, 153, 155
- excommunication 29, 171 n.7, 195 n.73
- existence 152 n.139 168 n.169, 257
analogous senses of within the created
order 162–63 n.157
as innermost in things 258–59
as the foundation of a dependence
relation 63, 274 n.69, 276
as the proper effect of God 36, 49, 50
n.39, 56, 91 n.150, 124, 215, 236, 241–43,
248–49, 251, 257–58, 275–76, 284–85,
287, 301–05, 317–18
as the terminus of causation 308–09
contrast with motion as an effect 237,
246–47, 276, 287
distinction of creaturely from divine
252, 272, 304
esse ad and *esse in* of a relation *see*
under relation
esse incompletum *see under* intention
- essence and 11, 110, 124, 228, 230, 248, 300
- participation and 63, 81, 188, 211, 221,
250–52, 272, 274, 278, 306 n.74
see also contingent or necessary mode;
creation; four orders; motion
- Exsurge Domine* 6 n.15
- external model of divine causal agency
295–97
- extrinsic denomination 241, 250 n.16, 272,
285, 293 n.48
see also relational predication
- falsity *see under* truth
- Farrelly, Mark John 1 n.1
- fate 15, 214–15, 223–24, 226–29, 232–34,
239–40, 261–62, 276, 281
- feasibility 114 n.36, 115
- Ferreira, Bartolomeo 30
- Feuerbach, Ludwig 324
- Fides et ratio* 10
- finkish dispositions 158–59
see also truth
- Finnis, John 45–46 nn.26–27, 165 n.161,
166 nn.162–64
- fire-and-the-kettle/-straw/-paper examples
55, 112, 157–58, 164, 221, 301
- first mover *see under* God
- Fisher, John 171 n.7
- Flint, Thomas 113 n.34, 114 n.39, 115 n.40,
142 n.112, 148 nn.124–25
- Fonseca, Pedro da 30 n.33
- foreknowledge *see under* God, middle
knowledge
- four orders *see under* order
- Frangipani, Octavio 28–29
- Freddoso, Alfred 17 n.3, 34 n.42, 103 n.3, 113
n.34, 150–51, 245 n.6, 255 n.27, 300 n.61, 301
n.62, 307 n.75, 307 nn.77–78, 308 n.80, 308
n.82, 309 n.87, 313 n.95, 314 n.101
- free choice *see* choice; freedom
- freedom
ability to do otherwise and 77–78, 81,
89, 96, 99, 105–06, 117, 121–26, 135,
144, 183 n.43, 184, 193 n.69, 244 n.5,
282–83, 285–86, 299, *see also*
indifference
ability to sin and 81–82, 89–90, 99, 120,
122 n.56, 204
as *facultas ad utrumlibet* 74, 82
as non-coercion 24, 244–45 n.5
Báñez's teaching on 74 ff., 88 ff., 105,
120–29, 207 n.106
Calvin's view of 4, 88, 106, 173, 185,
198–99 207 n.106, 245 n.5
divine 80–81, 84, 188, 194 n.72, 203–04
Erasmus's view of 3, 4 n.9, 199 n.86,
244 n.5

- freedom (cont.)
- Luther's view of 3–4, 12 n.27, 88, 106, 173, 185, 198–99 207 n.106, 244 n.5, 290
 - Molina's teaching on 78 n.120, 104 ff. 119 n.50, 120–29, 145, 206
 - of contrariety vs. of contradiction 81–83, 92 120–21, 122 n.56
 - of diversity 81–83, 122 n.56
 - of exercise and of specification 48 n.35, 77 n.117, 82–83, 99, 227, 230–31, 301
 - positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum* 78 n.120, 105 n.5, 115, 120–123, 135, 283
 - radically in the intellect and formally in the will 75–78, 99, 105, 121, 204–05, 207
 - reduced to divine freedom or the
 - contingency of creation 175, 187 n.54, 188, 191, 194–95, 202, 211, 287, 301
 - requirements of on TPC 282–83, 297–99
 - responsibility {dominium} and 1, 28, 74, 124, 125 n.63, 181–83, 187, 189–90, 193 n.69, 201–02, 209, 211, 234–35, 238, 284, 286, 295, 299, 301, 305–06, 322
 - skepticism and the antinomy of divine and human 324
 - see also* choice; indifference; total personal creation (TPC)
 - future contingents *see* conditional propositions concerning future contingent states of affairs
 - God's knowledge of *see related topics under* God
 - future, propositions about the *see under* truth
 - Gallicanism 34 n.43
 - Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald 9 n.19, 10 n.20, 34, 39 n.4, 47 n.29, 53, 60 n.63, 72, 124 n.61, 127 n.73, 128–29 n.80, 189, 247, 302 n.63, 304 n.68, 316
 - see also* God, determining or determined
 - Genke, Victor 2 n.6
 - Geulincx, Arnold 53 n.45
 - Ghent, Henry of 76, 77 n.117, 146 n.120
 - Gilson, Etienne 30 n.33
 - Gnesio-Lutherans *see* Synergist Controversy
 - God
 - as prime mover/first cause 38, 40, 44, 49–50, 60 n.63, 79, 89–90, 93, 109, 111 n.25, 124, 126, 128 n.78, 152 n.139, 177–78, 175, 189, 202, 209, 213 n.2, 217, 225, 234, 237, 239–40, 251
 - aseity of 126, 296
 - causal (*transeunt*) action of 15, 37 ff., 43 n.21, 55, 62, 66 n.75, 73, 107 ff., 243 ff., 262 ff., 281 ff., 292 ff., 295–305, 307–324
 - causal action *like light* or *color in the air* 248, 251–54, 276
 - causal indefectibility of 9, 44, 47, 53 n.45, 84, 89, 95–97, 100, 140, 142, 154, 173, 187, 198–99, 222, 227, 232, 245, 256 n.32, 280, 291
 - determining or determined {*Dieu déterminant ou déterminé*} 189, 247, 316
 - distinction from world *see under* order
 - divine ideas {rationes} 61, 115, 125 n.67, 130, 166 n.164, 172, 260–61
 - divine initiative 1 n.1, 3 n.8, 13 n.28, 90, 113, 117, 127–28, 175–83, 184 n.47, 295
 - divine refusal of *auxilium* needed to avoid sin 14, 98, 175, 179–84, 187–89, 201 n.93, 210, 234, 281
 - divine simplicity 15, 113, 248, 251, 258, 291, 295–98, 320
 - essence of (*ipsum esse subsistens*) 15, 60 n.63, 62, 99, 142–43, 227, 236, 248, 249–51, 255, 258–59, 271–76, 285 n.21, 293, 296, 298, 307
 - eternity of 87, 114, 119 n.50, 130, 135, 152, 153 n.139, 155–56, 174, 182, 237–38, 250 n.16, 266, 291, 293, 303 n.65, 304
 - freedom of *see* freedom
 - God's-action-in-created-effects texts 259–63
 - governance of *see* governance, divine
 - identity with causal action *see under* creation
 - impassibility of and Molinism 130–31, 148, 156, *see also* middle knowledge, as conditioned knowledge
 - infallibility of divine knowledge 22, 84 n.134, 107, 115, 134, 154, 173, 316
 - justice of 22, 88, 90, 98
 - omnipotence 42, 130 n.83, 142 n.112, 146–47, 207, 288
 - omnipresence of 61, 254
 - providence of *see* providence

- simple knowledge of (*scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, natural knowledge, prevolitional knowledge) vs. knowledge of vision (*scientia visionis*, free knowledge, postvolitional knowledge) 87 n.140, 113–16, 142–43, 146, 154
- sovereignty of 1 n.1, 53 n.45, 116, 119 n.50, 278, 299–300
- transcendence and incomprehensibility of 5 n.12, 7, 14, 36, 73, 98, 100, 149, 191, 193 n.69, 202–03, 209–11, 214–16, 222–23, 227–29, 231–33, 235–41, 247, 255, 258, 269, 279, 290, 292–94, 304–05, 320, 322
- trinity of 6, 269, 295 n.53, 314 n.96
- universal salvific will 7, 28
- see also related topics under creation and sin*
- Goris, Harm J.M.J. 12 n.26, 138 n.101, 152 n.139, 153, 278, 280
- Gottschalk of Orbais 2, 6 n.15
- Goudriaan, Aza 2 n.5, 128 n.80
- governance, divine 1, 6, 8, 44, 47, 52 n.44, 53 n.45, 109 n.20, 113, 130, 173, 189, 226, 237, 239, 244 n.5, 245, 248–49, 259, 260–63, 276, 301
- see also fate*
- grace 1–3, 32 n.37, 244 n.5, 322
- actual and habitual 5, 18, 25, 41, 45–46, 52, 61, 90, 190, 241
- efficacy and sufficiency 18, 20, 21, 22, 27–28, 33, 46–47, 68 n.80, 89–90, 98, 106, 112–13, 117, 120, 127–29, 171, 174, 178–79, 197–201, 210, 245, 281
- identity with vital act 241
- Jesuit teaching on 22 n.8, 25–29, 106–07, 111–13, 127, 129, 182 n.35
- nature and grace/the supernatural 24, 38, 41 n.13, 44–46, 52, 104, 107, 111–12, 118, 120, 122, 127, 158–59 n.148, 176, 182 n.34, 225, 322
- operative and cooperative 45, 46 n.27, 46 n.29, 47, 51 n.41, 52–54, 61, 68 n.80, 69 n.82, 72, 90, 112–13, 118, 229, 239
- prevenient and subsequent 45, 69 n.83, 71, 111–12, 117–18, 195 ff.
- see also auxilium; justification; premotion and related entries under causality; God*
- Grant, Walter Matthews 12 n.26, 114 n.39, 133 n.88, 146 n.119, 150 n.134, 151–54, 279–80, 285 n.22, 295–99, 305 n.72
- Grisez, Germain 12 n.26, 162 n.156, 163 nn.157–58, 165 n.161, 166 nn.162–64, 238 n.82, 278–80, 282–83, 285, 286 n.28, 287 n.31, 288, 293 n.48, 293 n.50, 294 n.51, 305 n.72
- grounding objection 14, 114 n.39, 131 ff., 156 ff., 317
- Guevin, Benedict 243 n.4
- Gumerlock, Francis X. 2 n.6
- habit {habitus} 41, 145, 231, 239, 269
- habitude {habitus} 145, 146 n.118, 148, 155, 259 n.39, 266, 313 n.95
- see also relation*
- Hardon, John A. 17 n.3, 106 nn.11–12
- hell 187 n.53, 324
- Henninger, Mark G. 260 n.39, 269 n.61, 274 n.69, 314 n.96
- Henricus *see* Ghent, Henry of
- Heredia, Vicente Beltrán de 11 n.22, 21 n.6, 32 n.37, 35, 39 n.4, 52 n.43, 96 n.166, 117 n.42
- Herrera, Pedro de
- as coauthor of the *Apologia* 117 n.43
- on physical premotion as a *vis activa* 52 n.43
- on the distinction of physical premotion and vital act 57 n.58, 68 n.80, 71 n.92, 72
- on the identity of operative and cooperative grace 47 n.29
- rejection of the idea that divine application is an instance of creative causality 53–54, 302 n.63
- hidden necessities *see under necessity*
- Holcot, Robert 3
- Hooker, Richard 5 n.12
- Hughes, Gerard J. 272 n.67, 293 n.48
- humanism 323–24
- Hume, David 324
- Hus, Jan 3
- hypostatic union 43–44 n.22
- Ibn Rushd {Averroes} 53 n.45
- Ibn Sīnā {Avicenna} 53 n.45
- ideas, divine *see under God*

- Ignatius of Loyola 106, 107 n.13
 imagination 274, 277, 321, 324
 immediacy
 excavator example 55 n.53
 of physical premotion *see related topics*
 under premotion (physical); causality
 of supposit {immediatione suppositi} and
 immediacy of power {immediatione
 virtutis} 55–57, 107–08, 112, 125, 145
 n.118, 223–24 n.31
In eminenti ecclesiae 34 n.43
in signo rationis or in signo cognito see
 under priority
 Incarnation 6, 43–44 n.22
Indiculus 6 n.15
 indifference 73–74, 78 ff.
 active and passive 58 n.60, 79–80, 84,
 208–09, 211, 216 n.6
 natural 79 n.125, 209, 283
 negative vs. privative 80, 208
 of intellect vs. of will 76–79, 99, 105, 121,
 122 n.56, 191, 204–08, 211, 283
 of the subject vs. of the object 78–79,
 204–06, 208–09, 215–16 n.6
 see also determinism and under free
 choice
 influx {influxus} *see under* causality
 inherence 50, 63, 220, 260, 267, 270, 273, 276,
 285 n.21, 296 n.55, 307, 310–11, 313 n.95,
 314 n.96, 318–19
 Inquisition 19–22, 26, 30–31, 33, 116, 119, 170
Institutio universalis 6 n.15
 instrumentality *see under* causality
 intention {intentio}
 as a willing of the end 45, 46 n.27, 47
 n.31, 75 n.105, 89, 99, 118, 204, 206, *see*
 also action, structure of human
 as in QDP q. 3 a. 7 ad 7 (*intentio sola*
 habens esse quodam incompletum)
 50–51, 52 n.43, 227, 253, 262–63, 270,
 308 n.80
 Islamic thought 53 n.45
 Israeli, Isaac 161
 Jansen, Cornelius 26, 45 n.25, 180 n.30
 see also Jansenism
 Jansenism 4, 6 n.15, 18, 34, 106 n.12
 Janson, Jacob 26
 Jesus
 desire of for ecclesial unity 7, 323
 grace of 196
 human actions of 1 n.2, 19, 81
 Johnston, O.R. 244 n.5
 Journet, Charles Cardinal 35 n.46, 280
 judgment 45–46 n.27, 75 n.109, 76–79, 83,
 99, 105, 160, 163 n.158, 164, 167, 204–06,
 208, 215 n.6
 see also action, structure of human
 justification 1, 4 n.11, 5, 6 n.15, 7, 17, 19–21, 45
 n.25, 46 n.29, 69 n.83, 80, 82 n.130, 106,
 112, 175, 177–78, 180, 183, 185–86,
 195–202, 207 n.106, 211, 243, 245
 see also conversion and God, divine
 initiative in conversion
 Kenny, Anthony 45 n.26, 86
 Kerr, Fergus 1, 2 n.4
 knowledge
 simple, prevolitional *see under* God
 free, postvolitional, of vision *see under*
 God
 middle *see* middle knowledge
 conditioned *see under* middle knowledge
 Krempel, A. 259 n.39
 Kvanvig, Jonathan 302, 305
 Langston, Douglas C. 30
 law of excluded middle *see* excluded
 middle, law of
 Lemos, Thomas de 5
 León, Luis de 19–20, 22–23
 Lérins, Vincent of 2
 Lessius *see* Leys, Leonard
Letter to Simplician see Simplician,
 Augustine's Letter to
 Leys, Leonard {Lessius} 22–30
Libellus supplex 32
Liber de causis see under Proclus
 libertarianism 11–12, 22, 30, 36, 60 n.63, 129,
 162, 238 n.82, 244 n.5, 279, 283, 295, 297,
 299–301, 306 n.73
liberum arbitrium see choice
light or colors in the air see under God
 limping example *see under* sin
 Llamzon, Benjamin 8–9 n.18, 11 n.23,
 168 n.169

- logical equivalence 15, 288–92
 Lombard, Peter 74, 80 n.126, 81, 90 n.147
 Lonergan, Bernard 12, 13 n.28, 34–36, 59,
 60 n.62, 64 n.72, 65, 109, 129 n.81, 213 ff.
 274 n.70, 279–81, 285 n.22
 as breaking with the presuppositions of
 the original controversy 12, 14, 214
 as having resolved the controversy 15, 214
 compatibilism of 230–35, 241
 on Aquinas's discovery of a theorem of
 divine action 219–20, 228
 on Aristotelian premotion and Bañezian
 premotion 220–22, 224–26, 240
 on divine transcendence 222–23, 240
 on fate 226–29, 240
 on the distinction between an agent's
 ability to act and actual operation
 216–17, 239
 on the nature of causation 217–20
 role of creation in his account of divine
 causality 235–39
 two-lane and three-lane highway view
 183–84, 234
 see also *Concordia*, and Lonergan's
 position; Molina, and the views of
 Lonergan
 Long, Steven 10 n.21, 121 n.54, 125 n.64, 126
 Louvain 18, 23–29, 30 n.33
 Lubac, Henri de 274 n.70
 Luther, Martin
 condemnation of 6 n.15, 45 n.25, 88
 debate with Erasmus 3, 4 n.9, 199 n.86,
 244 n.5
 denial of free choice 4 n.9, 106, 173, 185,
 198–99, 207 n.106, 244–45 n.5, 290
 doctrine of biblical perspicuity 4
 Molina and 12 n.27, 207 n.106, 290
 on original sin and justification 45 n.25
 see also *under* freedom
 Lutheranism 4, 19, 20, 21 n.5, 88, 206 n.103,
 323
 Madruzzi, Christoforo Cardinal 26, 28
 Magisterium 6
 see also councils, ecclesiastical; Pope
 Malebranche, Nicholas 53 n.45
 Marcos, Miguel 19
 Marín-Sola, Francisco 35–36, 280–82
 Maritain, Jacques 35, 280
 Maryland Dove 271–72
 Massilianism *see* semi-Pelagianism
 Maurer, Armand 110 n.23
 McCabe, Herbert 233 n.70, 238 n.82, 278–80,
 286 n.28, 300 n.60
 McCann, Hugh 12 n.26, 278, 279 n.9, 280,
 288 n.34, 290–91, 294 n.51, 299, 302,
 303 n.65, 304, 305, 306 n.73
 McTaggart, J.M.E. 150 n.134
 Medina, Bartolomé de 19
 Menn, Stephen P. 110 n.23
 merit 1, 18–19, 22, 28, 36 n.49, 44–45, 46
 n.28, 77, 107, 111–13, 118, 120, 127–28, 134, 170
 n.6, 174, 184, 187, 196, 243, 244 n.5, 245
 Merricks, Trenton 148, 156–68
 Meyer, Livinus de 17 n.3
 middle knowledge {*scientia media*}
 anticipated in Montemayor's position
 21–22
 as prevolitional 113–16, 133, 135, 142,
 154–55, *see also* *under* God
 as *scientia conditionata* 115, 156, 316–18
 as supercomprehension of the proximate
 cause 143–44, 148–49, 155
 counterfactual dependence 147–48,
 194 n.71
 determinism of the circumstances
 and 130–31, 144–45, 230 n.62
 divine impassibility and *see* *under* God
 divine omnipotence and 146–47
 doctrine of creation and 130, 143, 146–48,
 156, *see also* creation, as a stumbling
 block for Molinism
 human freedom and 104, 115–16, 119 n.50,
 143, 154–55, 197
 infallibility of divine knowledge and
 115–16, 131, 142, *see also* *under* God
 motivation for positing 106–07, 116, 129,
 161–62
 nature of 113–16, 154
 Pedro da Fonseca vs. Molina as originator
 of 30 n.33
 truth as correspondence and 160–61
 see also Alvarez, criticism of middle
 knowledge; *Concordia*; creation, as a
 stumbling block for Molinism; future
 conditionals concerning future
 contingent states of affairs; grounding
 objection; Molina; Molinism

- Miller, Barry 295
Milton, John 324
mode *see* action, as a mode of the effect;
contingent or necessary mode; distinction,
modal; necessity, de dicto and de re
modality
Molina, Luis de
alleged impending condemnation of 6
n.15, 33
commentary on the *Prima pars* 29 n.31,
30
different view of divine ideas from Báñez
115 n.41, 173 n.11
influence of Scotus on 3 n.8
life and work 30 n.31
precursors of 30 n.33, 171 n.7
teaching on divine causality *see*
concurrence, Molina's view of
teaching on free choice *see* freedom,
Molina's teaching on
truth as *adequatio intellectus et rei*
and 161
views of Aquinas and 109 n.20, 117, 128
n.78, 180, 186–87 n.52
views of Augustine and 117
views of Lonergan and 109 n.20, 183, 213
n.2, 221 n.26, 230 n.62, 241
see also *Concordia*; concurrence, Molina's
view of; Luther, and Molina; Molinism,
middle knowledge
Molinism
influences on Protestant (Arminian)
thought 5 n.12
neo-Molinism 10–11
semi-Pelagianism and 128
truth and 156 ff.
see also Congruism; Molina, Luis de *and*
related entries
Montemayor, Prudencio de 30–31
debate with Báñez 19–23
Most, William 33 n.41, 35 n.46, 280, 281 n.11
motion
motion of the mover is the movement of
the moved 62, 66–73, 219–20
Aristotelian analogies of (the road
between Athens and Thebes, a slope, a
ratio, teaching and learning) 66–67,
268
identical with action and passion 66–67,
218–220, 259, 268–69, 272
whatever is in motion must be moved by
another 78, 123–24
the *extrema* of a 270 n.63
contrast with creation 39, 246–47, 264,
266–69, 272–73
positive connection to creative causality
15, 242, 248–263, 276, 281, 286–87,
293–94, 302–03, 322
presupposes a subject that undergoes
change 39, 44, 247, 250, 264, 301–03
obviousness of and Aquinas's first way
272 n.66
and Aquinas's 'impulse' language 220 n.21
different senses of 249
see also action; application; Aristotle, on
motion; causality; premotion
mutakallîmun 53 n.45
natural law 166, 260–61 n.40
nature 43, 50
necessity
absolute and conditional/hypothetical/of
supposition *see* necessity, de dicto
and de re modality
as the ground of freedom 83
connection between logical consequences
and necessity of the consequence
140
de dicto and de re modality 13, 82–88,
95–99, 118, 135, 139, 176, 178, 183–212
passim, 256–57 n.32, 283–84, 288–92,
see also composed and divided senses;
conditional propositions concerning
future contingent states of affairs;
consequences
equivalent nomenclature for de dicto and
de re modality 84 n.134, 86
fundamentum revera sit 139, 141
hidden (overflow) necessities 142 n.112,
158 n.148
implied by indefectibility of God's will or
providence 255–58, 288–92, *see also*
premotion, efficacy of; grace, sufficient
and efficacious; God, causal
indefectibility; God, infallibility of
divine knowledge

- in the composed sense {sensus compositus} and the divided sense {sensus divisus} *see* necessity, de dicto and de re modality
- logical 85–86, 102, 137–38, 140, 142, 146, 155, 290, *see also* *ex vi consequentiae*
- necessity of the consequent {necessitas consequentis} and necessity of the consequence {necessitas consequentiae} *see* necessity, de dicto and de re modality
- of divine willing 84, 87, 147
- of nature 82–84, 89, 99, 143, 158, 164, 204
- of sin 95–99, 178–80, 183, 187, 214, 281, *see also* sin
- of the present (e.g., of Socrates's sitting) 193 n.69, 197 n.78, 256–57 n.32, 289–90
- of willing the end 77 n.117, 82, 83
- see also* contingent or necessary mode; truth
- negative existentials *see under* truth
- neo-scholasticism 9, 34, 55 n.53, 124
- Newman, John Henry Cardinal 16
- Nietzsche, Friedrich 324
- Nominalism 3, 244 n.5
- Normore, Calvin 130 n.83, 145 n.118, 148, 149 n.127
- O'Brien, Thomas Chrysostom 9 n.19, 10 n.20, 50 n.39, 60 n.63, 236 n.75, 248 n.12
- O'Connor, Timothy 295
- O'Connor, William 109 n.20
- Oberman, Heiko 3 nn.7–8
- occasionalism 40 n.9, 53, 237, 247, 252, 301–05
- Occham, William 3, 53 n.45, 90 n.147
- open theism 232
- order
- created vs. uncreated (God/world distinction) 11 n.25, 109, 110–11 n.25, 153, 178, 216 n.6, 271–72, 287–88, 296, 300, 304
- four orders within creation 162–63 n.157
- moral 91
- of explanation 298
- of nature 43, 49, 90, 100, 122, 126 n.69, 127, 153, 158 n.148, 163 n.157, 165 n.160, 225, 262, 270–71, 276, 288, 322
- of thought 163 n.157, 270
- supernatural 122, 127, 158 n.148
- technical/cultural 163 n.157, 165 n.160
- world 13 n.28, 27, 118, 166, 172–74, 227–28, 233, 235, 237–39, 2 60 n.40, 261, *see also* fate; providence
- Origen 76
- original sin *see under* sin
- Osborne, Thomas 10 n.21, 60 n.63, 62 n.69
- overflow necessities *see under* necessity
- Packer, J.I. 244 n.5
- partial causes 42, 108–10, 128 n.78, 176, 178, 180, 300, *see also* concurrence; Molinism
- participation *see under* existence
- past, propositions about *see under* truth
- Paul 1 n.1, 2 n.5, 98, 185 n.50
- Pegis, Anton C. 12 n.27
- Pelagianism 2 n.5, 3 n.8, 6 n.15, 7, 19, 26, 127–28, 180 n.30, 244 n.5
- Pelagius 2, 207 n.106
- Penner, Sydney 309 n.87, 314 n.95, 314 n.97
- per accidens* *see under* causality
- Philip II, King 31
- physical, meaning of *see under* premotion
- Pighius, Albert 4
- Pinkston, Brian Russell 307 n.77
- Placher, Wiliam 5 n.12
- Plantinga, Alvin 10
- Polaris 271–72
- Pontifex, Mark 35 n.46, 280
- Pope
- Alexander III 34
- Benedict XIV 6 n.15, 34
- Clement VIII 18, 32–33, 170
- Clement XI 6 n.15
- Clement XII 6 n.15, 34
- Gregory XIII 25 n.21, 29
- Hadrian I 6 n.15
- Innocent X 6 n.15, 34
- Innocent XI 29
- Innocent XII 29
- John Paul II 10
- Leo X 6 n.15
- Leo XI 33
- Leo XIII 34
- Paul V 6 n.15, 18, 29, 33–34
- Pius V 6 n.15, 24–25, 29, 33 n.41, 180

- Pope (cont.)
 Pius VI 34
 Sixtus IV 6 n.15, 23
 Sixtus V 28–29
 Urban VIII 33 n.41, 34
positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum see freedom
 potency and act see under action
 Prado, Norbert del 34–35, 39 n.4, 123 n.58, 124 n.59, 124 n.63, 125 n.65
 predeliberation see premotion (physical), as predeliberation
 predestination 1, 8, 178 n.4, 281
 after foreseen merits {post praevisa merita} 22 n.8, 113, 118, 128
 Baianism and 26–27
 magisterial teaching on 6 n.15, 7
 modern skepticism and 324
 Molina's *Concordia* and 30, 104, 117
 Montemayor debate and 17–19
 patristic and medieval debates on 2, 3 n.6
 prior to foreseen merits {ante praevisa merita} 22 n.8
 Protestantism and 5 n.12, 88, 243, 245
 relation to providence/as something in the governed 260–62, 276
 single vs. double 187 n.53
 predetermination see premotion (physical), as predetermination
 predication
 analogous see analogy
 relational see relational predication
 premotion (other forms)
 Aristotelian 64 n.72, 214–15, 216 n.6, 220–28, 231–35, 239–240
 impedible 35, 280–282
 internal 216 n.6, 224–25, 227, 233
 moral 34, 94
 objective external 225–27, 233
 subjective external 64 n.72, 225–27, 233
 see also Lonergan; Augustinianism; Marín-Sola; semi-Bañezianism; fate
 premotion (physical or “Bañezian”)
 active and passive senses of 37, 57–58, 61–73, 79
 as a mediate entity 213 n.2, 218–220, 222, 231, 240, 291–92
 as a principle of action {aliquid per modum principii} 40, 51–52, 61, 72 n.97, 182, see also essence, and formal sufficiency of an agent for acting
 as a quality 41 n.12, 51, 67–68 n.80
 as a secondary cause 60 n.63, 100, 108 n.16
 as a *terminus productus per solam operationem divinam* 73 n.93
 as *aliquid reale in rerum natura existentes* 51 n.41, 100
 as predeliberation 181, 190
 as predetermination 9, 13, 19, 35 n.45, 58 n.60, 66, 73, 80, 89, 107, 125, 127, 190, 209–210, 222, 322, see also determinism
 as something *praevisam, creatum*, and *realiter distinctum* 71–72, 100
 as the power of divine art 51–59, 73
 as *ultimum complementum actus primi* 51 n.41, 58–59 n.60
 contrasted with concurrence 40–42, 107–13, 311–15
 creation and 39, 52–54, 62–63, 302
 distinction from human action 9–10, 49, 52–54, 57–73, 88, 99–100, 193 n.69, 306 n.74, 315
 Francisco Arujo's alleged rejection of VIII
 identity with human action 61–73
 immediacy of 38, 53–57, 58–59 n.60, 60 n.63, 62, 100, see also immediacy of supposit and immediacy of power
 in the thought of Aquinas 9 n.19, 10 n.20, 15, 49, 109 n.20, 125 n.67, 180, 213, 220, 243–45
 intrinsic efficacy of 9, 14, 19, 27, 46–47, 73, 89, 210, see also grace, sufficient and efficacious
 meaning of ‘physical’ and 9, 42–44
 multiple involved in an act of choice 45, 46 n.27, 64–65 n.72
 neglect of in recent literature 10
 nomenclature of as a subject of controversy 10 n.20, 49 n.37
 obscurity of 59–60, 311 n.92
 ontological status of 9–10, 13, 39 n.4, 41, 51–52, 57–73, 99–100, 311 n.92

- wholly (entirely) prevenient 61–63, 67–69, 71, *see also* grace, prevenient and subsequent
- see also* action; *auxilium*; causality; concurrence; creation; God; priority
- presentism *see under* time
- prime mover *see under* God
- principle of bivalence *see* bivalence, principle of
- principle of contradiction *see* contradiction, principle of
- priority
 - explanatory 298–99
 - in signo rationis* or *in signo cognito* 152–53 n.139, *see also* priority, conceptual
 - logical/conceptual 44 n.23, 135, 152–53 n.139, 258 n.33, *see also* priority, *in signo rationis*
 - natural (physical) or causal vs. temporal 9, 27, 44, 49, 59, 60 nn.63–64, 63, 69, 78, 88, 93, 95, 100, 107, 122–23, 152 n.139, 221, 273–74, 289, 297–99, 302–03, 306 n.74, 308, 311, 313 n.95, 316–17, 320–21
 - of a subject (substance) to its accidents 63, 242, 264–65, 267, 273–74, 276, 285, 298, 309, 320
 - of action/causality to effects 49, 60 n.63, 62–63, 73, 99–100, 267, 273–74, 276 308–12, 313 n.95, 316–17, 320–21
 - of cause to effect 60 n.63, 62–63, 265–67, 273–74, 276, 282, 285, 297–99, 313 n.95, 320
 - of grace and justification 20, 127, 225, *see also* grace, prevenient and subsequent, operative and cooperative
 - of Luther's doctrine of justification to his principle of *Sola Scriptura* 4
 - pleonasm of 'physical premotion' and 60 n.63
- probabilism 34 n.43
- Proclus (and the *Liber de causis*) 251, 252 n.22
- propositions
 - as non-linguistic entities 163 n.158
 - see also* conditional propositions concerning future contingent states of affairs; de re modal truths; dispositional conditionals; negative existentials; truth
- Protestantism *see* Reformation and under Controversy *de Auxiliis*
- providence
 - Aristotelian premotion and 228, 231–32
 - as (non)necessitating 173–75, 228, 232, 240, 242, 255, 256 n.30, 257–58, *see also* necessity, implied by the indefectibility of God's will or providence
 - as determinative or 'predefintion' 125 n.67
 - as the divine *ratio* of the order of things to their end 166 n.164, 172, 226–27, 239, 260, 261
 - Báñez on 8, 61, 63, 117, 172–74, 210
 - executed by created intermediaries 237–38
 - in the Louvain Baianist dispute 27
 - Molinist view of 14, 30, 103–04, 107, 113–16, 118, 159, 162, 173 n.11, *see also* middle knowledge
 - Montemayor as precursor of Molinist views on 20, 22
 - perfect and imperfect *rationes* of 172
 - relationship to fate 223, 226–27, 232, 239, 261–62, *see also* fate; governance; predestination
- Pruss, Alexander 295
- publication, papal prohibition of 33
- Quesnel, Pasquier 6 n.15, 45 n.25
- quietism 7, 106
- Quiroga, Gaspar Cardinal de 23, 31, 170
- Rabeneck, Johannes 30 n.31, 30 n.33, 35, 103 nn.3–4
- Ramirez, Santiago (Jacobus) 36 n.48
- Ravesteyn, Josse {Tiletanus} 30 n.33
- Reformation
 - Catholic 107, 171 n.7, 195 n.73, 206 n.103
 - post-Reformation theology 4, 150 n.33, 275, 323
 - Protestant and Protestantism 3–5, 17–18, 24, 31, 106, 150 n.33, 171 n.7, 173, 207, 243–45, 323
- Reims, Hincmar of 2

relation

- Aquinas on 314 n.96, 269–71
- as a habitude {habitudō} 145 n.118, *see also* habitude
- as inherent in or between *relata* 296 n.55
- between propositions or the protasis and apodosis of a conditional 136–41, 155
- causal 15, 43 n.21, 63, 110–11 n.25, 140–41, 217–220, 222 n.29, 240–42, 250, 257 n.32, 259, 263–76 *passim*, 286, 296–98, 305, 307–08, 318–19, *see also* creation; causality
- causation not a transcendental relation 312–14 n.95
- conceptual (of reason) 63, 217, 259, 261, 265, 269–72, 274, 276, 297–98, 307
- creation as a relation in the creature 62–63, 263–76 *passim*, 285 n.21
- creaturely *esse* as the foundation of 274, 276
- esse ad* and *esse in* 314 n.96
- extrema* of a 270–71
- fate and Aristotelian premotion as a 221, 227, 233, 262, *see also* premotion (other forms); fate
- four notes of a (foundation, subject, terminus, relation) 63, 270–71, 308–10
- literally *πρὸς τι* or *ad aliud* 269–70, 273
- mixed 271
- predicamental (categorical) vs. transcendental 145–46 n.118, 259–60 n.39, 268 n.57, 269–70, 307–15 *passim*
- secundum dici* 259–60 n.39, 268 n.57, 313 n.95
- Trinitarian 269, 314 n.96
- truth as a 160–68 *passim*
- see also* creation; action; fate; causality; dependence
- relational predication 15, 153 n.139, 241, 246, 250 n.16, 282, 285, 288, 292–93, 303–04
- and predication *substantialiter* 292–93 n.48
- see also* extrinsic denomination
- Remonstrant Controversy 4, 323
- reprobation 18, 26 n.25, 28–29, 98, 100, 103–04, 117, 128, 174–75, 176 n.20, 187 nn.53–54
- responsibility *see under* freedom
- Riez, Faustus of 2, 128
- Rimini, Gregory da 90 n.147
- Rivo, Peter de (Peter van den Becken) 2, 23
- Rome, Giles of 110 n.23
- Ross, James 12 n.26, 111 n.25, 142 n.112, 147 n.120, 158 n.148, 163 n.157, 237 n.79, 277–80, 284–87, 289, 301, 303 n.65, 304 n.67, 320 n.113
- Rythovius *see* Baudewyns, Maarten
- Salamanca 8–9, 17–19, 22, 29, 31, 47 n.29, 52 n.43, 74 n.100, 170
- Sales, Francis de 33
- Santa Cruz, Juan de 20–21
- Schneemann, Gerardus 9 n.19, 26 n.24, 29 n.29, 109 n.20
- science, modern 43
- scientia*
 - conditionata* *see under* middle knowledge
 - media* *see* middle knowledge
 - simplicis intelligentiae* *see under* God
 - visionis* *see under* God
- scientific laws 305
- Scotus, John Duns 3, 30 n.33, 260 n.39
- for* John Scotus Eriugena, *see* Eriugena
- Scripture
 - Aquinas's appeal to Is 26.12 254–55
 - as supportive of both sides of the *de Auxiliis* problematic 1, 5, 19, 74 n.101, 196, 206, 212, 241
 - canon of (and deuterocanonicals) 4 n.11, 7
 - doctrine of creation and 251
 - inspiration of 1 n.2, 26 n.25
 - Latin Vulgate 179 n.27
 - perspicuity of 4
 - Sola Scriptura* 4 n.11
- Secada, Jorge 313–14 n.95
- secundum dici* relations *see* relation, *secundum dici*
- self-determination *see* freedom; choice
- semi-Bañezianism *see* Bañezianism, and Billot's semi-Bañezianism
- semi-Pelagianism 2, 6 n.15, 127 n.72, 128, 184 n.47
- sensus compositus* and *sensus divisus* *see* composed and divided senses; necessity, de dicto and de re

- Serry, Jacques Hyacinthe 10 n.20, 17–18 n.3, 128 n.80
- Sertillanges, Antonin 12 n.26, 278, 280 n.9
- Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego 158
- Shanley, Brian 279–80, 294
- Shapcote, Laurence 274 n.68
- Simplician, Augustine's letter to 2 n.5
- simplicity, divine *see under* God
- sin
 creaturely finitude and 82, 89, 97, 120, 188
 Cajetan on 91–93
 determination of 91, 93–100, 169, 174, 183–88, 210
 divine causation and 1, 13–14, 44, 47, 88–95, 99–100, 111, 127, 174–88, 210, 258 n.34, 279 n.6, 305–06
 divine permission of 22, 35 n.46, 93, 98, 111, 186–87, 280 n.11, 234, 281
 effects of the fall 24, 45 n.25, 98, 116, 118, 128, 185, 187–88, 244 n.5
 God as the sole and adequate cause of conversion and non-conversion 175–18, *see also* God, refusal of *auxilium* necessary for salvation
 human freedom and 28, 77–78, 81–82, 88–90, 95–99, 120, 122 n.56, 204
 immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin 82 n.130
 initiative in 90, 99–100, 175, 183–84, 186–87, 189, 210, 234–35
 limping example 97
 malice {malitia} of 90–99, 184, 186–87
 moral contrariety between sin and virtue 90, 92–93, 98, 185
 naturalitas or *entitas physica* of 47 n.31, 90–93, 95, 99 184–86
 original 7, 24, 98, 104, 188, 196
- Smith, Gerard 12, 13 n.27, 35, 109 n.20, 124 n.59, 169 n.3, 171 n.7, 173 n.12, 179 n.29, 180 n.31, 207 n.106
- Smith-Reeves, Harold 10 n.21
- Socrates (sitting) 193 n.69, 197 n.78, 256–57 n.32, 289–90
- sovereignty, divine *see under* God
- Stapleton, Thomas 171 n.7
- states of affairs as an ontological shadow or byproduct 284–87, 289
- Staupitz, Johann von 3
- Stebbins, Michael 13 n.28, 35 n.45, 36 n.49, 226 n.43, 280 n.10
- Stegmüller, Friedrich 8 n.17, 29 n.31, 35, 169, 170, 199 n.87
- Stone, M.W.F. 23 n.14, 24 n.17, 25 n.19
- Suárez, Francisco 5, 9, 14–15, 42, 48 n.35, 51, 57, 59, 118–19
- Congruism and 22, 28
- dilemma entailed by the natural priority of action to effect 316
- influence on modern thought 321
- on distinctions 311–12, 314–315
- on efficient causality 58 n.60, 70, 111 n.25, 145 n.118, 178 n.24, 307–15
- on freedom 122, 244 n.5, 318
- on subjects as quasi-material causes of their accidents 310–11, 318–20
- on the capability of *liberum arbitrium* for eliciting its own act 51, 57, 59
- on the obscurity of physical premotion 59
- on the truth of counterfactuals 149–50, 154–55
- on transcendental relations 259–60 n.39, 312–14 n.95, 314 n.96
- presents a more nuanced version of Molina's basic position 15, 110–11 n.25, 178 n.24, 277, 307
- rejection of supercomprehension 149
- rejection of the real distinction of being and essence 110 n.23
- scientia conditionata* and 113 n.34, 115, 145, 155, 316–18, 321
- teacher of Lessius 25 n.21
- views of Aquinas and 161, 242, 243 n.3, 276, 308, 314 n.98, 315–16, 317 n.109
- subject *see* priority, of a subject to its accidents
- substance as (quasi) material cause of its accidents *see under* causality, *see also* priority, of a subject to its accidents
- sufficiency, formal or as a principle of action *see under* essence
- sufficient reason 61 n.64, 194 n.72, 289, 292, 297–99, 306 n.74
- supercomprehension *see under* middle knowledge
- supernatural *see* grace; order, supernatural
- Synergist Controversy 4, 5 n.12, 323

- Tanner, Kathryn 5 n.12, 12 n.26, 193 n.69, 278, 280, 304 n.68
- Tapper, Ruard 30 n.33, 171 n.7
- tautology 86, 140, 290, 299, *see also* necessity, logical
- Thebes to Athens *see* motion
- Theses theologicae* 25–29
- Thirty-Years War 5
- Thomism 1 n.3, 9–10, 12, 31, 36 n.48, 51 n.41, 71, 90, 109 n.20, 145, 260 n.39, 280, 313 n.95, 323
vs. Bañezianism 49 n.37
- Tiletanus *see* Ravesteyn, Josse
- time
Aristotelian premotion and causation in time 221, 227
as a category of accidental being 269
as basis for relationally predicating distinct causal actions of God 249–50, 285–86, 303–04
Boethian observer 150–51
eternity and 114, 152–53 n.139, 266
identity through time 252, 285–87, 301, 303–04
presentist or A-series view of vs. eternalist or B-series view of 150–52, 157
truth value and 153, 155–57, 163–64
- Tollefsen, Olaf 238 n.82, 293 n.50, 294 n.51
- Torre, Michael 35 n.46, 280, 282, 285 n.22
- total personal creation (TPC)
as a category mistake 246–47
as metaphysically unsatisfying 294–295
charge of anachronism and 243–45
divine causation of the particular determination of free human acts 284–87
God's action not a determining antecedent to human free choice 288–92
implicitly denies the universal purview of divine causality 299–301
makes God responsible for sin 305–06
occasionalism and 301–05
undermines free choice 295–99
- Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia* 9, 11 n.22, 32 n.37, 38–39
- transcendence *see under* God
- transcendental relations *see* relation, predicamental vs. transcendental
- Trent, Council of *see* councils, ecclesiastical
- Trinité, Philippe de la 35 n.46, 280
- Trinity *see* God, triunity of
- trivial dependence 148, 157, 160, 163–65
- truth
as *adequatio intellectus et rei* 85, 161, 167
as primitive and monadic 167
convertibility of *ens* and *verum* 152 n.139, 161, 167, 258 n.33
correspondence and 85, 148, 156–68
de re modal truths 159–60 n.152
falsity and 162–65
God as 167–68
logically necessary 141–43
of counterfactuals 2, 6 n.15, 23, *see also* conditional propositions concerning future contingent states of affairs; grounding objection; necessity
of dispositional conditionals 158–59, 164–65
of negative existentials 157, 162–63, 165
of propositions about the past and future 150–54, 157, 163–64
practical 159, 165–66
realism and 157, 167
speculative 161–66
- Tuttle, Jacob 307 n.77, 311 n.91
- Unigenitus Dei Filius* 6 n.15
- universalism 7
see also God, universal salvific will
- univocity 288, 293, 304–05, 322
see also analogy
- Urbano edition of Báñez's commentary on *ST I* 8 n.18, 176 n.21, 216 n.6
- use {usus} 45, 77, 299
- Valencia, Gregory of 33
- Valladolid 19, 20, 22, 31
- Vasquez, Gabriel 5
- Velde, Roelf T. te 150 n.133
- Velde, Rudi te 272 n.67, 278, 280, 305 n.71
- Veritatis splendor* 10
- vital act *see under* action
- Voak, Nigel 5 n.12
- vocation 44, 185, 196
personal 1
- volition {voluntas simplex} 35 n.45, 38, 45, 46 n.27, 47 n.31, 51 n.41, 58–59 n.60,

- 61, 63 n.71, 64–66, 67–68 nn.79–80, 69
 n.83, 71, 72 n.98, 75, 77 n.117, 82–83, 204,
 216 n.6, 224–26, 233, 240
see also action, structure of human
- Voltaire *see* Arouet, François-Marie
- voluntarism 76–77, 142 n.112
- voluntary 76, 234
- Wawrykow, Joseph 36 n.49, 278 n.4
- Weber, Max 324 n.2
- West Gate Bridge 158 n.148
- Whitacre, Aelred 17 n.3, 29 n.30
- will
 as intellectual appetite {appetitus
 rationalis} 61 n.67, 75
 simple willing {voluntas simplex} *see*
 volition
- Wood, William 168 n.168
- Wycliffe, John 3
- Zomerén, Henry de 2, 23
- Zumel, Francisco 5, 19, 31, 170